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
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
Vol. 2, pt 2

MAJOR GENERAL SIR J.E.W. INGLIS, K.C.B.  
DEFENDER OF THE GARRISON AT LUCKNOW.




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7 MAR 66  
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HINDOO MAIDENS FLOATING LAMPS.  
ON THE GANGES





W. Daniell. R.A. Del<sup>t</sup>

R. Brandard. Sculp<sup>t</sup>

THE ADJUTANT.

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Jama Masjid

Tomb of a Khan Chief Old Delhi

The Palace

River Jumna

Barred


SHAH JEHANABAD, OR NEW DELHI.







GENERAL NEILL.

*From a Photograph by Kilburn.*





THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF MINTO.






GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER.





A RICH MAHOMEDAN.






W Daniell, R. A. Del't

R. Brandard. Sculpt

MAUSOLEUM OF HUMAION AT DELHI.





BATTLE OF ALIWAL.





L. Lowenstam. Sculpt.

EARL OF NORTHBROOK.





THE FORTS OF JELLALI & MERANI, MUSKAT.

LONDON, VIRTUE & CO. LIMITED.





L. Lowenstam. Sculpt.

LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G.C.B. G.C.S.I.





FUTTYPORE SICRI, NEAR AGRA.





THE BATTLE OF MEANE.





L Lowenstar

H. R. H. THE PRINCESS OF WALES.

















EAST INDIAN ISLANDS.

PACIFIC OCEAN

Scale of English Miles.

Longitude East of Greenwich



mautdar in his cause, and they went in a body to the officer's quarters; where, remonstrating with a freedom which he construed into insolence, they were threatened with death. The aggrieved party had immediate recourse to arms, and attacked the officer, who was supported by half his garrison. This occasioned the irregular fire heard at Onore. While these mutual hostilities were pending, one of the sultan's boats, accidentally passing Fortified Island, was hailed by the mutineers, who entreated to be taken on board. This being reported to Mirza, he sent over a messenger to the English officer to represent the folly of continuing at his post with only eleven men, recommending him to leave the island, and offering him every accommodation in his camp, until an opportunity presented itself for proceeding to an English settlement. The officer declined quitting the island, but desired Mirza would send over a sufficient force to take charge of the fort: his request was complied with, and these were the men who had been seen from the ramparts of Onore. All this was related by Mirza in the gravest manner; and the jemautdar, the Brahmin naique and his wife, with five sepoy (tutored for the purpose, at the peril of their lives) were brought into the durbar, to corroborate Mirza's story. It is almost unnecessary to observe that the whole of this tale was a fabrication of the sultan's officer to deceive the commandant."

Famine, pestilence, and desertion within, perfidy and harassing blockade without, continued to afflict the suffering garrison and its heroic chief, when, on March 7th, General Macleod paid one of his flying visits on the coast. As usual, he made proffers of service which he did not attempt to perform. At last deliverance came. The honour of the garrison and its intrepid commander was saved. Peace was concluded, and the Madras commissioners sent a ship to convey the garrison away, and orders to Torriano to deliver Onore to the nabob's officer. The commissioners, however, neglected to make any provision in the treaty for the protection of the inhabitants who had sided with the English, or for the removal of military stores. Torriano had by boldness and dexterity to secure these objects.

Mirza entertained his former enemy magnificently, and seemed quite unconscious of having merited reprobation by his cruelty and perfidy. Forbes describes the closing scene of this in the following paragraph:—"The guard was now ordered to leave the fort: while they were embarking, the Soubahdar Missauber, having looked the gates on the inside, at a signal made by Captain Torriano,

struck the British colours, and coming through a sally-port, resigned the keys to the sultan's officer ordered to take possession; whose detachment waited without the outworks until this ceremony had taken place. The whole being now safely embarked, Captain Torriano followed with two chests of treasure belonging to the company. Night coming on, they were obliged to anchor under the guns of the fort until daybreak, when the *Wolf* gallivat and all the boats proceeded over the bar; the officers embarked on board the *Hawke* India-man, and the whole fleet sailed for Bombay." Torriano exhausted his means and his influence in rewarding his brave followers. As far as his power allowed, he made promotions, and distributed presents which were at all events valuable as coming from him. He was himself neglected. He obtained a brevet majority after considerable delay! The day in which he lived and fought, and served his country so well, was unfavourable to the reward of the meritorious. Interest with the government, not genius or devotion, advanced men in the path of military promotion. On the eastern side of the peninsula the government of Madras seemed determined to exceed that of Bombay in folly and weakness. They placed reliance on the promises of Tippoo and his generals, who never kept faith themselves nor showed any confidence in the word of others. The English, Tippoo's father had too much reason to distrust; and the sultan himself was not disposed to forget the fact.

The Madras government, in May, 1783, appointed commissioners to treat with Tippoo, and these men acted with credulity and irresolution, betraying extreme ignorance of everything which the task imposed upon them demanded. Colonel Fullarton, who, in the south, had carried all before him, driving Tippoo's commandants from their strongholds, and possessing himself of a country fruitful and well cultivated, was ordered to give up his conquests, in order to appease Tippoo, and make peace (which the commissioners believed was sure) more satisfactory. In vain Fullarton resisted and remonstrated; the ignorant commissioners, worthy representatives of the Madras council, insisted upon obedience. The celebrated missionary, Schwartz, was interpreter to these gentlemen, and he also remonstrated upon the folly of the course pursued. "Is the peace so certain," said the astute and pious interpreter, "that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage the beast?" When, however, Fullarton had reluctantly and tar-

dily surrendered most of his conquests, the impracticable commissioners, in great alarm, ordered him to resume them.

The commissioners, having expended much useless time in preliminary negotiations with Tippoo's lieutenants and vakeels, at last proceeded to the head-quarters of the sultan's army, to arrange with him in person a peace based upon the principle of the *status quo ante bellum*. On their way to the camp of the sultan, they were treated with indignity, and their progress impeded in every way by the sultan's officers. On their arrival there, tents were assigned them, and a gallows erected opposite each. Communications with their countrymen were prohibited. The first piece of intelligence they received was of the murder of General Mathews and many other English prisoners, some of them officers of merit and distinction. Mr. Schwartz, the missionary interpreter, was seized and sent away, and the commissioners were not acquainted with any of the languages of India. Colonel Wilks declares that those gentlemen meditated flight. He rests his authority on the testimony of Captain, afterwards Sir Thomas Dallas, who commanded the escort which accompanied them. According to that officer's testimony, their plan was to leave the officer and his escort in the hands of the enemy, who would have murdered them, and, by an ingenious stratagem, they hoped to escape to the ships. A native servant of the captain understood English, and had been employed as interpreter, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring an educated person. This man, while lying outside the tent of one of the commissioners, where they were all assembled, overheard a conversation amongst them and with a surgeon from one of the ships in the roads, who was the chosen agent of the project. The native servant, being attached to his master, revealed the danger to which he was exposed, who took successful measures to prevent the execution of the plot. In England, when this charge was made, such of the commissioners as were then alive denied the truth of the statement; but General Dallas affirmed it. Those who are curious as to the disputed points of Indo-English history in connection with the wars in Mysore may see the narrative at length in the pages of Colonel Wilks.\* Weighing the

\* Wilks' *Sketches*, vol. ii. pp. 515—517.

evidence as produced by that gallant officer against the defence of Mr. Huddleston, the gallant colonel seems to make out a case too formidable for successful denial.

It was not until the 11th of May, 1784, that the treaty was signed. Probably Tippoo would have prosecuted the war, and placed the bodies of the commissioners on gibbets, had the folly and imbecility of these gentlemen as well as of the councils at Bombay and Madras determined matters; but Hastings, far off in Calcutta, extended his supervision to all the wide field of war and diplomacy in which the English were engaged, and the influence of his intellect and of his name was felt in the camp of the Mysoreans and the durbar of their king. The English prisoners who had been seized contrary to the armistice received no compensation; nor did the relatives of the men whom Hyder had caused to die by incarceration, or of those who were assassinated by Tippoo's orders. It was characteristic of English politicians that the sufferings and wrongs of their countrymen, however nobly endured, and however serviceable to their country, were overlooked in negotiations when an end was to be accomplished. The diplomatists of the crown and of the company were alike in this respect; the wrongs of individual sufferers and the merit of particular servants were regarded with indifference, if the public object in view at the time could be promoted, or apparently promoted, by that indifference. Often, when a little attention and care would secure public objects, and protect or secure redress for the wrongs of individuals, there was such a want of feeling, sympathy, and justice among the ruling classes of Englishmen, that the claims of their less influential brethren were totally unheeded.

On the whole, Tippoo was a gainer by the treaty and by the war, but the revenues of the English were in such a condition as to make it imperative upon the governor-general to accomplish a peace with Mysore.\* The desire of the directors at home for speedy terms of accommodation was, on the same grounds, intensely urgent.† From these causes, the proclamation of peace with Tippoo Sahib was regarded by Hastings as fortunate to his government.

\* Stewart's *History of Bengal*, London, 1813.

† *History of the East India Company*, London, 1798.

## CHAPTER LXXXIX.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN SEAS DURING THE WAR WITH MYSORE, FRANCE, SPAIN AND HOLLAND—CAPTURE OF NEGAPATAM, TRINCOMALEE, ETC., FROM THE DUTCH—LOSS OF TRINCOMALEE TO THE FRENCH.

DURING a considerable portion of the time in which hostilities were waged with Mysore, it will be seen from the foregoing pages that war existed with France, and that the French were the active and efficient allies of Hyder and his son Tippoo. The war with France greatly complicated the relations of the English with both those sovereigns, and led to various independent actions; especially at sea. The English had the advantage on the ocean, but the battles fought were indecisive. The French for the most part evaded general engagements, and succeeded in landing troops and stores, or in bearing them away from one place to another. They were afraid of the English at sea, yet did not show such a decided inferiority as to justify the extreme respect which they entertained for the naval power of England. The French admirals were, in the Indian waters, far more active, vigilant, and wary than the English. The latter, by their slow movements and want of watchfulness, often allowed French squadrons to effect what they would not have dared to attempt had the English commanders been sufficiently on the alert. It has been already seen that the fleets under the command of the English admiral, Hughes, and the French admiral, Suffrein, had various skirmishes off the Coromandel coast. Suffrein, early in 1781, collected the elements of a maritime force in Brest, and the English at the same time organized a fleet. The supposition in England was, that the expedition was intended for the Spanish Main. The British government, however, intended it for the East: at all events, that was the direction ultimately given to it. It is probable that from the first the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, and the assertion of British ascendancy in the East, were the ends designed. "One ship of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-four, three of fifty, several frigates, a bomb-vessel, a fire-ship and some sloops of war composed the squadron; of which Commodore Johnstone, with a reputation for decision and boldness, received the command. A land force, consisting of three new regiments of one thousand men each, was placed under the conduct of General Meadows, who had procured fame in the action at St. Lucia with D'Estaing. On the 13th of March, in company with the grand fleet destined for the relief of Gibraltar, the armament sailed from St. Helen's, and,

including several outward-bound East Indiamen, with store-vessels and transports, amounted to upwards of forty sail. The secret, however, of this expedition had not been so vigilantly guarded as to escape the sagacity of the Dutch and the French. The armament under Suffrein was ultimately destined to reinforce the squadron now at the Isle of France; and to oppose the English fleet in the Indian seas. But the particular instructions of that officer were, in the first instance, to follow and counteract the expedition of Johnstone, and above all, his designs upon the Cape of Good Hope. For the sake of water and fresh provisions, the English squadron put into Prava Bay in St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verde Islands; and, having no expectation of an enemy, cast their anchors as chance or convenience directed. A considerable proportion both of men and of officers, partly for business, partly for pleasure, were permitted to go on shore; and the decks were speedily crowded with water-casks, live stock, and other incumbrances. On the 16th of April, after nine o'clock in the morning, a strange fleet, suspected to be French, was seen coming round the eastern point of the harbour; and Suffrein, separating from the convoy with his five sail of the line, soon penetrated to the centre of the English fleet. The utmost dispatch was employed in getting the men and officers on board, and preparing the ships for action. The French ship, the *Hannibal*, of seventy-four guns, led the van, and coming as close to the English ships as she was able, dropped her anchors with a resolution which excited a burst of applause from the British tars. She was followed by the ship of Suffrein, of equal force. Another of sixty-four guns anchored at her stern. And the two other ships, of sixty-four guns each, ranged through the fleet, firing on either side as they proceeded along. The ships being extremely near, and the guns being played with unusual fury, much destruction was effected in a little time. After the abatement of the first surprise, several of the Indiamen brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect. Within an hour, the French ships at anchor had suffered so terribly, that the last of the three, having lost her captain, cut her cables and began to withdraw. Thus deserted astern, and despairing of success, Suffrein followed her example, and gave the

signal to retreat; the *Hannibal* alone remained, a mark for every ship the guns of which could be made to bear upon her; and displayed a resolution which may be compared with the noblest examples of naval heroism. She had lost her foremast and bowsprit; her cable was either cut or shot away; in the effort of hoisting more sail to get out of the fire, her main and mizen masts went overboard, and she remained, as it were, a hulk upon the water. Sustaining the weight of a dreadful fire, to which, enfeebled as she was, her returns were slow and ineffectual, she yet joined the rest of the ships at the mouth of the bay; and, being towed off, erected jury-masts, and proceeded with the fleet. An attempt on the part of the English to pursue was totally ineffectual. They sustained not any considerable loss, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, and the crowded situation of the ships. Their own steady and determined bravery counteracted the effects of surprise, and baffled the well-concerted scheme of the enemy. They remained to refit and provide till the 2nd of May, and on approaching the Cape, ascertained that Suffrein had arrived before them. Though previous to the arrival of Suffrein, that settlement, then supposed of great importance, was not in a condition to have offered any considerable resistance to Meadows and Johnstone, it was now accounted vain to make on it any attempt.”\*

At this juncture a Dutch fleet of East Indiamen lay in Saldanha Bay. The admiral resolved to cut them out, and the enterprise was attended with success. The commodore returned with his own ship and the prizes and frigates to Europe. The rest of the fleet, with the troops, proceeded to India. Suffrein strengthened the garrison at the Cape, so as to resist any attack from the English, and directed his course also to India. After various delays caused by winds and currents, the fleet arrived on the coasts of the peninsula on the 6th of December. The larger ships, with General Meadows and the principal part of the troops, went in quest of Admiral Hughes, then commanding on the Indian station; the smaller vessels, transports, and the remainder of the troops arrived at Bombay on the 22nd of January, 1782. The troops who landed at Bombay, after refreshing and tarrying a few days, were dispatched for Madras, and arrived while that city and the Carnatic were in terror from the arms of Hyder. The arrival of these timely reinforcements enabled the British officers, in spite of the wrangling of the councils, to make head against the foe.

\* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

While these events proceeded in connection with the new expeditions from France and England, others were passing which it did not belong to the province of the last chapter to relate, but shall here be recorded.

During the time England was at war with Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the French, Spain and Holland were also her enemies. Fortunately, the contest with the Mahrattas was first closed, as seen in former pages; and peace in Europe soon after occurring, left the company free to direct its whole strength against Mysore, a perception of which made Tippoo Sultan, however reluctantly, come to terms.

Holland being at war with England, Lord Macartney determined to take some action against Dutch interests in India, notwithstanding the numerous demands which were made upon his time and resources as governor of Madras. Soon after his arrival, he drove the Dutch out of Sadras and Pulicat, and in October, 1781, he determined to reduce, if possible, the very important settlement of Negapatam. The command of the troops destined for this task was given to Sir Hector Munro. The fleet under Sir Edward Hughes was to cover the operations. Colonel Braithwaite and his detachment were ordered to unite themselves to the force under Sir Hector Munro's command, swelling his little army to nearly four thousand men, which was dispatched on the enterprise. On the 21st, the seamen and marines debarked. On the 30th, the lines and redoubts were stormed. On the 3rd of November, trenches were opened to cover an approach against the north face of the fort. On the 6th, batteries for breaching were opened within three hundred yards.

The Dutch governor refused to surrender, it having been contrary to the military law of Holland for any officer to surrender a fortified place until a practicable breach was made. Between the 6th and 12th the breach was effected. The first use made of it was by the Dutch themselves, for the purpose of sorties, which were made with great spirit and determination. The English were prepared for this, and repulsed the attacks upon their trenches with their usual firmness. The governor offered to capitulate if honourable terms were conceded, which not being refused, Negapatam was taken possession of without storm. The surrender of this place was not very honourable to Dutch courage. The number of prisoners far exceeded the number of assailants. The surrender of such an important place, the chief settlement of the Batavian Company on the Coromandel coast, commanding the southern boundary of Tan-

jore, proved how far Dutch spirit, as well as power, had fallen in India. The English made prize of a large quantity of warlike stores. It so happened that the investments had not been made for two years, so that a very great quantity of valuable merchandise was secured by the victors.

Negapatam was the basis of operations against all the Dutch settlements in Coromandel. They fell almost without a blow. This had an important effect upon the Mysore war, for Hyder Ali immediately evacuated the forts of which he had taken possession in Tanjore. The policy of Lord Macartney, although opposed strenuously by Sir Eyre Coote, answered his expectations, and probably produced an effect upon the war with Mysore, which his lordship did not contemplate.

On the 2nd of January the fleet sailed from Negapatam, taking on board five hundred soldiers, and proceeded against the Dutch settlements in the Island of Ceylon. Trincomalee was the chief of those settlements. On the 4th the fleet arrived off that harbour. Means were taken instantly to reduce the fortifications by which it was protected. On the 11th the last of these forts, and the strongest, was stormed, and Trincomalee fell to the possession of the victors. The Dutch were now completely humbled in India, and when tidings of the peace with that power and its European allies arrived in India, Holland had little to lose in the peninsula. The French fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in January, and intercepted several English vessels; one British frigate of the largest class, separated from her companions in a fog, was surrounded and captured after a peculiarly gallant defence.

Sir Edward Hughes left Trincomalee on the last day of January, having performed his part in reducing that place. He was in want of stores, and many of his crews were sick. He arrived at Madras on the 11th of February, having had a very narrow escape of encountering a far superior force under Suffrein, a commander superior to any, except the gallant captor of Madras, who had commanded French naval forces in the East. In the open roads of Madras the danger of Hughes continued to be as great as it well could have been anywhere, for his ships were much impaired by long service, and consisted of only six of the line. The next day the squadron which brought General Meadows and his troops also arrived. This consisted of one seventy-four, one sixty-four, and one very large frigate, and had also a very narrow escape of being intercepted by the enemy. Twenty-four hours after, the French admiral

appeared, and passed Madras in line-of-battle. The above dates are given from Mill. Auber gives different dates, and is more particular in basing his information upon a comparison of documents. He relates the arrival of both admirals, and the results, in the following manner:—"On the 8th, Sir Edward Hughes arrived at Madras from Trincomalee, with the *Superb*, *Exeter*, *Monarch*, *Bedford*, *Worcester*, *Eagle*, and the *Sea-horse* frigate. On the 10th he was joined by Commodore Alnis with three ships of the line, and one transport containing General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton, with four hundred king's troops. On the 15th the French fleet appeared off Madras, and on the 16th stood to the southward. The English admiral weighed, and followed the enemy till they were separated from their frigates and transports. Sir Edward Hughes made the signal for chasing the latter, on which the *Isis*, being the foremost, came up with and re-took the *Lauriston*, a large transport laden with military stores and three hundred troops, together with several English vessels with grain which had been captured by the enemy on the coast. The enemy's fleet bore down, and having the advantage of the wind, brought eight of their ships to engage five of the English, the other ships on either side not being able to get into action. The engagement lasted from four until half-past six, when the French ceased firing, and hauled their wind. The *Superb* and *Exeter* were much damaged, having many shot between wind and water. Sir Edward Hughes went to Trincomalee to refit, and returned to Madras on the 10th of March to renew the attack on the enemy, whose ships had been dispersed during the action. Their hospital ship, the *Duc de Toscane*, having come to anchor in the roads of Negapatam, in the belief that it was a friendly port, was captured by the *Chapman* Indianman. On the 8th of April, Sir Edward Hughes came again in sight of the French squadron, then consisting of eighteen sail. On the 12th, the French, having the wind, engaged him; the action commenced at half-past one P.M., and ended at forty minutes past six. Both fleets anchored within five miles of each other until the 19th. In the interval, Sir Edward Hughes had refitted all his fleet, with the exception of the *Monmouth*, which had lost her main and mizen-masts, their places being supplied with good jury-masts. The enemy made a show of renewing the engagement; Sir Edward Hughes waited, with springs on his cables, but the enemy, after approaching within two miles, stood out to sea, and was seen no more. Sir Edward Hughes's force consisted of twelve ships, in

which there were two hundred and forty-seven killed, and three hundred and twenty wounded. The number in the French ship *Hero*, the flag-ship, killed and wounded, was two hundred, the admiral being obliged to shift his flag from her to the *Ajax*.\*

Were it not for the jealousy which both Hyder and Tippoo entertained of the French, the latter would have been able to effect much more against the English during that war. Thus, when the French gained Cuddalore, as the ostensible allies of Tippoo, they immediately proceeded to act as if the place were their own, offering indignity to Tippoo's officers. The latter resisted, and Tippoo ordered his governor to turn them out. The French were strong enough to keep possession, but in doing so they would have separated themselves from the Mysore power, and have been beaten in detail by the English: they were, therefore, obliged to leave Cuddalore, and being denied by Tippoo's officers the means of carriage and draught bullocks, they had to carry their own baggage and drag their own guns.

In July 1782, Hyder Ali having arranged with the French admiral a surprise upon Negapatam, both parties attempted to execute the concerted plan. Suffrein was to land troops close to the place, and their landing was to be supported by Hyder Ali. It was the object of the French admiral to effect his part of the arrangement without fighting, but his fleet having been descried by Admiral Hughes, that officer compelled him to give battle. The conflict was close and severe. Suffrein preferred close warfare, contrary to the general tactics of the French admirals. After maintaining for an hour and a half a fire which appeared to be equal, the French line showed symptoms of disorder, and a speedy victory for the English would have terminated the fight had not the wind suddenly shifted. This enabled Suffrein to cover the line of disabled ships by such as suffered least, and disconcerted the hopes and plans of Sir Edward. The French admiral was the better tactician. Notwithstanding the skill of the French commander, two of his ships struck their colours; he immediately fired into them, and continued to do so until they again hoisted French colours. The battle was, on the whole, in favour of the British. The English occupied the roads of Negapatam. The French were unable to accomplish their purpose, and sheered off for Cuddalore. This was done, however, with such coolness as to amount to a challenge to renew the battle. This Hughes could not do, having suffered so much in the previous conflict. When Negapatam was secured, he went to Madras to

\* Auber, vol. i. chap. xi. pp. 618, 619.

refit. Suffrein was more active and acute; he refitted at Cuddalore with admirable expedition, and was ready for sea before Sir Edward. Mill gives the following account of the energy and devotion of Suffrein:—"He was a man that when the exigency required, would work for days, like a ship's carpenter, in his shirt. He visited the houses and buildings at Cuddalore, and for want of other timber, had the beams which suited his purpose taken out. To some of his officers, who represented to him the shattered condition of his ships, the alarming deficiency of his stores, the impossibility of supplying his wants in a desolated part of India, and the necessity of repairing to the islands to refit; the whole value, he replied, of the ships was trivial, in comparison with the object which he was commissioned to attain; and the ocean should be his harbour, till he found a place in India to repair them."

On the 1st of August, Suffrein proceeded to sea, and reached Point de Galle, in the Island of Ceylon, where he was reinforced by two ships of the line from Europe, and met also military reinforcements. On the 25th, he anchored in the bay of Trincomalec. He attacked and conquered the English garrison, and on the 31st of August the French flag waved upon the ramparts of the fort. All this time Hughes was at Madras, and conducting the refitting of his squadron in a very leisurely manner. Lord Macartney remonstrated with him on the 5th of the month, assuring him that the French fleet had steered southwards on the 1st. Hughes, in the spirit which the English admirals generally showed in India, piqued himself on the eminence of his profession, and his distinction as an officer of his majesty's navy, and would not be dictated to, nor advised by a servant of the company, nor by civilians of any sort. He stayed where he was until, as so often happened with our admirals in the last war with Russia, when their services were urgently required, it was "too late." On the 20th of August he put to sea, three weeks after Suffrein left Cuddalore. The English admiral did not reach Trincomalee for a fortnight, and found the flag of France floating over the battlements. Hughes was then anxious to redeem his reputation by a naval victory. Suffrein, superior in force by the extent of one ship of the line and three frigates, as well as in the total number of guns, sailed out fearlessly. A long, fierce, and sanguinary conflict ensued, in which Suffrein displayed undaunted courage, first-rate seamanship, and an activity such as has seldom been surpassed. His captains neither showed skill nor courage; half their number were deposed

by him when the battle was over. Hughes also showed himself brave and skilful in his profession, and his officers and men proved themselves far superior to the enemy. A decisive victory crowned the efforts of the English, but night setting in soon after, and with that suddenness in which it descends so near the line, the enemy escaped. So anxious, however, were the French captains to get away, that several vessels were disabled, and some lost in the attempt. Suffrein brought in his shattered ships all but two, which Hughes neglected to make prizes, so that Suffrein sarcastically said, when he afterwards conducted them into port, "they are presents from the English admiral." Hughes, notwithstanding all the time he had taken to refit in Madras, was short of provisions, water, and ammunition, and was unable in consequence to attack, or even to blockade, Trincomalee, and sailed away to Madras, apparently incapable of forming any definite plan or purpose, for he was no sooner in Madras than he intimated his intention to proceed to Bombay.

At Madras he was urged to join in the expedition against Cuddalore, then projected, and where afterwards General Stuart so severely chastised the French General Bussy; without assigning any reason, Hughes refused to assist the expedition. He was an admiral holding the king's commission, and was not to give account of his actions to such persons as the council of Madras, servants of the East India Company. He would neither take part in the attack on Cuddalore, nor stay on the coast during the ensuing monsoon, but would go to Bombay:—"If the coast," says Mill, "were left unprotected by a British fleet, while the harbour of Trincomalee enabled the enemy to remain, and while Hyder was nearly undisputed master of the Carnatic, nothing less was threatened than the extirpation of the English from that quarter of India. Beside these important considerations, the council pressed upon the mind of the admiral the situation of the presidency in regard to food; that their entire dependence rested upon the supplies which might arrive by sea; that the stock in the warehouses did not exceed thirty thousand bags; that the quantity afloat in the roads amounted but to as much more, which the number of boats demanded for the daily service of his squadron had deprived them of the means of landing; that the monthly consumption was fifty thousand bags at the least; and that, if the vessels on which they depended for their supply were intercepted (such would be the certain consequence of a French without an English fleet upon the coast), nothing less than

famine was placed before their eyes. The admiral was reminded that he had remained in safety upon the coast during the easterly monsoon of the former year, and might still undoubtedly find some harbour to afford him shelter. A letter too was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr. Ritchie, the marine surveyor, would undertake to conduct his majesty's ships to a safe anchorage in the mouth of the Bengal river. And it was known that Sir Richard Bickerton, with a reinforcement of five sail of the line from England, had already touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for Madras. The admiral remained deaf to all expostulations. In the meantime intelligence was received that the enemy was preparing to attack Negapatam. The president had already prevailed upon Sir Eyre Coote to send a detachment of three hundred men, under Colonel Fullarton, into the southern provinces, which, since the defeat of Colonel Brathwaite, had lain exposed to the ravages of Hyder, and were now visited with scarcity, and the prospect of famine. Within two days of the former intelligence, accounts were received that seventeen sail of the enemy's fleet had arrived at Negapatam, and that the place was already attacked. The most earnest expostulations were still addressed to the admiral in vain; and the morning of the 15th of October exhibiting the appearance of a storm, the fleet set sail, and disappeared. The following morning presented a tremendous spectacle to the wretched inhabitants of Madras; several large vessels driven ashore, others foundered at their anchors, all the small craft, amounting to nearly one hundred in number, either sunk or stranded, and the whole of the thirty thousand bags of rice irretrievably gone. The ravages of Hyder had driven crowds of the inhabitants from all parts of the country to seek refuge at Madras, where multitudes were daily perishing of want. Famine now raged in all its horrors; and the multitude of the dead and the dying threatened to superadd the evils of pestilence. The bodies of those who expired in the streets or the houses, without any one to inter them, were daily collected and piled in carts, to be buried in large trenches made for the purpose out of the town, to the number, for several weeks, of not less, it is said, than twelve or fifteen hundred a week. What was done to remove the suffering inhabitants to the less exhausted parts of the country, and to prevent unnecessary consumption,—the governor sending away his horses, and even his servants,—could only mitigate, and that to a small degree, the evils which were endured. On the fourth day after the departure of Sir

Edward Hughes and his fleet, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived, with three regiments of one thousand each, Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, amounting to three hundred and forty, and about one thousand recruits raised by the company, chiefly in Ireland; but as soon as Sir Richard was apprised of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he immediately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bombay."

It is mournful to contemplate the representation of ignorance, pride, and obstinacy, on the part of a British naval commander, which is here made without any exaggeration. The terrible consequences are also depicted faithfully. If there were no proba-

bility that like causes in the constitution of our navy would produce like effects, such sad stories might be related without anxiety for the present or the future, if even with shame for the past. The admiral had no further opportunity to do much good or evil. Peace with France, Spain, and Holland, followed by peace with Hyder, left India in tranquillity as to foreign enemies, and the different councils, commanders, and governors more leisure for those mutual bickerings in which they perpetually indulged. Hastings, having composed these, as far as genius and self-command could compose them, at last, as already related, retired from the scenes of his struggles and his fame.

## CHAPTER XC.

HOME AFFAIRS—EFFORTS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO ASSIST THE CROWN IN THE WARS WITH FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND—DISCUSSIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN REFERENCE TO THE COMPANY'S AFFAIRS—IMPEACHMENT OF HASTINGS—ACQUITTAL—RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE—DEATH—THE COMPANY RESOLVE TO ERECT A STATUE TO HIS MEMORY.

FROM 1778 to the termination of the parliamentary prosecution of Hastings, the directors and the company were much engrossed with home matters, while the state of their affairs in India demanded also unremitting and serious attention.

In 1778-9 extraordinary exertions were made to resist the combination of France and Spain against British influence everywhere, but especially in the East. Instructions were sent overland to India for the reduction of Pondicherry, and the governors and councils were urged to prosecute the war with all their energy.

In April, 1779, the general court of proprietors voted unanimous thanks to the secret committee for the spirited orders they issued for operations against Pondicherry and the French, and presented them with sums of five hundred and three hundred guineas for the purchase of plate. Thanks were also voted to Sir Hector Munro and Admiral Sir Edward Vernon, to each of whom was given a sword set with diamonds, valued at seven hundred and fifty guineas. Three guineas bounty to each was voted for the first two thousand able-bodied seamen, two guineas each for the first two thousand ordinary seamen, and a guinea and a half each for the first two thousand landmen who should volunteer to serve on board the fleets of his majesty. Resolutions were passed by the court of directors "to build three 74-gun ships, with masts and

yards, to be delivered over to such officer as his majesty might appoint to receive them."

The following *résumé* of the home events in which the company was interested at that time is as correct as it is brief:—"The affairs of the company at this time engaged much of the attention of parliament. In 1779 an act had been passed declaring that the £1,400,000 borrowed of the public had been repaid by the company, and that as their bond debt was reduced to £1,500,000, they were authorized to declare a dividend of eight per cent. The territorial acquisitions and revenues were also to remain with them for another year, and the persons who at the passing of the act were in the offices of governor-general and councillors in Bengal were to hold the same during its continuance. In the following session Lord North acquainted the house that the company had not made such proposals for the renewal of their charter as were deemed satisfactory, and he therefore moved that the Speaker should give the three years' notice required by the act, previously to the cessation of their exclusive privileges of trade. Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke strongly opposed the minister, and asked whether he was not content with having lost America? Whether he could point out a single benefit which his motion was capable of producing, and whether he desired to behold those scenes of anarchy, confusion, distress, and ruin, which his idle

and impotent threats might produce in the company's possessions in India."\*

Mr. Fox argued that the ministerial measure was impracticable, and that the government and the nation would prove themselves ungrateful to the country, if such a proposition were tolerated. He declared that the disputes between the minister and the company arose from the desire of the former to grasp the patronage of the latter.† In order to give time for deliberation, an act was passed continuing the same privileges to the company as in the preceding year, to be reckoned from the 5th of April, 1780.‡

On the 12th of January, 1781, a select committee of the house was appointed to inquire into the petitions of the company and the inhabitants of Bengal, against the constitution of the supreme court and the action of British law generally.

On the 27th of April, Lord North proposed the appointment of a *secret* committee to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. The celebrated Edmund Burke demanded that the committee should be open; but, as the foreign enemies of England would watch the progress of such inquiry in an open committee, and profit by the information to be obtained, Lord North carried his point. Lord North, throughout the session, displayed an open enmity to the company, the real source of which was, what Charles Fox charged upon him, a desire to grasp the patronage. Edmund Burke was not less an enemy, but he was insidious.

At length the two acts were passed: the one concluding an agreement between the public and the company;§ the other to redress and prevent the recurrence of the complaints against the supreme court at Calcutta.|| By the first-mentioned act the company's exclusive privileges were continued till 1791, with three years' notice; during which time the territorial acquisitions and revenues were to remain in their possession. After a dividend of eight per cent. on the capital of £3,200,000, three-fourths of the surplus profits were to go to the public, and one-fourth to the company. Accounts of the state of the company's affairs were to be laid before the lords of the treasury and the general court. During the war with France, Spain, and Holland the company were to pay one-fourth of the expense of his majesty's ships in India. After peace, the company were to bear the

whole. The company were allowed to recruit, and to have two thousand men at one time ready for embarkation during war, but only one thousand in peace. The parties filling the offices of governor-general, commander-in-chief, and members of council were to be removable only by the king on representation of the directors, who might appoint to vacancies on the approbation of the crown. The commander-in-chief, if appointed by the directors a member of council, was to take rank as two members, but was not to succeed to the government unless specially appointed. British subjects were not to reside more than ten miles from the presidency without leave from the government.

Two important provisions were also inserted. In addition to the enactment of 1773, which required the directors to send to his majesty's government copies of all letters from India relating to the political, military, or revenue affairs of the company, a provision was now inserted that copies of all letters proposed to be sent by the directors to India relating to those subjects, should first be submitted for his majesty's approval, and if no disapprobation was expressed within fourteen days to the proposed despatch, the same might be forwarded to India.

The other was a clause suggested by the heavy drafts which had, at a former period, been drawn from India, and nearly ruined the company, being, the minister remarked, "the private fortunes of Asiatic plunderers," who would again seize upon the opportunity of doing so with avidity. Lord North, in alluding to the acceptance of presents, observed that it would be proper to interdict their receipt entirely, for which purpose it would be well to form a court of judicature in this country for the trial of offences committed in India. This suggestion, though not acted upon at that time, was adopted at a later period.

The other act related to the supreme court, and was passed to appease the minds of many persons who dreaded the consequences of the powers assumed by the supreme court of India.

The appointment of Lord Macartney to the governorship of Madras was one of the signs of the times, as it regarded the progress of ministerial and parliamentary opinion respecting the company. The governing class in England became intensely desirous of obtaining such posts as the governorships of presidencies, and more especially the office of governor-general, for members of their class. Lord Macartney was the first governor appointed by the direct intervention of the go-

\* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. i. chap. xi. p. 572.

† *Parliamentary History*, 1780, vol. xxi.

‡ 20 Geo. III. cap. 56.

§ 21 Geo. III. cap. 65.

|| 21 Geo. III. cap. 70.

vernment, and he unfortunately went to India in the spirit of one who felt that he did not owe his appointment to the company, and was superior in rank, as well as the origin of his appointment, to the company's servants. He made, therefore, little account of the opinion of Hastings, who was only a company's official, although governor-general of Bengal. Lord Macartney was a polite man, capable of governing his temper, and possessing much suavity of manner to inferiors in station; but he had a high opinion of his order, his office, and the source whence he derived it, and hence all harmony between the governments of Madras and Bengal was, from the day of his arrival in India until Hastings left it, impossible. At home his lordship's measures and interests were backed up by the government.

Tidings of the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey, by Governor-general Hastings, to the Suddur Dewanny Adawlut, reached England in October, 1781. The directors doubted the legality of the proceeding, and parliament took up the matter with considerable heat. A committee of inquiry was nominated, and reported in strong terms upon the illegality of the conduct of Hastings and of Impey. An address of the whole house to his majesty demanded the recall of Sir Elijah to answer to the house for his acceptance of the office. The directors passed a resolution, on the 24th of April, removing him.

A report was made by the secret committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. Mr. Dundas, the chairman, submitted to the house an enormous series of resolutions, which amounted to no less than one hundred and eleven. The resolutions were divided into three classes, each class containing three distinct heads. The first regarded the general system of government; it censured the conduct of Mr. Hastings as governor-general, and that of Mr. Hornby, governor of Bombay, and declared it to be the duty of the directors to recall them. The second and third classes related to the affairs of the Carnatic. On these a bill of pains and penalties was brought in against Sir Thomas Rumbold, J. Whitehill, and P. Perring, Esqrs., for breaches of public trust, and high crimes and misdemeanours.

On the 28th of May the house of commons came to the following resolution:—

“Resolved, That Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council at Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India,

and enormous expenses on the company, it is the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said governor-general and president from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain.”

These measures violently agitated the courts of directors and proprietors. Various meetings were held, and debates of the fiercest nature took place in them. On the 19th of June a special grand court was convened by requisition in the usual manner, when the following resolutions were passed:—

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this court, that the removing of Warren Hastings, Esq., the governor-general of Bengal, or any servants of the company, merely in compliance with a vote of the house of commons,—without being satisfied that the grounds of delinquency against the said Warren Hastings, or such other servants, are sufficient of themselves to vindicate the directors in coming to such a resolution,—would weaken the confidence which the servants of the company ought to entertain of the justice of their employers, and would tend to destroy that independency which the proprietors of East India stock ought to enjoy in the management of their own affairs.”

“Resolved, That it be recommended to the court of directors not to carry into effect any resolution they may come to relative to the removal of Warren Hastings, Esq., till such resolution shall have been approved by a general court.”

From the 20th of June to the 9th of October, the directors, in various meetings, discussed the contradictory conclusions to which the house of Commons and the court of proprietary had arrived, and passed resolutions at last in harmony with those of the Commons. It being well understood that the directors passed these resolutions under pressure from the government, and seven of the directors having recorded a protest against the recall of Hastings, the court of proprietary again met on the 21st of October, and again passed a resolution by a majority of three hundred and fifty-three votes in a house of five hundred and three persons, forbidding the removal of Hastings, vindicating him from the imputations thrown on him by parliament and a majority of the directors, and attributing to the directors themselves the misfortunes, wars, and debts, which the resolution alleged Hastings by extraordinary fidelity and ability had done much to retrieve. On the 22nd of October the directors rescinded their resolution against Hastings.

There were frequent changes of ministry; but the tone of parliament and of government was adverse to the company. In April, 1783,

Mr. Dundas brought in a bill for the better government of India. It was rejected. The session terminated without any further attack upon the company. During the recess the celebrated India bill of Fox and Burke was framed. Mr. Burke was then in the government. Mr. Fox brought in his bill on the 18th of November. The company petitioned against it. Burke delivered one of his most eloquent and imposing orations in its behalf. His descriptions of the misdeeds of the company were exaggerated; and those of the civilization and excellent qualities of the people and governments of India were contrary to fact and philosophy. Against Hastings the speech was virulent. The bill passed the commons, and went up to the lords: the company again petitioned. The lords threw out the bill. The king was known to be opposed to it, and a large popular party in the country was equally so. The commons passed most serious resolutions condemnatory by implication of the course pursued by the crown and the peers. The ministry was dismissed, and William Pitt appointed first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. Mr. Pitt brought in a bill "for the better government and management of the affairs of the East India Company" on the 10th of January. The commons rejected it. On the 25th of March parliament was dissolved. The court of proprietors of India stock manfully supported Hastings, and resolved that he should not be recalled.

When Hastings reached England, as before related, he proceeded at once to London. In June, 1785, he received in person the thanks of the very same court of directors which censured and sought to remove him, when they supposed the favour of the cabinet would be secured by doing so.

In January, 1786, Major Scott announced in parliament that Mr. Hastings was anxious to defend himself against the aspersions thrown on him by Mr. Edmund Burke, and challenged the great philosopher and orator to bring forward his impeachment. This was imprudent, and rather prejudiced than served the case of Hastings in the house. At length that impeachment was made, so notable for the amazing eloquence displayed in it, especially by Sheridan and Burke. It is generally considered that Hastings did not display his usual ability in managing his defence, and this is attributed to the fact that he had not been accustomed to work with English agencies and in English modes. Nearly his whole life had been spent in India, and his mind had become adapted to Indian intrigues. Lord Macaulay says, "Of all his errors, the most serious was, perhaps, the choice of a cham-

pion. Clive, in similar circumstances, had made a singularly happy selection. He put himself into the hands of Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough, one of the few great advocates who have been also great in the house of commons. To the defence of Clive, therefore, nothing was wanting, neither learning nor knowledge of the world—neither forensic acuteness nor the eloquence which charms political assemblies. Hastings entrusted his interests to a very different person, a major in the Bengal army named Scott. This gentleman had been sent over from India some time before, as the agent of the governor-general. It was rumoured that his services were rewarded with oriental munificence; and we believe that he received much more than Hastings could conveniently spare. The major obtained a seat in parliament, and was there regarded as the organ of his employer. It was evidently impossible that a gentleman so situated could speak with the authority which belongs to an independent position. Nor had the agent of Hastings the talent necessary for obtaining the ear of an assembly, which, accustomed to listen to great orators, had naturally become fastidious. He was always on his legs; he was very tedious, and he had only one topic, the merits and wrongs of Hastings. Everybody who knows the house of commons will easily guess what followed. The major was considered as the greatest bore of his time. There was hardly a day on which the newspapers did not contain some puff upon Hastings, signed Asiaticus or Bengalensis, but known to be written by the indefatigable Scott; and hardly a month in which some bulky pamphlet on the same subject, and from the same pen, did not pass to the trunk-makers and the pastry-cooks."

Much of what his lordship has said of Major Scott, in the above passage, is correct; but, on various grounds, Scott was an agent well adapted to the purposes for which Hastings had chosen him. His knowledge of all the circumstances, personally and practically, on the ground of which the governor-general expected to be called to account, was perfect. He was well acquainted with all the personages who figured in these transactions. His industry was unwavering, and his personal friendship and admiration for Hastings the warmest. Hastings did not select him as his agent in view of a parliamentary impeachment, but in view of attack in the courts of directors and proprietors. Scott was a far more suitable agent for this purpose than Wedderburn would have been. He knew the ways of the directory, the tone and temper of the proprietors, his *whole time* was given to work among them for Hastings, and

he did so successfully. His entering parliament was an after-thought, and he was there very useful to his friend; he corrected innumerable misstatements, and was "always on his legs" for that purpose during the debates. Many a rhetorical flourish very captivating to the house of commons was made sheerly ridiculous by a dry, prosy, but true statement from Scott. There was no putting him down, he was proof against all ridicule, reiterating his dry facts, financial, military, political, and personal, until they ceased to be disputed. He *was* a bore in the sense Lord Macaulay proclaims it, and he was so also to the enemies of Hastings, by his unsleeping vigilance, his physical endurance, and his ever-pestering, worrying statements and counter-statements, which were confounding to his antagonists, not one man among whom knew anything of the subjects of debate, except Burke. Burke, Dundas (the Lord Advocate of Scotland), and Sir Philip Francis were the only men of great mark acquainted with Indian affairs. Burke had read on the subject, with a view to an Indian appointment from the ministry, which he knew he could never receive from the company; and he was embittered, therefore, against the latter and its agents. His mind was inflamed with envy against Hastings as much as was that of Francis. Burke was, from these circumstances, an indefatigable student of Indian affairs. Sheridan spoke with glowing eloquence on subjects of which he knew nothing. Dundas learned much of Indian affairs when he served as chairman of the committee which produced the hundred and eleven resolutions. Francis, of course, knew Calcutta well, and the doings of members of the supreme council; but of the languages, peoples, and mind of India he knew little, almost nothing. A plain, stern, dogged, persevering, matter of fact man, "well up" in Indian affairs, was very useful to Hastings in the house, and absolutely indispensable among the constituency of the company. With these Scott had constant intercourse: there was probably not a director, not a single member of the proprietary, with whom Scott had not talked over the whole question. All the holders of India stock might have had Scott's arguments by heart. Hastings foresaw this, and made his selection judiciously. It is quite true, as Lord Macaulay affirms, that Hastings was destitute of a parliamentary advocate possessing the splendour of eloquence which Burke, Sheridan, or Wedderburn possessed; but that was not, as Lord Macaulay represents, his fault; nor did the circumstance of Wedderburn being Clive's adviser and defender show any superiority of

judgment on the part of that great man to Hastings in the selection of his advocates, for Wedderburn had been the early friend and associate of Clive, and offered his services, which were, of course, thankfully accepted. Had Hastings found a similar friend, he would have gladly made his eloquence, tact, and legal knowledge available; but Hastings had spent many years in India, and had formed few new friendships in England. None of his old schoolfellows and early companions were in a condition to do by him as Wedderburn did by Clive. Yet many men of note, and among them those who believed that he had acted very wrong in several of the proceedings for which he was called in question, were indignant at the malignant persecutions with which Burke and others pursued him, and made themselves his friends. Lords Mansfield, Lansdowne, and Thurlow (the Chancellor) were foremost among them. Pitt was another of the eminent men who doubted the propriety of various parts of the conduct of Hastings, but was scandalized at the virulence of the proceedings against him. He had even privately confessed to Major Scott (for the untiring major had interviews with all the ministers) that Hastings deserved high rewards from his country, which he, as minister, was only prevented from recommending his majesty to confer, by the fact that a vote of censure remained on the journals of the commons. The leading opponents of government were the leading opponents of Hastings in the house; but the king, the holders of Indian stock, and the country were intensely prejudiced against that party. The whigs in and out of the house opposed him, and a small but powerful section of the Tories, especially those who were disappointed of places by the government. One of the most fertile sources of attack against Hastings out of the house was the history of his marriage, and the name of Imhoff, and the guilt of his divorced wife, formed the material of the sarcastic squibs which were flung about in the clubs, coffee-houses, and journals. Lord North and Fox were accused of adding light labours of this kind to their relentless opposition in the house. Hastings did much to provoke all this, by an ostentatious defiance of his enemies. This did not arise, as Lord Macaulay supposes, from indiscretion and an undervaluing of his enemies; it arose from the fact that he was not conscious of guilt in the transactions where his lordship considers his guilt manifest. In some matters where his most ardent friends could not have defended him, he believed himself to have been in the right, and remained in that belief to the end of his days. His conscience was

neither tender nor enlightened: he was not, in any sense of the word, a religious man; but, as a politician, he was convinced that the course he had taken in India was that which his duty to the company and to his country demanded. The conscience of Burke, Francis, Sheridan, North, and Fox seems to have been neither more tender nor more enlightened than that of Hastings. There is no doubt that the defiant attitude which he took also arose from his determined character. He was not a man to quail before any foe. He who could coolly write despatches in reference to negotiations with the Mahrattas, when barred up in a house at Benares, with a few soldiers to defend him against half a million of fanatics, was not to be put down by the force of faction or the eloquence of political adventurers, however vast and dazzling the powers they might bring against him in the contest. It is remarkable that Hastings appeared to feel as little and fear as little the great weight of character and public station which some of his opponents brought against him, as he did the genius and personal hostility of others. The courage and persistence of Hastings were sustained by the openly avowed favour of the court. The king was his friend. Clive had derived much protection from the royal favour, Hastings even more. The ladies of the court scandalized many by their attentions to Mrs. Hastings, and it soon became evident that those who wished to find favour near the throne must not be remembered among the persecutors or prosecutors of Warren Hastings. The first note of war on the part of the opposition was an application for papers by Edmund Burke. Only some of these were granted. In April, 1786, the impeachment was produced, and Hastings was informed that he might be heard by counsel at the bar of the house. Hastings defended himself in person. He was not an orator. He was a great writer, and relied much on the power of his pen for his defence. It was eloquent, but of vast length, and tired the patience of a house much fonder of exciting logomachies than of business statements.

In the beginning of June Burke brought forward that part of the impeachment which related to the employment of English troops in Rohilund, in the service of the vizier, for a stipulated price. Burke affected to believe that he would have the support of Dundas, who formerly, as chairman of a committee of inquiry, condemned the Rohilla invasion. Burke must have known that the versatile Dundas would not be bound by such a circumstance; this was patent to the whole house, and the folly of selecting the least vul-

nerable point of the defence in the hope of catching the support of Dundas, or showing his inconsistency, was apparent to all the members not blinded by envy of Hastings, or pledged to the opposition. Dundas, as military men would say, turned the enemy's flank. He declared that although Hastings did wrong in supporting the aggressive designs of the Nabob of Oude, yet he had atoned for that fault, and won beside the lasting gratitude of his country by subsequent services. The tactics of Burke were indiscreet, and the spirit of his speech not less so. The feeling of the house was strong against him. Many of his expected supporters, finding that his first movement displayed bad generalship, forsook him. Only sixty-seven voted for the motion, in a house of one hundred and eighty-six members. A considerable number of the supposed supporters of the prosecution slunk away. Pitt spoke not, but voted for Hastings. The house of commons, *on report of a secret committee*, had censured the Rohilla war; a majority of the directors had censured it; but since then the *whole* of the facts had become known, they had been discussed with great ability in the court of proprietary by men the first and ablest in connection with Indian affairs, their speeches had been published, the error and the extenuation had been canvassed, and the commons in its final verdict refused to be carried away by the clap-trap of ready speakers, or affected by glowing antitheses of rhetoricians with less claim to principle than Hastings himself, were all the wrong-doing attributed to him chargeable at his door.

It was universally expected by the public that the impeachment would now drop, and even the government seems to have thought so, for Lord Thurlow openly spoke, notwithstanding the reserve of Pitt, of the desirableness of creating Hastings Baron Daylesford.

On the 13th of June, the country, if not the house, was startled by a renewal of the prosecution. Fox brought forward a resolution, condemnatory of what was called the deposition of the Rajah of Benares. Fox was eloquent on the occasion. Francis was learned, epigrammatical, and malignant as a demon. Pitt exposed the party purpose of Fox, the personal hatred of Francis, and eulogised in one of the most statesman-like of his speeches the policy, courage, and justice of Hastings in the transaction for which it was sought to condemn him. After an eloquent justification of Hastings, the house was astonished by the minister's declaration that he should vote for Fox's motion, because the fine laid upon Cheyte Sing was too heavy, although Hastings did right to fine him! Pitt's vote was clearly

not an honest one. Like Fox himself, he had aims of his own in view, and he would uphold or sacrifice Hastings as best promoted those aims. He deemed it politic to conciliate the opposition, and appear impartial. From the first, he was unwilling to be thought the partizan of Hastings, while he denounced the prosecution in the private circle of his friends with unsparing severity. What made the conduct of Pitt in the house most extraordinary was, that the usual ministerial circular had gone out to his party the day before, requesting their presence in the house to vote against the motion of Fox. The change of opinion was attributed to Mr. Dundas, who, on this subject, influenced the mind of the premier. The persuasives by which Dundas succeeded were appeals to the love of power and the ambition characteristic of Pitt. Hastings was more a favourite at court than himself, and Pitt was led by the insinuations of Dundas to believe that he would soon become his rival, as either a peerage or dishonour must result from the impeachment. The effect of Pitt's tergiversation upon the success of the motion was decisive. It was carried by one hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight, many in the majority declaring that they voted against their conscience to support the policy of the minister.

In 1787 the prosecution was renewed. The first charge opened was in connection with the conduct of Hastings to the begums of Oude, a portion of his public life more open to censure than any other. Sheridan introduced the charge in the most brilliant oration ever made by him, and which produced an effect in the house greater than probably any other speech ever delivered. After Sheridan's speech the debate was adjourned. When the house resumed, it was evident that the eloquence of Sheridan had decided the motion. The house was now as much carried away by eloquence, irrespective of the merits of the question, as upon the first resolution they were coldly insensible to the finest passages of the orator, and looked only to the facts of the case. The influence of Pitt, however, had as much to do in forming the majorities on all the motions as either eloquence or justice. Pitt supported Sheridan, as he had supported Fox. One hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight carried the motion.

The party carrying on the impeachment were now sure of victory, and hurried numerous resolutions through the house. The friends of Hastings began to forsake him, as those of Clive had deserted him in the hour of misfortune. The sergeant-at-arms arrested him, and brought him to the bar

of the peers, where Burke was directed by the commons to produce an impeachment founded upon their resolutions. The period for prorogation was too close to allow of proceeding with the ease, and Hastings was discharged on bail. At the opening of the following session, the commons proceeded to form a committee to manage the impeachment. The leading members of the opposition were called on to serve, and no name was objected to until that of Francis was read, when a large number of members objected to the injustice and indecency of the most malignant personal enemy Hastings had being placed in that position. It is much to the discredit of the leading men of the opposition that they fiercely contended for the appointment of Francis. Dundas and Wilberforce, believing that Pitt would sustain the motion for the appointment of Francis, upheld it. Wilberforce was especially ingenious in his argumentative support. Pitt suddenly rose and opposed the appointment of Francis. "The heaven-born minister" had everything his own way; his servile followers voted that Francis was not a fit person to be nominated on the committee.

On the 13th of February, 1788, the sittings commenced, on the result of which the fate of Hastings depended. The scene has been portrayed by the brilliant pen of Macaulay. In one of the happiest, richest, and most fervid outflowings of his eloquence, he has impressed the solemnity, importance, and the whole aspect of the court upon the mind of this generation of readers. The trial, amongst other things, was remarkable for the great number and singular variety of notable persons who were spectators:—"The long galleries were crowded by an audience such as has rarely excited the fears or the emulation of an orator. There were gathered together, from all parts of a great, free, enlightened, and prosperous empire, grace and female loveliness, wit and learning, the representatives of every science and of every art. There were seated round the queen the fair-haired young daughters of the house of Brunswick. There the ambassadors of great kings and commonwealths gazed with admiration on a spectacle which no other country in the world could present. There Siddons, in the prime of her majestic beauty, looked with emotion on a scene surpassing all the imitations of the stage. There the historian of the Roman empire thought of the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of Africa. There were seen, side by side, the greatest painter and the greatest scholar of the age. The

spectacle had allured Reynolds from that easel which has preserved to us the thoughtful foreheads of so many writers and statesmen, and the sweet smiles of so many noble matrons. It had induced Parr to suspend his labours in that dark and profound mine from which he had extracted a vast treasure of erudition—a treasure too often buried in the earth, too often paraded with injudicious and inelegant ostentation, but still precious, massive, and splendid. There appeared the voluptuous charms of her to whom the heir of the throne had in secret plighted his faith. There, too, was she, the beautiful mother of a beautiful race, the Saint Cecilia, whose delicate features, lighted up by love and music, art has rescued from the common decay. There were the members of that brilliant society, which quoted, criticised, and exchanged repartees under the rich peacock hangings of Mrs. Montague. And there the ladies whose lips, more persuasive than those of Fox himself, had carried the Westminster election against palace and treasury, shone round Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire."

Such were the spectators of the scene, and the audience before which the eloquence of England's best orators was about to be displayed. The descriptions given by Lord Macaulay of the appearance of Hastings on this occasion and his approach to the bar, of his counsel and his accusers, are amongst the most graphic and life-like which his pen has depicted:—"The serjeants made proclamation. Hastings advanced to the bar, and bent his knee. The culprit was indeed not unworthy of that great presence. He had ruled an extensive and populous country, had made laws and treaties, had sent forth armies, had set up and pulled down princes. And in his high place he had so borne himself that all had feared him, that most had loved him, and that hatred itself could deny him no title to glory, except virtue. He looked like a great man, and not like a bad man. A person small and emaciated, yet deriving dignity from a carriage which, while it indicated deference to the court, indicated also habitual self-possession and self-respect; a high and intellectual forehead, a brow pensive, but not gloomy; a mouth of inflexible decision; a face pale and worn, but serene, on which was written as legibly as under the picture in the council-chamber at Calcutta, *Mens æqua in arduis*: such was the aspect with which the great proconsul presented himself to his judges. His counsel accompanied him, men all of whom were afterwards raised by their talents and learning to the highest posts in their profession: the bold and strong-minded Law, afterwards chief-justice of the King's

Bench; the more humane and eloquent Dallas, afterwards chief-justice of the Common Pleas; and Plomer, who, nearly twenty years later, successfully conducted in the same high court the defence of Lord Melville, and subsequently became vice-chancellor and master of the rolls. But neither the culprit nor his advocates attracted so much notice as the accusers. In the midst of the blaze of red drapery, a space had been fitted up with green benches and tables for the commons. The managers, with Burke at their head, appeared in full dress. The collectors of gossip did not fail to remark that even Fox, generally so regardless of his appearance, had paid to the illustrious tribunal the compliment of wearing a bag and sword. Pitt had refused to be one of the conductors of the impeachment; and his commanding, copious, and sonorous eloquence was wanting to that great muster of various talents. Age and blindness had unfitted Lord North for the duties of a public prosecution, and his friends were left without the help of his excellent sense, his tact, and his urbanity. But in spite of the absence of these two distinguished members of the lower house, the box in which the managers stood contained an array of speakers such as, perhaps, had not appeared together since the great age of Athenian eloquence. There were Fox and Sheridan, the English Demosthenes and the English Hyperides. There was Burke, ignorant indeed, or negligent of the art of adapting his reasonings and his style to the capacity and taste of his hearers, but in amplitude of comprehension and richness of imagination superior to every orator, ancient or modern. There, with eyes reverentially fixed on Burke, appeared the finest gentleman of the age; his form developed by every manly exercise; his face beaming with intelligence and spirit,—the ingenious, the chivalrous, the high-souled Windham. Nor, though surrounded by such men, did the youngest manager pass unnoticed. At an age when most of those who distinguish themselves in life are still contending for prizes and fellowships at college, he had won for himself a conspicuous place in parliament. No advantage of fortune or connection was wanting that could set off to the height his splendid talents and his unblemished honour. At twenty-three he had been thought worthy to be ranked with the veteran statesmen who appeared as the delegates of the British commons at the bar of the British nobility." This was the future Earl Grey, the premier under whose government the reform bill was carried.

The reading of the charges and answers of Hastings occupied several days. Burke then opened the impeachment in a speech which

contemporaries describe as producing by the solemnity and manner of the orator as much effect as by its powers of reasoning and marvellous eloquence. Even Thurlow, the determined abettor of Hastings, uttered exclamations of admiration, and, at the close of the peroration, Hastings himself appeared affected, notwithstanding the dauntless and proud front he bore. Fox, Grey (afterwards Earl Grey), Lord Loughborough (formerly the advocate of Clive), and Sheridan all betrayed an animus the most hostile to the prisoner at the bar; but the lord chancellor, a host in himself (considering his abilities, boldness, and the advantages of his situation), indicated from the first a resolution to save him. The trial was so protracted that public curiosity flagged, and the persecutors became less confident. Their great cards had been played, and the game was not won. The defence of Hastings was expected to be brilliant, and to come with telling power when the impressions produced by the orations of his accusers were worn away. Such was the state of matters at the end of June, and when both houses were weary of the session. Only thirty-five days were given to the trial; it was obliged to stand over for another year.

In 1789 other business drew away the attention of the house and the public from the trial; the illness of the king excited the popular sympathy greatly, and still further contributed to cast the interest taken in the trial into the shade. The friends of Hastings grew bolder. Advantage was taken of indecorous expressions used by Burke, to move a vote of censure upon him in the commons, and it was carried. This deeply humiliated the great man, and deprived him of much moral power in his further prosecution of the impeachment.

In 1790 parliament was dissolved, and the temper of the new house towards Hastings was tested by his friends nearly as soon as it had assembled. It was maintained that the dissolution put an end to the prosecution. Pitt and the opposition united in affirming the contrary. Several of the articles of impeachment were, however, withdrawn, in order to facilitate the more rapid issue of the case.

In 1791 the prosecution on the part of the committee became less bitter, with the exception of Edmund Burke, who clung to it with all the tenacity of hatred which animated Francis, who, although not on the committee, was perpetually in communication with its members, and was, out of the house, the life of the prosecution, which still chased the already severely punished and much suffering Hastings.

In 1795 Hastings appeared before the bar of the lords to hear judgment. The curiosity of the public now returned with full force. His opponent Loughborough was chancellor; his friend Thurlow was in opposition; the committee for managing the impeachment was broken up into various parties, its members at enmity with one another; and out of the body of peers who took so deep an interest in the trial at its commencement, sixty had gone before the great tribunal, to render their own last account. Twenty-nine peers voted. Six voted against Hastings on the charges in connection with Cheyte Sing and the begums, a still smaller number voted against him on the other important articles of impeachment, and on none of the relatively minor charges was there a single voice against him. He was informed from the woolsack that he was acquitted. He bowed with the same air of respectful dignity, firmness, and self-consciousness as when he approached that bar nearly eight years before.

The decision met with almost universal approval. It was felt by the public that he had been put to an enormous cost—a fortune had been expended in his defence; that his anxieties for so many years were terribly penal; that he had been pursued with bitter personal animosity and jealous political envy; that his errors had been sought out with a vindictiveness such as had never before been directed against a public man, and that his great services had been unrequited by the country for whose greatness and glory he had done so much. All men had come to the conclusion that, but for Warren Hastings, the Asiatic empire of England had vanished from beneath her sceptre.

Hastings returned from the bar of the lords to his seat—the old family seat at Daylesford—a victor, but terribly impoverished by his contest. He had purchased the old manor house and estate, which had three quarters of a century before passed out of the family. The dream of his life's young morning was realized—he *was* "Hastings of Daylesford." But, alas! he took up his abode there when fortune had done much against him, as well as for him; and the remainder of his years were destined to be spent in comparative obscurity. The malignity of his enemies pursued him still. Francis, Burke, and Dundas were as bitter as ever; they lost no opportunity, public or private, not merely to damage his reputation, but to hurt his interests. But for the generosity of the East India Company he must have sunk into poverty.

Like many great men who have a genius for public business and for government, he was a bad manager of his private affairs; and

he who, as governor-general of India, saved an empire from financial anarchy, was more than once on the verge of pecuniary ruin as "Hastings of Daylesford."

Pitt continued to regard him with envy, because he enjoyed the king's favour; and because, on Eastern affairs, if not in other departments of statesmanship, he would have been a superior authority if permitted to emerge into public life. When Pitt retired from power, Hastings was nearly seventy years old.

In 1813 he was examined as a witness before the commons on the subject of India; on which occasion the whole house rose in respectful homage as he left its bar. Many marks of public respect were paid to him after that time by the Prince Regent, the leading men of the day, and the people generally. He was also made a privy councillor. His private life belongs rather to the biographer, but the closing scene was appropriate to the courage and equanimity of his career. On the 22nd of August, 1818, according to Macaulay—on the 3rd of that month, according to M. Auber and others—he closed his life, having attained his eightieth year. On that day he wrote to Colonel Toone in the following remarkable terms:—"I impose upon myself the last office of communication between you and me, to inform you that a few hours remain, which are to separate us from each other for ever. The infliction that must end me is a total privation of the function of deglutition, which is equivalent to the extremities of hunger, by the inability to take nourishment. I have called you by the only appellation that language can express me, '*Yar Woofadar*,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it (unprofitably, I own), but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world, and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that in the efficient body of directors I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not

express my full feelings; I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger and constituent body I can only express a hope, that if there are any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me, when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interest both had so long committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to its own."

Thus tranquilly this serene and heroic man passed away, after a career so eventful and turbulent, in which, amidst all its tremendous storms, he was ever calm, resolute, and great.

As it will not be necessary again to refer to this eminent personage in the progress of this history, except *en passant*, it may be here noticed that, after his death, the most marked tokens of respect for his memory were shown by the East India Company, which he had so long and so faithfully served, and which, during his long retirement from public life, had soothed his sorrows and generously provided for his wants. A court was called, when the chairman, Campbell Majoribanks, Esq., passed a warm eulogy upon his memory. The deputy chairman, Mr. Robinson, afterwards Sir George Robinson, who had served in India as a civil officer of the company during a portion of the time when Hastings was governor, followed the chairman in terms of high commendation of the personal and official conduct of Hastings. The following resolution was passed:—

"Resolved, That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Honourable Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Mohammedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."

## CHAPTER XCI.

HOME AFFAIRS (*Continued*).

DURING the progress of the events connected with Hastings, which necessarily occupied so large a space in the last chapter, the general affairs of the company occupied the attention of parliament and the country. In 1784, Pitt's bill was introduced. The new parliament met on the 19th of May, and the premier took an early opportunity of bringing forward his measure for the future government of India. In the sketch given of the history of the company's charters and constitutions, Pitt's bill was noticed sufficiently. The bill, after protracted discussions in parliament, and between the government and the company, was carried; but it was necessary in 1786 to introduce another bill to amend it.

During that year Lord Macartney returned from India, and immediately received a challenge from General Stuart, whose strange conduct in command of the Madras army during the war with Tippoo has been already noticed. His lordship was wounded. The circumstance led to the formation by the company of regulations against duelling of a most stringent character.

After the brief service of Mr. Macpherson in the chair of the supreme council of Bengal, and the refusal of Lord Macartney to occupy it, the directors took measures to find an appropriate successor to Hastings. This task was a difficult one, and their choice eventually fell upon Lord Cornwallis. He was appointed governor-general and commander-in-chief, and was the first upon whom the duty devolved of carrying out the act of 1784. General Sloper, who had previously assumed the command in chief of the army, was recalled upon a pension.

In 1787 the company made their first arrangements for an overland mail. In the same year means were arranged for securing an annual budget of Indian finance to lay before parliament.

In 1788, when the first struggles for liberty were indicated in France, fears were entertained in England that a war between the two countries would arise, from the principles put forth in popular assemblies in that country. The government of France was suspected of being anxious to divert the minds of the people from home topics to foreign conquests; and, as oriental dominion had always been a tempting object to the lovers of glory in France, reasonable fears were entertained in England that projects of fresh Indian wars would be matured. Lord Cornwallis saw,

or fancied he saw, symptoms of revived hope amongst some of the native princes that a coalition with some European power might be formed. He communicated these fears to the directors, and exercised increased vigilance upon the movements of the native chiefs, especially upon those of Tippoo Sultan. At this juncture, differences sprang up between the government at home and the court of directors, which led to intemperate discussions in the house of commons and among the proprietors of Indian stock.

In 1781 it had been decided by parliament that for every thousand men sent out for the defence of India by the government, the company should pay two lacs of rupees. Four regiments had been ordered to be raised for service in India in the latter part of 1787, and discussions arose as to the rank of the officers relative to those in the company's service. Petitions from the latter, as to the way in which they had been superseded and otherwise treated by the royal officers, caused discussions of an unpleasant nature in the court of directors, and a long, angry, and unsatisfactory correspondence between the government and the court resulted. In order to get rid of this difficulty, the directors declined accepting the services of the four regiments. The crown insisted on sending them out. The company refused, in that case, to pay for them. Thus matters stood when, on the 25th of February, 1788, Mr. Pitt brought in a bill to enable the crown to send out troops without the consent of the company, and to hold the company liable for their payment. The bill was opposed, and it ultimately passed both houses, containing clauses which limited the number of king's troops which might be sent to India, and maintained out of the revenue of that country.

In August, 1789, the directors appointed General Meadows to the government of Madras, and Colonel Robert Abercromby commander-in-chief of Bombay.

At the close of that year the directors made arrangements to reduce their military establishments, no danger such as had been apprehended having arisen from the political state of France. Lord Cornwallis was urged to consult economy in the reduction of the number of troops, native and European. At that very juncture a new and terrible war in India was imminent. It is remarkable how frequently, when the company were preparing for retrenchment in military expenses, the

political horizon became suddenly darkened and the thunder-cloud of war let loose its fires. Tippoo Sultan was once more preparing to brave the power of England.

The revenue settlements of Bengal occupied the attention of the directors as well as of the governor-general during 1789-90. What has been called the permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis received the approbation of the directors. The merits of Mr. Shore (the friend of Hastings) as a financier were brought out more fully than previously by the arrangements in connection with the permanent settlement. Mr. Pitt was greatly struck with the ability displayed, and his impressions of Mr. Shore's great talents led to that gentleman's selection as governor-general of Bengal, on the retirement of Lord Cornwallis. The permanent settlement was carried into effect by orders from the court of directors, in March, 1793, fulfilling one of the clauses of the bill of 1784, "That, to prevent future oppression, government were to be requested to fix an unalterable tribute rent." As the correspondence between Lord Cornwallis and the directors was frequent and their views concurrent, the measures taken by his government in civil affairs, although not originating at home, may in this chapter be properly referred to.

In 1793 district courts were established, for the satisfaction of litigants and the ends of justice. The same year his lordship invested the collection of revenue and the administration of justice in separate officers. In 1797 the British parliament substantially incorporated the regulations of Lord Cornwallis, in these and other respects, in an act for the internal government of Bengal. These "regulations" for the administration of law and revenue were mostly suggested by Hastings, in previous provisions of a less perfect order, according as circumstances arose in his day allowing of such.

Matters in India now assumed the aspect of impending war, and Lord Cornwallis prepared himself for the issue. In other chapters, the events of that war will be related; in this place it will be only necessary to say that English interests were exposed to fresh dangers, and English arms obtained fresh triumphs. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis was approved both by the company and the parliament. Thanks and honours were lavished upon him, and if he received much praise he deserved much. The war which his lordship had conducted to such a successful issue did not receive such cordial support in parliament. The pacific declarations of the act of 1784 were called for in both houses, and read. A motion was made

reaffirming the policy of that clause, in, if possible, stronger terms. Amongst the most ardent supporters of this motion was Lord Rawdon, who afterwards himself, placed in India in circumstances very similar to those of Lord Cornwallis, acted similarly to that nobleman, and had his conduct brought in question in a like way. It may indeed be affirmed that most of the eminent men in the British parliament who were forward to condemn the servants of the crown and company in India would, in the same circumstances, from motives of patriotism and justice, have felt themselves constrained to have acted an identical part.

On the 21st of September, 1792, the court of directors supposing that Lord Cornwallis would return to England sooner than he did, nominated Mr. Shore as his successor. The revolutionary proceedings in France alarmed the conservative susceptibilities of the English, and war was declared. Instructions to this effect were sent out to Lord Cornwallis, and were acted upon by his lordship with his usual wisdom and valour.

On the 23rd of January, 1793, the East India Company resolved, *nemine contradicente*, that the statue of Lord Cornwallis should be placed in the court-room of the India-house, in order "that his great services might be ever had in remembrance." In June following, another resolution was passed, also without a dissentient voice, granting his lordship an annuity of £5,000 as a reward for his services.

The year 1793 was one of importance to the East India Company, as the period approached when a new agreement must be made with the public. It soon became obvious that the just interests of the company, and those of India, were to be made subservient to political and interested parties at home, if their measures could be carried through parliament. The manufacturers of Manchester were not free-traders in 1793, and they raised a fierce clamour against the importation of piece-goods from India, and the exportation of any machinery to India, by which cotton cloth might be more cheaply produced. These demands were effectually resisted. The China trade of the company was, however, brought under modifications less in the interest of the company, and more in favour of the public. The company's charter was renewed for twenty years in spite of all opposition, personal, political, and commercial.

Edmund Burke opposed the appointment of Mr. Shore, now made Sir John Shore, on the ground of his friendship for Hastings. It was supposed that the new governor-

general would exercise an influence in India, with the company, and with the government, adverse to the party of which Burke was the head in the matter of the impeachment of Hastings. "The chair" replied to Burke in terms of becoming dignity, maintaining their prerogative, asserting the obligation which rested on them to select such high officials on the ground of personal fitness, and repudiating on their part all party motives. Sir John Shore was in England when this discussion arose. He entered upon the duties of government on the 28th of October, 1793. Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby assumed the office of commander-in-chief, under the court's appointment of September, 1792.

Lord Hobart, who was a nominee of Mr. Dundas, was appointed to the government of Madras on the 23rd of October, 1793. He was also nominated governor-general in case of the removal, from any cause, of Sir John Shore. Sir Charles Oakley, who was superseded by Lord Hobart, was, as a mark of respect, empowered to retain the reins of office for one month after his lordship's arrival at Fort St. George.

The company, having had its attention directed to Birmah, advised a mission from Bengal to the King of Ava. Captain Symes effected the purposes of the mission entrusted to him, which gave great satisfaction to the governor-general in India, and the directors at home.

Mr. Duncan was appointed to the government of Bombay in 1795.

In 1796 important military arrangements took place in London, under the supervision of the directors, by which batta and other extra allowances were fixed, a recruiting depot established, furlough regulations made, and retirement allowances for officers ordained, the entire expense of which amounted to the large annual charge of £308,000. A singular sentence was written at this time in the company's communications with the government in Bengal:—"That in reasoning upon political events in India, all conclusions, from obvious causes, must be liable to great uncertainty."

Lieutenant-general Sir Alured Clarke was appointed second in council, and commander-in-chief at Madras. He was sent out in view of a renewed war with Tippoo.

On the 24th of October, 1797, Sir John Shore was raised to the Irish peerage, in reward of his able services in India. The title bestowed upon Sir John was an odd one in connection with an Irish peerage, as it was connected with an English seaport, his style and title was Baron Teignmouth. His lordship's new honour was hardly needed to sustain his influence in India, where he only for a short time continued after his new rank

was conferred. In March, 1798, he returned to England. Previous to the return of his lordship, the Marquis Cornwallis was again nominated for the governor-generalship in India. Lord Hobart was not expected to remain in India, so that his provisional appointment would be of no avail. There were many questions open which it was supposed the Marquis Cornwallis was especially qualified happily to close. The military arrangements which at so much cost the company had formed were not well received at Bengal. Differences which arose when Hastings was in the chair of supreme government, and Lord Macartney in that of Madras, between the councils of Calcutta and Fort St. George, still continued; the difficulties connected with the debts of the Nabob of Arcot appeared to be interminable. Bengal required a supervision such as it had recently obtained from Sir John Shore, and formerly from Lord Cornwallis. Such were the leading reasons assigned by the directors for wishing to send to India again the statesman and general with whose former administration they had been so well satisfied.

The Marquis Cornwallis did not proceed to Bengal as intended. The public interests in the British Isles required that some statesman of great abilities and amiable disposition should be placed at the head of the Irish government. Thither he went. A terrible insurrection raged in that unhappy country in 1798, followed by another, confined to the capital, in 1803, which was led by the amiable, gifted, brave, and patriotic Thomas Addis Emmet. The followers of Emmet did not partake of his noble spirit and honourable principles. They attacked Lord Cornwallis, unattended and unarmed, dragged him from his carriage, and nearly murdered him. When Emmet learned the event, he no longer hoped for his country. He believed that he had commanded men ambitious of being soldiers, but whose ambition was satisfied with the rank of assassins. It is but just to them, however, to state, that when they learned who their victim was, they cursed their own weapons, and bitterly repented of the deed. The earl survived the attempt upon his life, and was destined at a future period again to govern India.

When the company found it impossible to obtain the services of Lord Cornwallis, their attention was fixed upon the Earl of Mornington. This nobleman had formed a taste for the study of Indian history and Indian affairs. When at Eton his education was conducted under the superintendence of Archbishop Cornwallis, who then resided at the palace of Lambeth, where, from 1771 to 1779, he was accustomed to pass the holidays. At the

palace he frequently met the Earl of Cornwallis and the members of his family, as they passed much of their time with the prelate, their kinsman.

When, in 1786, Earl Cornwallis assumed the governorship of Bengal, young Wellesley was led to conceive the idea that much interest was connected with the study of Indian literature and story. He had no purpose or notion of ever taking part in the affairs of that country, at all events, within the peninsula itself. In 1786 Lord Wellesley (as he then was) received the appointment of lord of the treasury. He then obtained a high reputation for scholarship, eloquence, and wisdom. In 1795 he was made one of the commissioners for the affairs of India. Up to 1797 he held both offices, and a seat in the privy council. The court of directors nominated him governor-general of India, and he accepted the charge. The common impression was that his lordship was unfit for the post, as ignorant altogether of Indian affairs. His able management in India afterwards led to the impression that he must have been a man of surpassing genius to form, so soon after his arrival, such just conceptions of the great task he had undertaken. These impressions were erroneous, except so far as that the genius of this remarkable man was such that had he gone to India ignorant of its affairs, he would have probably grasped the great subject, and mastered it under every disadvantage.

Every circumstance relating to the connection of such a man with India is interesting. M. Auber gives the following account of the outward voyage, its varied and important incidents, and the unexpected circumstances which furnished the earl with important information:—"Lord Wellesley had been requested to make a short stay in Madras, for the purpose of effecting a modification of the treaty with his highness the Nabob of Arcot in 1792. But as great importance was attached to an exact observance of treaties with the native powers, a principle so honourably established under the administration of Lord Cornwallis, no exertion of any other power than that of persuasion was to be used for the purpose of inducing the nabob to adopt any alteration of the treaty. Lord Wellesley embarked at Portsmouth on *La Virginie* frigate, on the 9th November, and on the 29th arrived at Madeira, where he was received with every mark of attention by the Portuguese authorities. On the following day the *Niger* frigate, with the *Surat Castle*, having on board Sir John Anstruther, who was proceeding to Bengal as chief-justice, accompanied by the whole of the convoy,

arrived off the island. In the night the ships of the fleet were obliged to slip their cables and put to sea, to avoid the effects of a sudden and tremendous storm. Lord Wellesley arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798, where he met with Major Kirkpatrick, the late resident at the court of Hyderabad, which post that officer had been constrained to quit, and to repair to the Cape for the benefit of his health. Lord Wellesley was, in some measure, aware that the increase of the French influence had occasioned considerable apprehension in the mind of Lord Teignmouth before he left India. His lordship, therefore, embraced the opportunity which the meeting with Major Kirkpatrick presented, to frame and submit a series of questions to that officer, whose replies enabled his lordship to form a more correct estimate of the importance to be attached to the subject. The result of his deliberations was communicated in a letter to Mr. Dundas, accompanied by his lordship's opinion on the value of the Cape, and more especially that of the island of Ceylon, to the interests of Great Britain. Ceylon had been placed under the Madras government since its capture in 1796. Accounts having reached Fort George in January, 1798, that the chief of the insurgents was in communication with the court at Kandy, and that apprehensions were entertained that the rebellious chiefs and the king might unite with the French and Dutch against the British interests, Lord Hobart proceeded to Columbo, in company with Admiral Rainier, on the 7th of July, for the purpose of securing those interests. Having effected the objects of his visit, he returned to Madras, and on the 18th announced his intention to relinquish the government, and to proceed to Europe. General Harris, the commander-in-chief at Fort St. George, succeeded provisionally to the government. In reparation for the disappointment and loss occasioned to Lord Hobart, who it could not be supposed would remain after two successors had been nominated to the office of governor-general since his lordship's appointment as successor to Sir John Shore in 1793, an unanimous resolution was passed by the directors, on the 8th of August, granting him a pension of £1,500 per annum, to commence from the time of his quitting Madras: which resolution was confirmed by the general court on the 6th of December, when the thanks of the company were also unanimously voted to his lordship for his able and meritorious conduct in the government of Fort St. George. In the same month the court of directors appointed Lord Clive (now Earl Powis) his successor. The question regarding the go-

vernment of Ceylon was yet undecided; but there were reasons to believe that it would be assumed by the crown. The Honourable Frederick North, in anticipation of this decision, having arrived at Bombay, addressed a private letter to Lord Wellesley, as he considered his lordship might be called to account 'for the arrival in India of a person unhoused, unappointed, unannealed,' who, with seven or eight more of his majesty's servants in embryo, like himself, had no security for their employment but the word of ministers."\* The island being declared a king's possession, Mr. North was confirmed in the government.

Lord Wellesley landed at Madras in April, 1798. On the 18th of May he reached Calcutta, and assumed his government. Scarcely had the governor-general arrived at his post, when the directors sent out the most rigorous instructions for his conduct. Tippoo was still the bugbear of "their honours," and they advised the noble governor not to wait for a declaration of war on the part of Tippoo, but if they found him engaged in any political coquetry with the French, war was to be declared forthwith. The directors were, no doubt, influenced in giving these directions by the advice of Lord Teignmouth. The company had arrived at the conviction, which was expressed at this period by General Craig—"A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India."

The year 1798 is rendered remarkable in Indian history by the fact that in it the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, left England for Madras at the head of the 33rd regiment, and embarked at Fort St. George on the 15th of August. So active were the measures of Lord Wellesley, that the court of directors were kept in continuous correspondence and in anxious consideration of his despatches, although, at the same time, their confidence never for a moment wavered, however vast the magnitude of the conceptions, the plans, or the undertakings of his lordship. The grand source of alarm to the directors was the French. Often as they had been beaten, they still survived in India, and with wonderful elasticity rose to influence again. With an exceedingly small amount of territory, they yet continued to form connections the most potential with the native courts, and to land stores of war and military forces dangerous exceedingly to the power of England when used to strengthen some great native power at war with her. Mogul, vizier, Mahratta, nabob, sultan, or rajah, whoever possessed French alliance, was formidable to England; and although England always won in the long run, the race of competition was

often close. France nowhere displayed against England an energy so unflagging as in India. Hence, the first care of the directors ever was to provide security against French influence, and by diplomacy to dissuade, or by battle to deter, all native princes from confederacy with France. These principles operated upon the court of directors in 1798-99 with more powerful influence than ever before: hence, every movement of the Earl of Mornington was watched from London with eager anxiety. His lordship's own mind was the reflex of the general mind of the company and of the country; and therefore his policy was popular in Britain, and met with the earnest and confiding support of the directors. The noble earl's government and policy sustained the favour they at first received. Both houses of parliament, the directors, and the proprietary of the company testified repeatedly and enthusiastically their respect for his lordship, and gratitude for his services; and when at length his labours terminated, he was rewarded with a pension of £5,000 a year as a tribute to his renown, and an acknowledgment of the great advantages he had conferred on the company.

During the year 1800 the services of Colonel Wellesley became highly appreciated by the court of directors and the government, by a variety of independent operations, which, although on a minor scale, were of great difficulty, and required a sound judgment and ready address.

Such were the leading events connected with the home proceedings of the company, and in relation to the company, during the part of the 18th century the history of which has not been written in previous chapters. It has been thought judicious to place the account of the relation of the government and the company at home during this period before the reader in a connected form, although so many great changes took place in India. The reader, having before his mind the whole outline of the company's affairs at home, the history of the leading official appointments, and the views of the directors, will be prepared to understand more clearly the conduct and policy of public servants in India, and to connect them with the mighty issues of war and peace in the peninsula. When the 18th century closed, English progress in India had made for itself already a grand page in history; British interests there had become vast, complicated, and profound; and a future was opened for the ambition and usefulness of England into which it was possible to look, as through a vista, however obscure the detail of the prospect, and however veiled its remoter forms.

\* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. ii. chap. v. p. 163.

## CHAPTER XCII.

MR. MACPHERSON SUCCEEDS HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—HIS FINANCIAL MEASURES—TIPPOO DEFEATS THE MAHRATTAS—LORD MACARTNEY SURRENDERS THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND REFUSES THAT OF BENGAL—AMBITION OF SCINDIAH—THE SIKHS BECOME IMPORTANT—EARL CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—HIS GENERAL MEASURES—TIPPOO INVADES TRAVANCORE.

THE last two chapters related the progress of home events connected with the East India Company, in such a manner as to bring before the reader the principal official personages in India from the period when Hastings retired from Bengal to the close of the century. The domestic policy of the Marquis of Cornwallis was also stated. The outline thus given of the proceedings and policy of the directors renders it unnecessary to dwell upon official changes and contests in India, so that the chapters relating the history of India during the fifteen years which intervened between the retirement of Hastings and the beginning of the nineteenth century may be occupied with the great political events which influenced so much the progress of the English and the destinies of the native states.

When Mr. Hastings withdrew from the government, Mr. Macpherson, as has been already shown, assumed the presidency of the supreme council. Scarcely had that gentleman taken upon him the onerous charge of governing India, when he found himself surrounded by fresh intrigues and difficulties among the native states. The condition of these states was restless as the sea. Scarcely was one movement quelled than another more disturbed began. No general policy could secure peace. The directions from home, the instructions from government house at Calcutta, were for peace; but the elements of disturbance were susceptible and powerful, and there were always influences to act upon them. The Mahrattas were rapidly rising into supremacy. Madajee Scindiah was the most potent of all the chiefs of that remarkable people, and his office of vakeel-ul-muluck to the Mogul greatly increased his influence. On the 27th of March Agra surrendered to Madajee, which he held in the name of the Mogul emperor. After his conquest of that great capital he marched for Delhi with the Mogul, detained only by the fortress of Allyghur, which had been armed and provisioned for twelve months, and which Scindiah could not approach except to reconnoitre.

Mr. Anderson was at this time the company's agent to the Mogul, and was, therefore, at head-quarters in the Mahratta camp. He found Scindiah so exalted by his conquests,

his assumed vicegerency of the Mogul dominions, and the services he had rendered to the English as mediator between them and the Mahratta confederation in the late Mahratta war, that he began to treat the company's officers with disrespect, and bore himself in such way to Mr. Anderson that he prepared to leave the Mahratta camp. Scindiah, alarmed for the moment at the probable consequences of driving away an agent and envoy of England by insult, offered many assurances that he had intended no affront. Mr. Anderson was induced to remain, but charged the Mahratta chief with meditating war against the company. Scindiah, placing his open hand upon his sword, said, "By my sword I swear I have no intention to make war." This, coming from a chief of such warlike and haughty reputation, caused Mr. Anderson to hope that no feud would break out between the company and the Mahratta power. Still Scindiah showed various tokens of hostility to the English. Among them that which excited most suspicion was the resistance which he offered to the residence of an English agent at the court of the Peishwa. This agent, Mr. Mallett, was sent from Bombay to Poonah; Scindiah received him with respect, but objected to his permanent residence at that capital. The comparative proximity of Poonah to Bombay, and the great amount of commercial business between the two places rendered a resident agent essential. A distance of eight hundred miles would have to be traversed, if Scindiah were the only medium of communication between the company and the Mahrattas. The supreme government determined to insist upon the recognition of the agent sent by them to the court of the Peishwa. The views of Scindiah against Tippoo Sultan tended further to sow dissatisfaction between him and the supreme council. The conduct of Tippoo to the Mahrattas was provocative of war. Hyder Ali had been little more than a nominal Mohammedan; he had little regard to "God or the prophet," if the will of either, as represented to him, stood in the way of his policy. Tippoo's principles were, on the contrary, drawn from the Koran. He believed himself to have been raised up as an avenger of the faithful and a scourge of the infidels,

and he made all the native states around him feel his wrath. The Mahrattas were heathen, and Tippoo believed that to convert such, under the threat of sword and fire, was a praiseworthy action. He was a Mohammedan fanatic, and infuriated in his fanaticism. He found means of compelling some sixty thousand Mahratta subjects, in one of the outlying provinces of that strange empire, to embrace Mohammedanism; and he put to death some thousands of Brahmins who refused to become followers of the prophet. His fury against native Christians rivalled that of the most terrible persecutors among the Roman emperors. Scindiah was as anxious to unite with the English in the chastisement of Tippoo, as he was to unite with any other power or powers for the humiliation of the English. The indications of the working of these desires in his mind rapidly increased.

In July, 1785, Scindiah made proposals for an alliance between the English, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas against Tippoo. The supreme government at Calcutta would neither listen to these overtures, nor permit the government of Bombay to do so. Scindiah considered this a breach of treaty; the supreme government thought so too, but were compelled to bow to the new act of parliament. The fierce Mahratta knew nothing of the parliament, but considered the English in India as a power which could not be bound to engagements, as when they became inconvenient or expensive, there were orders from home, from company, king, or parliament, which were made a pretext for violating such agreements. Tippoo and the Mahrattas fought it out, and the former was the conqueror. Scindiah was recalled to Poonah by the Peishwa, but refused obedience, and maintained ambitious wars on his own account. Pleading an especial treaty with the English, they reluctantly entered into an ambiguous agreement, promising aid to him as a Mahratta chief, but refusing to be compromised by his engagements with the Nizam. Thus complicated, during the government of Mr. Macpherson, were the connections of the English with the Mahrattas; while the latter by their own especial complications with the Mogul, the Sikhs, the vizier of Oude, and Tippoo, were involving the English in the meshes of an inextricable entanglement with native states, except so far as the judgment of Mr. Macpherson averted such confusion. This it was not in his power to do wholly, for the force of circumstances was too strong for him; but he showed much good sense and tact, and had considerable success in his measures to preserve peace, and keep the company free from the embroilments from

which none of the native states were long exempt.

The intrigues and activities of Scindiah continued; his quarrels were as widespread as India itself, and his fortunes were chequered:—"The vicissitudes of the different parties disputing for the last fragments of the Mogul empire were so sudden and incessant, that they baffled the keenest political foresight. Scindiah, after holding the power of prime minister for two years, was expelled from his office by a new combination of the Mogul chiefs. His army was defeated, and he himself obliged to fly to his own dominions. He was succeeded by various nobles, amongst whom was the infamous Gholam Kadir, by whom Shah Aulum was deposed and blinded. This outrage brought Scindiah again to Delhi; but the consolidated power of the British rendered him less formidable than he had been. The Prince Juwan Bukht, after several vain attempts to engage Nawab Vizir and the British government to aid him, and after one unsuccessful effort, in 1787, to re-establish himself at Delhi by force of arms, returned to Delhi, and died suddenly in 1788."\*

Amidst the general confusion and intrigues of native powers, the Sikhs at this time became prominent. While Mr. Anderson was at the camp of Scindiah, a person in the garb of a merchant came to him "Moolavee," and after offering to sell him some cloths, stated that he had rare jewels to show him in private. On withdrawing to examine the precious stones, the pretended merchant disclosed himself as a confidential messenger of Dooljah Singh, the Sikh chief. He stated that his prince was anxious for friendship with the English, as a protection against the ever-spreading encroachments of the Mahrattas. He informed Mr. Anderson that thirty thousand Sikhs were dispersed in various disguises between Pamput and Delhi, and ready to make a powerful demonstration at any well-concerted juncture. Mr. Anderson informed his government, which was anxious to avoid giving offence to the Mahrattas, and yet solicitous to avoid aiding by any indirect measure their progress. Mr. Hastings had foreseen that the great struggle in southern India, and in all India from Delhi to Madras, must ultimately be with them. He objected to any opposition to them, which by being premature, would impair the resources of the company, and consolidate the rival power. His successor was guided by these views, although he had never rendered to Mr. Hastings an effectual or generous support in that or any other department of his policy. Ultimately a pacific solution of the jealousies

\* Franklin's *Shah Aulum*, p. 159.

and differences between the Mahrattas and the Sikhs led to the latter placing five thousand horse at the service of the former, in case of any attack upon them by Tippoo.

Lord Macartney proceeded to Calcutta in June, 1785, on business connected with the pecuniary obligations of the Nabob of the Carnatic. While at Calcutta he learned that he had been nominated by the court of directors as the successor of Mr. Hastings. His lordship declined accepting the honour, although it was one he had long desired; and Mr. Macpherson as senior member of council, *ex officio*, remained at the head of the government. The resignation of Lord Macartney led to the appointment of Earl Cornwallis as governor-general, and Mr. Macpherson resigned the post which, as a *locum tenens*, he had so well filled. His administration was marked by the settlement of Penang as an English colony. The British cabinet recommended him to his majesty for a baronetcy. His services have been well summed up by Dr. H. Wilson in the following passage:—"With regard to Scindiah, the only important transaction that took place with him was his demand on behalf of Shah Aulum, of the tribute due to the Mogul, to the amount of four millions sterling. The demand was civilly, but peremptorily resisted by Sir John Macpherson's government, not, as might be supposed from the loose manner in which it is alluded to in the text, by that of Hastings. The leading feature of Sir John Macpherson's administration, however, was the eminent success which attended his efforts to reduce public expenditure, and re-establish public credit. In a minute in the secret department, dated 15th December, 1785, it is stated that a comparison of the receipts and disbursements of the year ending 30th April, 1786, exhibits a deficit of about £1,300,000. The arrears due to the armies of the three presidencies were about two millions. The ascertained Bengal debt alone was about four millions. The troops at Madras and Bombay were in a state of utter destitution, and some of them in open mutiny, from the great amount of their arrears. In this situation, the government of Bengal declared itself responsible for the debts of the three presidencies. All remittances of cash from the collectors' treasuries were prohibited, until the arrears of troops within or near their districts had been discharged. All civil servants, civil surgeons, and uncovenanted servants, drawing more than 300 rupees per month, were to be paid their salaries and all their arrears, with certificates bearing interest at 8 per cent. per annum until cashed. All issues of paper, on account of the company,

except the company's bonds, were ordered to be registered, the registry was to be published, and the paper was to be paid off in the order of its issue. The cash accumulating in the treasuries was to form a fund, by which the certificates and other paper were dischargeable; and under these arrangements, the governor-general and council publicly expressed their expectations that 'all the paper in currency at the end of 1785 would be paid off in the course of twelve months, through funds derivable from the amount of the reductions made in the established charges of the government, aided by the effects of these regulations, and the additional resources to be derived from the upper provinces.' These measures were made known to the public by advertisement in the *Official Calcutta Gazette*, 29th December, 1785, and 15th January, 1786. The orders were followed up by subsidiary arrangements, which completely altered the aspect of affairs. 'Every man in the settlement,' observed a competent authority on the spot, 'witnessed the magical effects of this measure. It operated like a charm in restoring public confidence, which once secured, this moving fund acquired life and activity. At no remote period from the commencement of the plan, treasury certificates could raise cash in the market at a discount less than the legal interest of the money. I shall ever bear grateful testimony of the salutary relief from ruin which the measure afforded to me, and to every trader in the settlement.\*' In a letter to the governor of Madras, from the governor-general, dated 20th May, 1786, he writes, 'In our reductions of expense, which have been very great (25 lacs), £1,250,000, I shall have cold praise, and a thousand secret enemies.' He received, however, in November, 1786, the unanimous thanks of the court of directors for his able administration of the affairs of India, and was raised by his majesty to the dignity of a baronet. It was during the government of Sir John Macpherson that, by an amicable arrangement with the King of Queda, the valuable settlement of Penang, or Prince of Wales' Island, was added to the company's eastern possessions."

On the 12th of September, 1786, Earl Cornwallis landed at Calcutta, and immediately took charge of the government. His investigations of the condition of the revenue were prompt, and his report to the directors was, that the department was worked in a manner the most unsatisfactory. The company's paper was at a discount; the estimated

\* Prinsep's *Proposal of a Substitute for Funding*, 1797.

and actual receipts of revenue were utterly discrepant, the former was stated as 92 lacs 59,000 rupees, but the actual receipt into "the khalsa" was calculated as 66 lacs 12,000 rupees. The debt was 6 crores 24 lacs, and bore interest at  $8\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. per annum. A month after his assumption of government, his lordship declared that the expenses of the establishments of the presidencies absorbed the whole revenue, and that investments for trading purposes could only be made by issuing paper, which would increase the evil. The native chiefs had heard of the fame of the new governor, and many of them repaired to Calcutta to pay their respects. The vizier sent his minister, Hyder Beg Khan, Mohammed Reza Khan, the nabob Mobarek-ul-Dowlah, and the Shah-zada; each sought a personal interview.

Among the early communications of Lord Cornwallis to the directors there were severe animadversions upon the condition of the company's army. Physically the natives were superior to the European recruits, according to his representations, and morally they were no worse, perhaps better. His lordship considered the loyalty of the sepoys doubtful.

In February, 1787, Sir Archibald Campbell entered into a new and especial arrangement with the Nabob of the Carnatic for the defence of his territory. The nabob was to contribute "to the peace establishment," per year, nine lacs of rupees. In time of war, the company was to undertake the defence of the province, the nabob seeing to the payment of revenue. The great advantage of this arrangement was, that it prevented the divided councils and interests, which had previously, especially in time of war, so much embarrassed the relations of the company with the nabob. A treaty similar to the former was made by the same diplomatist with Ameer Singh, the Rajah of Tanjore.

These important treaties were followed by another, in July of the same year, with Asoff-ul-Dowlah, the vizier nabob of Oude. The noble earl at the head of the company's affairs resolved that no interference with the internal affairs of the nabob's government should take place during his administration. His lordship forgave the vizier certain arrears due to the company, and urged upon him a more just administration of law in his dominions, and a system less oppressive to his people, pointing out, that from the contiguity of the territories, and the peculiar relations of the nabob and the company, oppression and injustice in Oude would endanger the security of that province, and thereby the territory of Bengal. In 1788 a treaty of commerce with

the vizier was effected on principles which both governments regarded as equitable and advantageous.

In 1788 Lord Cornwallis directed the attention of the company to the conduct and disposition of Tippoo, declaring that in case of a war in Europe between England and France, the latter power would be sure to ally itself with Tippoo, and as a consequence the Carnatic would once more be the theatre of a desperate and dangerous struggle. The Earl of Cornwallis felt convinced that a war between England and France was imminent, and his lordship knew that the intense desire of France to found an oriental empire was not diminished by former disappointment, disaster, and defeat. His lordship, on these grounds, intimated to the directors his purpose of watching Tippoo with unremitting vigilance. The governor-general was much engaged during the latter part of 1788 in negotiations with the nizam (or soubahdar) of the Deccan. Territory belonging to the English by treaty, was surrendered by his highness, and dubious passages in existing treaties settled and defined.

In July, 1789, an understanding was come to between the governor-general and the nizam, that a British contingent should be at the service of his highness, on condition that it should not be employed against any native state with which the company was at peace.

In 1788 Tippoo, aware that he was an object of jealousy and suspicion to the English, became peevish and affrontful to their agents. He also acted in an aggressive way towards the rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. He advanced towards the Malabar coast in a manner most menacing to the Travancore rajah, and instigated the Rajah of Cochin to claim the ground upon which "the lines of Travancore" were built. The Rajah of Travancore addressed a requisition for troops to the commander-in-chief of the British forces of Madras, upon hearing which, Tippoo retired upon Seringapatam. It was clear that the period rapidly approached when Tippoo and the English must try their relative strength once more upon the field of battle. Before, however, the trumpet of war summoned him to the scenes of strife, Earl Cornwallis had opportunity to devote his time to the adjustment of the "permanent settlement," in conjunction with the celebrated Mr. Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth. The measures of these two eminent persons required a number of years to mature. The arrangements for civil judicature, magistracy, and police, which ultimately gave an historical interest to the administration of Lord Cornwallis were discussed by him, and

the foundation laid for their execution in the interval of peace which took place between the first symptoms of a renewed struggle on the part of Tippoo, and the bursting forth of the impetuous torrent of his hostility.

The hour at length arrived when war with Tippoo must be proclaimed, however reluctant the governor-general to proceed to extremities, however desperate the state of Indian finance, and notwithstanding the peaceful resolutions of the English parliament in 1784, in reference to Indian affairs, and the consequent instructions to Earl Cornwallis to avoid by all means complications which would lead to war.

The precise circumstances out of which the war arose are sufficiently set forth in the formal demands of Tippoo upon the Rajah of Travancore, and the reply of the rajah. The demands, however, were only pretexts on the part of Tippoo to cover designs of aggrandizement. He set up pretensions for the sake of blinding the English government as to his real wishes. In this he succeeded, so far as the Madras government was concerned, which recognised the justness of Tippoo's demands, without any investigation of the merits of the case. The supreme council, however, certified themselves of all the particulars, pronounced the demands of Tippoo unjust, and his allegations false. All the native states in Southern India took the same view. The supreme government also pronounced heavy censure upon the want of intelligence and the pusillanimity, indolence, and neglect of duty on the part of the Madras government, several of the members of which it was necessary to displace:—"Towards the end of October, 1789, the army of Tippoo was known to be encamped in the neighbourhood of Palgaut; and the rajah was confirmed in his expectation of an attack. On the 14th of December, Tippoo arrived at a place about twenty-five miles distant from the boundary of Travancore, and the ravages of his cavalry were carried within a mile of the wall. On the following day a vakeel, a sort of character in which the capacities of a messenger and negotiator were compounded, arrived from the camp of the sultan, bearing a letter to the rajah. It contained the annunciation of Tippoo's demands: that, as the rajah had given protection within his dominions to certain rajahs, and other refractory subjects of the Mysore government, he should deliver them up, and in future abstain from similar offences. 2. That as the Dutch had sold to him that which was not theirs to sell, he should withdraw his troops from Cranganore. 3. That he should demolish that part of his lines which crossed the territory of Cochin, because it be-

longed to the kingdom of Mysore. The rajah replied: 1. That the rajahs of whose protection the sultan complained had obtained an asylum in his country, because they were his relations, at the distance of many years; that no objection to their residence had ever been taken before; that to prove his amicable disposition, they should nevertheless be removed; and that no refractory subject of the Mysore government had ever, with his knowledge, been harboured in Travancore. 2. That the fort and territory which he had purchased from the Dutch belonged to the Dutch, and was in no respect the property of the dependant of Tippoo. 3. That the ground on which he had erected his lines was ceded to him in full sovereignty by the Rajah of Cochin before that rajah became tributary to the sovereign of Mysore; and that the lines, existing at the time when he was included in the late treaty between the English and the sultan, were sanctioned by the silence of that important deed."\*

The events which immediately followed are summed up with precision and with admirable condensation by Mill:—"On the 24th of December Tippoo encamped at not more than four miles' distance from the lines; began to erect batteries on the 25th; early in the morning of the 29th turned by surprise the right flank of the lines, where no passage was supposed to exist; and introduced a portion of his army within the wall. Before he could reach the gate which he intended to open, and at which he expected to admit the rest of his army, his troops were thrown into confusion by some slight resistance, and fled in disorder, with a heavy slaughter, across the ditch. Tippoo himself was present at the attack, and, not without personal danger, made his escape.

"Intelligence of these events was received by the supreme government from Madras on the 26th of January; and on the morrow instructions were despatched to that presidency. The governor-general expressed his expectation that the Madras rulers had considered Tippoo as at war, from the first moment when they heard of the attack; that they had diligently executed the measures which he had formerly prescribed; and in particular, that all payments to the nabob's creditors, and all disbursements on the score of investment, had immediately ceased. He added, that his intention was to employ all the resources which were within his reach 'to exact a full réparation from Tippoo for this wanton and unprovoked violation of treaty.'"

The efforts of the governor-general to form especial alliances with the Mahrattas and with

\* Mill; Thornton; Auber.

the Nizam of the Deccan became at once urgent. The Mahrattas were so powerful that it became absolutely necessary to engage them on the side of the English. A junction between the Mahratta states and Tippoo would have compelled the nizam (as the Subahdar of the Deccan had become universally styled) to join the confederacy. With any amount of French aid, there could be but little hope of the English company, in the low state of its finance, being able to hold its own. The first serious victories gained by such an alliance would cause all the native states in India to make common cause against the British. The Mahrattas had been humiliated so recently by Tippoo in the field—such fanatical outrages in the name of Mohammed had been perpetrated upon Mahratta tribes by the orders or direct cruelty of Tippoo, and so great had become his power, that the Poonah government was willing to pledge the Peishwa to alliance with the English. The nizam's wishes lay in the same direction; but he feared, such robbers were the Mahrattas, that they would invade his territory as soon as it was denuded of troops in the common cause. This delayed all action on the part of the government of Hyderabad. The nizam was willing to march at once against Tippoo, if Lord Cornwallis would guarantee his territory against Mahratta invasion. His lordship dared not do that, from fear of offending the power against whom the guarantee was demanded. His lordship's diplomacy was surrounded by difficult and delicate conditions, and rare courage and address were required to bring out the company's "raj" safe through elements so conflicting.

The noble earl at the head of the government succeeded in accomplishing all that was necessary in the relations which he established with these rival powers. When the tidings of his measures reached England, the court of directors passed resolutions of satisfaction. The house of commons, having demanded explanations from the board of control, and manifested generally displeasure that war under any circumstances should break out with Tippoo, received with satisfaction the answers given by the president of the board of control, and expressed their approbation by a vote on the 2nd of March, 1791, in the following terms:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house that the treaties entered into with the nizam on the 1st of June, and with the Mahrattas on the 7th of July, are wisely calculated to add vigour to the operations of war, and to promote the future tranquillity of India, and that the faith of the British nation is pledged to the due performance of engagements contained in the said treaties."

A considerable party in parliament which did not object to the treaties, as contingent upon a war necessary and unavoidable, were of opinion that the war with Tippoo could have been averted, and wished to press parliament to a declaration to that effect. These movements arose from party opposition to the board of control, as a branch of the general government, on the part of some, and from jealousy of the East India Company, which always to a considerable extent existed in the commons. The result of the discussions which ensued was the following declarations:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the attacks made by Tippoo Sultan on the lines of Travancore on the 29th December, 1789, 6th March, and 15th April, 1790, were unwarranted and unprovoked infractions of the treaty entered into at Mangalore on the 10th March, 1784."

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the conduct of the Governor-general of Bengal, in determining to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultan, in consequence of the attack on the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious."

The governments of Madras and Bombay, which were most immediately concerned, were utterly unprepared for war. The council of Madras was full of apprehension, ready to submit to any terms Tippoo might dictate. Had it not been for the firm intervention of the supreme government, the honour and interests of the company would have been irredeemably compromised.

Sir Thomas Munro\* thus noticed the helplessness of the Madras government, the feebleness of its measures, and the impolicy of the unpreparedness for war in which the presidencies most concerned then were. Sir Thomas wrote from Amboor in January, 1790:—"A second attack is daily expected, and if the king is left alone, all his exertions against a force so superior can delay but for a very short time his ruin. The English battalions were behind the lines, but not at the place attacked: and it is said they have orders not to act, even on the defensive. If such be the case, the rajah ought to dismiss them with scorn. The distinction made between recent acquisitions and ancient territory appears to be a subterfuge of government to cloak their dread of war under a pretended love of peace, for Cranganore was a fair purchase of the Dutch from the Rajah of Cochin, subject to an annual tribute of thirty-five rupees. Before we can assemble an army to face the enemy, Tippoo may be in possession

\* Not to be confounded with Sir Hector Munro.

of Travancore. We have derived but little benefit from experience and misfortune. The year 1790 sees us as little prepared as that of 1780, and before the war. We shall commence the war under the disadvantage of a want of magazines. The distresses and difficulties which we then encountered from them have not cured us of the narrow policy of preferring a small present saving to a certain, though future, great and essential advantage."\*

Upon this letter, as illustrated by the events which followed, M. Auber thus remarks:—"Every word of this letter was almost prophetic. In the following spring Tippoo effected his objects. He subdued Travancore, laid waste the country, and took the fortresses of Cranganore and Jaycottah, possessing himself of all the northern portions of the province of Travancore. The conduct of the Madras government, during these proceedings, excited the strongest indignation in the mind of Lord Cornwallis. His lordship reprobated the supineness which they had manifested in making preparations to support the rajah, and adverted to the general state of the company's affairs on the coast, determined to take temporary charge of the government of Fort St. George, but relinquished his intentions on learning that General Meadows had been appointed to succeed Mr. Holland as governor."

General Meadows arrived on the 20th of February, 1790, and on March 31st wrote the following despatch to the directors:—"I found things in that state of confusion that is generally attendant on a change of systems. Whether a civil or a military governor is best, I shall not take upon me to determine; but either is certainly better, I conceive, than neither or both. We have a long arrear both from and to us. His highness the nabob is so backward in his payments, so oppressive to his polygars, that at this time it is so necessary to have on our side, that I conceive it will be absolutely necessary, upon his first material delay of payment, to take the management of his country into your own hands: a measure, in spite of the opposition to it, so advantageous to you, the country, and even to his highness himself, when so wisely projected and ably executed by Lord Macartney. I came here at a most critical period, with many things of importance to decide upon in a less time than many prudent people would have thought necessary to decide upon one: but the approaching war with Tippoo was one of the most important. I heard and read all upon the subject a short time would allow of, and then adopted the plan laid down by Colonel Musgrave, which

\* Private letters.

I thought the best, and which, from circumstances, it was very probable he would have to execute himself; for, in the present situation of the government, it is impossible I would leave it. I conceive the expense will be six lacs of pagodas a month, and can conceive anything but how or where we shall get the money, even stopping investments, &c. However unfortunate a war is, it should be made if possible short, brilliant, and decisive."

The suspension of the inefficient members of council, and the appointment of others in whom Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows had confidence, enabled the general before his despatch was sent away, to express his intention of leaving the government in the hands of the newly constituted council while he took the field against the enemy.

These letters of Sir Thomas Munro and General Meadows will make sufficiently clear to the reader the state of the English at Madras on the eve of the conflict in which they were once more destined to be conquerors.

The despatch of General Meadows gave great satisfaction to the directors, who entertained the highest confidence in the good sense and manly judgment of the general, as they also did in the statesmanlike qualities of Earl Cornwallis.

The war with Tippoo must occupy a separate chapter. It is in this only necessary to relate that the preparations for bringing the Mysorean chief to subjection were on a large scale as compared with those attending other Indian wars. General Meadows placed himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, assembled in the Carnatic. His plan of operations was to march to Coimbatore, and afterwards to enter Mysore, while the Mah-rattas and the army of the Deccan operated upon the north of the Mysorean territory. General Abercromby, at the head of eight thousand men, was concentrated upon the Bombay frontier to invade the possessions of Tippoo in the Ghauts. The council of Madras delegated to General Meadows, as governor of that presidency and commander-in-chief of its armies, the power of directing and conducting the war, and authority to make treaties or stipulations with the polygars of the Carnatic who upon Tippoo's frontier were disposed to join him, and such as upon the Travancore borders were at least hostile to the rajah. It was supposed that the nairs, especially certain of that order subject to Tippoo, could be induced to render the British an effectual support, and the governor had full authority conceded to him to enter into agreements with them.

The general joined his army on the 7th of May. "The centre army," as the despatches

call a force under Colonel Kelly, was ordered to take the field in July, to preserve the Carnatic itself from marauding and desultory incursions of the irregular Mysorean cavalry. In October the command of this force devolved upon Colonel Maxwell, on the death

of the commander just named. At that time the arrears of revenue to meet the expenses of the war amounted to twenty-two lacs of pagodas. Such were the preliminaries of another great war with a great native power in India.

## CHAPTER XCIII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—SUCSESSES OF COLONEL STUART—INVASION OF MYSORE—REVERSES OF THE BRITISH—INVASION OF THE CARNATIC BY THE SULTAN—SUCSESSES OF THE BOMBAY ARMY ON THE COAST OF MALABAR—ALARM AT MADRAS AND CALCUTTA—ARRIVAL OF EARL CORNWALLIS AT MADRAS.

THE importance, political and military, of not permitting Travancore to fall under the dominion of Tippoo must be obvious to the reader who studies its situation on the map of India, and observes its relative position to the territories then held by the Sultan of Mysore, and by the East India Company:—"The territory of the Rajah of Travancore commences near the island of Vipeen, at the mouth of the Chinnamangalum river, about twenty miles to the north of Cochin. From this point it extends to the southern extremity of India, bounded on the west by the sea, and on the east by the celebrated chain of mountains which terminate near the southern cape. The situation of this prince made a connection between him and the English of importance to both: he was placed at so great a distance that he had little to apprehend from the encroachments of the company; his country, which was only separated from their province of Tinnivelly by the ridge of mountains, formed a barrier to the invasion of an enemy into that province, and through that province into the Carnatic itself; the support of the company was necessary to preserve the rajah against the designs of such powerful and rapacious neighbours as Hyder Ali and his son; the productiveness of his dominions enabled him to contribute considerably to the military resources of the English; and, in the last war with Hyder, his co-operation had been sufficiently extensive to entitle him to be inserted in the treaty with Tippoo under the character of an ally. The descent of Tippoo, with an army, into the western country, filled the rajah with apprehensions. He was the only prey on that side of the Ghauts, opposite the dominions of Tippoo, which remained undevoured; and the only obstruction to the extension of his dominions from the Mahratta frontier to Cape Comorin—an extension attended with the highly-coveted advantage of placing him in contact with Tinnivelly, the

most distant and most defenceless part of the English possessions in Coromandel."\*

The importance of the territory thus described, and the dangerous policy of Tippoo, having determined the English to make war, it was at once energetically prosecuted. Lord Cornwallis relied much upon his native allies. The Mahrattas had already proved themselves formidable enemies even against English armies, and the Nizam of the Deccan possessed numerous troops, and, as the representative of the Mogul, possessed a certain influence over the religious prejudices of Mussulmen in the south of India. The directors had, however, with more judgment than their servants in India displayed when courting connection with the government of "the soubah" (as they were accustomed to call the nizam or soubahdar), pronounced the army of his highness a worthless rabble, and expressed astonishment that any reliance should be placed upon his troops. Yet it was well that the Mohammedan influence of the nizam should be on the side of the English, as Tippoo appealed to the fanaticism of the Mohammedans of Southern India in language naturally calculated to inflame it.† He gave himself out to be a descendant of Mohammed, as divinely inspired to restore the religion of that prophet, by destroying or proselyting all heathens and infidels. He was fired with the emulation of the great Saracen conquerors, who by the sword and the Koran desired to subjugate all men. His seal had inscribed in Arabic upon its centre, "I am the messenger of the true faith." Round the seal in Persian verse was inscribed:—

"From conquest, and the protection of the Royal Hyder, comes my title of Sultan; and the world, as under the Sun and Moon, is subject to my signet."

Tippoo was the first Mohammedan prince

\* Mill.

† Malcolm's *Political History of India*. Penhoen's *Empire Anglaise*, vol. iv. p. 54.

in India who formally and openly disclaimed the authority of the great Mogul; and who impressed coin with his own effigy and titles.\* This was the more singular as he was a fanatic of Islam, and the Mogul was the Padishaw of all true believers within the bounds of India. Tippoo probably reconciled the inconsistency by his claim of descent from the prophet, and inspiration from God. Hyder Ali had certainly set his son an example of non-allegiance to the sceptre of Delhi; but the independence of the father, although real was not ostensible, and although avowed was never declared formally. It was fortunate that the English army, both of the company and of the crown, at that period serving in India, was in an excellent condition, and in some degree prepared to cope with emergencies.

The following representation of the state of the British troops by an officer well acquainted with the history of the period is correct:—"There were in India, in 1788, a regiment of British dragoons, nine regiments of British, and two of Hanoverian infantry, in all about eight thousand European troops, in addition to the company's establishments. Several of the first officers in the British service were in command in that country; and a system was established, which, by joining the powers of governor to those of commander-in-chief, united every advantage which could give efficacy to the operations of war. The discipline, which had lately been ordered by the king for establishing uniformity in his army, was now equally practised by his majesty's and the company's forces in India. The field equipment was refitted and enlarged at the several presidencies; and every preparation made to act with the promptitude and effect which unforeseen exigencies might require. Public credit, increasing with the security afforded to the country, and also in consequence of like able arrangements in the conduct of the civil line of the government, the company's funds rose daily in their value; and their affairs, as stated to parliament by the minister at the head of the India department, were not only retrieved from supposed ruin, but soon appeared to be in a state of decided and increasing prosperity."†

In an army thus constituted and uniform, the commanders might well have confidence even against the well-trained and numerous hosts of the Sultan of Mysore. At no previous period had the company such a military force. For the first time the royal troops and those

\* Major Rennell's *Memoir of Tippoo Sahib*, p. 71.

† *Narrative of the Campaign in India, which terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan in 1792*. By Major Diron, deputy-adjutant-general of his majesty's forces in India. London, 1793.

of the company met in mutual good feeling and respect. Much of this resulted from the regulations which had been made a short time before, both in parliament and in the court of directors; much more, however, depended upon the impartiality and justice of Lord Cornwallis, who dealt equally by all, whether royal or company's soldiers, excluding all sinister influences, ignoring cliques at Calcutta, and simply doing what in his judgment was best for the army and the government. Lord Macaulay well observes, in reference to a very different man, "No man is fit to govern great societies who hesitates about disobliging the few who have access to him, for the sake of the many whom he will never see." Lord Cornwallis had this quality for governing great societies, as well as many other rare gifts. The neglect previously permitted to prevail in preserving the country in a proper state of defence was at last redeemed:—"The Carnatic, which had been the seat of the former, and would probably soon be the seat of a future war—at least the scene where our army must assemble, and the source whence it must be supplied—required extraordinary exertion of military arrangement to prepare it for the operations of defensive or offensive war. To protect a weak and extensive frontier; to discipline a detached army; and to provide resources in a lately desolated country, fell to the lot of Sir Archibald Campbell. Skilled in every branch of military science; with knowledge matured by experience in various countries and climates; indefatigable in all public duties, and endued with a degree of worth and benevolence which attached to him all ranks in the army, and excited voluntary exertion in every officer to second the zeal of his general, he had a task to perform, which, though great and complicated, was not beyond the reach of such distinguished talents. Granaries were established in the frontier and other stations in the Carnatic, containing supplies for near thirty thousand men for twelve months; and furnished in such a manner as to provide against the exigencies of famine or of war without incurring additional expense to the public; a complete train of battering and field artillery was prepared, surpassing what had ever been known upon the coast; a store of camp equipage for twenty thousand men was provided; the principal forts were repaired, and more amply supplied with guns and stores; the cavalry were with infinite difficulty completed to their full establishment; and a general uniformity of discipline and movement was established in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery."\*

\* *Narrative of the Campaign.*

Authorities differ as to whether Tippoo was prepared for the bold measures of the English. Finding, as he did, that the Madras government was timid and temporising—that at Bombay they considered the attack upon the lines of Travancore as not necessarily involving war with the British, he was surprised, it is alleged, when Earl Cornwallis treated that circumstance as tantamount to a declaration of hostilities against the East India Company. Other authorities give Tippoo credit for the nicest discrimination as to the characters of those with whom he had to do, and for having foreseen the course which things would take, for which he amply prepared himself.

The plan of operations by the army of Madras was determined by a report of Colonel Fullarton's, made after the previous war with Tippoo. The colonel averred that the most direct route from the Carnatic through the passes of the Ghauts, or the southern boundary of Mysore, was practicable. General Meadows resolved accordingly to ascend the Ghauts, and march upon Seringapatam. This route was more remote from Madras than that upon the northern boundary, through the Baramahl. The southern road, however, lay through a well-watered, grain-producing country, and where forage and cattle might be procured. General Meadows fixed his point of support at Coimbatore, and directed Colonel Stuart to begin hostile operations by attacking the forts in the low country before ascending the Ghauts. These strongholds could not have been left behind while entering the enemy's territory, and yet to reduce them must cause considerable delay, unless a small corps of the army could effect the purpose.

About thirty miles to the west of the basis of operations chosen by General Meadows, stood the strong post of Palgaut, which was considered as a bulwark opposed to an army advancing against Mysore in that direction. As Stuart marched to Palgaut, he encountered the first burst of the monsoon, which strikes that part of the peninsula with unexpended fury. It smote the British column: the country was laid under such a deluge as defied military operations; while the storm, as if wielded by the hand of a living foe, swept away the tents of the campaigners, dispersed their cattle, and all but utterly disorganized the force. Stuart arrived at Palgaut, and made formal summons for its surrender, which was all he could do at such a season. He returned to Coimbatore, and was thence dispatched to Dindigul in the south-east, a hundred miles distant from Palgaut. These long marches wearied the troops excessively, and many of the baggage animals died *en route*.

He soon found that his appliances for reducing Dindigul were insufficient. It was the custom of the British to neglect the proper means of reducing strong places, and to rely on the courage and physical strength of their men, reckless of the sacrifice of human life thus incurred. A very imperfect breach was made by the time that nearly all Stuart's ammunition was expended. He stormed this breach and was repulsed, notwithstanding the most desperate valour on the part of the troops. This display of daring intimidated the enemy notwithstanding their success, and being ignorant that the English were short of provisions, terms of capitulation were offered, which, of course, Stuart was glad to accept. When he arrived again at head-quarters, he was once more ordered to lay siege to Palgaut. The weather was now mild and radiant, and the earth was cooled by the monsoon; his army, therefore, made a rapid and healthful march against the object of their attack. Some delay was, however, created by the large train of heavy artillery which Meadows ordered to accompany the force, under the belief that a very considerable resistance would be offered. Such belief was unfounded. On the morning of the 21st of September, before all the batteries were opened, those of the fort were silenced after a feeble fire. The garrison surrendered, making only one condition, that they should be protected from the nairs in the British service, who were furious against Hyder for his recent persecutions of them.

While Colonel Stuart was thus occupied, General Meadows prosecuted with ardour and address his ascent of the Ghauts. The campaign conducted by that general has been severely criticised and warmly defended. Probably the most impartial and clear account, in a brief compass, is that of an officer of engineers, and author of a history of British India—Hugh Murray, Esq. Having described the plan of operations by which the general reached the high table-land of Mysore, Mr. Murray says:—"A chain of posts along the rivers Cavery and Bahvany, namely, Caroor, Eroad, Sattimungul, had been successively reduced; and the last of these, commanding the important pass of Gujelhutty, which opened the way into the heart of the country, was occupied by Colonel Floyd, with a force of two thousand men. By this arrangement the different corps were very ill-connected together; for General Meadows at Coimbatore was sixty miles distant from the division of Floyd, and thirty from that of Stuart. The second of these officers pointed out the danger of his situation, and the intelligence he had received that the enemy was collecting a great force to attack

him; but the commander paid no attention to this warning, and ordered the detachment to continue in its present position. The Mysore cavalry, under Seyed Saheb, had indeed, in their attack, been very easily repulsed, and even compelled to retire behind the Ghauts; still, this failure of the advanced guard under a pusillanimous chief afforded no ground to judge of what might be expected when the whole force under the sultan himself should be brought into action. Early in September his horsemen were seen in large bodies descending the Ghauts; and as, when crossing the Bahvany at different points, they endeavoured to surround the handful of English and sepoys, the latter soon felt themselves in a very critical situation. They nevertheless made a gallant defence, and the enemy, having entangled their columns in the thick enclosures which surrounded the British position, were charged very effectually with the bayonet, and several squadrons entirely cut off. The Mysoreans, however, still advanced with increasing numbers, and opened a battery, which did great execution among the native soldiers; yet these mercenaries stood their ground with great bravery, saying—'We have eaten the company's salt; our lives are at their disposal.' They accordingly maintained their position, and Tippoo thought proper to withdraw during the night to the distance of several miles: but the casualties had been so very severe, and the post proved so untenable, that Colonel Floyd considered it necessary in the morning to commence his retreat, leaving on the field three dismounted guns. The sultan, at the same time, having mustered his forces, began the pursuit with about fifteen thousand men, and after mid-day overtook the English as they retired in single column. The latter, repeatedly obliged to halt and form in order of battle, repulsed several charges; yet, as soon as they resumed their march, the Indians hovered round them on all sides. They were compelled to abandon three additional guns, and their situation was becoming more and more critical, when some cavalry being seen on the road from Coimbatore, the cry arose that General Meadows was coming to their aid. This report, being favoured by the commander, was echoed with such confidence through the ranks, that though Tippoo had good information as to the real fact, he was deceived, and withdrew his cavalry. Colonel Floyd was thus enabled to prosecute his retreat towards the main army, which had already marched to meet him, but by a wrong road; so that the two divisions found much difficulty, and suffered many hardships, before they could rejoin each other. The English, in the course of

these untoward events, had lost above four hundred in killed and wounded; their plans for the campaign had been deranged; the stores and magazines formed on the proposed line of march lay open to the enemy, and were therefore to be removed with all speed. General Meadows, notwithstanding, resumed offensive operations, and had nearly come in contact with the army of the sultan; but this ruler, by a series of manœuvres, evaded both him and Colonel Maxwell, then stationed at Barmahl, and by a rapid march descended into the Coromandel territory."

Tippoo menaced Trichinopoly, but being desirous to make a wide circuit of devastation in a short time, he wheeled to the north, and ravaged the Carnatic. His mode of procedure was similar to that of his father when the latter marched to Madras, but either being poorer or more politic, instead of wasting all in his course by fire, as Hyder did in a large portion of his progress, levied "black mail," and so successfully, that he realized a considerable augmentation of his stores and treasury. The opposition which he met was nearly as slight as that which his predecessor experienced when English power was less, and the Madras presidency not so capable of resisting an invasion. Tippoo approached Pondicherry, and negotiated with the French; but their orders from home at that time were peremptory, to come to no terms with him hostile to the English. This disheartened Tippoo, who had already encountered a desperate resistance at Thiagar, from a British officer of talent named Captain Flint, the same who in the previous war had met him with such gallant warfare at Wandiwash.

General Meadows, who in single actions fought with skill, and was industrious and brave, was not equal to the complicated movements of a campaign on so wide a theatre, and in so difficult a country. He was in fact out-generalled by Tippoo, and was at this juncture reduced to great straits. Neither his courage nor activity failed him, but he still talked of offensive operations when he was not able, with the force left at his command after disasters so numerous and so recent, to defend the Carnatic.

The campaign against Tippoo had proved unsuccessful. The British were compelled to resign their footing in the territory of the sultan, while he, descending from his highlands, negotiated with their rivals under the walls of Pondicherry, reduced the English garrisons of the Carnatic, and caused alarm at Madras itself. Meadows had still a fine body of men under his command, but they were not concentrated, were not strategically well situated, and were, numerically, so

inferior to the forces of Tippoo, that their very existence was in jeopardy.

During the progress of these events General Abercromby, at the head of the Bombay army, effected too little to influence the results of the campaign. When Tippoo was before Pondicherry, engaging a Frenchman to go on a mission to the court of Louis XVI. for troops, whom he was ready liberally to subsidize, Abercromby was busy on the coast of Malabar. His activity there was of importance to the second campaign, so soon about to commence, but was not effectual either in relieving Meadows, retrieving his reverses, or preventing the descent of Tippoo upon the coast of Coromandel.

On the 14th of December Abercromby took Cannanore. His previous delays enabled him to put his army in fine condition, so that the whole coast of Malabar was swept by his troops, every fort and place of arms belonging to the enemy surrendering at discretion, while Tippoo was equally triumphant on the eastern shores of the peninsula. The victories of Abercromby were not so influential upon the war as those of Tippoo. The Malabar coast was not so important a theatre of action as that of Coromandel.

When tidings of these things reached Calcutta, the supreme council and the governor-general were much alarmed. Earl Cornwallis still entertained the highest respect for the gallant Meadows, and for his capacity on a limited sphere of action, or as second in command; but he did not feel justified in any longer entrusting the military

conduct of the war to him. The tidings of occurrences on the Malabar coast did not reach Calcutta until a considerable time after the desperate state of the Carnatic was known there. Lord Cornwallis feared that under the influence of the reverses which had befallen the British, the nizam, or the Mahrattas, perhaps both, might make separate peace, and abandon the alliance. No confidence could be placed in their professions at the outset of the war; and as no prospect seemed to exist of the conquest and dismemberment of the country of Tippoo, it was not unlikely that they would not only give up their English ally, but join the sultan in his invasion of the English territory.

As early as the 29th of January, 1791, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras with six battalions of Bengal infantry, under Colonel Campbell, and a large supply of ammunition and military stores, with heavy guns. He immediately assumed the command of the Madras army, and lost no time in preparing everything for a new campaign. After consultation with the Madras council and his officers, he resolved upon a plan of campaign different from the former, except in the main purpose of somewhere ascending the Ghauts with the chief force at his disposal, and carrying the war into the Mysorean country. He ordered General Meadows to join him, and so energetic and prompt was his lordship's conduct of affairs, that within a week after he landed in Madras, he took the field. The second campaign will form the subject of a separate chapter.

## CHAPTER XCIV.

SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN—LORD CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—HE ENTERS MYSORE—FORCES THE LINES OF SERINGAPATAM—LAYS SIEGE TO THE CITY AND FORTRESS—IS OBLIGED TO RAISE THE SIEGE—GENERAL ABERCROMBY COMPELLED TO RETIRE—SUFFERINGS OF LORD CORNWALLIS'S ARMY.

THE policy of Tippoo towards the English was supposed by the governor-general to depend upon the aid which he received from the French. It was presumed by the British commander that, at all events, Tippoo's mode of conducting the war would depend upon the prospect of the co-operation of a French force in the Carnatic. The sultan was determined, with or without the French, to sustain a war in which he had been so far successful; for he believed that the defensive power of Mysore was such as to baffle all the efforts and sacrifices which the East India Company could make to conquer it, while its

geographical position and character were such as would enable an energetic sultan, with military talent, at any time to invade and plunder the low-lying lands of the English on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. He believed that a very moderate amount of French aid in officers and men, especially in the engineer department, would enable him to conquer Madras, which he felt confident would be followed the next season by the conquest of Bombay. The sultan even boasted that with ten thousand auxiliary French he would march across the country, and burn or retain Calcutta.

The first purpose of the general was to elude Tippoo, leaving him in the Carnatic to do his worst there, and ascend the Ghauts before the sultan could either intercept him or perceive his plan. For this end his lordship marched to Vellore, and made as though pressing for Amboor, *en route* to the passes nearest and opposite to Madras. Tippoo, astonished and alarmed by tidings to this effect, which the English took care to have conveyed to him, disposed his resources to prevent the accomplishment of what he presumed must be the intention of the British chief. Had Lord Cornwallis purposed to adopt that plan, the rapidity of his movements, and the suddenness of his departure from Madras, would probably have enabled him to do so in spite of Tippoo; but in that case the sultan would have hung upon his rear, and he would have been embarrassed in his march. Tippoo was very unwilling to leave the vicinity of Pondicherry until he had secured the co-operation of the French, and was thus led to make delay which he was unable afterwards to redeem. He was also less prompt to move, because he had a large force of light cavalry, in which he knew the English were deficient, and he concluded that he could easily outmarch them, and intercept them at a moment sufficiently opportune to prevent their marching through the passes, towards which he supposed they would proceed from Amboor. The English commander, however, by a sudden detour to the right, and marching with great celerity for four days, came upon the northern pass of Moogler. There a body of the enemy was posted as a guard, but they were without any suspicion that an English force was near them, and were surprised, many were slain or captured, and the remnant were routed. By another rapid march of four days, the English general placed his army on the high plains of Mysore. The suddenness of his appearance there struck terror to the foe. Messengers arrived at the head-quarters of the sultan, informing him of these feats of generalship, which filled him with greater consternation than even the presence of an English army in the centre of his patrimonial territory.

Tippoo, leaving all his conquests in the Carnatic, hurried with so much rapidity as to throw his army into disorder, and ascended the Ghauts by the passes of Changana and Policode. He seemed bewildered, acting on no plan, his rapidity was that of panic, not of generalship. Notwithstanding his celerity of march, he expended time on matters of inferior motive, and personally attended to the removal of his harem from Bangalore, when he ought, at the head of his army, to

have hung upon the flanks of his invading enemy. The English laid siege to the fortress of Bangalore on the 5th March. Thus, in one month, by marches and manœuvres worthy of a general, Tippoo was obliged to evacuate the Carnatic, his country, guarded so strongly by nature, was penetrated without resistance, and a powerful British force sat down before the second city in his dominions.

The English began their operations against the place with the utmost vigour, but various misadventures on the part of Lord Cornwallis's officers against the army of Tippoo, which harassed the English flanks, caused serious loss in men, and very great loss of horses, many of which were captured or stabbed by the irregular troops attending the sultan's army:—"Another enterprise, which proved somewhat hazardous, was the carrying of the fortified town of Bangalore, a place of very considerable extent and importance. It was surrounded with an indifferent wall, but the ditch was good, and the gate was covered by a very close thicket of Indian thorns. The attack was made, too, without any due knowledge of the ground; and the soldiers, both in advancing and in endeavouring to force an entrance, were exposed to a destructive fire from turrets lined with musketry. Colonel Moorhouse, one of the most accomplished soldiers in the service, received four wounds, which proved fatal. At length, when the gate was almost torn in pieces, Lieutenant Ayre, a man of diminutive stature, forced his way through it, and Meadows, who preserved an inspiring gaiety in the midst of battle, called out, 'Well done! now, whiskers, try if you can follow and support the little gentleman!' On this animating call, the troops dashed into the town; though its great extent rendered the occupation difficult. Tippoo likewise threw in a strong corps, which renewed the contest, opening a heavy fire with small arms; but when the English betook themselves to the bayonet, they drove the enemy with irresistible fury through the streets and lanes, and soon compelled them to evacuate the pettah. Our loss, however, amounted to one hundred and thirty-one."

The fortress was breached on the 21st. It was not in a condition to be stormed, but the energy of Tippoo seemed to have returned, and he was making such prodigious exertions for the relief of the place, that it was deemed necessary, even at a great sacrifice, to capture the stronghold as speedily as possible. The commander-in-chief, after consulting with his officers, ordered the assault to be made that night. This was good generalship. The enemy had no expectation that the night following the day on which an im-

perfect breach appeared, an assault would be attempted; not a man in the fortress entertained such an idea. The night was bright with all the beautiful clearness of tropical moonlight, so that the breach could be distinctly seen from the lines, and the dusky sentinels of the sultan pacing to and fro on the battlements. The signal for attack was a whisper along the ranks from the front of the assaulting column to the rear. They were ordered then to advance in silence, and with rapidity. At eleven o'clock the column advanced, treading lightly along the covered way, and then emerging with a rush, they planted the ladders, and the forlorn hope was within the place before the enemy were aroused to their danger. The drums of the sultan beat to arms, the killidar leading his troops rushed to the post of danger, but the English had already driven in troops posted near the breach, and spreading to the right and left around the wall, penetrated the place. A fierce hand to hand encounter ensued, but the English had learned from their chief the advantage in war of promptitude and celerity, and poured in, charging with the bayonet, and strewing their way with slaughtered enemies. The governor and the defenders fought bravely but vainly, the bayonets of the English like a torrent of steel swept all before them, and in a very short time the place was mastered.

Tippoo received the intelligence with despair, and even with stupor. He had expected the assault some days later, and was prepared with a stratagem to raise the siege at the period when his spies should announce to him that the storm was to take place. The suddenness of Lord Cornwallis's movements perpetually disconcerted his plans, and rendered useless his superior numbers and great resources.

The capture of Bangalore strengthened the governor-general every way, but he did not find there such supplies of provisions and forage as the exigencies of his army required, and the deficiency of his supplies of this nature from all sources now became serious. Instead of advancing upon Seringapatam, the sultan's capital, he was obliged to proceed northward on a gigantic foraging expedition, and also in the hope that the rear-guard of what the nizam called his army might arrive, which, as it was sure to plunder the country in its course, would be well supplied, and part freely with those supplies for money. Ten thousand horse made their appearance, as was expected. The astonishment and disappointment of the English general could not be suppressed when he beheld this force. Unacquainted with Indian warfare, and with the natives of

Southern India, his excellency had formed no conception of the sight which now met his eyes. Wilks, the historian of the Mahrattas, amusingly describes them thus:—"It is probable that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe contains any arms or articles of personal equipment which might not be traced in this motley crowd. The Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Seythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, matchlocks of every form, and metallic helmets of every pattern. The total absence of every symptom of order and obedience, excepting groups collected round their respective flags, every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory." These wild heroes had neither provender nor provisions. The governor-general ordered them to relieve the harassed light horsemen of his army on the outposts, but they took no notice of the duties imposed on them, and engaged themselves altogether in plundering the enemy, when on outpost duty, and stealing from their allies when in camp.

The condition of the English now became truly alarming. Tippoo had laid waste the country. No supplies could be obtained. The governor-general determined to advance upon the capital, and by one bold stroke, if possible, frustrate his enemy and end the war. He had no carriage, and from this circumstance the march assumed a singular aspect. The troops, officers, and men, sutlers, followers, women, and even children, carried the ammunition. Swarms of camp followers, and nairs, each carrying a cannon-ball, exhibited an aspect of earnestness and oddity such as no army before probably ever displayed. "The British army marched over the barren heights above the valley of Milligotah, and there commanded a view of the mighty fortress of Seringapatam,—the nest of hewn stone, formidable even in the eyes of the British soldier, where Tippoo had brooded over his ambitious designs, and indulged his dreams of hatred in visionary triumphs over the strangers who had so lately imposed a yoke on Asia. Nature and art combined to render its defences strong. An immense extended camp without the walls held the flower of the sultan's troops."\*

Tippoo prepared to abandon his capital, or at all events to remove his treasures and his harem to Chittledroog, a place built upon a towering rock supposed to be impregnable. The mother of the sultan, and some of his wives, upbraided him for his want of spirit,

\* *History of British Conquests in India*, vol. i. p. 185. By Horace St. John.

reminded him that such a movement would alarm his people, and with stinging reproaches urged him for once to give battle to the English upon the open field, and by his resolution and numbers overwhelm them. He selected a position with good military judgment, and prepared to occupy it with obstinacy. Drawing up his fine army on a range of heights above the Cavery, upon an island in which Seringapatam stood, he thus placed himself between his capital and his hitherto conquering enemy, and dared the issue. Lord Cornwallis made a skilful movement against the left flank of his opponent. Tippoo threw up redoubts on precipitous hills, which covered that part of his position, and as his army was numerous, he could spare men to occupy all those outposts in strength. The guns of the sultan commanded in every direction the approaches of the English, while the nature of the ground over which they must march to storm the heights was so broken by natural and artificial inequalities, that the English could not silence the fire of the Mysoreans, nor adequately cover their own advance. Through all difficulties, in spite of the most terrible cannonade, midst showers of rockets, and confronted by deadly ranges of small arms, the English reached their enemies, steel to steel, and dislodged them from every eminence. Every rocky elevation was the scene of a separate conflict. With the same steady advance over crag and ravine, up the steep acclivity, and through the fiery flight of the enemy's missiles, the English pressed their unrelenting way, occupying each post only when clashing bayonets and sabres had, with brief and decisive execution, closed the mortal strife. The enemy fled at last for shelter under the walls of the strong city. Five hundred British lay upon the slopes and summits of the contested ridges. The enemy perished in far greater numbers. This was accounted for by the mode in which the British fought. As the lines of flashing bayonets crested the well defended hills, they were lowered with quick precision, and searched with sure and sanguinary aim the over-crowded masses of the enemy. Then from the summits so well won, the English musketry poured a deadly fire upon the fugitives, who fell fast until pursuit could add no victims to vengeance, or glory to victory.

The deficiency of food for the men, and of any kind of fodder for the cattle, rendered it impossible for the British commander to remain long enough before Seringapatam to capture it. To retreat seemed almost as difficult. It was only possible by the sacrifice of all his baggage and stores, and of his splendid battering train. His lordship

has been criticised severely by some for advancing at all against the capital, where he knew the resources of Tippoo were concentrated, in the state of destitution as to supplies of his army. It has been explained by some on the ground of the reasonable alarm entertained by his lordship of the immediate action of the French on the side of Tippoo. Intelligence of the French revolution had reached the governor-general, he apprehended that war between France and England would once more involve India in its vortex, and that the Carnatic would be, as before, the necessary theatre of battle. Under these exciting apprehensions, it has been said that his lordship acted with a precipitancy in beginning his march upon Seringapatam from Bangalore, out of keeping with his usual coolness of judgment. At all events, the hour for retracing his steps arrived. The fine material of his army was abandoned or destroyed, and a retreat commenced, in which his men, wearied and hungry, fell back reluctantly from before a foe they had vanquished, and just when the prize appeared within reach.

His lordship was not only obliged to retreat himself, but to countermand those forces which were hastening with all speed to his support. In the last chapter the successes of General Abercromby, on the Malabar coast, were noticed as contemporaneous with the campaign of General Meadows, and a part of the latter's plan of operations. When Lord Cornwallis began his march from Madras, Abercromby was directed to operate from the low lands of Malabar, and, if possible, ascend the Mysore country, so that it would be taken, as might be said of an army, on both flanks at once. Abercromby met with an ally who facilitated his enterprise. The people of Coorg were the enthusiastic enemies of Tippoo, on account of his civil oppressions and religious persecutions. Their youthful rajah, after a long captivity, had lately contrived to effect his return. The greater part of his subjects were groaning in exile; but in the depth of the woody recesses there was still a band of freemen, who rallied round him with enthusiastic ardour. By a series of exploits, that might have adorned a tale of romance, the young prince recalled his people from the distant quarters to which they had been driven, organized them into a regular military body, drove the oppressors from post after post, and finally became undisputed ruler of Coorg, expelling the Mohammedan settlers who had been forcibly introduced. A common interest soon united him in strict alliance with General Abercromby, who thus obtained a route by which he could transport his army, without opposition, into the elevated plain.

The conveyance of the heavy cannon, however, was a most laborious task, as it was often necessary to drag them by ropes and pulleys up the tremendous steeps which form on this side the acclivity of the Ghauts. At length the general had overcome every difficulty, and was in full march to join Lord Cornwallis, when he received orders to retreat, which, in this case too, could be effected only by the sacrifice of all the heavy artillery.

At this juncture the Mahrattas were advancing in another direction. Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt, two of the chiefs of that strange people, were very earnest in the war. They took the field early in the campaign, but were impeded by obstacles which delayed their course in a manner honourable to themselves. The strong fortress of Durwar, garrisoned by some of the best soldiers of Tippoo, lay in the line of the Mahratta march. There were two battalions of the company's sepoys with this force, and with their aid the Mahrattas believed that they could take the fortress—an operation most unsuitable to the military tactics of those tribes. The siege was conducted in a manner so absurd and dilatory that protracted operations were necessary. The fortress held out from December 1790 to June, 1791, and then only surrendered because the Mahratta cavalry made the blockade so strict that the besieged could obtain no provisions. The terms of surrender were not observed by the Mahrattas, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the English officers who accompanied them.

While Lord Cornwallis's army was in full retreat, the men dropping down dead from sickness, fatigue, or hunger, a body of cavalry appeared, and beyond them, in the distance, vast clouds of dust arose, as if a numerous army were on its march. The English had just made their formation for encountering the supposed enemy, when a grotesque horseman advanced slowly, and with confidence. He was identified as a Mahratta. He was one of the advanced guard of the army of Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt. Great was the joy of the wearied and famished soldiery, and of their brave and skilful, but sorely afflicted chief. On came the Mahrattas, as clouds drifting upwards from the horizon before the rising storm. Squadron after squadron of wild cavalry—hardy, seasoned-looking warriors—swept on over the devastated and trampled plain; and at last the British sepoys, in their compact infantry order, thoroughly officered, and appearing in the finest state of efficiency, defiled before the governor-general. The British met one another with cheers, for which even the faint and the famishing in the army of Madras found a

voice. The singular looking hosts of troopers brandished their swords, shook their lances, and curvetted their well-fed steeds. Had the governor-general but known that such an army—well supplied, as a Mahratta army always was—was hastening to his aid along the steeps from the north, he would have held his position before Seringapatam, and the glory of Mysore had sunk suddenly as the eastern sun sinks at evening. Tippoo's irregular horse had intercepted all communication, and the governor was ignorant that the Mahrattas had pierced the passes of the Mysorean Ghauts. Had he known so much, he would not have countermanded the advance of General Abercromby; had that general received intelligence which might have been communicated to him seaward of Madras, if at that presidency pains had been taken to organize a system of procuring and communicating intelligence, he would have continued his march. The English, notwithstanding the frequent failures of their plans from similar deficiencies, were still characterised by their want of alert and active vigilance. The arrival of the Mahrattas was a means of relief only to those who had money to buy what these allies possessed in abundance, but his lordship made such arrangements as procured supplies of necessities for his whole camp. "As soon as these auxiliaries arrived, the scarcity in the cantonments of the English, which previously amounted almost to famine, ceased, so far as they were willing to pay the enormous prices that were extorted from their necessities. Every article abounded in that predatory host: it exhibited 'the spoils of the East, and the industry of the West,—from a web of English broadcloth to a Birmingham penknife; from the shawls of Cashmere to the second-hand garment of the Hindoo; from diamonds of the first water to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden;' while 'the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity utterly inconceivable in any camp, excepting that of systematic plunderers by wholesale and retail.' These allies, moreover, introduced the commander to a most useful class of men, the brinjarries or grain-merchants, who, travelling in large armed bodies with their wives and children, made it their business to supply all the militant powers of Hindostan. They distributed their corn with the strictest impartiality to all who could pay for it; and the general, now amply supplied with funds, was no longer exposed to want, and easily obtained a preference over Tippoo, whose pecuniary resources were beginning to fail."

Notwithstanding the relief thus opportunely obtained, the governor-general did not deem it practicable to retrace his steps to the scenes of his recent conquests. His battering train having been lost, a fresh one had to be procured from Madras before he could hope to besiege Seringapatam. Other supplies of military material were also necessary, in place of those which had been destroyed previously to the retreat.

Repose was now absolutely necessary for the army of Lord Cornwallis. Nearly all the cattle had died, either from overwork, or an epidemic disease which quickly destroyed them, and caused them to putrefy almost immediately after death. This caused sickness in the camp, which was much increased by the starved followers eating the putrid flesh. Small-pox, so common and so fatal in the East, made great havoc. The store of rice was to a considerable extent wasted, or embezzled by the native drivers and servants. The supplies which the Mahrattas sold at so high a price were rapidly vanishing. Safe communications were opened with Madras, and the wearied army, as it rested, awaited with zeal, as well as obedience, the day when, with recruited force, it might again march against the boasted capital of Mysore. While these events were passing, and indeed as soon as the junction with the Mahrattas was formed, Tippoo became anxious to negotiate. On the 27th of May he sent a flag of truce, accompanied by numerous servants and a bushel of fruit, and a letter in Persian soliciting peace. The flag and the fruit were returned the next morning, much to the gratification of the troops. An answer to Tippoo's letter was also sent, "acquainting him that the English nation would agree to no peace which did not include their allies; and if he meant to negotiate, he must in the first instance deliver up all the British subjects who were prisoners in his dominions, and consent that a truce should take place until his proposals could be considered and the terms adjusted. The fruit was returned in the same manner as it had been sent; not as an insult, but merely to show that his lordship declined even the appearance of friendly intercourse with the sultan. In the army it was understood that Tippoo, finding he could not treat separately with the English, and seeing that he had another season to try his expedients for disuniting the confederacy, as well as to prepare for his defence, replied to his lordship by asserting that he had no British subjects detained prisoners in his country since the former war, and that he would not agree to a truce."\*

\* *Review of Lord Cornwallis' Second Campaign against Tippoo.* By Major Dirom.

It was of great consequence to the success of another campaign that a good understanding should be established with the Mahrattas. This Lord Cornwallis succeeded in accomplishing before he dispatched General Meadows, Colonel Stuart, and others of his superior officers on different expeditions. The Mahrattas were a people of great military pride and quick sensibilities; they were also vindictive, and, like most oriental people, fickle in their policy. Any ill-will springing up between them and the British troops would perhaps have been productive of irremediable mischief. A want of respect to their chiefs on the part of the governor-general would have sent the whole host away, or have caused them to make separate terms with Tippoo. Yet, if the governor-general had paid their chiefs any undue deference, or appeared to depend upon the alliance as a *sine qua non* for conducting the war with Tippoo, they would have at once assumed the air of conquerors or superiors, and become as troublesome as Tippoo himself. Lord Cornwallis had but little experience of oriental peoples, and that which he knew of the natives of India was confined to the neighbourhood of Calcutta previous to this campaign. He had, however, the mind of a statesman, with such superior natural taste and judgment as qualified him in an eminent degree for intercourse with orientals, especially in the transaction of political business. When the Mahrattas formed their junction with the British, they pitched their tents at some distance; and Lord Cornwallis had to consider with what ceremonial his interview with the leaders of this army should be associated. The following graphic picture was given by an eye-witness, the deputy adjutant-general of Lord Cornwallis's army, Major Dirom:—

"On the 28th May the army fell back towards Milgottah, where the Mahratta armies were to encamp; and, to prevent discussion and delay on points of ceremony, Lord Cornwallis proposed to meet the Mahratta chiefs at tents pitched midway between the Mahratta and the British camps.

"Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by General Meadows, their staff, and some of the principal officers of the army, went to the tents at the hour appointed, which was one o'clock; but the chiefs, who consider precision as inconsistent with power and dignity, did not even leave their own camp till three, though repeated messages were sent that his lordship waited for them. They at length mounted their elephants, and, proceeding as slow and dignified in their pace as they had been dilatory in their preparation, approached the place of appointment at four o'clock, escorted by

several corps of their infantry, a retinue of horse, and all the pagentry of Eastern state. The chiefs, on descending from their elephants, were met at the door of the tent by Lord Cornwallis and General Mcadows, who embraced them, and, after some general conversation, retired to a private conference in another tent.

"Hurry Punt, about sixty years of age, a Brahmin of the first order, and the personage of greatest consequence, is said to be the third in the senate of the Mahratta state. His figure is venerable, of middle stature, and not corpulent; he is remarkably fair, his eyes grey, and his countenance, of Roman form, full of thought and character.

"Purseram Bhow, aged about forty, stands high in military fame among the Mahrattas. He is an active man, of small stature, rather dark in his complexion, with black eyes, and an open animated countenance, in which, and his mien, he seemed desirous to show his character of an intrepid warrior. His antipathy to Tippoo is said to be extreme; for the sultan had put one of his brothers to death in a most cruel manner, and Hyder's conquests to the northward fell chiefly upon the possessions of his family, which he lately recovered by the reduction of Darwar. Hurry Punt was destined to be the chief negotiator on the part of his nation; each commanded a separate army, but the Bhow was to be employed more immediately in the active operations of the field.

"The chiefs themselves, and all the Mahrattas in their suite, and indeed all their people, were remarkably plain, but neat, in their appearance. Mild in their aspect, humane in their disposition, polite and unaffected in their address, they are distinguished by obedience to their chiefs, and attachment to their country. There were not to be seen among them those fantastic figures in armour so common among the Mohammedans, in the nizam's, or, as they style themselves, the Mogul army; adventurers collected from every quarter of the East, who, priding themselves on individual valour, think it beneath them to be useful but on the day of battle, and, when that comes, prove only the inefficiency of numbers, unconnected by any general principle of union or discipline.

"The Mahrattas of every rank seemed greatly rejoiced in having effected this junction, and considered it a happy omen that this event should have taken place at Milgotah, a spot so renowned in their annals for the signal victory gained by Madharow in 1772, in which he completely routed and dispersed Hyder's army, and took all his cannon. Many of the chiefs and people who had

served with that general were now in these armies; but they had since felt the superiority of the forces of Mysore, and were impressed with such an idea of Tippoo's discipline, and his abilities in the field, that they were not a little pleased in having joined the British army, without having occasion to try their fortune singly with the sultan. They all showed great eagerness to hear the news, and to know the reason of our having burst our great guns. On being told of the victory of the 15th of May, and of the subsequent necessity of destroying the battering train, from want of provisions, and not knowing of their approach, they partook in the joy and grief we had experienced on those events; and seeing that we considered the late defeat of Tippoo as a matter of course, and that we looked forward with confidence to the capture of the capital, they expressed themselves to the following effect:—"We have brought plenty—do you get more guns—we will feed you, and you shall fight." The conference between the generals and the chiefs broke up between five and six o'clock, apparently much to the satisfaction of both parties."

The officer who gave the description just quoted presents also an animated picture of the military habits of our ally. It has been already related that two sepoy battalions were attached to the Mahratta forces. These regiments belonged to the Bombay army. The chiefs always placed the British infantry in front, so that they served as a picket to the Mahratta camp. Indeed, the only measure taken specifically to guard against surprise, was that those infantry regiments were thrown out in advance, encamping always in that advanced position. Cavalry was spread in detachments far on the rear and flanks of the army, to secure plunder or cover the arrival of supplies. These, without exercising any especial vigilance, would be soon able to detect an advancing enemy. Major Dirom expresses great surprise at the artillery appointments of our ally:—

"The gun carriages, in which they trust to the solidity of the timber, and use but little iron in their construction, are clumsy beyond belief; particularly the wheels, which are low, and formed of large solid pieces of wood united. The guns are of all sorts and dimensions; and, having the names of their gods given to them, are painted in the most fantastic manner; and many of them, held in esteem for the services they are said to have already performed for the state, cannot now be dispensed with, although in every respect unfit for use. Were the guns even serviceable, the small supply of ammunition with which they are provided has always effectually

prevented the Mahratta artillery from being formidable to their enemies.

"The Mahratta infantry, which formed part of the retinue that attended the chiefs at the conference, is composed of black Christians, and despicable poor wretches of the lowest caste, uniform in nothing but the bad state of their muskets, none of which are either clean or complete; and few are provided with either ammunition or accoutrements. They are commanded by half-caste people of Portuguese and French extraction, who draw off the attention of spectators from the bad clothing of their men by the profusion of antiquated lace bestowed on their own; and if there happen to be a few Europeans among the officers and men, which is sometimes the case, they execrate the service, and deplore their fate.

"The Mahrattas do not appear to treat their infantry with more respect than they deserve, as they ride through them without any ceremony on the march, and on all occasions evidently consider them as foreigners, and a very inferior class of people and troops. Indeed the attention of the Mahrattas is directed entirely to their horses and bazars, those being the only objects which immediately affect their interest. On a marching day the guns and the infantry move off soon after daylight, but rarely together; the bazars and baggage move nearly about the same time, as soon as they can be packed up and got ready. The guns and tumbrils, sufficiently unwieldy without farther burden, are so heaped with stores and baggage, that there does not seem to be any idea of its ever being necessary to unlimber, and prepare for action on the march. As there are no pioneers attached to the Mahratta artillery to repair the roads, this deficiency is compensated by an additional number of cattle, there being sometimes a hundred, or a hundred and fifty bullocks, in a string of pairs, to one gun: the drivers, who are very expert, sit on the yokes, and pass over every impediment, commonly at a trot. The chiefs remain upon the ground, without tents, smoking their hookahs, till the artillery and baggage have got on some miles; they then follow, each pursuing his own route, attended by his principal people; while the inferiors disperse, to forage and plunder over the country.

"A few days after the junction of the Mahratta armies an irregular fire of cannon and musketry was heard in their camp between nine and ten at night. The troops immediately turned out in our camp, and stood to their arms, thinking that Tippoo had certainly attacked the Mahrattas; but it proved to be only the celebration of one of their ceremonies,

in which they salute the new moon, on its first appearance."

Another circumstance occurred soon after, also characteristic of their customs and discipline:—"The ground on which our army had encamped at the junction, being bare of grass and extremely dirty, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of marching; and sent to the Mahratta chiefs, to request they would move next morning, as their camp lay directly in our route. They returned for answer, 'that they should be happy to obey his lordship's commands; but, as they had halted eight days, it was not lucky, nor could they, according to the custom of their religion, march on the ninth day.' His lordship gave way to their superstitious prejudice, and deferred his march."

The allies moved on the 6th of June to the north of the Mysore, towards Nagamangala. Purseram Bhow had established a post and depot there. From thence they marched eastward to Bangalore. The objects of these marches were to enable the Mahrattas to withdraw in safety the posts they had established on their line of march; to subsist the allies at the expense of the enemy; to cause Tippoo to consume the provisions which he had laid up for the defence of the capital.

The Mahrattas marched tumultuously, and seemed to depend upon the vigilance and discipline of the English against surprise, the very service which the English had expected from the numerous Mahratta irregular horse. Those horsemen were most active, but not so much as the eyes of the grand army as independent corps, conducting all sorts of irregular and eccentric expeditions on their own account. They captured some of Tippoo's elephants and minor convoys. They waylaid his cavalry scouts, and boldly fell upon them when a chance of success was opened. This was of importance to the English, whose horses were much reduced by travel and insufficient fodder.

Earl Cornwallis had much difficulty in keeping the Mahratta chiefs in good humour, each affecting the bearing of a sovereign prince. It was also most difficult for him to form plans of military co-operation with them. New battering trains were soon sent from Madras and Bombay, money came from Calcutta, provisions were found by the Mahrattas, but horses and oxen to draw the guns and stores could not be procured by any amount of payment. By ingenious arrangements with officers, especially those in command of battalions, Lord Cornwallis "relieved the bullock department," as the deputy-adjutant-general of the army expressed it. Camels were purchased by individual officers in their

zeal for the public service; and the whole army was animated by an enthusiastic desire to make up somehow every deficiency of equipment. The only supplies issued to the British sepoys were rice, salt, and arrack; the European soldiers had cattle and sheep for slaughter, in addition to rice and small rations of corn. The British commander, like the great Duke of Wellington many years afterwards in the Spanish peninsula, became a sort of grain merchant to supply his troops, and with equal success. Captain Read, an officer well versed in the languages of Southern India, and possessing a remarkable talent for organization, made arrangements with the grain merchants on a gigantic scale, and by trusting to them in fair and open market, treating them justly, and paying the value for their commodities, the English army received regular supplies. The Mahrattas by plunder barely provided for themselves, while the nizam's forces could neither supply their wants by purchase nor plunder.

After the reduction of various forts the army came in sight of Bangalore. Captain Read succeeded in meeting it with a convoy of brinjarries (or corn merchants), having ten thousand, or as some writers of the time affirmed, twelve thousand bullock-loads of rice and grain. Here Lord Cornwallis received intelligence of the favourable views which were entertained in England of his conduct in waging and conducting this war. He also received despatches informing him that half a million sterling was voted by the company to replenish his exchequer, and that large reinforcements of troops, especially artillery, were on their way out. From Cal-

cutta he heard that bullock draught was preparing for his service, and a despatch from Vellore informed him of the arrival there, from Bengal, of one hundred elephants and twenty-five bullocks. Thousands of coolies arrived with provisions on their own speculation, so that supplies became abundant. The army was thus encouraged, and their noble commander, confident of victory, communicated by sympathy his confidence to his troops.

A new disposition of forces occurred in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a view to protect the arrival of supplies to the allies, cut off supplies from Tippoo, and secure sufficient support for such vast bodies of men, troops, and camp-followers. Colonel Duff, whose name became afterwards so much identified with the peoples and countries of Southern India, took charge of the artillery, and prepared a battering train for service once more at Seringapatam. He had rendered invaluable aid to the army in the same way on its previous advance to the Mysorean capital.

The approaching period of the monsoons rendered an advance upon Seringapatam impossible. The grand army, under Lord Cornwallis, kept open its communications with the Carnatic, to secure the arrival of guns, ammunition, and stores. To ensure this important end, it was necessary to secure the pass of Palicodé, and that could only be accomplished by the capture of Ousoor, a fortified place which commanded it. This was the first operation of the army of any magnitude after the junction of the triune forces, and, as it may be considered as the beginning of the third campaign, is reserved for a separate chapter.

## CHAPTER XCV.

WAR WITH TIPPOO: THIRD CAMPAIGN—EARL CORNWALLIS CONQUERS OUSSOOR—REDUCES THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF MYSORE, AND ADVANCES TO THE FORTIFIED LINES OF SERINGAPATAM.

ON the 15th of July the army moved from the cantonments of Bangalore towards Ousoor. This part of the country had not as yet been made the theatre of war, and the inhabitants were engaged in attention to their fields. The landscape was beautiful in its variety of aspect, fertility, and careful cultivation. Rich foliage crowned the knolls and hill-tops, as the ground undulated or rose in bolder eminences. The elevation of the region gave coolness, yet it basked in all the glorious light of the Indian sun.

The seventh brigade reached Ousoor under Major Gowdie. On the appearance of the British the enemy abandoned the place, attempting unsuccessfully to blow it up before commencing their flight. A large store of grain and powder rewarded the march of the British brigade. The fall of Ousoor was very dispiriting to Tippoo; he regarded it as strategically of great importance, and his orders were to strengthen and defend it to the uttermost. Previous to the arrival of Major Gowdie, the English prisoners were murdered

by express order of Tippoo, notwithstanding remonstrances by the governor, and solicitations for mercy from the inhabitants. Like his father, the sultan delighted to shed the blood of defenceless enemies. The various hill-forts in the neighbourhood surrendered, or were taken, and the English held the important pass by which their stores and convoys were chiefly to arrive during the remainder of the campaign.

About the middle of August, Tippoo, having consented to treat with the allies jointly, instead of separately, as was his policy, sent a vakeel to Ousoor. This person, Apogy Row, was well known to the English, having in the previous war also acted the part of a negotiator. He would not open his credentials without certain ceremonies, which were evidently designed for delay, and he was, therefore, not permitted to enter the camp.

By the end of the month of September twenty-eight thousand bullocks were provided in the Carnatic for the use of the army. The laborious and expensive preparations in cattle, material, and carriage equipment, of which Tippoo had ample information by his spies, alarmed him more than the actual presence of numerous armies on the high table-land of Mysore. He was convinced that the English were in earnest, and had ample means to sustain a new and protracted campaign. Yet such was his hatred to the British, a feeling inherited from his father, and provoked by their shameless violation of treaty, that he preferred risking his all in conflict with them, to opportune concession.

During the remainder of the autumn the British were engaged in various directions, but chiefly to the north-east of Bangalore, in reducing forts, and cutting off communications with the country from the sultan's headquarters. His lordship in this way found means of employing the army honourably, and with great detriment to the enemy.

The country of Tippoo was studded with "droogs," fortified hills or rocks. Some of these were exceedingly precipitous. Nature had provided Mysore with bulwarks of defence, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan knew how to make them available. Among these Nundroog was one of the chief, and was held by one of Tippoo's most trusted officers. There was only one of the faces of the rock which was accessible, and that only under circumstances of difficulty almost constituting the impossible. This portion of the crag was defended near the summit by a double wall. An English detachment commanded by Major Gowdie, under the direction of General Meadows, formed approaches on the steeps, built batteries, and dragged up cannon. In twenty-

one days two breaches were opened. General Meadows himself led the assault. A night of soft clear moonlight, such as guided the forlorn hope so swiftly through the newly-formed breach at Bangalore, favoured the English. The assailants suffered hardly any loss from the fire of the enemy; the steepness of the ascent brought them inside the range, but huge masses of granite were rolled down, which hurled away many of the English in their descent, so that ninety men were lost before the breaches were attained. Then sword to sword, high up on that moonlit summit, a fierce encounter took place in the gaping chasms made by the English guns. Thirty English fell in the breaches; these once carried, the enemy struggled no more, and Meadows, sword in hand, like a volunteer subaltern, entered at the head of the stormers. It was one of the most gallant feats ever performed by Englishmen, and by an English general.

Colonel Stuart attacked Savendroog, which had been of equal importance with Nundroog, but which, during the siege of the latter, was so strengthened, that Tippoo's officers considered it impregnable. It was battered, breached, and stormed in twelve days without a man being lost on the side of the conquerors. Outdroog was surrendered after a feeble resistance, so great was the panic created by what were considered, previous to their accomplishment by the English, impossible feats. Kistnagherry town was burned; the droog of that place was attempted by a *coup de main*, but the attack failed. Tippoo, perceiving the moral effect of these exploits, determined upon a bold attempt to countervail them. He led an expedition southward, and suddenly attacked Coimbatore. The garrison capitulated on terms which respected their liberty; Tippoo violated the capitulation, and sent the whole garrison prisoners to Seringapatam with every conceivable indignity, and many cruelties. Tippoo probably considered that even if ultimately defeated, he might execute vengeance upon such men as he could get into his power, the English in the former war having shown such indifference to the fate of the prisoners he had murdered, when they came to terms of peace. Tippoo was not able to effect much more than the reduction of Coimbatore.

Before the month of October had far advanced, the supplies of men and money arrived from England, including two companies of Royal Artillery, under Major Scott. Three hundred seasoned troops also arrived from St. Helena. These troops endured the climate of India better than those which came directly from England. While from the presidencies

of Bengal and Madras reinforcements and supplies were poured in on one side of Mysore, the reinforcements which arrived from England at Bombay were organized, and ready to ascend the Ghauts on the other side.

While these events occurred, Tippoo sent a strong force into the Baramaul, which endangered the British convoys. Lord Cornwallis ordered Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, at the head of a strong infantry brigade, to co-operate with some Mahratta irregular cavalry to clear that country. The chief work of this brigade was the reduction of forts, which the enemy feebly defended; but in every case where opportunity was afforded, they acted with treachery and cruelty. By the end of November Colonel Maxwell performed his mission, but not without having sustained one serious repulse and heavy loss in officers and men.

While these events were transpiring, the Bombay army, under General Abercromby, was engaged in active operations. That officer, as seen in the last chapter, had been ordered by Lord Cornwallis to retreat. He returned to Tellicherry from Bombay early in November, bringing with him drafts on service, recruits, and a battering train. On the 23rd of the month this force marched from its cantonments, and assembled at Cannanore. Earl Cornwallis ordered General Abercromby to proceed upon the same plan as in the previous campaign. That officer accordingly marched on the 5th of December to the Pondicherrim Ghaut, and on the 7th crossed the river at Illiacore, this river being navigable to within two miles of the place which the general selected for the passage of his army, so that the heavy guns and stores were brought up to that point. From Illiacore the ascent of the ghaut was steep and rugged. Deep ruts had been formed by torrents during the previous monsoon. It was necessary to repair the road, that the guns and baggage might be brought up in safety, and thus considerable delay was occasioned. The English officers and soldiers were much impressed by the grandeur of the route, the bold mountain towering to the heavens, its steeps clothed thickly with forest, the views of the country beneath, and of the distant sea, presenting the richness and variety peculiar to oriental scenery. Having surmounted the difficulties of the ascent near Illiacore, the army had a long march of twenty-six miles through a wooded, partly undulated, and partly abrupt country to Pondicherrim, where the ascent of the great hill offers the grand impediment to an army. The number and strength of the trees peculiar to the Indian forest furnished means for affixing ropes to pull up the heavy guns and the store carriages.

Leaving the Pondicherrim Ghaut, the army pursued its toilsome way over thirty miles of wooded, rocky, picturesque, and most difficult country, to the foot of the Sedaseer Ghaut. At this point the services of the Rajah of Coorg became available, as in the previous advance, and much facilitated the march of the army, not only by supplies of food, but by the warlike and vigilant co-operation of a brave people. Having penetrated the range of successive ghauts, the Bombay army encamped on the plains of Mysore, where it awaited the period for co-operation with the grand army. General Abercromby's force consisted of four European regiments, eight battalions of sepoy, four companies of artillery in four brigades, amounting to nearly nine thousand good soldiers. Here it is necessary to leave the army of Abercromby until other events are related.

When, in July, the necessity of procuring subsistence compelled the allied armies to separate, the Mahrattas, with a Bombay contingent under Captain Little, proceeded from the neighbourhood of Bangalore in the direction of Sera and Chittledroog. The country being fertile, the Mahratta commander, Purseram Bhow, selected it for his sphere of operations. Captain Little, at the head of the Bombay native contingent serving with his army, made for himself much distinction. One of the most sanguinary pitched battles of the war was won by him, and siege was laid to Scooly-Onore by the end of December. On the second of January the place capitulated.

Purseram Bhow was elated with his successes, which were chiefly due to Captain Little and his Bombay sepoy. The Mahratta, therefore, instead of joining General Abercromby's army, went in an opposite direction, disarranging the comprehensive plan of the campaign, and hazarding the success of the war. When "the bhow" ought to have been with Abercromby, so as to make the Bombay army unassailable, and secure the safety of his own, he was at Bidenore, unable to effect anything bearing upon the grand scope of the campaign.

Tippoo, alarmed by the rapidity of the Mahratta movements, and the enterprises which Captain Little had directed, detached Cummer-ud-deen Khan in the direction of Bidenore. The bhow became alarmed in turn, and, desisting from his designs on Bidenore and other cities in its vicinity, retired from before the corps of the khan, and, yielding to the stern letters of Lord Cornwallis and Hurry Punt, directed his course towards Seringapatam, to take his place in the military array formed against that city.

The khan, emboldened by the retirement of the bhow, from terror, as he supposed, of his superior prowess, performed various exploits with his cavalry, making long marches and effecting several surprises. A strong body of Mysorean horse penetrated into the Carnatic, committed extensive devastation, reached the neighbourhood of Madras, exciting much alarm, and were only repelled after all the Europeans had volunteered to go out against them. The council, always timid, although often rash, was of course panic-struck. The agriculturists all around Madras deserted their fields.

While these military movements were taking place, the English navy inflicted much injury upon the enemy's strong places on the coast of Malabar. Commodore Cornwallis, Captains Byron, Sutton, Troubridge, and Osborne attacked various coast fortifications belonging to Tippoo, assisted in the conquest of Cannanore, and captured Fortified Island, at the mouth of the Onore river. The French had sent out store-ships from their settlements for Tippoo's service, under protection of their own frigates, although the two nations were then at peace. The English commodore stopped one of these convoys. The French commodore fired two broadsides without any previous declaration or warning of hostile intent; the result was an action, in which the French were severely punished, and their frigate captured.

On the 14th of January, 1792, the various bodies of the grand army, with the exception of that belonging to the nizam, formed a junction in the neighbourhood of Outredroog. On the 25th of January the advanced guard of the nizam's army was seen approaching, and Lord Cornwallis proceeded out to meet it. The allied armies marched next day, and on the 27th reached Hooleadroog. In the previous June that place had been conquered by the British. After the retreat of Lord Cornwallis, the Mysoreans again took possession of it, and strongly fortified it. The town was small, but the fort was considered inaccessible to assault; nevertheless, the killidar (governor) surrendered to Colonel Maxwell upon summons.

Lord Cornwallis posted a garrison at this place, and assembled all his forces in its vicinity. After such preparation as was necessary, his army moved forward towards the capital. Tippoo had no well-founded hope of defending his provinces; but in his obstinacy and determination he had resolved to defend the city to which his father had given so much fame as the seat of his government. Tippoo believed that it was strong enough to resist the allied arms of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Madras, and he counted upon

the exhaustion of their resources in the siege, which would necessitate a disastrous retreat, lead to dissension among the allies, another invasion of the Carnatic by himself, and the siege—perhaps capture—of Madras. With aid from the French and from the Sultan of Turkey, he believed he could expel the English from the shores both of Malabar and Coromandel; that the nizam and peishwa would be glad to make separate terms, and that his supremacy would be recognised in the peninsular portion of India. As the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, at a much later period, believed that Sebastopol would exhaust the resources of the great powers of Western Europe which besieged it, so Tippoo concluded that the allied powers of Southern India would pour out fruitlessly their blood and treasure before Seringapatam, so as to ensure him an ultimate and complete conquest.

Lord Cornwallis had succeeded in gaining the confidence of the governments of Hyderabad and Poonah, and in uniting in his plans the generalissimos of the armies of these states. He exercised, therefore, virtually, the supreme direction of the armies, and was enabled to carry out his plans of action without opposition. His resolution was to march at once upon Seringapatam. Hooleadroog was established as an advanced post, being ten miles nearer the grand object than Outredroog, and from which the allied armies, now finally assembled, were to commence their march, for the second attempt upon the enemy's capital.

Before proceeding upon the final struggle and grand issue of his enterprise, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of affording the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs a view of his army in its full strength and array of war. Those personages appeared highly pleased with the compliment which his lordship proposed to confer, but did not seem to contemplate the utility of forming an intimate acquaintance with the discipline, equipment, arrangement, and component peculiarities of an ally's troops. They thought it a fine opportunity for displaying their own elephants, their personal pomp and glory, and for impressing upon the minds of the English troops ideas of the greatness of the native sovereigns and commanders associated with them in the field.

On the 31st of January the British troops were ordered under arms, for review by the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs. The noble earl and General Meadows proceeded to meet the princes and generals of the allies to the right of the English line.

The following graphic description of what followed was given by the only officer present who, acquainted with all the facts, thought proper to describe their occurrence :—

"The camp was pitched in a valley close to Hooleadroog, and, from the nature of the ground, could not be in one straight line, but was formed on three sides of a square, with a considerable interval, on account of broken ground, between the divisions, which were thus encamped each with a different front. The reserve, consisting of the cavalry, with a brigade of infantry in the centre, formed the division on the right of the line, and the two wings of the infantry formed the two other divisions of the encampment; the battering train being in the centre of the left wing fronting Hooleadroog. The extent of the line, including the breaks between the divisions, was above four miles. The prince, the minister, Hurry Punt, and the tributary Nabobs of Cuddapu and Canoul, who had accompanied Secunder Jau from Hyderabad, were on elephants richly caparisoned, attended by a numerous suite of their best horse, and preceded by their chubdars, who call out their titles; surrounded, in short, by an immense noisy multitude. The prince was in front, attended by Sir John Keenaway, on an howdered elephant, near enough to answer such questions as might be asked by his highness respecting the troops. On his reaching the right of the line, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned the officers' salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular notice as they passed the corps of the reserve. Having seen a regiment of Europeans, besides the dragoons in the first division, the chiefs were not a little surprised to find a brigade of three regiments, on proceeding a little farther, in the centre of the second division. They had passed the sepoys at rather a quick pace, but went very slow opposite to the European corps, and seemed much struck with their appearance. The troops all in new clothing, their arms and accoutrements bright and glittering in the sun, and themselves as well dressed as they could have been for a review in time of peace: all order and silence, nothing heard or seen but the uniform sound and motion in presenting their arms, accompanied by the drums and music of the corps, chequered and separated by the parties of artillery extended at the drag-ropes of their guns. The sight was beautiful even to those accustomed to military parade; while the contrast was no less striking between the good sense of our generals on horseback, and the absurd state of the chiefs looking down from their elephants, than between the silence

and order of our troops, and the noise and irregularity of the mob that accompanied the Eastern potentates. After passing the right wing, the road leading through some wood and broken ground, the chiefs, on ascending a height, were not a little astonished to discover a still longer line than the two they had passed, and which, in this situation, they could see at once through its whole extent. But for the battering train, which occupied a mile in the centre of this division, at which they looked with wonder; but for the difference of the dress and music of the Highland regiments in the second European brigade, and the striking difference of size and dress between the Bengal sepoys in the right, and the coast sepoys which they now saw in the left wing; but for these distinctions which they remarked, such was the extent of ground which the army covered, and the apparent magnitude of its numbers, that the chiefs might have imagined a part of the same troops were only shown again upon other ground, an expedient not unusual among themselves, whenever they have it in view to impress strangers with a false idea of the strength of their forces. It was five o'clock before the chiefs reached the left of the line, when, having expressed themselves highly gratified with all they had seen, they accompanied Lord Cornwallis to his tents. After a short visit, and fixing the time and order of their march for the following day, they returned about sunset to their own camps."

The same author, from his official knowledge, gives the following account of the march:—

"On the 1st of February the allied armies commenced their march from Hooleadroog in the following order:—The English army moved off as usual, at daybreak, in three columns. Firstly, the battering guns, tumbrils, and heavy carriages on the great road, formed the centre column. Secondly, the line of infantry and field-pieces, on a road made for them at a distance of a hundred yards or more, as the ground required, marched parallel to the battering train, and on its right, that being the flank next to the enemy. Thirdly, the smaller store carts and private baggage carts marched in like manner, on a road to the left of the battering train, beyond which was the great mass of baggage, carried on elephants, camels, bullocks, and coolies, all the servants of the army, and families of the sepoys. This immense multitude on the baggage flanks was prevented from going ahead of the columns by the baggage-master and his guard, and was flanked, giving it a space of several miles which it required, by the part of the cavalry not on other duties,

and the infantry of the reserve. The advanced guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, the body guards, and the detail of infantry for the pickets of the new camp. The rear-guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, and the pickets of the old camp, and did not move till they saw the baggage and all stores off the old ground of encampment.

"In this manner the line of march was shortened to one-third of what would be its extent if confined to one road; and, from the component parts of the army being thus classed and divided, the whole moved on with as much ease as if the battering train only had been upon the march. The heavy equipment of the army, great guns, store carts, provision and baggage, thus formed a mass of immense breadth and depth, guarded in such manner on all sides that on no quarter could the enemy approach the stores or baggage without opposition from some part of the troops on the march. The armies of the allies, which were not mixed in our details, followed, as is their custom, at a later hour, and without any disposition for their defence."

The army, after successive marches, arrived before Seringapatam. The enemy's horse hovered upon the flanks, and offered considerable opposition to the advanced guard. Tippoo appeared disposed to dispute the passage of the river Madoor, but Lord Cornwallis having reinforced the advanced guard with a brigade of infantry, the enemy, after a show of resistance, dispersed, laying waste the country, and retiring upon the main army. Ascending high ground on the opposite banks of the Madoor, the British had a magnificent landscape, rich alike in fertility and variety, spread before them; far away on every side patrols of the enemy's horse were in observation, and the flame and smoke of burning villages and homesteads appeared along the whole horizon. The route now taken was different from that along which the army had advanced to the first attack of Seringapatam, and it was also different from that upon which Lord Cornwallis had retired; the troops were thus enabled to form a more extensive acquaintance with the country, which afforded the Europeans a lively pleasure; as compared with the low country beneath the Ghauts, it was alike beautiful and temperate.

The last march of the allies was made on the 5th of February, and lay over the barren hills to the north-east of the capital. From the line of route, the valley beneath was frequently spread out to view in all its extent; the proud city, with its cupolas, palaces, and fortifications, was distinctly seen; and beneath the walls in numerous lines were ranged the tents of the sultan's troops. Every step

the army advanced, the irregular cavalry of Tippoo harassed it; regular troops appeared on the flanks, and threw fiery showers of rockets. The advanced guard was obliged frequently to halt and draw up in line of battle. As the allies advanced, the impediments offered by the enemy increased, and when at last it reached the place of encampment, the quartermaster-general, his assistants and guards, were placed in imminent danger while marking out the ground. The line chosen for the encampment lay across the valley of Milgottah, and was parallel to that of the sultan, at a distance of six miles. The encampment of the allied armies was divided by a small stream, called the Lockany river, which, taking its rise from the lake below Milgottah, runs through the valley into the Cavery. The British army forming the front line, its right wing reached from the river along the rear of the French rocks to a large tank which covered that flank of the line. The park and the left wing extended from the other side of the river to the verge of the hills which the army had crossed on their last march. The reserve, encamped about a mile in the rear, facing outwards, left a sufficient space between it and the line for the stores and baggage. The Mahratta and the nizam's armies were also in the rear, somewhat farther removed, to prevent interference with our camp. The encampment of the confederate army was judiciously pitched at such distance from Seringapatam, and so covered by the French rocks in front of its right as to prevent immediate alarm to the enemy, either from its proximity or apparent magnitude. The first night in which the allies lay before Seringapatam they were disquieted by the activity of the enemy's cavalry, and the Deccan troops were much alarmed by flights of rockets which came perpetually among their tents. This alarm continued long after it was proved that more confusion than danger ensued from these missiles. The English took no notice of them, but their scouts stealing out and concealing themselves behind the crags which were scattered round, brought down with musket shots many of their foes.

On the 6th of February reconnoitring parties were sent out to examine the enemy's lines. From the left Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell and his attendants had a clear although rather remote view of the sultan's camp. The following description of it was given by one of the staff of the British army:—"On both sides of the river, opposite to the island of Seringapatam, a large space is inclosed by a bound hedge, which marks the limits of the capital, and is intended as a place of refuge to the people of the neighbouring country from the

incursions of horse. On the south side of the river this inclosure was filled with inhabitants, but that on the north side was occupied only by Tippoo's army. The bound hedge on the north side of the river includes an oblong space of about three miles in length, and in breadth from half a mile to a mile, extending from nearly opposite to the west end of the island to where the Lockany river falls into the Cavery. Within this inclosure the most commanding ground is situated on the north side of the fort; and, besides the hedge, it is covered in front by a large canal, by rice fields, which it waters, and partly by the winding of the Lockany river. Six large redoubts, constructed on commanding ground, added to the strength of this position, one of which, on an eminence, at an ead-gah or mosque, within the north-west angle of the hedge, advanced beyond the line of the other redoubts, was a post of great strength, and covered the left of the encampment. The right of Tippoo's position was not only covered by the Lockany river, but beyond it by the great Carrighaut Hill, which he had lately fortified more strongly, and opposite to the lower part of the island defends the ford. The eastern part of the island was fortified towards the river by various redoubts and batteries, connected by a strong intrenchment with a deep ditch, so that the fort and island formed a second line, which supported the defences of the first beyond the river; and when the posts there should be no longer tenable, promised a secure retreat, as from the outworks to the body of a place. Tippoo's front line or fortified camp was defended by heavy cannon in the redoubts, and by his field train and army stationed to the best advantage. In this line there were one hundred pieces, and in the fort and island, which formed his second line, there were at least three times that number of cannon. The defence of the redoubts on the left of Tippoo's position was intrusted to Syed Hummeed and Syed Guffar, two of his best officers, supported by his corps of Europeans and Lally's brigade, commanded by Monsieur Vigie. Sheik Anser, a sipadar or brigadier of established reputation, was on the great Carrighaut Hill. The sultan himself commanded the centre and right of his line within the bound hedge, and had his tent pitched near the Sultan's Redoubt, so called from being under his own immediate orders. The officer is not known who commanded the troops in the island; but the garrison in the fort was under the orders of Syed Sahib. The

sultan's army certainly amounted to above five thousand cavalry, and between forty and fifty thousand infantry. Ever since the junction of the Mahratta armies, Tippoo, seeing he could not continue to keep the field, had employed his chief attention, and the exertions of the main body of his army, in fortifying this camp, and improving his defences in the fort and island."

The hostile armies were now in presenee of one another on the grand theatre of action. The stake for which they contended was high. The defeat of the allies must result in a disastrous retreat, in which they would be obliged to separate, and would be attacked and beaten in detail; or, if the British succeeded by their skill and boldness in forcing their way against all attempts to cut them off, they would reach Madras with terribly diminished numbers. General Abereromby's army might be unable to make good its retreat, and would be exposed to the chance of attack unsupported by the army of Mysore. On the other hand, if the sultan suffered defeat, all was lost. He had but two chances left; one was in the great strength of his fortified camp, the other in that of the city and fortress of Seringapatam. He reasonably calculated that the only portions of the allies who would dare to storm his fortified camp would be the British, and that even if they succeeded, their army must be so reduced in numbers by the conflict as to render it impossible for them to prosecute a siege of the fortress, and he would then assail and defeat the native armies in the open field. Should the French render him assistance, he would then be enabled to conquer the Carnatie, and carry his arms also along the western coast. He expected that a great battle of artillery would take place before his fortified lines, which would lessen the numbers of the English, while his cavalry harassed and wearied out the Mahrattas and the troops of the nizam. His hopes were that the lines of his fortified camp would prove too strong for his enemies, and that the campaign would terminate in his favour without siege being laid to the capital itself. Thus both parties looked forward to the struggle as one of vast magnitude and consequence, and awaited with eager and anxious suspense the moment when the terrible tournament of the nations and powers of Southern India should meet in the concussion of deadly conflict which must one way or the other terminate the war. Another chapter must reveal the incidents and issue of the struggle.

## CHAPTER XCVI.

THIRD CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—STORMING OF THE FORTIFIED CAMP BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—PASSAGE OF THE CAVERY, AND OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND.

THE rival armies now confronted one another with concentrated strength. Tippoo waited for the attack dogged and resolute. The Earl of Cornwallis determined upon bold and prompt measures. Having carefully reconnoitred the enemy's position, he issued the orders for attack in the evening of the 8th of February. As this was one of the most memorable and interesting actions ever fought by the British in India, it will interest the reader to peruse his lordship's own description of the plan of battle, as made known in his order of the day:—

The army marches in three divisions at seven this evening to attack the enemy's camp and lines; pickets to join, field-pieces, quarter and rearguards, and camp-guards, to stand fast.

*Right Division.* Major-general Meadows.

*Centre.* Lord Cornwallis; Lient.-colonel Stuart.

*Left Division.* Lient.-colonel Maxwell.

If the right attack is made to the westward of the Somarpett, the troops of that attack should, after entering the enemy's lines, turn to the left. But if the attack is made to the eastward of Somarpett, the troops should turn to the right to dislodge the enemy from all the posts on the left of their position.

The troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy's lines, should turn to the left; the front divisions, however, of both the right and centre attacks should, after entering, advance nearly to the extent of the depth of the enemy's camp before they turn to either side, in order to make room for those that follow; and such parts of both divisions, as well as of the left division, as the commanding officers shall not think it necessary to keep in a compact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and pass over into the island with them.

The reserve, leaving quarter and rearguards, will form in front of the line at nine this night, and Colonel Duff will receive the commander-in-chief's orders concerning the heavy park, the encampment, and the reserve.

Young soldiers to be put on the quarter and rearguards at gun firing, and the pickets to join when the troops march off.

A careful officer from each corps to be left in charge of the camp and regimental baggage.

Colonel Duff to send immediately three divisions of gun lascars of fifty men each to the chief engineer, to carry the scaling ladders, and the chief engineer is to send them to the divisions, respectively, along with the officers of his corps.

The officers of engineers and pioneers to be responsible that the ladders, after having been made use of by the soldiers, are not left carelessly in the enemy's works.

Surgeons and doolies to attend the troops, and arrack and biscuit to be held in readiness for the Europeans.

The divisions to form, as follow, after dark:—

The right in front of the left of the right wing.

The centre in front of the right of the left wing.

The left in front of the left of the left wing.

"In addition to the troops detailed in the orders, Major Montague of the Bengal, and

Captain Ross of the royal artillery, with a detachment of two subalterns and fifty European artillerymen with spikes and hammers from the park, accompanied the centre, and smaller parties the two other columns.

"The troops had just been dismissed from the evening parade at six o'clock, when the above orders were communicated; upon which they were directed to fall in again with their arms and ammunition.

"By eight o'clock the divisions were formed, and marched out in front of the camp; each in a column by half companies with intervals, in the order directed for their march.

"The number of fighting men was at the utmost 2800 Europeans and 5900 natives.

"The officers commanding divisions, on finding that their guides and scaling ladders had arrived, and that every corps was in its proper place, proceeded as appointed at half an hour past eight o'clock.

"The evening was calm and serene; the troops moved on in determined silence, and the full moon, which had just risen, promised to light them to success.

"The right column was conducted by Captain Beatson, of the guides, the centre column by Captain Allen, of the guides, and Lieutenant Macleod of the intelligence department; and harcarrahs (native guides or spies), who had been within the enemy's lines, were sent both to these and the left column.

"Tippoo's pickets having made no attempt to interrupt the reconnoitring parties in the forenoon, he probably did not expect so early a visit. The distance of our camp seemed a circumstance favourable to his security, and he did not, perhaps, imagine that Lord Cornwallis would attack his lines till strengthened by the armies commanded by General Abercromby and Purseram Bhow."

Tippoo was wholly unprepared for an attack by infantry alone on a fortified camp, protected by guns of every calibre, in every direction. When the columns of attack moved on, the tents of the camp were struck, and preparations made for its defence in case of sudden attack. The cavalry were drawn up in the rear in support of it. Great was the anxiety of the camp guards as they stood to their arms, prepared for every casualty, and awaiting the issue of the terrible crisis in which the army was placed. Lord Cornwallis very

judiciously withheld from his allies any knowledge of the contemplated assault until the army was actually in motion. Had they been made acquainted with the plan, they would have raised all sorts of objections, and, finally, refused co-operation. When they heard of the enterprise consternation seized them. The idea of a body of infantry, so small in number, without artillery or cavalry, advancing upon so strong a place, garrisoned so numerously, bristling with cannon, and held by a determined ruler, totally appalled them. When they learned that Lord Cornwallis himself commanded the column by which it was intended to penetrate the enemy's defences, their astonishment and alarm rose even higher. They could not conceive of a great English lord fighting as a common soldier, and voluntarily placing himself in a position so imminent of peril. The chiefs immediately prepared for the only issue of the conflict which they could comprehend as possible—the total defeat of the British, and the consequent dangers of destruction to the allied armies.

Onward marched the assailing columns. Between ten and eleven o'clock the centre came upon a body of cavalry, with a strong detachment of the enemy's rocket brigade. The cavalry, astonished at being confronted by the head of a battalion of British infantry, galloped away, but left the rocketmen to make feint of attack. These did little harm to the English, who, amidst showers of innoxious fire flashing over their ranks like meteors, prosecuted the advance with rapid but steady step.

At this juncture the left column of the assailants was ascending the Carrighaut Hill, and the scene presented to head-quarters was grand and imposing; for instantly the hill was topped with a circle of flame, from continuous flashes of musketry. The centre column was quickened by the discovery of their approach made by Tippoo's cavalry, and, animated by the fusillade from the Carrighaut, they pressed on with extraordinary vigour, so that the retreating cavalry had scarcely reached the camp fifteen minutes before them. The English broke through the bound hedge which surrounded the camp, and penetrated at once the enemy's lines. The right column, from the nature of the ground, had been compelled to make a considerable detour, and unfortunately did not reach the hedge until half-past eleven o'clock. Lord Cornwallis had foreseen the probability of such a mishap, and had halted his troops half-an-hour in the early period of the march. Nevertheless the right column had wound its intricate way so much farther to the right than his lordship's plan contemplated, that after

all, the proposed approach to the boundary line was far from simultaneous. When this column did penetrate the hedge, it was at a spot too near that where the division under the commander-in-chief in person had already entered, but diverging to the right within the hedge, made directly against the chief redoubt upon which the defence relied on its left. The moon shone out brilliantly upon the cupola of the large white mosque which, crowning a hill, was as a beacon to the English. The mosque became the object towards which their march was directed. When diverging to the right this column proceeded in part without the hedge, and diverted the attention of the enemy, while the remainder of the division pushed on to the redoubt. It was not the intention of Lord Cornwallis that this redoubt should be attacked, because its situation was so far in advance of the enemy's proper lines of defence. The battle having already raged from the left to the centre, and thence to the right, the troops at the White Mosque Redoubt were thoroughly prepared, and a heavy fire of cannon loaded with grape and of musketballs smote the head of the assailing column. This terrible volley also revealed in vivid distinctness the full outline of the defence.

The English of the 36th and 76th regiments gallantly charged the "covert way," opening a steady and deadly fire on the defenders, who were swiftly driven within the inner works of the redoubt. The English, in essaying to pass the ditch, found themselves in the condition in which English troops have generally found themselves when similar duties were imposed on them—most of the ladders were missing, and those possessed were too short. The arrangements by which human life might be spared had been neglected, and the men had consequently to make fruitless efforts of valour to accomplish that which was physically impracticable. In this critical juncture a pathway across the ditch was discovered; over this the officers dashed, sword in hand, followed impetuously by the men. The pathway terminated against a small gate, which was the sortie; this the assailants forced in a moment, and entered a large traverse between the gateway and the redoubt. The enemy retired reluctantly and slowly before the bayonets of the assailing force. Reaching the inner circle of defence, whence retreat was impossible, the defenders turned a gun upon the traverse, which, if properly directed, must have swept it of the crowds whose eager valour urged them so madly on. From the circular rampart the soldiers of the sultan fired desultorily, but with close range, upon the thronging invaders,

who now filled the gorge and traverse. An irregular and less effective fire responded from the English. Several officers mounted a banquette to the right of the gorge, while a group of soldiers found their way up another to the left, and from both a dropping fire of musketry was directed into the redoubt. The fire of the enemy was still superior, and the officers resolved upon a charge with the bayonet. The men, as in the Redan at Sebastopol, during the storming of that place, were unwilling to give up the musketade, but were at last brought into order by their officers, and, headed by Major Dirom and Captain Wight, charged in at the gorge of the redoubt. A close fire of grape and musketry caused a sanguinary repulse. Captain Gage opened such a fire of musketry from the banquette to the right as to deter the enemy from taking such advantage of their success as was open to them. The British were rallied, and again led by the same officers, whose escape in the previous attempt was almost miraculous. The enemy had not reloaded the gun by which the gorge had been raked, and their musketry fire was insufficient to check the advance. Captains Gage and Burne, with Major Close, scrambled in at the same time, and, supported by a few followers, dashed sword in hand upon the flanks of the defenders, who broke away, and perished beneath the bayonets of their pursuers, or were shot as they leaped into the ditch below. Some fugitives, breaking through all dangers, were upon the point of escape, but fell into the hands of the troops composing the supporting column. The redoubt was won before the supporting column had arrived. While yet the battle raged in the redoubt, Tippoo sent a large body to the rescue. They advanced with drums beating and colours flying. Fortunately Lieutenant-colonel Nesbit, after routing another body of the enemy, had his attention called by the noisy advance of this reinforcement from the sultan. The officer who led was challenged by Nesbit,\* who felt uncertain who they were; he replied, "We belong to *the Advance*," the title of Lally's brigade. The Mysorean officer supposed the English to be part of his own brigade, but his reception soon altering his opinion, he set his men the example of ignominious flight, which was effectually followed. Had this corps arrived in time, and been commanded with spirit, it might have been impossible for the English

to hold the redoubt. To the left of the conquered defence was another work, which was stormed quickly, but with great slaughter; the commandant and four hundred men were slain, with the heavy loss of eleven officers and eighty men on the part of the British. A deserter from our army, who belonged to Lally's corps, gave himself up at this post. From his account, it appeared that Monsieur Vigie, with his Europeans, about three hundred and sixty, were stationed in the angle of the hedge in front of the redoubt. Captain Oram's battalion, upon which they fired, had attracted their attention, till finding themselves surrounded; they broke, and endeavoured to make their escape, some along the hedge to the left, but chiefly by passing through the intervals of our column as it continued advancing to the redoubt. The colour of their uniform contributed essentially to the effecting of their escape, and to the same circumstance Monsieur Vigie himself owed his safety; he was seen to go through the column mounted on a small white horse, but, being mistaken for one of our own officers, was suffered to pass unmolested. The deserter was of great use, he guided the English through various intricate ways, by which danger was avoided, and important objects accomplished at little loss. The general having established posts, wheeled his men to the left in the direction of the centre column. In attempting this he passed across the track of that body, and found himself to the left of the attack at Carrighaut Hill. No firing was heard, and no reliable intelligence of the operations of the centre or left columns was attainable. After a considerable pause a heavy firing began between Carrighaut and the fort, when General Meadows advanced to support the forces which he supposed to be engaged in the direction whence the sound of firing came. At this juncture the day broke, and General Meadows perceived what had taken place upon the centre and right attacks.

While the right column of the assailants were thus occupied, that of the centre, under Lord Cornwallis, was engaged in important operations. His lordship had divided his corps into three divisions. The first, or advance, had been ordered to force its way through the enemy's line, and, if successful, to follow the retreat of the defenders into the island. The second, or centre division, was to move to the right of the first, to sweep the camp in that direction, and ultimately attempt the capture of the island, which it was hoped might be facilitated by the first division entering with the fugitives whom they might drive from the lines. The third

\* Some accounts represent this as having been done by Lieutenant John Campbell, of the grenadier company, 36th regiment, who, although wounded in the redoubt, rushed forth and seized the standards of this detachment of the foe.

division was the reserve, with which Lord Cornwallis posted himself, so as, if possible, to afford and receive co-operation as it regarded the column of right attack under Meadows, and of left attack under Maxwell. The first division of the centre column, under the command of the Hon. Lieutenant-colonel Knox, was composed of six European flank companies, the 52nd regiment of the line, and the 14th battalion of Bengal sepoys.

The captains of the advanced companies were ordered to push on, attacking only whatever they met in front, until they reached the great ford near the north-east angle of the fort, and then, if possible, to cross it and enter the island. Rapidity was the chief element of success in this movement, and this was urged by Earl Cornwallis himself upon the captains in terms exceedingly imperative. The 52nd regiment and the 14th Bengal sepoys were to follow, with more solid order, the rapid movement and more open formation of the flank companies, and all were to avoid firing unless in case of indispensable necessity.

At eleven o'clock the advanced companies reached "the bound hedge," and found the enemy ready to receive them with cannon and musketry. Without a shot the British dashed through the line, the astonished defenders fleeing panic-struck before a movement so unexpected and unaccountable. The sultan's tent occupied a particular spot in the line of the advance, but he had fled from it, leaving obvious signs of the precipitation of his departure. The ground between that point and the river was almost a swamp, being under the cultivation of rice; this circumstance, with the darkness and the tumult of the fugitives, caused the advanced companies to miss their way and separate. They reached the ford in two separate bodies. The first dashed across close behind the fugitives, with whom they were nearly entering the place, but the enemy secured every point of ingress opportunely. Captain Lindsay, at the head of a company of the 71st regiment, rushed into the sortie, which led through the glacis into the fort, thence he proceeded along the glacis, through the principal bazaar, which stretched away to the south branch of the river, over the north branch of which the British had passed. The enemy having no conception of the possibility of the English finding their way there, fled in terror; many were bayoneted in the attempt to escape. There was an encampment of cavalry on the island, who immediately dispersed, not knowing what force of English had penetrated the place. Lindsay and his gallant men of the 71st took post on a bridge over a nullah which lay across the island, and placed a

party at a redoubt which commanded the southern ford.

The second body of the advanced companies reached the northern ford at this juncture, and found it nearly choked with bullocks, bullock waggons, guns, and Mysorean soldiers. So great was the terror of the fugitives, that they made no resistance, and were bayoneted in great numbers as they struggled to pass the ford. Some of the guns of the fort opened upon the supposed situation of the English on the main-land, but none were directed against the ford, as the fugitives as well as the pursuers must in that case have been at least equal sufferers. The deputy-adjutant-general of the British army afterwards remarked upon this episode of the defence—"It is no incurious circumstance here to observe, what was afterwards learned from some French deserters, that, at the time of the firing of these guns, the sultan was at the Mysore or southern gate of the fort, which he refused to enter: he was much enraged that the guns had opened without his orders, and sent immediately directions to cease firing, lest it might be imagined in his camp that the fort itself was attacked, and the panic among his troops in consequence become universal. To this order, wise as perhaps it was in its principle, may be attributed the little damage sustained by the troops, who crossed into the island, within reach of grape from the bastions of the fort."

Knox and the companies under his command gained the glacis, where Captain Russell and some of the grenadiers of the 52nd awaited his arrival, the captain being of opinion that Lord Cornwallis intended the operations to be conducted against the northern face of the fort, along that bank of the Caverry, rather than in the direction taken by Captain Lindsay. Knox turned to the left, in the direction opposite to that taken by Lindsay, until he arrived at "the Dowlat Baug," where he seized a moorman of distinction. Two Frenchmen were also captured, and all acted as guides to conduct the party to the "pettah"\* of Shaher Ganjam. Arrived at that place, the British found the gate shut, but no garrison, the troops having moved to the lines to resist the attack there, and being unable to regain their post. The gate was forced. The French prisoners conducted the English to the gate, which led to the batteries. There also the guard had left. The gate being open, Knox, having only one hundred men with him, took post in the street, and ordered the drums to beat the grenadiers' march, as a signal to the other troops of the first division to come to his

\* *Pettah*: a suburb generally adjoining a fort, and surrounded with "a bound hedge," wall, and ditch.

assistance. At this moment firing commenced from the lines and batteries along the river, on the right of the enemy's camp, opposite the advance of the left column of attack. Knox had a large number of officers with him, and he directed them, with detachments of his small force, to take in reverse the enemy's batteries, from which the firing had been heard. The enemy were terrified by a series of movements which appeared to them so complicated and ingenious. Wherever they turned they met some English, and in the places least likely to meet them: and instead of opening a fire of musketry, the English parties silently and with celerity charged with the bayonet, giving no time for formation, or any suitable plan of resistance. Many of the Mysoreans, driven from the batteries, fled to the gate of the pettah. There Knox, with thirty soldiers, seized the fugitives, or slew them as they came up. Large parties threw away their arms, and turned in other directions, on meeting this small party of English, which they magnified to twenty times the number. One of the soldiers captured by Knox, in order to save his life, informed that officer that a number of Europeans were enduring a miserable incarceration in a neighbouring house. Knox released these; one of them was a midshipman, whom the French admiral, Suffrein, had captured ten years before, and with other prisoners inhumanly handed over to the sultan, with the full knowledge that they would be thus treated. Most of the liberated men were common soldiers, and some deserters, who were treated as barbarously as the rest. The main body of the troops of the first division followed in close order to the river. Missing the ford, about one thousand men of the 52nd, and the Bengal sepoy, crossed the Caverry opposite the Dowlat Baug or rajah's garden, which they entered by forcing open the river gate. Captain Hunter, who was in command of this force, was here joined by several officers and men of the flank companies who had been separated from their own parties, and who were ignorant of the route taken by their comrades. The captain took post in the garden, and awaited the development of events. In Indian warfare nothing is so dangerous as a pause; while victory shines upon the banner of the soldier, he must bear it onward; on the slightest hesitation, that sun becomes clouded, and the career of triumph is rapidly turned. While Hunter hesitated, the enemy rallied, and bringing guns to bear upon the garden, opened a severe fire. In this situation the captain remained until the first streak of morning appeared, when he descried a fresh party of the enemy with cannon on the opposite bank of the river. He

plunged into the Caverry, led his men across, dispersed the party, spiked the guns, and joined head-quarters, having suffered some loss from grape and musketry in crossing the river. The remaining portion of the first division failed to enter the island, and after a severe conflict, fell back upon Capt. Russell's brigade. The 71st regiment having charged and cleared the way for the Bengalees, they rallied and resumed their advance. The 2nd or centre division of the centre column, under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, swept to the right of the 1st division, joined by the detachment of the 14th Bengal sepoy, which were separated from the first. Their march was directed against "the Sultan's Redoubt." This was a post of some strength, planned by the sultan himself, who gave a close personal superintendence to the work of the French engineers whom he employed. Major Dirom, describing the dispersed articles found at dawn around the sultan's abandoned tent in the camp, thus observes:—"Many pikes, ornamented with plates of silver, belonging to the sultan's sewary or state equipage, were seen scattered round the tent, in which, among other articles, was found a case of mathematical instruments of London make; which gives probability to the accounts we had received that the sultan had turned his attention to the science of fortification, and that he had been his own engineer."

Major Dalrymple, who commanded the advance, was obliged to disobey the orders against firing, for a large body of cavalry opposed his progress. He formed the 71st regiment in line, believing that a full volley would prevent the cavalry from charging. His opinion was correct, every shot emptied a saddle; by the time the line reloaded and shouldered, the smoke had dispersed, and the horsemen were seen scattered in all directions. The redoubt was immediately abandoned, the 71st regiment entering unopposed. Having garrisoned the place, Colonel Stuart directed the course of his division against the left of Tippoo's right wing, so as to meet the column under Maxwell, by which the right of the defence was assailed, and the left flank of which Maxwell had already turned. The rear or reserve division of the centre column, commanded by Earl Cornwallis himself, drew up by the Sultan's Redoubt after its capture by Major Dalrymple, and there his lordship anxiously awaited the co-operation of General Meadows from the right, while that officer, as has been shown, was anxiously in quest of him. His lordship remained in that position until near dawn, when the seven companies of the 52nd, and the three companies of the Bengal sepoy, which had occupied the garden and charged through the Caverry to

escape the peril of their position, arrived at the spot where his lordship awaited in suspense intelligence of the progress of affairs. The ammunition of these troops had been damaged in passing the river; this was fortunately discovered and the cartridges replaced, when Tippoo, who had learned the position of Lord Cornwallis, directed his left and centre to rally, concentrate, and fall upon the English commander-in-chief. These orders were obeyed with celerity and address, so that the English general found himself attacked by a powerful force. The unexpected arrival of the body which had retreated from the garden so swelled the numbers of Lord Cornwallis, that he felt himself in a position to receive the enemy with animation and decision. Here a fierce battle ensued. The English repulsed the Mysoreans by deadly volleys of musketry repeatedly, and on every occasion followed up the repulse by charges of the bayonet; but still the enemy rallied, relying on superiority of numbers. At daylight a well directed charge by the British finally repelled the attack. The position which his lordship occupied exposed him to the danger of being surrounded by the enemy, or of retiring under fire of his batteries. He skilfully withdrew round the Carrighaut, where, as described, he met General Meadows. Had that general occupied the time in boldly advancing, and had his lordship himself advanced to the support of his first and second divisions, the island would have been carried by a *coup de main*. The plan of Earl Cornwallis was bold, but he and most of his chief officers carried it out with disproportionate caution.

While the right and centre of the British were thus engaged, the left was also engrossed in the efforts and anxieties of complicated battle. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell was ordered to storm the Carrighaut, and descending its slopes, force his way across the river into the island. The column, like that of the centre, was divided into several divisions. The front division of this column, under Lieutenant-colonel Baird, consisted of the flank companies of the 72nd regiment, commanded by Captain Drummond and Lieutenant James Stuart, and the 1st battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Archibald Brown. The main body of this column, consisting of the battalion companies of the 72nd regiment, and the 6th battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Macpherson, was, as detailed in the orders, led by Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell. He was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Agnew and Lieutenant Wallace; and also by Lieutenant Capper, of the Madras establishment, who, with great zeal, had served as a volunteer with the army

during the two last campaigns, and attended Colonel Maxwell in this attack.

The Carrighaut was defended by infantry without artillery, but a strong rocket brigade\* assisted the infantry. The enemy was surprised, and with little resistance deprived of an important post. The ascent was defended by a "double headed work," which was taken before the enemy could do anything but cast a few rockets, and offer a desultory fire of musketry. The hill commanded one of the principal fords, and the right wing of the sultan's lines. The flank companies of the 72nd scaled the defences and occupied them, the sepadar (brigadier) in command of the defence was mortally wounded in the escalade of the British. Descending from the high post of Carrighaut to a shoulder of the same hill, but having the separate name of Pagoda Hill, Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell possessed himself of that post also. Around the bottom of the hill ran a watercourse, in which a strong party of the enemy lay concealed; and as Maxwell moved down towards Tippoo's lines, they opened fire upon him with close range from their sheltered position. At the same time the fire from Tippoo's line within the bound hedge was directed upon them, but not with much effect, as there was not light enough to direct the guns with steady aim. Near the foot of the hill the Lockany river formed an obstacle, it was defended by infantry, and several officers were killed and wounded in approaching its banks. Nevertheless, Maxwell broke through every barrier, drove the Mysoreans from their concealed positions, forded the Lockany, cut through the bound hedge, stormed several posts, and found himself on the banks of the Cavery, meeting, as before named, the centre division of the British central column on the way. The passage of the Cavery was difficult, the river was deep, rocky, and commanded by the enemy's batteries on the island. Lieutenant-colonel Baird was the first to reach the opposite bank, followed by about twenty soldiers. Other detachments rapidly followed, but the ammunition of all was saturated with water. At this juncture the

\* *Rocket* : a missile weapon, consisting of an iron tube of about a foot long, and an inch in diameter, fixed to a bamboo rod of ten or twelve feet long. The tube being filled with combustible composition, is set fire to, and, directed by the hand, flies like an arrow, to the distance of upwards of a thousand yards. Some of the rockets have a chamber, and burst like a shell; others, called the ground rockets, have a serpentine motion, and on striking the ground, rise again, and bound along till their force be spent. The rockets make a great noise, and exceedingly annoy the native cavalry in India, who move in great bodies; but are easily avoided, or seldom take effect against our troops, who are formed in lines of great extent, and no great depth.

events took place (already described) where Colonel Knox was so successful. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, a cool and skilful officer, perceiving the effects of Lieutenant-colonel Baird's passage, sought and found a safer ford, which he passed with the remainder of his men. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart also crossing, both officers and the detachments under their command joined Colonel Knox at the pettah, where, the reader will remember, he posted himself with a few men, while his officers attacked the batteries which fired upon Maxwell's column. Colonel Stuart, in order to ascertain the position of the pettah in reference to the island generally, moved round the outside of the walls, and coming upon open ground, encountered a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, who appeared to be without orders, and to have remained idle during the night. The colonel attacked them in line, presuming upon their cowardice, and dispersed them, slaying many. He had scarcely performed this feat, when the English who had first landed, and marched round to the south side of the island, came in view. Finding themselves unsupported, they were retiring, in hopes of forming such a junction as actually took place. At this moment officers were dispatched to inform Earl Cornwallis of the position of affairs.

When daylight fully revealed the true aspect of events, it presented these results of the night's conflict,—nearly all Tippoo's redoubts in front of his lines had been captured; the lines themselves stormed; the Cavery forded by a portion of Lord Cornwallis's and the whole of Colonel Maxwell's columns; and posts taken and occupied on the island. Strategically, the situation of Tippoo was critical, and he had lost many men. The loss of Lord Cornwallis was also heavy, but bore a small proportion to that of the enemy, and the advantages obtained.

Earl Cornwallis and General Meadows looked with exultation from the Carrighaut Hill upon the whole theatre of the night's performances, and his lordship immediately took measures to reinforce the troops on the island. The enemy had already begun an attack there. Batteries and redoubts, advantageously situated, opened upon the English, and the scattered crowds of Mysoreans rapidly re-collected, and assumed form and order.

The command of the troops on the island devolved on Colonel Stuart. He retired from the pettah, and drew up his men across the island in front of the Laul Baug, covering the ford leading towards the Pagoda Hill with his right, and he occupied lines and batteries which had been constructed by the enemy for the defence of that part of the

island. The colonel's troops had expended all their ammunition that was not damaged. This exposed them to some danger, but the arrival of the reinforcements with a plentiful supply of ammunition reassured Stuart and disheartened the enemy. Leaving for a time Colonel Stuart unmolested, Tippoo passed the Cavery, and stealing forward large bodies of men under cover of the unequal ground, he prepared an attack upon "the Sultan's Redoubt," which General Meadows had taken the night before by a *coup de main*. Earl Cornwallis perceived this from the Pagoda Hill. The Sultan's Redoubt was within range of the guns of the fort which now opened against it. The gorge was covered by no traverse or outwork, and was left open to the fort, and exposed to the fire thence, so that the redoubt, if taken by the English, might be untenable. It was garrisoned by eighty men of the 71st, fifty Bengal sepoy, and twenty men, European engineers, and artillery. Some twenty wounded Europeans, men and officers, and perhaps an equal number of stragglers, had also entered the place. There was no water, and but a small quantity of ammunition. Against this poor defence the attacks of the enemy were unremitting all the morning. Repeated assaults were driven back with heavy slaughter. No assistance could be rendered from head-quarters, because all approach to the point of contest must be under the fire of the enemy's guns. Before noon, the commanding officers and nearly all the senior officers were killed or wounded. There was fortunately in the redoubt an officer sent thither by Earl Cornwallis the night before with a message; he found it difficult, if not impossible to return, and he took the command. This officer was Major Skelly. When he assumed the direction of the defence, the ammunition was within a few rounds of being expended. At that moment an officer saw two loaded bullocks in the ditch, such as were generally attached to regiments for carrying ammunition. Their burdens were secured, and found to be as was supposed. The discovery was of the utmost importance, and diffused joy and confidence throughout the little garrison. As soon as the men had filled their cartridge boxes, a body of cavalry numbering more than two thousand men was seen advancing towards the redoubt. It was supposed that they would charge through the open gorge. Before coming within musket-shot they halted, and about four hundred men dismounted, and, sword in hand, attempted to gain an entrance. They were received with a fire so close and precise, that a large number were slain in the opening of the gorge, and

the rest fled broken and panic-struck, covered by the discharge of cannon and rockets. It was one o'clock in the afternoon when this repulse took place. For a time the enemy seemed in doubt what course to pursue, except to direct a fire of field-pieces and musketry against the gorge. Matters so continued until two o'clock. Another assault was then made, led by the remnant of the brigade of Lally, commanded by Monsieur Vigie. The original soldiers of the brigade had either died, fallen in battle, or were invalided, and it was now almost wholly composed of natives, Mahrattas, and other non-Mussulman people. They advanced steadily, until the defenders discharged a well-directed volley into their column, when the native soldiers refusing to advance, broke from their ranks and turned. This was the last effort of the enemy, who at four o'clock began to retire from behind the rocks where they had taken post. One fourth of the little garrison was now killed and wounded, and the latter were dying of thirst. A party volunteered to procure water from a neighbouring ditch and pond, and not only found a supply, but discovered that the enemy had retired, leaving only a few scouts in the vicinity of the rocks.

Earl Cornwallis made arrangements to relieve the garrison in the evening, as well as the troops at some other posts where harassing duty was performed, and directed supplies to be sent to the detachments which had so gallantly established themselves in the island. The desperate defence of the Sultan's Redoubt had drawn off the attention of the enemy from the troops in the island. At five o'clock in the evening after Tippoo withdrew his forces from the rocks, the cavalry dismounting, assisted by "rocket-boys," attacked the pettah. The English were seldom vigilant, and their native adherents were engaged in plunder when the attack began. Many of them consequently fell under the scimitars of the Moslem troopers, and the rest were driven out. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart ordered the 71st and a native battalion to retake the place. This was done after an obstinate combat, the British pursuing the enemy from street to street, whither they retired fighting. A prisoner taken in this conflict gave valuable information. He stated that Tippoo had convened his principal sirdars, and had exhorted them to make a bold effort to drive the English from the island, and to recover the tomb of Hyder; that the chiefs had thrown their turbans on the ground, and had sworn to succeed or perish in the attempt. The attack, the prisoner said, was to be made in the night, and the march of the assailants was to be

directed along the bank of the northern branch of the river, to turn the right flank of our line, and to cut off the communication with the camp. This account, so circumstantial, seemed to deserve credit, and Colonel Stuart made his arrangements to repulse the expected attack.

Major Dalrymple, with the 71st regiment, and Captain Brown's battalion, was directed to keep possession of the pettah, and two field-pieces were sent in order to strengthen their position. Lieutenant-colonel Knox had charge of the right wing, in which was posted the 72nd regiment; Lieutenant-colonel Baird was stationed on the left, with the six companies of the 36th regiment; and a proportionable number of sepoy were posted according to the space to be defended by each wing. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart himself, with Major Petrie, took post in the centre in the rear of Shaher Ganjam, with a small body as a reserve. The regimental field-pieces were posted in the most convenient stations, and the guns of the batteries were turned towards the fort. Small parties were also detached, as pickets, to the front, and Major Dalrymple was directed to seize the most favourable opportunity of sallying upon the flank or rear of the enemy, as they passed Shaher Ganjam to the attack of the lines. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart having reported this intelligence to the commander-in-chief, he immediately ordered four field-pieces into the island, which arrived in the course of the night; and Major Gowdie with his brigade, after furnishing the detail for the relief of the sultan's ead-gah redoubts, was directed to take post at the foot of the Pagoda Hill, to be in readiness to pass the ford into the island on the first alarm. Every possible precaution having been taken to insure success, the troops lay upon their arms anxiously expecting the approach of the enemy; but the night passed in silence, and day broke without an alarm. That an attack was intended could not be doubted; but the repulse in the Pettah had either slackened the ardour of the chiefs, or the soldiery dispirited by the fatal events of the last twenty-four hours, could not be brought to second the zeal and enthusiasm of their commanders.

On the evening of the 7th of February Earl Cornwallis was pleased to issue the following orders:—"The conduct and valour of the officers and soldiers of this army have often merited Lord Cornwallis's encomiums; but the zeal and gallantry which were so successfully displayed last night in the attack of the enemy's whole army, in a position that had cost him so much time and labour to fortify, can never be sufficiently praised; and his

satisfaction on an occasion which promises to be attended with the most substantial advantages has been greatly heightened by learning from the commanding officers of divisions, that this meritorious behaviour was universal through all ranks, to a degree that has rarely been equalled. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, requests that the army in general will accept of his most cordial thanks for the noble and gallant manner in which they have executed the plan of the attack. It covers themselves with honour, and will ever command his warmest sentiments of admiration."

During the night Tippoo abandoned his few remaining posts on the north of the Caverry, and the island remained the next morning the only theatre of contest. The English found the pettah a defensible place, and their other positions were also good: they had likewise obtained great stores of forage by driving the enemy from the mainland. The pettah was also rich in grain stores, and a pulse wholesome for cattle. The Laul Baug, as the magnificent garden of Tippoo was called, supplied material for the siege, and the palace connected with it, as well as the buildings of the Fakeers, erected by Tippoo round the tomb of his father, furnished suitable habitations for the officers, the wounded, and the sick.

The city of Srirangapatam was invested on its two principal sides; from the camp, and more especially from the pickets of the British, its fine outline, with its bold defences, were distinctly visible. The conflicts during the night of the 6th of February, and the day and night of the 7th, constituted a great and continuous battle, one of the grandest and severest which the English had fought in India. The arms, standards, and munitions of war already captured were immense. Eighty pieces of cannon, thirty-six of them brass, were taken. Tippoo had also suffered from desertion, many of his soldiers having fled on both nights, especially that of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, before day.\* Many deserted to the English, and, according to the reports of the most intelligent among those who had remained longest with him, his loss up to the 11th of February amounted to probably twenty-five thousand men.†

\* The nairs, and others whom he had oppressed, or persecuted on religious grounds, and who served with the English, cut off many of the fugitives.

† Tippoo's army was recruited from every part of Southern India. Mohammedans, from religious zeal, volunteered to serve him from every district across the peninsula, from Malabar to Coromandel. Numbers also volunteered from Central India from the same cause.

Major Dymock thus refers to these desertions:—"His sepoy's threw down their arms in great numbers, and, taking advantage of the night, went off in every direction to the countries where they had been impressed or enlisted: many came into our camp; and that continued to be the case during the siege. From their reports it appeared that, on a muster taken of the sultan's army some days after the battle, his killed, wounded, and missing were found to amount to twenty thousand. Fifty-seven of the foreigners in Tippoo's service took advantage of the battle of the 6th and 7th of February to quit his service and come over to our army. Among them were Monsieur Blevette, an old man, who was his chief artificer, or rather chief engineer, and Monsieur Lafolie, his French interpreter, both of whom had been long in his and his father's service. Monsieur Heron, who was taken at Bangalore, and released on his parole, to enable him to bring away his family, also took this opportunity to fulfil his promises: several other people of some note were likewise of the number; some of them of the artificers sent to Tippoo from France, when his ambassadors returned in 1789. Thirty of these foreigners, headed by Joseph Pedro, a Portuguese, who held the rank of captain in Tippoo's service, engaged immediately with the Mahrattas. Some requested to go to the French settlements in India, others to return to Europe; a few might, perhaps, be taken into our service, and the remainder have probably engaged in the Mahratta or nizam's armies. The remains of the sultan's army, which had withdrawn in the course of the day and night of the 7th, were collected on the morning of the 8th; his infantry on the glacis, and within the outworks of the fort; his baggage and cavalry on the south side of the river towards Mysore. The crowd in and about the fort was very great; but his army never again encamped in order, or made any formidable appearance." Active preparations were now made for the siege. The magnificent garden was soon desolate, the rich fruit-trees and far-shading cypresses affording gabions for the engineers. Fascines and pickets were procured from the material of the garden palace, where the lascars and English pioneers spared nothing which their requirements demanded. An account of the remaining events must be reserved for another chapter.

Even Mahrattas, who, as a nation hated him, served in his ranks.

## CHAPTER XCVII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM—NIGHT ATTACK ON THE TENT OF EARL CORNWALLIS—GENERAL ABERCROMBY REACHES THE ALLIED CAMPS—SURRENDER OF TIPPOO'S SONS AS HOSTAGES—SECESSION OF HALF HIS TERRITORY AS A CONDITION OF PEACE.

ON the 9th of February the siege of Seringapatam commenced in due form. The island which now appeared likely to be the sphere of a fierce and sanguinary struggle was but four English miles in length, and one mile and a half in breadth, the centre being the highest ground, thence sloping in every direction to the river Cavery, the waters of which surrounded it. The following account of it, and the condition of Seringapatam at the period of the siege, was given by an official person on the staff of his excellency the governor-general and commander-in-chief:—"The west end of the island, on which the fort is built, slopes more, especially towards the north; the ground rising on the opposite side of the river commands a distinct view of every part of the fort. The fort and outworks occupy about a mile of the west end of the island, and the Laul Baug, or great garden, about the same portion of the east end. The whole space between the fort and the Laul Baug, except a small enclosure, called the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, on the north bank near the fort, was filled, before the war, with houses, and formed an extensive suburb, of which the pettah of Shaher Ganjam is the only remaining part, the rest having been destroyed by Tippoo to make room for batteries to defend the island, and to form an esplanade to the fort.

"This pettah, or town, of modern structure, built on the middle and highest part of the island, is about half a mile square, divided into regular cross streets, all wide, and shaded on each side by trees, and full of good houses. It is surrounded by a strong mud wall, and seemed to have been preserved for the accommodation of the bazaar people and merchants, and for the convenience of the troops stationed on that part of the island for its defence. A little way to the eastward of the pettah is the entrance into the great garden, or Laul Baug. It was laid out in regular shady walks of large cypress trees, and full of fruit-trees, flowers, and vegetables of every description.

"The island of Seringapatam is watered not only by a river, but also by a canal cut from it, at a considerable distance, where its bed is higher than the island, and brought from thence in an aqueduct across the south

branch opposite to that face of the fort. This stream, conducted in various canals to all the lower parts of the island on the south side, afforded great convenience to the inhabitants in that quarter, and was the means of keeping the gardens in constant beauty and abundance.

"The fort, thus situated on the west end of the island, is distinguished by its white walls, regular outworks, magnificent buildings, and ancient Hindoo pagodas, contrasted with the more lofty and splendid monuments lately raised in honour of the Mohammedan faith. The Laul Baug, which occupies the east end of the island, possessing all the beauty and convenience of a country retirement, is dignified by the mausoleum of Hyder, and a superb new palace built by Tippoo. To these add the idea of an extensive suburb or town, which filled the middle space between the fort and the garden, full of wealthy, industrious inhabitants, and it will readily be allowed that this insulated metropolis must have been the richest, most convenient, and beautiful spot possessed in the present age by any native prince in India.

"The sultan's proud mind could not be tranquil, in seeing his beautiful garden, and all his improvements, in the possession of his enemies, who were also preparing to deprive him of his last citadel, and all that remained of his power. His anger was expressed in a continual discharge of cannon from the fort, directed to the island, to the redoubts, and to every post or party of ours within his reach. Some of his shot even ranged to the camp, and seemed aimed at head-quarters; but the distance on every side was considerable, and his ineffectual cannonade served rather to proclaim the wrath of the sovereign than to disturb or materially annoy his enemies."

Tippoo saw that he had no hope of repelling the English, and as a means of conciliation, as well as of obtaining terms of peace, he determined to release Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, whom, in violation of the terms of capitulation, he carried captives from Coimbatore.

"On the evening of the 8th of February, Tippoo sent for these officers. They found him sitting under the fly of a small tent (the roof without the walls), pitched on the south

glacis of the fort, apparently much dejected, very plainly dressed, and with only a few attendants. After giving them the welcome tidings of their intended release, he asked Lieutenant Chalmers, who had commanded in Coimbatore, whether he was not related to Lord Cornwallis, and an officer of considerable rank in our army. On being answered in the negative, he then asked whether he should see his lordship on going to camp; and being told he probably should have that honour, requested him to take charge of two letters on the subject of peace, which he said he had been very anxious to obtain ever since the commencement of the war, as it was not his intention to break with the English; and requested his assistance in effecting that important object. He further expressed his wish that Mr. Chalmers would return with the answer; told him their baggage should be sent after them; gave him a present of two shawls and five hundred rupees, and ordered horses and attendants to go with them to the camp."

Such were the hypocrisy and treachery of Tippoo, that while suing for peace, and although really anxious to procure it, he was meditating fresh schemes for retrieving by arms the disasters which had befallen him. On the forenoon of the day on which he liberated the British officers, his cavalry passed from their encampment and moved down the south side of the river Cavery. Notice was given of their movement from the island to head-quarters, but no one supposed that they had any intention of crossing to the north side of the river. This, however, they accomplished at a ford six miles distant from Seringapatam; and on the morning of the 10th, at dawn, moved to the rear of the left wing of the British camp, undiscovered, and passed between the camp of the nizam and that of Earl Cornwallis. The nizam's army seldom threw out pickets, or appointed posts of observation, yet the English sepoy sentinels mistook the enemy for horsemen of the Deccan. An officer who was in the English camp on the night of the transaction thus describes what followed, and accounts for the failure of the enterprise:—"The head-quarters were in the rear of the right wing, and so near to the right flank of the line, that the party of the enemy on passing the park of artillery, which was posted between the wings, asked some of the camp followers for the Burra Sahib, or commander. Not suspecting them to be enemies, and supposing these horsemen wanted Colonel Duff, the commanding officer of artillery, they pointed to his tent. The horsemen then drew their swords, and galloped towards the tent, cutting some lascars and people as they

advanced, till being fired upon by a party of Bombay sepoy drafts and recruits, encamped in the rear of the park, who had turned out with great alacrity; they were dispersed before they could do any further mischief. Some shot were afterwards fired at them from the park as they went off, but they got away across the hills again with very little loss.

"This scheme was one of those daring projects that have been so frequently practised by the native powers against each other in effecting revolutions in the East; and had those assassins been conducted by a guide, or their judgment been equal to their spirit in the attempt, it is possible they might have effected their murderous purpose. But the Mohammedan horsemen in the service of the native powers in India are generally intoxicated with bang, a plant mixed with their tobacco in smoking, or with opium, of which they take a large dose before they enter upon any dangerous enterprise: this inebriation renders their exertions so wild and disunited, that it is almost impossible for them ever to prove successful against a vigilant enemy. This incursion, though soon over, created a general alarm in the army; the safety of Lord Cornwallis was not less the object of the public than the private concern."

Increased vigilance was adopted by the English; and the commander-in-chief, who was careless of having his tent guarded, was induced to order a captain's guard to do duty there in future.

Immediately after this event, and while the work of making pickets, fascines, and gabions, proceeded vigorously on the island and in the British camp, another series of operations went forward which were of deep interest to all the armies concerned. These were connected with the march of the Bombay army under General Abercromby to join that under Lord Cornwallis. When last the march of the Bombay army was noticed, it had ascended the Ghauts, and appeared on the enemy's frontier. Various circumstances hindered its progress, and Tippoo dextrously impeded it by complicated and skilful movements of troops in that direction. On the 8th of February, while the army of Lord Cornwallis was operating so successfully before Seringapatam, Abercromby began a rapid movement to form a junction with his chief. On the 11th he crossed the Cavery at Eratore, not more than thirty miles from Lord Cornwallis's camp. On the 13th he had to ford a small river, which emptied itself into the Cavery, between his army and the object of their advance. At that place, suddenly, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, which had been watching for the opportunity, swept between

the army and the baggage, destroying and capturing a considerable portion. They also repeatedly charged the rearguard, and cut off a few stragglers and camp followers. On the 14th, a powerful corps of Mysorean horse harassed both flanks, and repeatedly appeared ready to charge; it was at last necessary for the British to halt, and stand in order of battle. Just as the formation of the line was completed, a British officer contrived to reach Abercromby with intelligence that Colonel Floyd, with the cavalry of Lord Cornwallis, four thousand allied horsemen, and a battalion of sepoys, were on their way to cover his advance.

Tippoo was observant of all these movements, and set the whole cavalry of Mysore in motion to cut off some of those bodies of troops. On the morning of the 14th, when Colonel Floyd marched with the British horse, the allies lingered on the ground, and refused to follow when the importunities of Major Scott urged the necessity of the whole force keeping together. When at last they did move, Tippoo's troopers passed between them and the British, attacked and routed them, and had not Floyd and his British dragoons hastened back, the Deccan and Mahratta horsemen would have been altogether dispersed. The enemy took to flight on the appearance of the British. On the 16th, the Bombay force arrived in the camp of the commander-in-chief. It consisted, after its losses, and the deduction of garrisons and posts formed *en route*, of three brigades; and when the sick and wounded were sent to hospital tents, the force numbered six thousand bayonets. One-third of the men were Europeans: with the exception of a few topasses the rest were sepoys.

The time had now arrived for commencing the siege, and orders were issued to open the trenches. Major Dirom thus describes the bulwark against which the energy and skill of the assailing armies were to be directed, and the mode of attack contemplated:—

“The fort of Seringapatam, of a triangular figure, constructed on the west end of the island, is embraced by the branches of the river on its two longest sides; the third side, or base of the triangle towards the island, being the face most liable to attack, is covered by strong outworks, and is defended by two very broad and massy ramparts, the second at a considerable distance within the first, both having good flank defences, a deep ditch, with drawbridges, and every advantage of modern fortification.

“The two other sides of the fort being protected by the river, it was intended that the main attack should have been carried on from

the island, by making a lodgment in the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, and from thence to run regular approaches against the north-east angle of the fort, which would also be subject to a powerful enfilade attack from batteries on the north bank of the river. Much time and many lives must probably have been lost in this attack; the undertaking was arduous; but there being no impediments besides those of art to encounter, the superior power of our troops and artillery could not fail of success.

“Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, had in the meantime been able to reconnoitre the north face of the fort very closely, and from what he saw, and the information he received from Monsieur Blevette, the head artificer, and others of Tippoo's Europeans, who had come over to us, it was judged more advisable to make the principal attack across the river against the north face of the fort. The curtain there was evidently very weak, and extending close along the bank of the river, left no room for outworks, and the flank defences were few and of little consequence. The ditch, excavated from the rock, was dry, and said to be inconsiderable; and it appeared to be so from what could be observed in looking into it from the Pagoda Hill. The stone glacis which, built into the river, covers that face, was broken, or had been left incomplete, in two places, including several hundred yards of the curtain; the walls might therefore be breached to the bottom, and would probably fill up great part of the ditch. The fort built on the declivity of the island on the north was there exposed in its whole extent, and every shot fired from that quarter must take effect, while the slope the island has also to the west end, exposed that part of the fort to a very powerful enfilade attack from the ground by which it is commanded on the south side of the river, opposite to the south-western face of the fort.

“The north branch of the river, which would intervene between the main attack and the fort, was the only objection. It seemed possible, by repairing an old dam or embankment, to throw the water entirely into the other branch; at all events the channel, though rugged, was not deep or impassable, and the embarrassment of such an obstacle was in some measure compensated by the security it gave against sallies, and the cover it would afford in breaking ground at once within breaching distance of the fort. The fire, too, from that side could not be very considerable, and there was a certainty of carrying on the approaches rapidly, and breaching the place with little loss. It might not be necessary to storm,

and if it should, an extraordinary exertion must be made at the general assault.

"Such were understood to be the principal reasons which determined Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the attack from the island against the east face, and adopt, in preference, that across the river against the north face of the fort."

On the 19th of February orders were given to open the trenches. At the same time, Lord Cornwallis commanded that the British troops on the island should cross to the south side, and disturb the cavalry encampment there, so as to divert the attention of the enemy from the proceedings directed against the north face of the fort. The 71st regiment and the 13th battalion of Bengal sepoys were ordered for this service. Night, soon after sunset, was chosen for this expedition. The troops crossed the river, made a detour among paddy fields, and about midnight arrived at the enemy's camp. Captain Robertson, at the head of a few companies, was sent forward, while the rest of the detachment remained in support. The captain ordered that the men should advance in close order, yet stealthily, and not fire. He entered the camp undetected, and fell upon the troopers with the bayonet, killing above one hundred. The men fled in confusion, leaving their horses, about two hundred of which the English bayoneted. The enemy now began to assemble as the alarm was given. Robertson then fired several volleys at random into the camp, so as to keep up the confusion already created while he retired. The effect of this manœuvre on the fort was instantaneous; rockets were thrown up, blue lights ignited, the bastions illuminated, so that the whole fort seemed to be a blaze of fire—the enemy expected a general assault. A single shot was fired in the direction of the musketade, but it was impossible to open a cannonade without destructive effects upon the cavalry. Captain Robertson bravely and skilfully accomplished the task assigned to him, without losing a man. There was no breach of discipline, no plunder, although many horses might have been taken away; had the men left their ranks to make prizes of the horses, the whole party might have been endangered.

Major Dalrymple, to whom the expedition had been entrusted, brought off his troops safely:—

"He returned with his detachment to the island, at four o'clock in the morning, and proceeded from thence to the head-quarters of the army, with the 71st regiment, which was one of the corps ordered up from the island, in consequence of the plan of attack being changed from thence to the north side of the fort.

"Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, and the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel Knox, who was to command the guard for the trenches, had, in the afternoon, visited the outposts, and looked at the general situation of the ground opposite to the north face of the fort, as directed in the general orders. The large redoubt, called Mahomed's, which was constructed for the defence of the centre of the sultan's camp, is nearly opposite to the middle of the fort on the north side, and at the distance of about fifteen hundred yards from that face. The approaches were to connect with that redoubt; but in order to take full advantage of an attack so unexpected on that side, it was determined to break ground within breaching distance of the fort, and, having formed a sufficient parallel, to work back from thence to the redoubt. A deep ravine, in which there is a stream of water on the right of the redoubt, turns along its front, and is branched into several nullahs, or canals, for the cultivation of the rice fields between the redoubt and the river. One of these nullahs, running nearly parallel to the north face of the fort, and being also at the distance wished, about eight hundred yards, was to be formed into a first parallel for the attack, to which the ravine or water-course itself formed an imperfect approach. About one thousand yards to the right of the ground fixed upon for the parallel, there was a square redoubt of the enemy's near the river, and a mosque with very strong walls, at nearly the same distance on the left, both convenient posts to be occupied by the guard for the trenches.

"The troops for working, and for guarding the trenches, having assembled at the engineer's park as directed, marched down as soon as it was dark, to commence the interesting operations of the night. The disposition of the guard for the trenches, or covering party, consisting of the 36th regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, being the first arrangement, was made by Lieutenant-colonel Knox, according to the plan fixed with the chief engineer, and was as follows:—

"Captain Wight, with the grenadiers, and a battalion company of the 36th regiment, accompanied by Lieutenant Mackenzie, aide-de-camp to the chief engineer, with a party of pioneers with gabions for closing the gorge of the work towards the fort, was sent to dislodge the enemy, and take possession of the redoubt on the right of the parallel: the light infantry company of the 36th regiment, under Captain Hart, and two companies of sepoys, were to occupy the mosque to the left. Sergeants' parties were distributed along the front and flanks of the parallel, to prevent the possibility of surprise. A battalion of sepoys was

sent into the nullah intended for the parallel, and the remainder of the covering party lay upon their arms, on each side of the water-course in the rear of the parallel, under shelter of some banks near the burying-ground of Tippoo's Europeans, whose quarters had been at Somarpett.

"The chief engineer having detailed the working parties under the different officers of his corps, proceeded to execute the parallel which he had marked out the preceding night. They worked undiscovered, and so ineffectual were the blue lights of the fort, that, when illuminated on all sides, in consequence of the diversion which was made from the island, they did not enable the garrison to see the people who were at work within eight hundred yards of the walls; nor can those lights be of any service to discover an enemy, unless in a very close attack, where they are generally of still more use to the assailants.

"General Meadows, accompanied by the officers of his suite, came down in the evening to the advanced redoubt, where he remained during the night, in readiness to give his orders in case anything particular had occurred. In the morning he inspected the work that had been executed, and afterwards continued his daily visits to the trenches during the siege. By daylight, the nullah was formed into a wide and extensive parallel, and a redoubt was constructed to cover its left flank, the right being protected by the ravine.

"The party that had been sent to possess the redoubt near the river, having found it evacuated, and too open to be rendered tenable, in the course of the night rejoined Colonel Knox. In the morning the parties were withdrawn that had been posted in front, and on the flanks of the parallel during the night; but the party was continued in the mosque on the left, as it was thought strong enough to resist the cannon of the fort.

"Daylight showed the sultan that the exertions of his enemy had been directed to a more material object than beating up his horse camp during the night; and that his attention had been successfully drawn off to a different quarter, during the most interesting operation of the siege. He opened every gun he could bring to bear upon the parallel, and upon the mosque, and sent parties of infantry across the river to harass our troops in flank, and to interrupt the work.

"Tippoo, finding all his exertions from the fort would be ineffectual in repelling the attack on that side, thought of employing another expedient in his defence, by turning off the water from the large canal, which, being cut from Caniambaddy for the cultivation of the grounds on the north side of the river,

supplied the greatest part of our camp. This measure, he knew, would distress our troops, and, by depriving the camp of a large stream of running water, soon render it unhealthy; and moreover, by increasing the quantity of water in the bed of the river, would add to the difficulty of our approach. It is probable that the Bombay army, previously to their junction, prevented the sultan from an earlier attempt to deprive us of this source of health and comfort, to which he was now urged by the opening of our trenches, and the commencement of the attack on that side of the fort. The sudden deficiency of the water soon indicated that the enemy had diverted the stream from the canal. The 14th battalion of coast sepoy, commanded by Captain Wahab, was immediately detached with a party of pioneers to dispossess the enemy, and endeavour to repair the damage. Tippoo's troops did not attempt to defend the position they had taken on the banks of the canal, which they had broken down in order to turn the stream into the bed of the river; and the embankment being very massy, the little they had been able to destroy was soon repaired, and the stream again confined to its former channel."\*

A battalion of sepoy was stationed there to prevent a second attempt by the enemy. After the commencement of the main attack as above described, the Bombay army was directed to cross the river, and invest the south-west side, and make ready for an enfilade attack upon the face of the fort. When Abereromby made good his passage, he perceived the enemy drawn out in battle array. Tippoo did not believe that the river could be forded with guns at that particular point, and had made no provision to prevent such a result. His cavalry had been thrown into such confusion by the surprise effected through the activity and boldness of Captain Robertson, that they were marshalled with difficulty. He now appeared in person at the head of his infantry, resolved to prevent Abereromby securing such points as would strengthen his position. These were a redoubt, and a "tope" or grove between the fort and the heights upon which Abereromby took post, and the sultan manifested an intense anxiety to prevent their occupation. The English forbore any attempt during the day, but at night Colonel Hartley, with a battalion of grenadier sepoy, effected a surprise. The next morning Tippoo saw from his fortress three European and six sepoy battalions under Abereromby on the heights, strongly posted, and beyond the range of the guns of the batteries.

On the nights of the 19th, 20th, and

\* *Narrative of the Campaign in India, 1792.*

21st of February the English carried on their works with industry, courage, and skill; thirty men only were killed and wounded by the cannonade of the sultan during those operations. He watched the English with vigilance, and opposed them with activity. Every morning he paced anxiously and fearlessly the ramparts, to observe the progress made the previous night. Every feature of the defence was drawn by himself, and his fortitude amazed the allies. Deserters were now numerous, especially from his cavalry, to the English, the Mahrattas, and the nizâm—the majority of these renegades preferred the service of the sovereign of the Deccan.

During the progress of all these demonstrations Tippoo negotiated with hesitating and reluctant diplomacy. His vakeels were received by the British commander-in-chief. Tents were pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, and thither the representatives of the sultan and the allies repaired on the 15th, 16th, 19th, and 21st. Deserters reported that the chief men in the city, anxious to save their treasures, and preserve their families from alarm, and possibly insult, had remonstrated with the sultan against continuing a war which brought desolation and disaster to their doors. Tippoo refused to make the extensive concessions demanded from him, still believing that the allies would not long be able to obtain subsistence in a country already nearly exhausted. The strong fort of Mysore was still his. Cummer-ud-Deen Khan held the Bidenore country, as already shown, and he was supposed to be hastening thence with reinforcements and convoys.

On the 22nd of February Tippoo found that General Abercromby had pushed up his posts in closer proximity to the weakest part of the defence. He determined to dislodge them. For this purpose a strong detachment occupied the tope, a few moments before the arrival of an English party for the same purpose; a combat ensued, the English were reinforced from the redoubt, their surprise of which has been related, and the combat became extended and severe: the Mysoreans were driven out, and the English drew up in front of the grove opposite the batteries of the fort. All day Tippoo threw rockets against the tope, and sent out skirmishers, who succeeded in wounding the English sentinels. When night fell he directed the guns of the fort against it, while cavalry and infantry operated upon its flanks. The English were largely reinforced, and a fierce battle was fought. The arrangements for supplying the English with ammunition were, as usual, bad, and the brave men had to retire before continuous peals of musketry, to which they

had no means of replying. The enemy, emboldened, charged the tope, the troopers dismounting and leading the way sword in hand. The English instantly turned, charged with the bayonet, and drove the aggressors under the walls of the fort. Again the enemy advanced, but did not charge, maintaining a murderous fusillade, which the English could not answer by a single shot, and were obliged to retreat under a heavy and galling fire. While the enemy were pressing more closely, and their fire thickening, the 12th battalion of Bombay sepoy, with a supply of ammunition, arrived, and turned the fortunes of the day. The sepoy covered the retreating English, who, with replenished cartouch-boxes, rallied, and again drove the enemy out of the tope, once more taking post in its front, along which a battle of musketry was waged with furious energy. The English again reinforced, pursued the enemy under the guns of the fort, as the sun set closing the day and the battle. This battle caused great uneasiness to the British on the island, and in the camp of head-quarters, as the waving to and fro of large bodies of men, and the continued roar of musketry, led the British to believe that the whole of General Abercromby's force was in action, and hotly pressed. When night came, a burning anxiety to know the result pervaded the allied camps, and means were taken to obtain prompt intelligence, which allayed all doubts, and afforded fresh encouragement. Abercromby himself had been apprehensive that the attack was a feint by Tippoo to engage the attention of the English while Cummer-ud-Deen should fall upon his rear, so that he feared to detach support to the troops in the tope, so as to put an earlier termination to the conflict. The English lost about one hundred and twenty men, and many valuable officers, in killed and wounded.

On the night of the 23rd of February the second parallel was finished, and the ground selected for the breaching batteries within five hundred yards of the fort. On the same night a redoubt was constructed on an island in the river, from which it was believed a cannonade might be directed with effect in certain conjunctures. Abercromby advanced to a ravine between the fort and the lately contested tope, and made there a lodgment. A battery was commenced near that point, from which to throw red-hot shot and shells into the fort.

On the night of the 24th the English were prepared to open a fire from nearly sixty cannon and howitzers. The weight of metal was sufficient for breaching, and the means of setting the city on fire were ample and certain. The place was not yet fully invested. Pur-

seram Bhow was, as has already been shown, on an expedition which he chose to take without the concurrence of his allies. He was now expected, and with his force of twenty thousand cavalry, a brigade of English sepoy infantry which he had with him, and thirty pieces of cannon, the investment of the city would speedily be completed, and Tippoo would obtain no supplies, unless his lieutenant, the khan, could force his way through the blockade.

Major Cuppage was advancing from Coimbatore with a very strong brigade, and orders to take the fort of Mysore on the way. Supplies were abundant, and the arrangements for convoys effective. The sultan could no longer maintain himself, unless by sorties he could clear the vicinity of his capital and raise the siege. The 24th of February dawned on the besieged and besiegers, full of interest. The former, drooping and dependent, expected that as soon as the shadows of evening closed around the ramparts, the thunder of the breaching batteries would roll over the city. The besiegers were full of high hope, eager to avenge their murdered countrymen, and enrich themselves with the booty of a stormed capital. Suddenly orders came to the English to cease working in the trenches, and to abstain from all hostile acts. At the same moment, Tippoo, ever treacherous even when treachery brought little advantage and much peril to himself, opened an active fire from all points of the defence, wounding and slaying several officers, as well as many men. This was in contravention of articles of armistice signed the night before. Lord Cornwallis sent repeated flags of truce and remonstrances, but the sultan continued his fire until noon, although the English did not reply. His aim probably was to make his people believe that he had dictated terms of peace. The same day a proclamation of Lord Cornwallis announced the cessation of hostilities, but that the same vigilance, as if in actual warfare, was to be observed at all the posts of the allied armies. On the night of the 23rd Tippoo had signed preliminaries of peace, having accepted the terms dictated by Lord Cornwallis. These terms were severe, but not more than the conduct and character of Tippoo necessitated, and it was in the power of the allies to have then closed his career, and have saved much blood and treasure that afterwards it became needful to expend. As the struggle between the English and Tippoo did not end with this war, and the treaty made by Lord Cornwallis laid the foundation for subsequent quarrels, it is desirable to present its terms to the reader:—

Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace concluded between the allied armies and Tippoo Sultan.

ART. I.—One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultan was in possession before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent, according to their situation.

ART. II.—Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid by Tippoo Sultan, either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion.

1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid immediately.

2nd. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid in three payments not exceeding four months each.

ART. III.—All prisoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ali, to be unequivocally restored.

ART. IV.—Two of Tippoo Sultan's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a due performance of the treaty.

ART. V.—When they shall arrive in camp, with the articles of this treaty, under the seal of the sultan, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers. Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship shall be agreed upon.

Major Dymock relates that “the allies, Hurry Punt on the part of the Mahrattas, and the nizam's son, Seeunder Jaw, and his minister Azeem-ul-Omrah, on the part of the nizam, conducted themselves with the greatest moderation and propriety in the negotiation, and on every occasion on which they had been consulted during the war.”

The surrender of his sons as hostages caused much commiseration in the city, and a sort of insurrection among the ladies of the harem, who besought the sultan to request an additional day's delay from Lord Cornwallis, in order that the young princes might be sent into his camp with suitable preparation. His lordship, hearing of this, sent word that he was willing to defer the surrender of the hostages, and that he would wait upon their highnesses as soon as they arrived at the tents prepared for their reception. Tippoo requested that they might be at once conducted to his lordship's tent, and delivered into his own hands.

On the 26th the hostages left the fort, and seldom has the page of history recorded a scene more touching. The ramparts were crowded with soldiers and citizens, whose sympathy was deeply stirred. Tippoo himself was on the rampart above the gateway, and is represented as having shown profound emotion.

As the princes left the gate the fort saluted them with the usual discharge of cannon, and as they approached the British camp twenty-one guns thundered forth a similar token of respect. They were met by the English negotiator, Sir John Kennaway, the Mahratta and nizam's vakeels, and a guard of honour. The princes were conveyed on elephants caparisoned after the manner of Southern India; each was seated in a silver howdah. The vakeels of the different courts were also borne

upon elephants. Harcarrahs\* led the procession, and seven standard bearers, carrying small green flags suspended from rocket poles. After these followed one hundred pikemen, whose weapons were inlaid with silver. The rearguard consisted of two hundred sepoy and a squadron of horse.

Lord Cornwallis, attended by many of his principal officers, as well as his staff, met the princes at the entrance to his tent, as they descended from their howdahs. He embraced them, and taking one in each hand, led them into his tent. The elder, Abdul Kalick, was only ten years of age, the younger, Moozaad-Deen was two years younger. Lord Cornwallis placed them on each side of him as he sat. Gullam Ali, the principal vakeel of Tippoo, then surrendered them formally as hostages, saying, "These children were this morning the sons of the sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father." Lord Cornwallis addressed the vakeel, assuring them that his protection should be extended to his interesting hostages; and he spoke so feelingly, yet cheerfully, to the children that he at once gained their confidence.

The princes wore flowing robes of white muslin and red turbans, in which each wore a sprig of rich pearls. They had necklaces composed of several rows of large pearls. From the necklace, each wore an ornament of the same pattern, the centre of which consisted of a large rich ruby, and one exquisitely chaste emerald. The centre piece was surrounded by brilliants. Their manners were characterised by propriety and dignity becoming their high rank. The elder boy had a Moorish aspect, his colour was rather dark, lips thick, nose flat, and the countenance long and preternaturally thoughtful. Neither his person nor manner was so much admired as the appearance and demeanour of the younger child, who was fair, with regular contour, large, bright, expressive eyes, and a countenance kind and cheerful:—"Placed too on the right hand of Lord Cornwallis, he was said to be the favourite son, and the sultan's intended heir. His mother (a sister of Burham-ud-Deen's, who was killed at Sattimangulum), a beautiful, delicate woman, had died of fright and apprehension, a few days after the attack of the lines. This melancholy event made the situation of the youngest boy doubly interesting, and, with the other circumstances, occasioned his at-

tracting by much the more notice. After some conversation, his lordship presented a handsome gold watch to each of the princes, with which they seemed much pleased. Beetel-nut and otto of roses, according to the Eastern custom, being then distributed, he led them back to their elephants, embraced them again, and they returned, escorted by their suite and the battalion, to their tents. Next day, the 27th, Lord Cornwallis, attended as yesterday, went to pay the princes a visit at their tents, pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, within the green canaut or wall, used by the sultan in the field, of which we had so often traced the marks during the war. The canaut of canvas, scalloped at top, was painted of a beautiful sea-green colour, with rich ornamented borders, and formed an elegant inclosure for the tents. It was thrown open to the front, and within it the pikemen, sepoy, &c., of the princes' guard formed a street to a tent, whence they came out and met Lord Cornwallis. After embracing them, he led them, one in each hand, into the tent, where chairs were placed for his lordship, themselves, and his suite. Sir John Kenna-way, the Malhratta and the nizam's vakeels, also attended the conference. The eldest boy, now seated on his lordship's right hand, appeared less serious than yesterday; and when he spoke, was not only graceful in his manner, but had a most affable, animated appearance. The youngest, however, appeared to be the favourite with the vakeels; and at the desire of Gullam Ali, repeated, or rather recited some verses in Arabic, which he had learned by heart from the Koran, and afterwards some verses in Persian, which he did with great ease and confidence, and showed he had made great progress in his education. Each of the princes presented his lordship with a fine Persian sword, and in return he gave the eldest a fuzee, and the youngest a pair of pistols, of very fine and curious workmanship. Some jewels, shawls, and rich presents were then offered to his lordship as matter of form; after which, beetel-nut and otto of roses being distributed, the princes conducted his lordship without the tent, when he embraced them and took his leave. The tent in which the princes received Lord Cornwallis was lined with fine chintz, and the floor covered with white cloth. The attendants sprinkled rose-water during the audience; and there was a degree of state, order, and magnificence in everything, much superior to what had been seen amongst our allies. The guard of sepoy drawn up without was clothed in uniform, and not only regularly and well armed, but, compared to the rabble of infantry in the

\* *Harcarrahs*: messengers employed to carry letters, and on business of trust. They are commonly Brahmins, are well acquainted with the neighbouring countries, are sent to gain intelligence, and are used as guides in the field.

service of the other native powers, appeared well disciplined and in high order. From what passed this day, and the lead taken by the eldest son, it seemed uncertain which of them might be intended for Tippoo's heir. Perhaps, and most probably, neither; for Hyder Sahib, about twenty years of age, has always been said to be Tippoo's eldest son; had been educated accordingly, and had accompanied his father constantly during the war, till lately, when he was sent on a separate command."\* The vakeels declared that he was not a favourite, nor destined to be the heir. This was, however, supposed to be said by them to prevent that prince also from being demanded as a hostage.

On the morning of the 28th a salute was fired from the fort, to announce the satisfaction of the sultan at the treatment which his sons received. Every preparation was now made to complete the definitive treaty, and hasten the departure of the allies. There arose many grounds of suspicion that Tippoo had actually murdered some of the English prisoners after the signature of preliminaries of peace, and that others were retained in a miserable confinement in Seringapatam. Ten sepoy of General Abercromby's corps were taken on the 29th of February, brought into the fort, each mutilated of his right hand, and sent back to the English camp. These men were shown to Tippoo's vakeels, who said they had been caught plundering. The sepoy declared that they were wandering about beyond the fort, were seized, brought before the sultan's chubdar, or officer of justice, and thus mutilated. The vakeels denied that this was by orders of the sultan, or with his knowledge. When Tippoo was remonstrated with by Lord Cornwallis, the reply was insolent and satirical:—"His lordship must have been misinformed; but for his satisfaction, if he desired it, he would throw down one of the bastions that he might see into the fort." In a variety of ways the sultan appeared as if he doubted the sincerity of the allies, or was himself insincere. He was preparing the means of further defence, although his sons were hostages, and he had signed terms of a preliminary treaty. His vakeels also raised every obstruction which falsehood and artifice could create to the ratification of the treaty. He refused to pay the full fine stipulated, although a crore of rupees had been already sent. Cummer-ud-deen Khan had arrived with an immense convoy and a powerful reinforcement, and was permitted to enter the fort. The cession of territory was after many disputes fixed, and yielded nearly half a million sterling to each of the three allied

*Narrative of the Campaign.*

powers. The sultan had determined, as soon as the allies withdrew, to take ample vengeance upon the Coorg Rajah for the aid which he gave to the Bombay army. Lord Cornwallis insisted therefore upon that prince being secured as an independent sovereign by the treaty. Tippoo refused, and so keen was his love of revenge, that no concession demanded of him excited such grief and indignation. He was nearly driven to madness.

Lord Cornwallis sent back the guns to the island, and ordered the troops to prepare to renew the siege, should matters come to that extremity. There was, however, such disarrangement and destruction of material as rendered a new siege far more difficult than the former. Fresh food was scarce in the camps, a pestilential effluvia stole over the posts which were occupied in the island, and many of the men sickened and some died. Upon all this the sultan had calculated, and therefore instructed his vakeels to procrastinate, while he added strength to his fortifications, especially to the north face of the fort. The civil officers of Tippoo represented to him the great forces now occupying his country, and urged him to remove all doubt of his sincerity, by a full and frank compliance with the terms of the treaty. They were justified in these representations, for, on the 16th of March, 1792, the following number of troops were in Mysore, and chiefly around Seringapatam:—11,193 Europeans, 72,620 natives, with 254 cannon.

The negotiations with the sultan made such unsuccessful progress, that on the 16th of March the body-guard which attended the princes was disarmed, and the royal children were sent towards the Carnatic. Intimation was given to the sultan that if the definitive treaty were not immediately signed, hostilities would be resumed.

Purseram Bhow, with his Mahrattas, and the Bombay sepoy battalions, under Captain Little, attached to the army of that chief, crossed the river to the south side of the fort, to join the force of General Abercromby, and make the blockade there more complete. "It may appear extraordinary that the other Mahratta army, or the nizam's army, had not been employed to act with General Abercromby, in the absence of Purseram Bhow. Lord Cornwallis mentions in one of his despatches that it suited neither the health nor inclination of Hurry Punt to go upon any detached service; and that the nizam's minister, although he, with great zeal, offered to supply the place of the bhow, was so completely ignorant of military affairs, and such was the want of arrangement prevailing in every department of his army, that he was

equally unable to put his troops in motion, or to provide for their subsistence, even for a few days, if removed from our army."

The blow took eagerly to his task, and with his cavalry scoured the country to Mysore, capturing elephants, camels, and bullocks belonging to the sultan. At last finding resistance vain, his troops unwilling to defend the city, and his family and vakeels anxious for peace on any terms, Tippoo signed the necessary documents. He requested that the ratification of the treaty should be presented by his sons to Lord Cornwallis in person. This was to induce his lordship to recall the *cortège*, which had been halted at a day's march. With this request Lord Cornwallis complied. Tippoo requested a personal interview with Lord Cornwallis, which his lordship refused, probably from an apprehension of giving cause of jealousy to our allies, from having no great respect for the sultan's character, and from seeing it would answer no essential public purpose.

"On the 19th of March the young princes, attended and escorted in the same manner as when they first arrived in camp, came to perform the ceremony of delivering the definitive treaty to Lord Cornwallis and the allies. They arrived at head-quarters at ten o'clock, which was the hour appointed, and were received by his lordship, as formerly, with the greatest kindness and attention. The boys had now gained more confidence; the eldest in particular conducted himself with great ease and propriety; and, after some general conversation, having a parcel handed to him, which contained the definitive treaty in triplicate, he got up and delivered the whole to Lord Cornwallis. The nizam's son, or Mogul Prince as they call him, and the Mahratta plenipotentiary, Hurry Punt, did not think it consistent with their dignity to attend on this interesting occasion, any more than on the first day that the princes arrived in camp. Even their vakeels were late in making their appearance. At length, on their coming, the eldest prince receiving two of the copies of the treaty, returned to him by Lord Cornwallis, delivered a copy to each of the vakeels of the other powers, which he did with great manliness; but evidently with more constraint and dissatisfaction than he had performed the first part of the ceremony. One of the vakeels (the Mahratta) afterwards muttering something on the subject, the boy asked at what he grumbled; and, without giving him time to answer, said, 'they might well be silent, as certainly their masters had no reason to be displeased.' These may not be the precise words, but something passed to that effect, which did great honour to the boy's manli-

ness and spirit. The princes having completed the ceremony, and delivered this final testimony of their father's submission, took their leave and returned to their tents; and thus ended the last scene of this important war."\*

The losses of Tippoo were very heavy. The British main army captured 432 pieces of cannon, and in the various conflicts with it, including the siege, Tippoo acknowledged that the number of men killed, wounded, missing, and taken prisoners was 31,720. The Bombay army took 224 guns, and the acknowledged loss of the sultan to that army in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters was 9020 men. The Mahratta army, and Bombay brigade associated with it, slew, wounded, captured, or caused to desert, 6850 men, and made prizes of sixty-six pieces of artillery. The nizam's army, with the Madras brigade attached, won thirty-six guns, and slew or dispersed 1550 men. The naval squadron of the English at Fortified Island seized or spiked forty-three cannon, and killed and wounded 200 men, besides taking the fort. The nizam's army took four forts, the Mahrattas six, the Bombay army sixteen, and Lord Cornwallis's own army forty. "The guns taken by Tippoo Sultan during the war were the thirty-seven at the Travancore lines, belonging to the rajah (found afterwards in the Paniany river); six field-pieces, which the detachment at Sattemangulum were, from the cattle being killed, under the necessity of quitting in their retreat; two or three guns at Permacoil, in the Carnatic; and the few guns which the detachment commanded by Cummer-ud-Deen Cawn retook in Coimbatore. The only forts of consequence that remained in Tippoo's possession at the conclusion of the war were, Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Bideenore, Mangalore, or a new fort near it called Jemaulghur, Kistnaghery, and Sankeridurgum. The two last forts being in the ceded countries, there were only four places which have not either been in the possession of his enemies during the war, or made over to them in consequence of the peace."

The prize money of the army was considerable. Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows gave up theirs for the benefit of the army in general. The company granted a year's batta, which, with the value of captured commodities, made nearly £600,000. The British armies and their allies soon began their homeward march when the treaty was signed, and the sultan was left to brood over his disasters in his diminished dominions.

\* Major Dirom's account.

## CHAPTER XCVIII.

DEPARTURE OF LORD CORNWALLIS FROM INDIA—SIR JOHN SHORE BECOMES GOVERNOR GENERAL—HE RESIGNS—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR GENERAL—GENERAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE ENGLISH—EFFORTS OF THE FRENCH—TIPPOO SULTAN FORMS A FRENCH ALLIANCE TO EXPEL THE ENGLISH FROM INDIA.

LORD CORNWALLIS having brought the war with Tippoo to a successful issue, sought the earliest day compatible with public interests to retire from the government of India, and Sir John Shore assumed the reins of government; Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby receiving the appointment of commander-in-chief. The general was appointed to his high office by the court of directors in September, 1792; Sir John was installed in his high office October 28, 1793. Lord Hobart, a nominee of Mr. Dundas (the enemy of Hastings), succeeded Sir Charles Oakley in the government of Madras, five days before Sir John Shore filled the chair of the general government.

Notwithstanding the successes of Earl Cornwallis, and the moral impression which he left behind with all the native states, their treachery and selfishness were such that the English could rely on no treaty, nor on the personal disposition of any chief; reliance could be alone placed on their own power for peace, and the integrity of their territories. The influence of the French was again beginning to be felt. They formed a fresh treaty with the nizam of the Deccan, and acquired such power over him by means purely diplomatic, that he took two French brigades into his service.

The disturbances in Europe, which ensued upon the French revolution, threatened to affect the interests of England in India. The coasting trade was impeded by French cruisers, and no effectual means were taken against them until much loss of property and some loss of life ensued. Commodore Cornwallis, in the spring of 1794, checked these attacks upon the coasting vessels.

Tippoo Sultan having performed all that he had stipulated, and scrupulously maintained peace, his sons were therefore surrendered to him on the 28th of March. It was the belief of the governments of all the presidencies that the sultan was, by a rigid economy, and a skilful attention to the resources of his dominions, preparing for a new struggle, in order to regain the territories wrested from him, and his prestige in Southern India, and that he only awaited the restoration of his children to take a more decided course. Strong suspicions were entertained that he was, with such objects, already in

correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey, and with the revolutionary government of France. As soon as Tippoo received his sons, indications were given that he was preparing for war, and the foe against whom the bolt was likely to be thrown was the nizam. A jealousy existed between this prince and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, and Tippoo was anxious to ally himself with the latter.

The treaties of 1790 clearly constrained neutrality on the part of the English, and such a policy suited the temper of the governor-general. The French took advantage of that neutrality, and instigated both the Mahrattas and the nizam to make war. French officers and troops actually joined both armies. The nizam was defeated without any help from Tippoo, and the Mahrattas were ascendant in all Southern India, except where the English, French, and Tippoo held a stern independence. The French continued to intrigue, and a French and English contingent were at the same time in the nizam's country.

While matters were thus uncertain in the Deccan, events rapidly occurred in the north, which increased the power of the English. The Vizier of Oude and the Rohillas had a fresh war, which ended in the supremacy of the ally of the English, and new arrangements, political and financial, in their favour.

The death of Sir William Jones, the learned and upright judge at Calcutta, was regarded as a loss to India and to England.

In the year 1796 the directors decided upon a revision of the military system of British India, which was carried out at an increased cost of £308,000 per annum. The appearance of a new French squadron off the coast of Coromandel caused uneasiness at the presidencies of Madras and Bengal, and the rumour that a powerful Dutch fleet was at sea, destined to co-operate with the French, deepened the alarm, and led to active defensive preparations. Sir George Keith Elphinstone encountered the Dutch fleet at the Cape of Good Hope, and compelled it to surrender, relieving the government of India of all fear from that quarter.

Before the year 1796 closed, the army of Tippoo had been increased so much, and his general military preparations were of such a character, that representations were made to him of the suspicious nature of his proceedings,

and explanations were demanded. At the same time the Madras army made ready for the field, in case the answer of the sultan should prove unsatisfactory. The government of Bombay also placed the coast of Malabar in a state of defence. The troops of that presidency were ordered to attack any French force landing in Western India, even if it were necessary to violate the territory of Tippoo.

The sultan's letter was ingeniously evasive, affording no explanation and offering no offence. Tippoo prepared more actively to assert certain claims upon Kurnaul, a dependency of the nizam, and the English government prepared to enforce respect for the treaty of Lord Cornwallis.

During 1796-7 the financial pressure upon the company was exceedingly severe. In whatever form the company prospered, financial distresses incessantly recurred. Sir John Shore was an able financier, but he had not the bold conceptions of Hastings, and he dared not incur the danger of impeachment in England by any measures of finance resembling those by which Hastings so often filled the coffers of the company. Sir John's conduct gave such satisfaction in England, that he was created Baron Teignmouth, October 24th, 1797.

The affairs of Oude were greatly disturbed during Sir John Shore's administration. The vizier died, a pretender ascended the musnid, the country was disturbed, the court a scene of debauchery and cruelty the most horrible and flagrant. Oude was what it had always proved before, and what it constantly became afterwards—a torment and difficulty to the English. Vizier Ali, who had been acknowledged by the government at Calcutta, was deposed, and Saadut Ali set up, who stipulated to pay seventy-six lacs of rupees instead of fifty-six paid by his predecessor, and also promised to pay up all arrears incurred by previous nabobs of that province. Territory was also surrendered, and money obtained for the company to a large amount under various forms and on different pretexts.

In March, 1798, Lord Teignmouth returned to England. Lord Cornwallis was again appointed governor-general, but, as was mentioned in a previous chapter, the state of Ireland required his services. The Earl of Mornington accepted the vacated post. On the 18th of May, 1798, Lord Mornington assumed the authority of governor-general. The first measure of great general interest upon which he entered was a revision of the system of finance. The credit of the company was at a very low ebb, for

there existed a general impression in India that Tippoo, the French, the Mahrattas, and other powers would all combine in a grand attempt to overthrow the English.

In June, 1798, the directors sent out a despatch for war to be proclaimed against Tippoo, if it were found that he had entered into any negotiations with the French. This resulted from a proclamation made at the beginning of the year in the Isle of France, declaring the wish of Tippoo to form an alliance offensive and defensive with France. At this juncture the force of French auxiliaries in the pay of the nizam amounted to fourteen thousand. Scindiah, the most ambitious prince in India, not excepting Hyder, had also a French force in his pay. Tippoo, early in 1799, sent an embassy to France. At Mangalore he accepted a French detachment to serve in his army, and he now seemed anxious for the moment when a renewed struggle with the English should begin.

After the peace with him in 1792, the state of the army was, as usual, permitted to decline in Madras, so that in 1799 General Harris, who then commanded the troops there, declared that it was inadequate even for the defence of the Madras territory. North-western India was in danger from the Affghans, whose incursions were incessant and fierce. The state of the British army there was most unsatisfactory. It was principally recruited from Oude fanatics, who were disloyal; and the relaxation of discipline was such as to excite the utmost alarm of General Sir James Craig, who went so far as to affirm that from the want of discipline, and the general character of the sepoys, "the fate of our empire in India probably hung by a thread of the slightest texture." Again, the commander-in-chief reported, "A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India, and we have no means for conducting an offensive one."

The Sikhs and the Mahrattas carried on consultations which were supposed to be inimical to the English. Under French influence and instigation all India seemed ripe for a combined attack upon the English, when in 1798 Lord Mornington found himself at the head of the government.

Immediately upon the arrival of Lord Mornington as governor-general of India, he found himself opposed by the council of Madras in a manner similar to that from which Hastings suffered so much inconvenience. His lordship possessed a spirit resolute like that of Hastings, but his aristocratic connexions in England gave him a power and authority which were wanting to Hastings. He resolved to exercise both in asserting his

prerogative as governor-general, and he at last succeeded in quelling the insubordinate disposition of the jobbing council of Madras.

At this juncture in Indian history, a man appeared upon the stage destined to acquire a fame wide as the world, and lasting as time—Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington. In February, 1797, he landed at Calcutta with the 33rd regiment of the line, of which he was lieutenant-colonel.\*

\* The history of the Duke of Wellington is too well known to English readers to render it necessary to give any detailed account of the previous career of that wonderful man. Yet as the circulation of our History of the British Empire in the East is considerably beyond the limits of the British Isles, the following brief notice may be desirable:—"It is a circumstance of rather unusual occurrence that the day and place of a famous birth should be unknown even to contemporary inquirers; yet such is the case on the present occasion. It is certain that the Duke of Wellington was born in Ireland, and of an Irish family, and that the year in which he saw the light was that which ushered also Napoleon Buonaparte into the world. The 1st of May, 1769, is specified, with few variations, as the birthday of Arthur Wellesley by those of his biographers who venture on such circumstantiality, and Dangan Castle, county Meath, has been selected with similar unanimity as the scene of the event. The former of these statements has received a kind of confirmation by the adoption of the duke's name and sponsorship for a royal infant born on the day in question; yet, in the registry of St. Peter's Church, Dublin, it is duly recorded that 'Arthur, son of the Right Honourable Earl and Countess of Mornington,' was there christened by 'Isaac Maun, archdeacon, on the 30th April, 1769.' This entry, while it conclusively negatives one of the two foregoing presumptions, materially invalidates the other also; for, though not impossible, it is certainly not likely that the infant, if born at Dangan, would have been baptized in Dublin. Our own information leads us to believe that the illustrious subject of this biography first saw the light in the town residence of his parents, Mornington House, a mansion of some pretensions in the centre of the eastern side of Upper Merrion Street, Dublin, and which, as it abutted eighty years ago as a corner house upon a large area, since enclosed with buildings, was occasionally described as situate in Merrion Square. We are not inclined, however, to pursue a question of which the most notable point is the indifference with which it was treated by the person most immediately concerned. The Duke kept his birthday on the 18th of June."

Arthur Wellesley, by the death of his father in 1781, became dependent, at an early age, upon the care and prudence of his mother. Under this direction of his studies he was sent to Eton, from which college he was transferred first to private tuition at Brighton, and subsequently to the military seminary of Angiers, in France. On the 7th of March, 1787, being then in the eighteenth year of his age, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley received his first commission as an ensign in the 73rd regiment of foot. His promotion was rapid, but not more so in its first steps than in examples visible at the present day, and much less so than in the case of some of his contemporaries. He remained a subaltern four years and three months, at the expiration of which period of service he received his captaincy. The honour of having trained the Duke of Wellington would be highly regarded in the traditions of any particular corps, but so numerous and rapid were his exchanges at this period, that the distinction can hardly be claimed by any of the regiments on the rolls of which he was temporarily borne. He entered the army,

It will be seen from the brief abstract of the memoir given in the note below, that when the Hon. Arthur Wellesley landed in India, he was in his twenty-eighth year, had seen considerable service, and had occupied the post of a brigadier in critical circumstances; indeed, both the lieutenant-colonel and his regiment had received high commendations for their conduct at various operations in the Low Countries.

as we have said, in the 73rd, but in the same year he moved, as lieutenant, to the 76th, and within the next eighteenth months was transferred, still in a subaltern's capacity, to the 41st foot and the 12th Light Dragoons, successively. On the 30th of June, 1791, he was promoted to a captaincy in the 58th, from which corps he exchanged into the 18th Light Dragoons in the October of the year following. At length, on the 30th of April, 1793, he obtained his majority in the 33rd, a regiment which may boast of considerable identification with his renown, for he proceeded in it to his lieutenant-colonelcy and colonelcy, and commanded it personally throughout the early stages of his active career. These rapid exchanges bespeak the operation of somewhat unusual interest in pushing the young officer forward; for in those days a soldier ordinarily continued in the corps to which he was first gazetted, and to which his hopes, prospects, and connections were mainly confined. So close, indeed, and permanent were the ties thus formed, that when Colonel Wellesley's own comrade and commander, General Harris, was asked to name the title by which he would desire to enter the peerage, he could only refer to the 5th Fusiliers as having been for nearly six-and-twenty years his constant home. The brother of Lord Mornington was raised above these necessities of routine, but what is chiefly noticeable in the incidents described is, that the period of his probationary service was divided between cavalry and infantry alike—a circumstance of some advantage to so observant a mind.

Before the active career of the young officer commenced, he was attached as aide-de-camp to the staff of the Earl of Westmoreland, then Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and in 1790, having just come of age, he was returned to the Irish parliament for the family borough of Trim. The most eager researches into this period of his career have not elicited anything to prove that he was distinguished from those around him. In one particular, indeed, he shared the failings common to his class and times, after a fashion singularly contrasted with the subsequent developments of his character. Captain Wellesley got seriously into debt. So pressing were his obligations, that he accepted temporary relief from a bootmaker in whose house he lodged, and before quitting England on foreign service, confided the arrangement of his affairs to another Dublin tradesman, whom he empowered for this purpose to receive the disposable portion of his income.

At length, in the month of May, 1794, Arthur Wellesley, being then in his 26th year, and in command of the 33rd regiment—a position which he owed to his brother's liberality—embarked at Cork for service on the continent of Europe, so that his first active duties involved great independent responsibility. Throughout the war in the Netherlands, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley distinguished himself by courage and ability. The command of a brigade had devolved upon him by seniority, and he had commanded the rearguard in a disastrous retreat. After the termination of the Netherlands campaign, his regiment returned to England, where it remained until ordered to India.—*Abridged from Memoir of the Duke of Wellington, in "The Times," September 16, 1852.*

At the period that Colonel Arthur Wellesley and his brother, the Earl of Mornington, governor-general of India, met at Calcutta, war with Tippoo Sultan was imminent. On this account the 33rd regiment was ordered to Madras, where, in September, 1798, Colonel Wellesley arrived. It was a circumstance both singular and important that the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, who was destined to play so important a part in the coming war with Tippoo, had had previous opportunity of making himself acquainted in a military point of view with Madras, the Carnatic, and the contiguous territory of Mysore. Soon after Colonel Wellesley had landed at Calcutta, he was ordered on an expedition to Manilla, but the dangerous condition of affairs at Madras led to the recall of that expedition. On his return from the Straits of Malacca, he proceeded to Madras, without touching at Calcutta. He there made acquaintance with Lord Hotham, the governor, remained in the presidency for several weeks, examined the ground which must be passed over in a conflict with Tippoo, and made himself well acquainted with the military capabilities, defensive and offensive, of the Carnatic, so that when he was ordered to Madras officially, he was a competent judge of the military questions which were then under discussion.

On Lord Hotham's removal from the government, Lord Clive, eldest son of the great conqueror of Bengal, arrived to fill that situation. How different his position and prospects from those of his illustrious father! The first Clive landed upon the sea-stricken shores of Madras, poor and desolate, a mere clerk, in the lowest situation; the son and successor of that unfriended youth landed as governor of that very place, with the rank and title of a peer, and all the advantage which great wealth confers.

The Earl of Mornington entertained a very high respect for Lord Clive, although they had never met, and he at once opened communications with him of a confidential nature as to the government and prospects of the presidency, the causes of former failures and present dangers, and the grounds of hope for future success. There is a frank, manly, generous tone in the communications of the governor-general to Lord Clive, which cannot fail to impress men much in his favour. The governor-general also requested Lord Clive to accept the exposition of his views, which would be made by his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. Thus the latter was brought into intimate and confidential relations at once with the governor of the presidency, to the defence of which he was to

bear so important a relation. The connexion also of Colonel Wellesley with General Harris, then commanding the troops of the presidency, was intimate and full of confidence—another circumstance which bore upon the future favour of the colonel, and upon the good of the service.

Before passing to the narrative of events in which General, afterwards Lord Harris, took so important a part, some notice of that noble soldier is desirable. General Harris described himself thus, "A humble clergyman's son, thrown very early in life into the army, entirely a soldier of fortune, with scarce any assistance save my own exertions." It is remarkable that the great Duke of Wellington, notwithstanding his aristocratic connexions, attributed his advancement also to his own exertions:—"I raised myself to my present position," was one of his terse expressions in the house of lords, spoken in the closing period of his career.

The father of General (Lord) Harris was the youngest child of seven; he was educated for the church, but never advanced beyond the rank of a curate. Lord George Sackville was an intimate friend of the struggling curate, and promised to provide a profession for one of his children. George was the eldest son of the Rev. Mr. Harris, and was born in the year 1744. When about fourteen years of age, Lord George Sackville gave him a cadetship in the royal artillery, his lordship being then master-general of the Ordnance. On the displacement of Lord George, his successor, the Marquis of Granby, confirmed the appointment, and thus commenced the military career of Lord George Harris. He was afterwards gazetted to an ensigncy in the 5th regiment of foot. In 1765 he obtained a lieutenancy by purchase, the means of which were obtained by the greatest difficulty. He soon after obtained leave of absence in order to travel and study in France, and he there not only learned the French language, but studied the military art as professed by that nation. On his return he joined his regiment in Ireland, where many adventures befel him trying to his courage and prudence, but confirming those virtues in him. In 1771 he obtained a company by the severest self-denial on the part of his mother, as it had to be purchased by an outlay of £1100; he had then attained his twenty-sixth year. He soon after was ordered with his regiment to America. He soon saw active service there, and was desperately wounded at the battle of Bunker's Hill. After rapidly recovering from his wound, he was again engaged with the Americans, and was again wounded. He was afterwards entrusted by Earl Cornwallis with

a letter to Washington, and obtained the majority of the 5th regiment. Colonel Walcott having been shot through the body at German Town, Major Harris took the command of the regiment. While covering the embarkation of the troops from Philadelphia, he made the friendship of the celebrated Admiral Lord Howe, an event which influenced the major's future career. In October, 1778, he went with General Meadows on a secret expedition against St. Lucie. General Meadows, with one thousand seven hundred British, was attacked by five thousand French, who were signally repulsed. On this occasion Major Harris, at the head of the 5th, greatly distinguished himself.

After these events the major embarked in a Dutch vessel for England, and was captured by a French privateer. He was almost immediately set at liberty, and after visiting home, and marrying, re-embarked to join his regiment at Barbadoes. In 1780 he again returned to England, and was persuaded by General Meadows to go with him to Bombay, as military secretary and aide-de-camp. From Bombay he proceeded with General (Sir William) Meadows to Madras, and served in the campaigns against Tippoo Sultan, in 1790 so that the character of the country of Mysore, and of its resources, army, and sovereign, was well known to General Harris when, under the government of the Earl of Mornington, his services were required in a post of high command.

After the campaigns of Earl Cornwallis, General Harris returned to England, but again went out to India, landing at Calcutta in October, 1794, when he received the appointment of commander-in-chief at Madras. His nominal rank in the army was afterwards raised to that of lieutenant-general, and a seat in the Madras council was given to him, in which he supported the authority of the Earl of Mornington, when as governor-general that factious body attempted to oppose him. These high honours were conferred upon him in 1797. In this position the events now under relation found the commander-in-chief of the Madras army.

The Earl of Mornington was determined to bring the dangers and difficulties of India to an immediate solution. He laid down a plan of action, and sent it as a secret despatch to Lieutenant-general Harris, and recommended his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, to devote his skill and energy to the object of bringing the troops in cantonments to a higher state of discipline. The noble earl resolved upon bringing Tippoo to account for his conspiracy with the French against the English.

Meanwhile events went on elsewhere which quickened Lord Mornington's decision. "At the very moment when Colonel Wellesley was ordered to Madras, Buonaparte had actually disembarked a French army on the shores of Egypt, and had put himself in communication with Tippoo—facts quite menacing enough to warrant unusual misgivings. The strength, too, of the Mysore army gave at least seventy thousand troops, admirably equipped, and in no contemptible state of discipline, while the Madras muster rolls showed a total of no more than fourteen thousand of all arms, including less than four thousand Europeans. In fact, Lord Mornington had been compelled to exchange the scheme of attack originally contemplated for a more cautious and regular exertion of his strength. With these reluctant conclusions he ordered General Harris to stand on the defensive along the Mysore frontier, and to augment the efficiency of his army by all available means, while he turned his own attention to the native courts, whose alliance or neutrality it was desirable to secure. That nothing on his part might be wanting to the success of the enterprise, he had transferred himself and his staff from Calcutta to Madras, and the effects of his policy and his presence were quickly discernible in the impulse communicated to every department of the service, and the restoration of energy and confidence throughout the presidency. These efforts were admirably seconded by the practical exertions of his brother at Wallajahbad. So effectually had Colonel Wellesley employed the three months of his local command, that the division under his charge from being weak and ill provided had become conspicuous for its organization and equipment; and when the whole army afterwards took the field in wonderful efficiency, the especial services of Colonel Wellesley in bringing about this result were acknowledged in a general order of the commander-in-chief."

Among the measures which demanded Lord Mornington's care and vigour was a plan for disarming the French in the nizam's employ. The scheme adopted was the governor-general's own, and the *modus operandi* was drawn up by him in detail, and executed with the utmost secrecy and the most energetic promptitude. A treaty was concluded with the nizam, September 1st, 1798; by it a contingent of six thousand company's soldiers with artillery was to serve with the army of the Deccan. In pursuance of this arrangement, Colonel Roberts, with his detachment, reached Hyderabad on the 10th of October. Everything was silently made ready, and on the 22nd the English contingent, with a force of cavalry belonging to the nizam, surrounded

the French camp, disarmed all the sepoys, and seized the persons of the French officers, without shedding one drop of blood.

The governor-general showed an earnest desire to avert war; he granted a ready compliance with certain demands concerning disputed territory made by Tippoo's vakeels. He endeavoured to open up negotiations for conferring peace, by breaking up the alliance between Tippoo and the French. Colonel Doveton was commissioned to facilitate a settlement; but after three separate efforts to accomplish his purpose, which were defeated by the evasions of Tippoo, there remained no appeal but to the sword.

The governor-general having settled a new treaty with the nizam, directed negotiations through Colonel Palmer to the Mahrattas. The colonel produced at the court of Poonah the proclamation of the French governor of the Mauritius, announcing Tippoo as an ally to drive the English out of India. His excellency wished to have a contingent placed in connexion with the Peishwa, as had just been arranged at the court of the nizam. The Mahratta minister refused compliance, but expressed his purpose to abide by the treaty under which the last war with Tippoo had been brought to so happy an issue. By negotiations with Persia, a stop was put to the threatening proceedings of Zemaun Shah in the north-west. His excellency's next step was to form a commission for the purpose of correspondence with all tributaries, allies, or subject chiefs connected with Mysore, so as to detach them from connexion with the sultan. This commission was comprised of remarkable men, namely, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel Close, Lieutenant-colonel Agnew, Captain Malcolm, political assistant at Hyderabad, and Captain Macaulay. At last, a declaration of war was made; Tippoo was summoned to submit, and referred to General Harris as the medium through whom he must make any communication to the governor-general.

The council of Madras was reluctant to enter upon the war; everything there was, as it always had been when left to a Madras council, in confusion and distress. There were no funds, no commissariat, the troops insufficient in number and equipment, and no readiness even for operations of defence.

Mr. J. Webbe, the chief secretary, considered the plans of Lord Mornington dangerous and impracticable, and the opinions of this functionary had great weight with the community of Madras, native and European. The future Duke of Wellington had so high an opinion of him that he had his portrait hung up at Strathfieldsaye, and used

to point it out as the likeness of one of the ablest and honestest men he ever knew. General Harris was, however, determined to carry out the views of the governor-general, which he believed sound, whatever course might be taken by the "timid members of council." Mr. Webbe, so much esteemed by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, pronounced against war with Tippoo, notwithstanding his conspiracy with the French, on the ground that the French could not then aid him, that Tippoo could not of himself disturb the balance of power, and that it was impolitic for the English to extirpate the sultan, as they would by that act increase unduly the influence of the nizam and the Mahrattas. The reasoning of Mr. Webbe was sound, although Tippoo deserved any penalty the English could inflict. The predictions of Mr. Webbe were verified, the destruction of Tippoo was one of the elements of the great Mahratta war, in which the English expended so much blood and treasure. Earl Mornington acted with justice towards Tippoo. He did not proclaim war until efforts of moderation failed. It was his conviction that the French would succeed in throwing forces into India to aid the sultan, unless he were speedily removed out of the way. The governor-general's mode of proceeding disclosed eminent capacity, but after all Mr. Webbe was correct in his policy. Had Tippoo been left to himself at that juncture, it might have been as well for English interests in India for a long time. The die however was cast, and the differences between the Mysore tyrant and the East India Company were soon to be settled by the sullen arbiter—war.

In the conduct of Lord Clive, General Harris and the governor-general obtained co-operation and support. His lordship relieved the general from the cares of the Madras government, which had virtually devolved upon him, and he worked with an earnestness worthy of his gifted father.

Mr. Webbe, the ablest civilian then in India, fell under the displeasure of the directors and the government at home, because of his conscientious and honourable opposition to Lord Mornington. His lordship, Lord Clive, and General Harris protested against the removal and political degradation of so upright and competent a person, and induced the directors to revoke their measures, but the inferior members of the Madras council, anxious to gain favour with the home authorities, contrived to divest him of the chief secretaryship, and send him to Nagpore. The noble sufferer took this so much to heart, that, *en route*, upon the banks of the Nerbuddah, he died of a broken heart. The

conduct of the Earl of Mornington, Lord Olive, and General Harris towards this invaluable man was honourable, generous, manly, and just, as might be expected from such men, who sympathised with honour and genius, and who in differing from the gifted secretary, respected his judgment and his motives, and confided in his talents and integrity. Probably at no period of the eventful life of General Harris, excepting while engaged, soon after, in the siege of Seringapatam, did he feel such a sense of anxiety and responsibility as during the discussions with Mr. Webbe, and his preparations for this war. To such an extent was his mind oppressed with these feelings, that he wrote to the governor-general, begging that Sir A. Clark, then at Calcutta, should be appointed to the supreme command. His excellency considered the general competent, and ex-

pressed his reluctance to remove him from so honourable and important a post, even at his own request. The governor-general being then at Madras, a personal interview removed the general's doubts, and restored his confidence. The general, remembering the experiences of Lord Cornwallis, under whom he had served in the previous war against Tippoo, expressed his determination to advance at once upon the capital, to evade even a general engagement with Tippoo, and not to tarry for any advantage whatever, but to decide the war at the capital, unless Tippoo forced on an engagement by throwing his army across the march of the British. The governor-general concurred in this line of strategy, as did also the superior officers of the army. The progress and events of the war itself must form the subject of a separate chapter.

## CHAPTER XCIX.

### FINAL WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—STORMING OF SERINGAPATAM—DEATH OF TIPPOO.

WHEN at last the hour arrived for commencing the conflict with Tippoo which he had by his folly provoked, the arrangements of the British were in a condition to inspire the highest hope, except in the department of the commissariat, in which the English had always proved themselves deficient. The opening of the campaign has been much praised. "The whole force put in motion consisted of three columns: the corps of the Carnatic, thirty thousand strong; that of Bombay, two-thirds less numerous; and the contingent of our ally, the nizam. The latter consisted of the British detachment in the nizam's service, of a few battalions of his own infantry, including some of M. Raymond's force lately disbanded, and of a large body of cavalry. To complete the efficiency of this powerful division it was resolved to add a king's regiment to its rolls, and at the express wish of the nizam's minister, coupled with the prompt approval of General Harris, Colonel Wellesley's corps was selected for this duty, and on him the general command of the whole contingent was suffered to devolve. By these arrangements, which were to the unqualified satisfaction of all parties concerned, Colonel Wellesley assumed a prominent place in the conduct of the war, and enjoyed opportunities of displaying both his special intelligence and his intuitive military powers. Few opportunities indeed could be better calculated for the

full development of his genius. He held a command sufficiently independent to elicit all his talents; he formed one of the political commission attached to the commander-in-chief; and he acted under the eyes of a governor whose acuteness in discerning merit and promptitude in rewarding it were quickened on this occasion by the natural impulses of affection. Nor were there wanting in the same ranks either models of excellence or stout competitors for fame. Besides Harris himself, there were Baird and Cotton, Dallas and Brown, Floyd and Malcolm—soldiers all of them of high distinction and extraordinary renown, who either sought or staked a professional reputation in this memorable war against Tippoo Sultan."

The anonymous writer just quoted thus sketched the progress of the campaign:—"By the end of February, 1799, the invading forces had penetrated into the dominions of Mysore, though so difficult was the country, and so insufficient, notwithstanding the previous preparations, were the means of transport, that half-a-dozen miles constituted an ordinary day's march, and three weeks were consumed in conveying intelligence from the western division of the army to the eastern. The first movements of Tippoo from his central position had been judiciously directed against the weaker corps which was advancing from Cannanore on the opposite coast of

the peninsula, but in his attempt on this little force he was signally repulsed, on which, wheeling to the right about, and retracing his steps, he brought himself face to face with the main army under General Harris near Malavelly, a place within thirty miles of his capital city, Seringapatam. His desires to engage were promptly met by the British commander, who received his attack with the right wing of the army, leaving the left, which was composed of the nizam's contingent under Colonel Wellesley, to charge and turn the flank of the enemy opposed to it. Colonel Wellesley's dispositions for this assault were speedily made, and, having been approved by General Harris, were executed with complete success. The conduct of the 33rd decided the action. Knowing that if he could break the European regiment the native battalions might be expected to despair, the sultan directed a column of his choicest troops against Colonel Wellesley's corps; which, reserving its fire till the enemy had closed, delivered a searching volley, charged, and threw the whole column into a disorder which the sabres of the dragoons were not long in converting to a rout. After this essay it was clear that the campaign would turn upon the siege of the capital, and on the 4th of April the army, by the judicious strategy of Harris, arrived in effective condition before the ramparts of Seringapatam. Between the camp of the besiegers and the walls of this famous fortress stretched a considerable extent of irregular and broken ground, affording excellent cover to the enemy for annoying the British lines with musketry and rocket practice. At one extremity was a "tope" or grove called the Sultan Pettah tope, composed mainly of betel-trees, and intersected by numerous watercourses for the purposes of irrigation. The first operations of the besiegers were directed to the occupation of a position so peculiarly serviceable to the party maintaining it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th, General Baird was ordered to scour this tope—a commission which he discharged without encountering any opposition. Next morning Tippoo's troops were again seen to occupy it in great force, on which General Harris resolved to repeat the attack on the succeeding night, and to retain the position when carried. The duty was entrusted on this occasion to Colonel Wellesley, who, with the 33rd and a native battalion, was to be supported by another detachment of similar strength under Colonel Shawe. This was the famous affair of which so much has been said, and which, with such various colourings, has been described as the first service of Arthur, Duke of Wellington. On receiving the order, Colonel Wellesley

addressed to his commander the following note, remarkable as being the first of that series of despatches which now constitute an extraordinary monument of his fame:—

*Camp, 5th April, 1799.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

I am, my dear Sir, your most faithful servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"This letter has been often appealed to as evidence of that brevity, perspicacity, and decision, afterwards recognised as such notable characteristics of the great duke's style. The attack made by Colonel Wellesley was a failure. Bewildered in the darkness of the night, and entangled in the difficulties of the tope, the assaulting parties were thrown into confusion, and, although Shawe was enabled to report himself in possession of the post assigned to him, Colonel Wellesley was compelled, as the general records in his private diary, to come, 'in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope.' When daylight broke the attack was renewed with instantaneous success, showing at once what had been the nature of the obstacles on the previous night; but the affair has been frequently quoted as Wellington's 'only failure,' and the particulars of the occurrence were turned to some account in the jealousies and scandals from which no camp is wholly free. The reader will at once perceive that the circumstances suggest no discussion whatever. A night attack, by the most natural of results, failed of its object, and was successfully executed the next morning as soon as the troops discovered the nature of their duties."

During these and subsequent operations General Harris showed conscientiousness, capacity, and untiring diligence, so that the Duke of Wellington observed: "It is not sufficiently known that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded." Independently of his personal exertions in the details of the army, the general produced a voluminous body of despatches, letters, and reports, full of information and interest, and proving that he was competent in wielding the pen as well as the sword. In approaching Seringapatam his temper and diligence were severely tried by the casualties to baggage, baggage animals, carriages, stores, and guns, especially the battering trains, occasioned by the nature of

the country. All the predictions of Mr. Webbe were fulfilled, and much that the general feared from his previous experience under Lord Cornwallis came to pass. Fortunately the progress of General Harris was unopposed, in consequence of the expedition of Tippoo to cut off the Bombay army, as already referred to in the quotation just cited. That event was of considerable importance to the campaign, and the defence of the troops of the Bombay army reflected great honour upon them, and much influenced the fate of the war. Tippoo would have succeeded in surprising the army of General Stuart, and in cutting off a brigade before the main army could come to its assistance, but for the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg, who, the reader will remember, materially aided the advance of General Abercromby's army in the previous war. Lieutenant-colonel Montresor had command of three native battalions at Sedaseer, near Periapatam. In this direction Tippoo's army cut through the jungles with astonishing celerity, and fell upon the brigade, which made an obstinate defence under the gallant example and skilful arrangements of the brigadier. This occurred on the 6th of March, but Tippoo's vicinity was discovered through the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg on the day before, who, hastening to General Stuart, apprised him of the danger of Colonel Montresor's detachment. The rajah hurried with his own troops to the colonel's assistance, and General Stuart in person made a rapid march with a regiment of British infantry, and the flank companies of another. The rajah, in his despatch to the governor-general, gave by far the most interesting account of the event which appeared. Its unique character will interest the reader:—"On Tuesday, the 5th of March, myself, Captain Mahony, and some other English sirdars, went to the hill of Sedaseer, which is within my territories. This mountain, which is exceedingly lofty, the English sirdars and myself ascended, and we remained there. Having from thence reconnoitred, we observed nothing for the first four or five hours (Malabar hours); after this we observed one large tent in the direction of Periapatam, which is within the territories of Tippoo Sultan, and continued to see some other white tents rising; a large green tent then appeared, and then another tent which was red, and after that five or six hundred tents. Upon this, the English sirdars and myself were satisfied that it was the army of Tippoo Sultan; we then returned to the English army at Sedapore, and acquainted the general that Tippoo's army was at Periapatam. The army was accordingly prepared, as were also the battalions at Sedaseer, under

the command of Colonel Montresor. Next morning, Tippoo's army advanced close to the battalions under the command of Colonel Montresor, and there was a severe action. After the battle commenced, the battalions put a great many of Tippoo's people to death. Tippoo, unable to sustain their fire, and having no road by which to advance, divided his army into two divisions, with the intention of getting into the rear of Colonel Montresor's battalions by a secret path. The colonel having received intelligence of this division, made a disposition of his force so as to sustain both attacks; and maintained the fight from the morning, uninterrupted, till two o'clock. The enemy were beaten, and unable to show their faces. When the information of Tippoo's attack reached the main body, General Stuart, in order to assist the force at Sedaseer, marched with two regiments of Europeans, keeping the remainder of the army in the plain of Karrydygood. Upon this occasion I accompanied General Stuart.

"Tippoo, in order to prevent the two regiments from advancing to the relief of the troops at Sedaseer, was posted in the road between. General Stuart, upon approaching, ordered the two regiments to attack the enemy. A severe action then ensued, in which I was present with my people. Many of the enemy were slain, and many wounded, the remainder having thrown away their muskets and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion.

"Tippoo having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam. Having considered for five days, but not having taken up resolution to attack the Bombay army again, he marched on the sixth day (Saturday) back to Seringapatam. My continual prayer to the Almighty is, that the English circle may continue as my parent, that I may remain as their child; that all their enemies may be defeated, and that their territories, measures, and prosperity may increase without end, and that I may enjoy peace under their protection. In this manner I approach the Sovereign Ruler with my constant prayer, night and day, and all times in humble supplication."

Arrived before Seringapatam, General Harris dispatched a strong corps under General Floyd, to meet and assist General Stuart. Floyd's force consisted of four cavalry and six infantry regiments, twenty field-pieces, and a body of the nizam's horse.

On the 7th of April, 1799, the allied army took up its position for the last siege of Seringapatam. Tippoo was so much engrossed with the proceedings in his front,

that twenty-four hours elapsed before he was aware of the dispatch of General Floyd, to bring General Stuart from Periapatam. When at length he heard of the movement, he sent his confidential lieutenant, Cummer-ud-Deen, with nearly his whole cavalry, in pursuit.

On Sunday, the 11th, General Harris moved out to meet Generals Floyd and Stuart, who had in the meantime formed a junction.

The most active, if not the most successful officer with General Harris, up to the time when the siege actually commenced, was the Hon. Colonel Wellesley; yet he was exceedingly delicate, giving no promise of the "iron frame" for which he became afterwards celebrated. There is an incidental proof of the physical delicacy and arduous energetic temperament of the embryo great man in one of the Earl of Mornington's dispatches written at the time. His excellency, writing to General Harris, said, "Do not allow Arthur to fatigue himself too much," showing the governor-general's opinion of his brother's inability to endure much toil, and of the eager earnestness of his nature.

On the 17th of April General Harris recorded in his journal his apprehensions as to the supplies for the armies. The commissariat was still the defective part of the service of the British army; officers competent in the field, chivalrous everywhere, seem to have given no proper attention to that indispensable part of an effective army. Men of rank thought it beneath them. General Harris himself, although infinitely painstaking, and well aware of how much depended upon regular and ample supplies, was less proficient in the ability to provision an army than in any other part of his profession. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley surpassed the general-in-chief and all his officers in this invaluable requisite of generalship. The state of the supplies was such on the 17th, that General Harris believed it necessary, against military rule, to hasten the attack, and run great risks in doing so, rather than hazard the loss of his army by hunger and sickness; various outpost combats ensued in consequence of this determination, which occupied two days. On the 19th General Stuart reported to head-quarters that the Bombay column had only two days' provision. The journal of General Harris at this time (as subsequently published by his son-in-law) betrays an anxiety intense and feverish from the inadequacy of supplies, but, nevertheless, the expression of his apprehensions is uniformly pervaded by a trust in Providence and deference to the will of God, which must be edifying to all who peruse it, and invest the memory of the man with a sacred dignity.

Thus, on the 25th of April, he wrote—"A violent storm of wind and rain last night; I trust we shall not have more rain, or it will be next to impossible to get our guns into the batteries. Providence directs all things for the best; then let us bow down in humble resignation." The guns were got into the batteries by the exertions of the general and his soldiers, although there was more rain, and the difficulties were great, for, on the 26th, he recorded—"Our new battery, and the altered one, opened, and had very soon every success expected. Determined to attack the enemy's post in our front and right in the evening. Disposition made and communicated to Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches, with the 73rd Scotch brigade, 2nd battalion Bengal volunteers, 2nd battalion 3rd regiment coast sepoys." These dispositions proved effectual, but only after the English sustained heavy loss, the sultan making desperate resistance. It was the last effort of gallantry made by Tippoo previous to the assault. The proceedings were of great importance to the English, as furnishing the ground for the breaching batteries which were yet to be erected. The order for attack was given by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, who personally superintended its execution, with the caution and boldness which were his characteristics. The following description was given by one who had the best means of knowing the events he relates:—"At the hour proposed the guns from our batteries commenced a heavy fire of grape, which was the signal for the attack. The Europeans then moved out, followed by the native troops. The enemy, seeing this movement, began an active fire from behind their breastwork; guns from almost every part of the fort opened upon our troops with great effect, and, by the time they had quitted the trenches, the fire of cannon and small arms was general. The companies from the 73rd regiment and Scotch brigade then pushed on with great rapidity to the enemy's works, who, seeing the determined spirit of the English troops, fled from their posts in great confusion and dismay; but many fell by the bayonet while endeavouring to escape. The relief from the trenches, which was this evening commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, had by this time arrived; a part of the 74th regiment, and the regiment De Meuron, composed the Europeans of that relief, and were ordered immediately to advance to support the rest. These pushed on to the right of the attack. A heavy fire was continued from the ramparts, and by those of the enemy who had fled from

\* The Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, for some time private secretary of Lord Harris.

the part of their intrenchments first attacked, and taken post behind the traverses more to the right; several made a desperate stand, and fell by the bayonet; the Europeans dashed in, forcing the traverses in succession, until they had extended as far as the turn of the nullah towards the stone bridge. At this turn there is a redoubt, open to the south-east angle of the fort, but which flanked a watercourse running parallel and close to the intrenchment that was carried. This redoubt was stormed by the 74th regiment, and left in their possession, while Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with a small party of that corps, and a few men from the regiment De Meuron, pushed forward along the intrenchments and the road, till he came to the bridge leading over the great river. Lieutenant-colonel Wallace at the same time advanced considerably more to the right, till, fearful of risking too many lives while acting in the dark, he prudently fell back, and took possession of the enemy's post at the stone bridge, on the road to Shawe's post; but this post being too much detached from the main body of the troops, he withdrew the party left to defend it during the night. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell crossed the bridge, and went some distance on the island; but it was necessary to make an immediate retreat from that dangerous situation, and nothing but the night and the consternation of the enemy could have given the smallest chance for the party to escape. They returned under a heavy fire from all sides, and made their way back to the redoubt, where Lieutenant-colonel Wallace had taken post with the few of the 74th regiment who had remained with him, and the rest of the troops whom he had placed to the left along the watercourse, which runs close to the intrenchment, and in this situation they remained all night, exposed to grape from the fort, and galled by the musketry from the ground on the right flank, and from the post at the stone bridge, which took them in the rear. The enemy continued firing grape and musketry at intervals the whole night; at length the daylight appeared, and discovered both to us and to them the critical state of our men. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell having been crippled the preceding night by being barefooted during his excursion across the bridge, was obliged to return to camp, and Lieutenant-colonel Wallace being next in command, he sent to inform Colonel Sherbrooke of their situation, and to request further support, as the enemy were collecting in great force on the right flank, and at the post they occupied near the stone bridge, from which they galled our people in the rear to a great degree.

Colonel Sherbrooke, on receiving this report, instantly ordered all the Europeans who had remained in the trenches to advance to Colonel Wallace's post, and each man to take with him a pickaxe, or momitie.\* Colonel Wallace, in the meantime, seeing the necessity of dislodging the enemy from the bridge, ordered Major Skelly, with a few men of the Scotch brigade, to move down and attack that post. He was followed by a company from that regiment, and soon got possession.

"The Europeans had by this time arrived from the trenches, and by their exertion and the assistance of the pioneers, an intrenchment was thrown up and completed by ten o'clock; but from the dawn of day to that hour continued efforts were made by the garrison to regain what had been lost, but in vain. The determined bravery of our troops baffled all their endeavours. The post gained at the bridge secured the rear of the other, and presented a new front to the enemy; it was strengthened by another company from the 74th regiment and two companies of sepoys, and in a short time the whole of them were under cover. The loss on this occasion was great. Two officers and sixty men killed, ten officers and two hundred and sixteen men wounded; nineteen men also missing; altogether, killed, wounded, and missing, three hundred and seven officers and men."

On the night of the 28th a breaching battery was erected, which on the morning of the 30th was opened against the walls. By the 1st of May the outer wall of the west angle of the fort was partly demolished, and the masonry of the bastion within was greatly shaken.

On the 2nd of May Tippoo made clever and daring efforts to close the breach, which he was enabled in a considerable degree to effect, because the English working parties who were preparing for the assault were in such a position as to prevent discharges of grape against Tippoo's workers. Colonel Wellesley, perceiving this disadvantage, used the most strenuous and persevering exertions to complete the task committed to the English workmen, so as to leave the range free against the workmen of the sultan, or the breach still practicable, if the general-in-chief should order an assault. The letter in which the future hero of so many other great sieges reported his proceedings is very characteristic—terse, pointed, and complete. It will be seen that the Hon. Colonel Wel-

\* A sort of spade, used throughout India in the removal of earth, and very efficient in the hands of those who are accustomed to it. It is chiefly employed in the formation of those magnificent reservoirs for water, to which the peninsula owes its fertility.

lesley had, in a subordinate command, to encounter at Seringapatam the very difficulty which so much impeded him in the war of the Iberian peninsula some years later—want of tools. Many a time during his brilliant career in Portugal and Spain had he to make a report in similar terms—"It could not be done for want of tools." Even so late as the siege of Sebastopol the English soldiers were unable from this cause to perform the task assigned to them. Or when supplied with tools, the result in India, Spain, and the Crimea has been the same—they were of such bad material as to be soon rendered useless. It is strangely characteristic of the English, that with resources beyond all other nations for military appliances, they should be neglectful beyond all other nations in providing them, notwithstanding innumerable proofs of the danger incurred by the neglect, and the sacrifice of human life which it occasioned.

*To Lieutenant-general Harris.*

MY DEAR SIR,—We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools. I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do anything to it until the night before it is to be used.

Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis. On the left of the breach, he found the wall which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieutenant Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our trench was exposed, from which alone we could fire as we repaired the other. Lieutenant Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

I am, &c., ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The period for the assault at last arrived, and the commander-in-chief resolved to devolve that duty upon Major-general Baird. That officer was ordered to capture the rampart as his preliminary measure in the actual attack. In order to accomplish this, his force should be divided into two columns, one to proceed along the northern rampart, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop; the other to proceed along the southern rampart, and to be commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke. These columns were to proceed in their respective routes until they joined on the eastern face, thus making a complete circuit of the rampart. They were then to descend into the town, attacking such cavaliers as were not captured in the onset, and routing any bodies of troops making a stand for the defence of the place.

An excellent arrangement was suggested

to General Baird by the commander-in-chief, to prevent confusion or accident among the troops giving the assault, and also to conceal from the enemy to the latest moment the intention to make it that night. The different corps were to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night, and in such succession, as should place them there in the precise order that they were to go out to the assault. Thus each party would know its precise place the moment the signal should be given to incur the hazard of the undertaking. It was agreed between the commander-in-chief and Major-general Baird that such should be the plan of operations.

As the assault upon Seringapatam, which terminated the career of Tippoo, is one of the episodes in Indian history most interesting to English readers,—the war against Tippoo having been the only Indian war very popular in England,—the events which issued in the catastrophe of the throne of Mysore will be given in detail. Colonel Close, the adjutant-general (afterwards Sir Barry Close), communicated to General Baird, on May 3rd, his final orders for the morrow. Some knowledge of these is necessary for the clear comprehension of the whole action, for an account of a battle, especially if it be the storming of a fortification, however exciting certain features of the conflict may be, cannot afford an intelligent interest to the reader unless the plan of operations is first possessed, if not in all its minutiae, yet sufficiently in detail to show the dependence of one part upon another in conducing to one grand result.

*Disposition of the Troops ordered for the Assault of the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, 1799.*

Left attack, under Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

To move in column, left in front.

To take possession of the cavalier, close to the breach, and move along the north rampart of the fort; to proceed till they join the right attack, leaving a battalion company of the 33rd regiment in charge of the cavalier already mentioned, close to the breach, and occupying such other parts on the ramparts, by detachments from the 12th and 33rd regiments, as shall be thought necessary by Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

Right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke.

To move in column, right in front.

To move along the south rampart of the fort, leaving such parties as may be thought necessary by Colonel Sherbrooke, from the 73rd or 74th regiments, in charge of such parts of the ramparts as he may deem it essentially necessary to occupy.

Half of the European and half of the native pioneers to accompany each attack with hatchets: the European pioneers to carry the scaling ladders, assisted by forty men from the battalion companies of each of the leading regiments; the native pioneers to carry a proportion of fascines.

If the road across the river and the breach shall be deemed sufficiently broad, the two attacks to move out to the assault at the same moment. On coming to the top of

the breach, they are to wheel to the right and left, so as to get on the face they are ordered to move on; but if the road and breach are too narrow, the left attack is to move out first. The leading companies of each attack to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases of absolute necessity.

Each attack to be preceded by a sergeant and twelve volunteers, supported by a subaltern officer and twenty-five men.

The leading flank companies of each attack to be provided with hand-hatchets.

Major-general Baird carried his orders into speedy and precise execution. While he was doing so, the English batteries kept up through the night an incessant fire, and so well was it directed towards the breach, that the enemy was unable to work at it. There were no indications that the enemy expected the assault, although this continued night fire might have been regarded by him as a portent of the coming storm. The British army, confident in the genius of such men as Harris, Baird, Wellesley, Close, Stuart, Shawe, Malcolm, &c., were full of joyous excitement. These, upon whom the chief responsibility devolved, were exceedingly anxious. At a little before one o'clock, the hour appointed for the assault, the commander-in-chief sat in his tent alone, in profound thought and painful suspense. Captain Malcolm, already famous, although destined to be better known to the world as Sir John Malcolm, came on business connected with the approaching crisis. Seeing the general's expression of countenance so full of mingled doubt and stern resolution, the captain cheerfully rallied his chief, saying, "Why, *my lord*, so thoughtful?" referring playfully to the probability of the conqueror of Seringapatam gaining a peerage. The general replied, "Malcolm, this is no time for compliments; we have serious work on hand; don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak from want of food and exhaustion, that a sepoy could push him down. We must take the fort or perish in the attempt. I have ordered General Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity: if he is beat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches; if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence."\*

At the given hour—one o'clock in the afternoon, which was selected because the enemy was likely to seek repose in the heat of the day—the storming parties moved from the trenches. They boldly forded the Cavary under a heavy fire, and many fell. Each of the divisions reached the ramparts

\* *The Life and Services of General Lord Harris, G.C.B., during his Campaigns.* By the Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, Private Secretary to Lord Harris, and late Governor of Madras.

according to the plan prescribed, and fought their way round to the place assigned for their meeting. The resistance offered to these divisions was unequal, Tippoo in person, surrounded by his principal chiefs, having delayed the course of one of the sections of the attacking force, while the other encountered no leaders of eminence, although the troops opposed to them were numerous. Having descended into the city, all points where the enemy assumed a defensive position were speedily conquered, and at last the sultan's palace was the only considerable place remaining unvanquished.

While these events proceeded, Colonel Wellesley remained at the head of the forces in the trenches, in a state of mind similar to that of General Harris at head-quarters. Colonel Wellesley had received reports of the state of the breach, had revised them in terms exactly like those afterwards used at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; had superintended the final preparations, and was expecting the result from his appointed post. "It was," says one near him, "a moment of agony, and we continued with aching eyes to watch the result, until, after a short and appalling interval, we saw the acclivity of the breach covered with a cloud of crimson." The assault in fact succeeded, and Colonel Wellesley advanced from his position, not to renew a desperate attempt, but to restore some order in the captured city, and to certify the death of our dreaded enemy, whose body was discovered yet warm and palpitating under a heap of his fallen adherents.

The events in the city, when the troops were drawn up before the palace eager for the assault, formed portions of the most touching and exciting episodes of the siege, and constitute one of the most romantic stories of Indian warfare. The soldiers were eager to storm the palace gates, believing that Tippoo was there, and hoping to release some British prisoners. A report, however, had spread among the troops, upon authority that seemed worthy of reliance, that Tippoo had murdered all the English prisoners taken during the siege. This turned out to be true; but before full evidence of the fact had been acquired, the belief of its truth incited in the English soldiery a thirst for vengeance. Within the palace, the confusion and disorder equalled the consternation of its residents, and those upon whom its defence devolved. The kildar (governor) was paralyzed by a report that Tippoo had been shot, and was lying dead under one of the gateways.

The royal family refused to open the palace gates, dreading retribution for the murder of so many English. Major-general Baird, who

headed the assault, had himself been cruelly incarcerated for three years in Seringapatam. General Baird was unwilling to expose the occupants of the palace to the horrors of a storm in the temper of his infuriated soldiery. He commissioned Major (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allan to hold up a flag of truce, and, if possible, induce the inmates of the palace to place themselves under the protection of the English general. The major was familiar with the language of Mysore, and was a man of happy address and engaging manner. He undertook the task with his usual ability, and eager to prevent the further effusion of blood, and the vengeance which the exasperated soldiers of the 33rd were panting to inflict, he persevered with honourable and laudable pertinacity, until his persuasiveness and tact were crowned with success. It is impossible for any narrative to do justice to his conduct, or to depict the scenes in which he took part. He has himself left a modest record of what took place, which is too interesting not to afford to the reader :—

“Having fastened a white cloth on a sergeant’s pike, I proceeded to the palace, where I found Major Shee and part of the 33rd regiment drawn up opposite the gate; several of Tippoo’s people were in a balcony, apparently in great consternation. I informed them that I was deputed by the general who commanded the troops in the fort, to offer them their lives, provided they did not make resistance, of which I desired them to give immediate intimation to their sultan. In a short time the killidar, another officer of consequence, and a confidential servant, came over the terrace of the front building, and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed, and appeared inclined to create delays, probably with a view of effecting their escape as soon as the darkness of the night should afford them an opportunity. I pointed out the danger of their situation, and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination, pledging myself for their protection, and proposing that they should allow me to go into the palace, that I might in person give these assurances to Tippoo. They were very averse to this proposal, but I positively insisted on returning with them. I desired Captain Scohey, who speaks the native languages with great fluency, to accompany me and Captain Hastings Fraser. We ascended by the broken wall, and lowered ourselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men were assembled. I explained to them that the flag which I held in my hand was a pledge of security, provided no resistance was made; and the stronger to impress them with this belief, I took off my

sword, which I insisted on their receiving. The killidar and many others affirmed that the princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the sultan. They appeared greatly alarmed, and averse to coming to any decision. I told them that delay might be attended with fatal consequences, and that I could not answer for the conduct of our troops by whom they were surrounded, and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left me, and shortly after I observed people moving hastily backwards and forwards in the interior of the palace: I began to think our situation rather critical. I was advised to take back my sword, but such an act on my part might, by exciting their distrust, have kindled a flame which, in the present temper of the troops, might have been attended with the most dreadful consequences, probably the massacre of every soul within the palace walls. The people on the terrace begged me to hold the flag in a conspicuous position, in order to give confidence to those in the palace, and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, I sent another message to the princes, warning them of their critical situation, and that my time was limited. They answered, they would receive me as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose, and soon after the killidar came to conduct me.

“I found two of the princes on the carpet, surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired me to sit down, which I did in front of them. The recollection of Mooza-ad-Deen, who, on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up, with his brother, hostages to Marquis Cornwallis, the sad reverse of their fortunes, their fear, which, notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident, excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Mooza-ad-Deen (to whom the killidar, &c., principally directed their attention) by the hand, and endeavoured, by every mode in my power, to remove his fears, and to persuade him that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, nor to any person in the palace. I then entreated him, as the only means to preserve his father’s life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me of the spot where he was concealed. Mooza-ad-Deen, after some conversation apart with his attendants, assured me that the padishah was not in the palace. I requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were alarmed at this proposal, and the princes were reluctant to take such a step, but by the authority of their father, to whom they desired to send. At length, however, having promised that I would post a guard of their own sepoys with-

in, and a party of Europeans on the outside, and having given them the strongest assurances that no person should enter the palace but by my authority, and that I would return and remain with them until General Baird arrived, I convinced them of the necessity of compliance, and I was happy to observe that the princes, as well as their attendants, appeared to rely with confidence on the assurances I had given them.

"On opening the gate, I found General Baird and several officers, with a large body of troops assembled. I returned with Lieutenant-colonel Close into the palace for the purpose of bringing the princes to the general. We had some difficulty in conquering the alarm and objections which they raised to quitting the palace; but they at length permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird was justly excited by a report which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege; this was heightened, probably, by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during more than three years' imprisonment in that very place: he was, nevertheless, sensibly affected by the sight of the princes, and his gallantry on the assault was not more conspicuous than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion. He received the princes with every mark of regard, repeatedly assured them that no violence or insult should be offered to them, and he gave them in charge to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to headquarters in camp, escorted by the light company of the 33rd regiment; as they passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presenting arms.

"General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the palace, in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the light company of the 74th regiment, followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops were immediately disarmed, and we proceeded to make the search through many of the apartments. Having entreated the killidar, if he had any regard for his own life, or that of his sultan, to inform us where he was concealed, he put his hands upon the hilt of my sword, and in the most solemn manner protested that the sultan was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded during the storm, and lay in a gateway on the north face of the fort, whither he offered to conduct us, and if it was found that he had deceived us, said the general might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. General Baird, on

hearing the report of the killidar, proceeded to the gateway, which was covered with many hundreds of the slain. The number of the dead and the darkness of the place made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking; but aware of the great political importance of ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killidar, and the other two persons, were desired to examine them one after another. This, however, appeared endless, and as it was now becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accompanied the killidar into the gateway. During the search we discovered a wounded person lying under the sultan's palanquin; this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Cawn, one of Tippoo's confidential servants; he had attended his master during the whole of the day, and on being made acquainted with the object of our search, he pointed out the spot where the sultan had fallen. By a faint glimmering light it was difficult for the killidar to recognise the features, but the body being brought out, and satisfactorily proved to be that of the sultan, was conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognised by the eunuchs and other servants of the family.

"When Tippoo was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart that doubt was removed. He had four wounds, three in the body, and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the cheek. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch, with a red and green silk belt hung across his shoulder, his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall; he had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatever.

"Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders, and a short thick neck, but his feet and hands were remarkably small; his complexion was rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline: he had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps of sternness, in his countenance which distinguished him above the common order of people."

The portrait of this remarkable man thus given by Major Allan is correct. Tippoo himself believed, or was desirous of persuading himself, that he was descended from Mohammed, and had received, as he believed

Mohammed had, a divine commission. His flatterers were accustomed to compliment him, by averring that he very much resembled in person the great Arab conqueror. This opinion has been generally entertained in Europe, but had no foundation in fact. Muir's description of "the false prophet" is generally received as correct, and the reader can judge how far it agrees with Major Allan's delineation of Tippoo:—"Slightly above the middle size, his figure, though spare, was handsome and commanding; the chest broad and open, the bones and framework large, the joints well knit together. His neck was long and finely moulded. The head, unusually large, gave space for a broad and noble brow. The hair, thick, jet black, and slightly curling, fell down over his ears; the eyebrows were arched and joined. The countenance thin but ruddy. His large eyes, intensely black and piercing, received additional lustre from their long dark eyelashes. The nose was high and slightly aquiline, but fine, and at the end attenuated. The teeth were far apart. A long black bushy beard, reaching to the breast, added manliness and presence. His expression was pensive and contemplative. The face beamed with intelligence, though something of the sensuous also might be there discerned. The skin of his body was clear and soft; the only hair that met the eye was a fine thin line which ran down from the neck toward the navel. His broad back leaned slightly forward as he walked; and his step was hasty, yet sharp and decided, like that of one rapidly descending a declivity. There was something unsettled in his blood-shot eye, which refused to rest upon its object. When he turned towards you, it was never partially, but with the whole body."\*

The body of the sultan was the next day buried with military honours in the mausoleum built for his father. During the funeral ceremony a thunder-storm burst above the city. The lightnings played around the place of sepulture, as if Heaven designed to mark its anger against a man whose every step through life was stained with blood, and whose character, like that of his father, was essentially cruel. Several Europeans and natives were killed and others injured by the lightning. The scene, its causes, and attendant consequences, deeply impressed the minds of the whole population of Seringapatam and of the British army. Search was made by order of General Harris for the state papers of Tippoo, when abundant material was obtained to justify the Earl of Mornington in declaring war against him, although the line of policy

sketched out by the able and indefatigable Mr. Webbe (the chief secretary at Madras), was that which was most consonant with the data upon which his excellency proceeded. It appeared that Tippoo had carried on correspondence hostile to the English, and for the purpose of expelling them from India, with the French Directory, with the Affghan Prince Zemaun Shah, the Mahrattas, and other Indian powers. The plan of co-operation with Buonaparte, then in Egypt, for an invasion of India, was also discovered.

The despatches of General Harris are master-pieces of good sense and professional knowledge. The Earl of Mornington's sagacity in selecting such a man for the arduous post of commander-in-chief of such an army was proved. He wrote home letters of high compliment to General Harris and the army; and, eloquent as these despatches were, they were not too encomiastic. His lordship, acting upon the principle which always characterized the conduct of his illustrious brother, the future Duke of Wellington, selected suitable men for his purpose, and left such a measure of responsibility and discretion with them as kept them unfettered, and stimulated their exertions. General Harris was in every way worthy of his lordship's confidence, which was rendered with respect and cordiality.

The adjustment of affairs at Mysore, and the arrangements necessary for carrying on the government of the newly-acquired province, occupied the attention of the governor-general. He had, however, men at hand competent to the task. The intellectual resources of the English in India were at that time very abundant, and the Earl of Mornington well knew how to use them. Among his officers, civil and military, there were few who at all approached in administrative ability his own brothers, the Hon. Henry Wellesley and the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. He dispatched the former, with Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, to Seringapatam, to make preliminary arrangements, and furnish him with full information for a perfect judgment of what might be necessary for the government of Mysore. Before his excellency formed any definitive judgment of the affairs of that kingdom, he directed General Harris to adopt measures insuring the complete and permanent military mastery of the country. He ordered that possession should be taken of the district of Canara, and of the heads of all the ghauts communicating between Canara and the upper country, as well as the Coimbatore country. The general-in-chief was also ordered to demand the unequivocal surrender of all forts throughout the Sultanate of Mysore, and peremptorily to demand, in the name

\* Muir's *Mohammed*.

of the East India Company, from all officers of the late sultan, civil and military, that all description of public property should be placed at his disposal.

The governor-general entered into minute detail as to the portion of troops to be employed by the general on each particular service, but always deferring to General Harris as to the soundness of any judgment pronounced in military affairs. So clear, comprehensive, and complete were the military views of the Earl of Mornington, that one is forced to adopt one of two opinions—that his gifted brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, imparted them, or that he himself possessed an intuitive military genius. There were no men of such remarkable talents about him as to leave a third view probable—that some one of the military men of Calcutta or Madras inspired his views. The prompt replies to General Harris's despatches leave the impression that the Earl of Mornington, like his great brother, Colonel Wellesley, was gifted by nature with military talent.

The governor-general supposed a French invasion by way of the Red Sea possible. He is represented by most historians of the time as unduly apprehensive of it. Such an impression is erroneous. He desired it. It was his conviction that such was then the power of the English in India, that they could give a very good account of any army of Frenchmen landing on the peninsula. His excellency was very desirous that the nizam's troops should move to the south-east, and gradually pass out of the Mysore territory, leaving the English contingent to garrison certain places near that frontier.

The chief difficulty connected with Mysore, in the mind of the earl, was the relation of the Peishwa to that territory. The Mahrattas had acted haughtily, yet evasively; they had not carried out the principles of the treaty

framed in prospect of the former war with Tippoo, and made permanent; they indicated a desire themselves to possess the sovereignty of Southern India. They were sure to claim a large portion of the conquered dominions of Tippoo, and his excellency believing that they had no claim similar in validity to that of the nizam, who had entered heartily into the war, resolved that they should acquire no more than was necessary to a fair show of alliance. The numerous French prisoners he ordered to Madras. Finally, matters were put in train for the permanent occupation of Mysore and the distribution of territory among the allies. The government of the English province, including the capital, was given to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley with the universal approbation of the English in India, both civil and military.

The old royal family, that had been so cruelly and treacherously deposed by Hyder, was restored to the throne—a nominal one—under the protection, and, in fact, dictation of the English; and the old capital, the city of Mysore, was once more made the depository of metropolitan dignity.

The conquest of Mysore was complete, and the glory of Seringapatam gone for ever. For a time the English were destined to look down from its high turrets and conquered bastions, as from a watch-tower, upon Southern India, as if observing the enemies of their growing empire, still numerous and powerful there. Eventually the mosques and palaces, the walls and battlements, of the once mighty queen of the table-land of Southern India were to sink into decay. When its ruins were trodden by the descendants of the conquerors, they could regard them with no regret as to the prosperity of Southern India or of Mysore, and view them only as appropriate monuments of the achievements of British valour over a treacherous and sanguinary despotism.

## CHAPTER C.

THE HON. COLONEL WELLESLEY, AS GOVERNOR OF MYSORE, MAKES WAR ON DHOONDIA WAUGH—RESULTS UPON THE INTERESTS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA—GENERAL DIFFICULTIES OF LORD WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT—AFFAIRS OF OUDE—DISAGREEMENTS WITH BIRMAH—MISSIONARY EFFORTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY.

THE conquest of Mysore made much impression in Europe. England hailed the intelligence with delight. The pride of the country was gratified. The English felt that the French were not the only conquerors. In the subjection of a great oriental kingdom as large as Scotland, the national vanity found a set-off against the triumphs of the French.

Throughout the continent the event was regarded as a great triumph to the arms of England, and an acquisition of power raising that country in its position, in respect to other European states. "It is not easy, perhaps, at this period of time, to appreciate the extraordinary interest with which it was viewed by contemporary observers, but it deserves

to be remarked that these impressions were by no means confined to the shores of Britain. In the negotiations for the peace of Amiens, the French plenipotentiaries repeatedly specified the conquest of Mysore as counterbalancing the continental triumphs of Napoleon himself, and the argument was acknowledged by Mr. Fox and his party to be founded on substantial reason."

In July, 1799, General Harris left Seringapatam for Pondicherry, and according to the orders received by him from the governor-general, he surrendered to Colonel Wellesley the government of Mysore, civil and military. It has been said that so great an honour would never have been conceded to the colonel, had he not been the brother of the governor-general. This remark might with justice be made if both these illustrious persons were not gifted and conscientious men. The Earl of Mornington was certainly desirous to promote the welfare of his brothers, but he was not the man to do so at the cost of the public weal. Indeed, so slow was he to recognise the superior gifts of the colonel, that he more than once disappointed the just expectations of the latter, when his excellency supposed that his duty pointed out the preferment of a competitor. In this way Major-general Baird—no doubt a gifted man, but far inferior to Colonel Wellesley—received preference when the whole army looked for and desired the promotion of Arthur Wellesley. There are few instances which show more competent and conscientious performance of duty than is to be found in the government of Mysore by the Hon. Arthur Wellesley. He displayed a capacity for detail, for intricate accounts, for laborious public business, for judging of men in military and civil situations, for discerning the native character, for penetrating and unravelling native intrigue, such as has seldom in the world's history been seen in so young a man. His laborious toil for the public good, while his health was really delicate, showed a devotion to duty which became characteristic of the man, and enabled him to set an example to the people of the British Isles which has not been lost.

From various providential causes, the purpose of the governor-general to send Colonel Wellesley on different expeditions was frustrated. The designs of the governor-general upon the Isle of France, which was a nest of pirates and French privateers, were rendered nugatory from a circumstance common in Anglo-Indian history—the refusal of the admiral to co-operate, standing out upon the superior dignity of his profession, and attempting nothing until the period for doing anything had passed away. The design of Lord

Wellesley to give his brother the command of an expedition against Batavia was overruled by the wise remonstrances of Lord Clive, who affirmed that the condition of Mysore required the administrative ability and military talent of a man such as he pronounced Colonel Wellesley to be. Lord Clive also declared that no other officer appeared to possess in so high a degree the qualifications necessary to quell a chief of the adventurous spirit of Dhoondia, and so well adapted to sustain a desultory and predatory warfare. So long as Dhoondia was in arms, Mysore must have continued in a dangerous condition, as the daring exploits of that chief inspired hopes in the disaffected from the coast of Malabar to the jungle country along the Mahratta confines. That strange people encouraged Dhoondia; while professing alliance with the company, they allowed men and supplies to be drawn by the insurgent chief from their country, although when he was ultimately driven within their borders, they robbed his camp of elephants, cattle, and treasure. The opinions of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley concerning the policy necessary to be pursued towards Mysore and the surrounding country below the Ghauts was full of wisdom. His letters and despatches at that period are most remarkable productions. Concerning the people along the Malabar coast who sympathised with the Mysoreans, ready to rise upon the prospect of success should Dhoondia gain any important advantage, Colonel Wellesley observes:—"As soon as the person of this rebel shall be taken, it is probable that the inhabitants will be more ready than they have been hitherto to give up their arms; and the day on which the inhabitants give up their arms and acquiesce in the orders and regulations of government, which require that no man shall appear armed, will be the date of the establishment of civil government in the province. Till then everything must be chance or force." These opinions were verified by the events in which the Colonel took so important a part. The chief strength of the rebel leader consisted in the difficulties of the country he occupied for the operation of regular troops. He knew all its recesses, and made its unequal ground and far-spreading jungles—so unhealthy to Europeans—his fastnesses, from which he sallied forth at the most favourable moments with expert skill, resolute daring, and opportune vigilance, against the cultivated country, laying waste whatever parts were known to be disposed to settle down peaceably under English rule. The mode of operating in such a country, recommended by Colonel Wellesley, and practised by him so far as his authority and opportunities allowed, was new to the English.

in India, but opened up to them a plan of aggression against the natives as efficient as it was original. When afterwards acting in Coticote, the opinions entertained by Colonel Wellesley on this matter were expressed more formally and received more notice; but it was in his first pursuit of Dhoondia that the plan was adopted, on a limited scale, for the means at his command did not allow of its extensive adoption:—"The result of my observations and considerations upon the mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this,—that as long as the jungle is thick as the enemy can conceal himself in it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers, and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our side. You propose, as a remedy, to move in small compact bodies in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind,—I say only some purposes, because their success would not be complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as the Nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But, as we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road. This, you say, is a work of time; it is true it is so, but it must be recollected that the labour of every man turns to account,—that the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following season as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security to the followers is adopted."\*

The separate command of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley in Mysore not only introduced a new mode of warfare against the desultory

proceedings of irregular native troops, but it opened up a new era in the military discipline of British India. Peculation and jobbery pervaded all ranks and grades of both the company's and the royal army, but more especially the latter. To conceal the robbery which was practised, perjury was resorted to when investigations took place, which was seldom the case. The tribunals nominated to hear complaints and try offences were of little utility, for they were seldom conducted honestly, being generally ready to screen powerful delinquents, and often composed of men who ought themselves to be placed on their trial for the plunder of public property, or the oppression of inferior officers, the common soldiery, or the natives. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley made strong representations to his superiors as to the importance, duty, and necessity of establishing a good administrative system. In one of his despatches on this subject he gave a definition of the administration of justice which has been called "Aristotelian":—"I understand the administration of justice to be the decision of a competent tribunal upon any question, after a complete knowledge of its merits, by an examination of witnesses upon oath in order to come at the truth."

In his attempts to carry out, and cause to be carried out, the administration of justice after such fashion, the governor of Mysore met with difficulties which would have deterred probably any man then living but himself. Hastings or Clive might have undertaken the task, but after those two most eminent persons, Colonel Wellesley alone was competent to grapple with this great evil. His mode of procedure may be illustrated by a single case, and related in his own words:—

"While I was absent in the month of January last (I believe) the Lascars, &c., of the store department of Seringapatam wrote a petition to the military board and a letter to General Brathwaite, both without signature, in which they represented the existence of all kinds of enormities and bad practices in the store department,—such as false musters, stealing of stores, cheating, &c. Captain — was at Madras at the time these papers were received, and they were communicated to him; whereupon he went off in a great hurry to stop some bandies loaded with gun-metal, which General Brathwaite was informed were coming from Seringapatam. He did stop these bandies at Vellore, and it was found that the gun-metal belonged to General Smith,—at least, it was said so.

"However, the military board and government determined to defer the inquiry till I should return, and then to order that the

\* *Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. India, 1797—1805. Vol. ii. Murray, 1858.*

whole matter of the petition and letter above-mentioned should be inquired into. Accordingly I received orders to institute an inquiry shortly after my return, and of course I determined that it should be an inquiry in earnest. I first gave orders to the commissary to turn off his dubash, and then I assembled a large committee, consisting of myself, all the staff of the army and garrison, and all the most respectable officers not employed upon any other duty; and, indeed, they were mostly the friends of the commissary.

"On the first day we went into the arsenal to inquire into the grounds of the complaints; the petition was explained to all the Lascars and artificers, and they were asked particularly whether they had any grounds of complaint on the subject of each allegation. They all declared not, and appeared anxious to come forward to vindicate the commissary and his dubash from any imputation that might have been laid upon them by the petition and letter. However, I was not satisfied with this proceeding, and on that evening I issued a proclamation, in which I called upon the inhabitants to state who had purchased stores, and threatened punishment to those who had purchased them and concealed it. Then came out a scene of villany and speculation which has never been surpassed, and seldom equalled in this country. It was proved before the committee that Colonel —— had sold large quantities of saltpetre, which he had stolen from the stores while he was a member of the committee for the valuation of captured property, and that the arsenal was a public sale shop for all kinds of military stores and ordnance, the principal agent in which transactions was the commissary's dubash. The artificers and Lascars who had at first declared that they had no reason to complain, and knew nothing of the petition and letter to the military board, then came forward to testify the truth of everything, and proved particularly that false musters had been taken and sent to Madras, and that, in fact, half the people for whom pay was drawn were not employed.

"When the dubash was called upon to make his defence, to the surprise of everybody, he said that he was determined to tell the truth and to conceal nothing; and he declared that he had orders for everything that he had ever done, either from Colonel —— or Captain ——, and that he had papers in the arsenal which would prove the truth of what he then asserted. On account of what appeared against Captain —— on that day I determined to turn him out, and I did dismiss him that evening, but he went to the arsenal before he was dismissed and broke open the desk, and, as the dubash says, destroyed some

of the papers which he had heard him promise to produce to the committee. However, he did not destroy all, and particularly not those relating to himself, which I forced him to produce; and the dubash, by means of them, has been able to prove clearly that Captain —— had a large share of the profits resulting from the sale of ordnance and stores. In regard to Colonel ——, the proof against him was not equally clear, for want of the papers which were destroyed; but it is clearly proved against him that he sold copper bands taken from the pillars of the Mysore palace, contrary to the orders of the military board; that he never gave General Smith credit for above an eighth part of the money produced by the sale of guns, which he avows, and which he says belonged to General Smith, until, by the proceedings of the committee, it appeared he had sold guns to that amount, and there are papers still forthcoming which will prove that he had his share of the profits arising from the false musters. Besides this, Captain —— sent gunlocks, &c., to Madras, for sale, and he knew of Colonel ——'s robbery of the saltpetre, and was concerned with him in cheating the captors and the public out of a large part of it.

"All this can be proved by writings and accounts, besides by the evidence of a host of dubashes and conicopolies.

"I have thus given you the outline of what has passed, but the intervals have been filled by details of scenes of villany which would disgrace the *Newgate Calendar*.

"Government are now deliberating upon all this, and I expect shortly to have orders which will let me know whether these gentry are to be brought to a court-martial, or to be dismissed the service, or to be hanged."

Thus, Colonel Wellesley had at the same time to reform the administrations of justice in his own army, to administer a large and disorganized kingdom, to maintain anxious correspondence with the governments of Calcutta and Madras on most important subjects, sometimes in connection with enterprises in which he was expected to take part, and to drive a powerful chieftain from a difficult country, whose followers were numerous, and who had the sympathy of the natives and of neighbouring states. Some of the instructions received by Colonel Wellesley from his superiors were of a nature to cause apprehensions of the results should he obey them. He was directed, in case of the expulsion of Dhoondia, to pursue him into the Mahratta territory, which the colonel foresaw would cause a Mahratta war. Notwithstanding the professed friendship of the Peishwa, that high personage sent troops against Dhoondia, who

routed them with such ease and with such little loss of life on either side as to lead to the suspicion that the war waged by the Peishwa was a pretence. For two months, Colonel Wellesley was left unsupported by the Madras government, while in vain endeavouring by long marches and night surprises to bring his enemy to battle. The British commander had to extemporise a commissariat, to provide support for his troops, and even to organize a corps of engineers from the service of the line. He was neglected by his superiors, as he was afterwards in the Spanish peninsula.

After a harassing campaign, on the 10th of September, 1800, Colonel Wellesley came upon the rebel camp. The force at his command was four regiments of cavalry, the horses of which were nearly worn out with excessive toil. The colonel did not hesitate to charge the enemy. It was a brilliant performance; the rebel force was routed with slaughter, and Dhoondia himself was slain. An interesting boy of four years of age, son of the rebel chief, was taken among the baggage. The colonel took him to his tent, and protected him. During his residence in India he tenderly guarded the child, and when about to return to Europe, he left a sum of money for the education and maintenance of his favourite. The results of this campaign were important to Colonel Wellesley himself, as well as to the public. The reputation of the governor of Mysore rose high among the native courts, and in the presidential capitals of the company. The governor-general was greatly gratified, and the government at home not less so. The Earl of Mornington had been blamed for placing his brother in a post which it was alleged ought to have been given to General Baird or some other superior officer; but the selection had justified itself, and the success of the colonel increased the fame of the elder brother, by extending the confidence already so largely entertained in his judgment. Concerning his position at that time, some curious remarks were made by him a short time before his death, when Duke of Wellington and Warden of the Cinque Ports:—"I thought myself nobody at the time, but now, on perusing my own despatches, I perceive that I was a very considerable man."

The death of Dhoondia put an end to all fears about the disturbance of Mysore and the coasts of Malabar. This, however, did not exempt his excellency, the governor, from anxiety, as it was from Mysore that the English chiefly watched the Mahrattas, who were known to be intensely inflamed by jealousy against the English, and anxious to form any

combination to dispossess them of power. The Peishwa and the lesser magnates of the tribes were, however, at variance; and Colonel Wellesley displayed an acute policy in playing off one chief against another, so as to prevent any immediate organization of the confederacy against the English.

The government of Colonel Wellesley in Mysore was interrupted by his appointment to the command of the army intended to attack the Isle of France, and afterwards Batavia, but the final destination of which was Egypt, the Earl of Mornington having conceived the plan of sending thither an expedition against Buonaparte. Colonel Wellesley having been unjustly superseded in that command by his brother, who gave the appointment to General Baird, he returned to his government in Mysore. The expedition to Egypt sailed under Baird, but was too late, the army of Abercromby having defeated the purposes of the French expedition.

It was in April, 1801, that Colonel Wellesley resumed his government of Mysore. He continued in the government, conducting it with discretion and sagacity, and rendering large services to the state without any honour having been conferred upon him until April, 1802, when he received promotion in his military rank: he was gazetted major-general. For some time longer Colonel Wellesley gave his chief energy to the government of Mysore, still exercising vigilance in reference to the proceedings of the ambitious and discordant Mahratta confederacy, until at last the breaking out of the Mahratta war furnished a new field for the exercise of his military genius.

Meanwhile, the governor-general was occupied in incessant cares to preserve the peace of India and the security of the British possessions. On every side there were difficulties. The government of Hyderabad was losing stability and power. In order to preserve it as a counterpoise to the Mahrattas, it was necessary to meddle with its affairs more intimately than suited the tastes of the directors and the policy of the imperial government, or accorded with the instructions sent out to the governor-general. Certain territory was assigned to the company as an indemnity for the outlay in support of the contingent forces maintained for the defence of the nizam's dominions.

The Affghans became exceedingly troublesome. Repeated invasions of the Sikh territories by their chief alarmed the government of British India. Negotiations with Persia to counteract these incursions of the Affghans eastward had some effect in retarding their progress, but their aggressions were a constant source of uneasiness at Calcutta, and all

over British India. These invasions inspired the Rohillas with hope of independence, and while the Oudeans were ever ready to oppress them, they were equally willing to unite with them against the English. The affairs of Oude, always more troublesome and harassing to the English than those of any other part of India, caused more disquietude to the Earl of Mornington, or, as he became, Marquis of Wellesley, than even the enmity and plots of the Mahrattas.

The financial embarrassments of the Oude government were much the same as they had always been; and, as usual, it was in arrears of the stipulated tribute to the government of Calcutta. The whole condition of Oude during the administration of the Marquis of Wellesley, and the philosophy of that condition, were afterwards expressed in a memorandum of the Hon. Major-general Wellesley on the subject, with a brevity and perspicuity exceedingly remarkable as coming from one who had spent so few years in India. No documents concerning Oude since presented by officers of the British government have surpassed in accuracy and clearness that of General Wellesley. The reader may learn the state of that country, not only at the beginning of the present century, but even since the period of annexation, from the masterly memorandums of him who, afterwards as the Duke of Wellington, became so important an authority on all political subjects when regarded from a military point of view. This memorandum has been very appropriately termed a *résumé* of the subsequent history of the province:—

“Oude is a fertile country, was at that time well cultivated, and is peopled by a hardy race, who have for a great length of time supplied soldiers to all the states of India.

“In this situation it is obvious that the government of Oude must always have been an object of jealousy to that power which possessed the provinces of Behar and Bengal, which are situated lower down upon the Ganges. In fact, these provinces had no natural barrier against an invasion from Oude, and depended for their security upon their own artificial means of defence.

“This was the case not only in respect to the state of Oude itself, but in respect to the Rohillas; to the king, who was at that period of time in some degree of strength; and to the Mahrattas; each of which powers might have found an easy and convenient passage through Oude to an invasion of the company's provinces of Behar and Bengal.

“On the other hand, by the possession of the provinces under the government of Oude, or an intimate union with the government, a

barrier was immediately provided for the provinces under the Bengal government. Nothing remained on the left or east of the Ganges besides the Nabob of Oude and the company, excepting the Rohillas, and this river afforded a strong natural barrier against all invaders. Besides this object, the seat of war, in consequence of the alliance with or possession of Oude, was removed from the company's provinces, the source of all the means of carrying on war, to those of the enemy if it should have been practicable to carry on offensive war; or, at all events, to those of the nabob if such supposed war should have been reduced to the defensive.

“By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates that evil. It is usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy is generally the whole or nearly the whole disposable resource of the state, it is not easy to produce it at the stipulated moment. The tributary government is then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which it may be supposed distress on the one hand and avarice and extortion on the other can invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

“As soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government, and the result is an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

“But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government,

and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration in order to save the resources of the state and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy."

The occupation of Lahore by the enterprising Affghanchief, Shah Zemaun, compelled the Marquis Wellesley to enter in a decided manner into the circumstances of Oude. His decision to do so was, however, made imperative by events which he could neither have foreseen nor controlled. Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth) had in his last arrangements connected with that province of the Mogul empire permitted Vizier Ali, after his deposition, to remain in Benares. The Marquis Wellesley deemed it imprudent to allow him to reside so near to the scene of his former intrigues, and ordered his removal to Calcutta. The deposed vizier refused to leave Benares for any place of residence south or east.

On the 14th of January, 1799, he called on the English resident, Mr. Cherry, and complained in violent and vindictive terms of the purpose for his removal entertained by the governor-general. The resident remonstrated, when suddenly Ali struck him with his sword, and the attendants of the vizier instantly cut Mr. Cherry down. Four other Englishmen who were present were also assassinated, but a fifth defended himself until assistance arrived, when Ali and his fellow-conspirators fled. He collected about him other men as desperate as himself, but they were pursued by the British authorities, and, after having behaved most cowardly, dispersed. Ali sought refuge in Rajpootana, where a chieftain, whose protection he relied upon, delivered him up to the English. These circumstances created a great sensation in Oude, where the populace sympathised with the desperate Vizier Ali.

Colonel Scott was then sent to the nabob with a demand for the dismissal of his native troops, and his acceptance of a British contingent. The nabob endeavoured, with the usual hesitation of Indian princes, to evade those demands, and when that was no longer possible, he offered to resign the sovereign authority, which the governor-general did not feel at liberty to permit without instructions from home, unless, indeed, the nabob resigned his sovereignty to the company. The artful nabob calculated upon this, and therefore made proposals which he presumed would create delay. Finally, he refused to support a British contingent, on the ground of the expense. The Marquis Wellesley then demanded that territory equivalent

to the tribute agreed to be paid to Sir John Shore should be assigned absolutely to the company, and that new arrangements should be made between his highness and the English, which would in effect place the administration of Oude in the hands of the latter. Troops were ordered to advance from Bengal against Oude; this led the nabob to surrender. The marquis immediately appointed a commission for administering the affairs of Oude, and nominated one of his gifted brothers, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, as chief commissioner. He acted with vigour towards the petty states contiguous to Oude, concluding a treaty with the nabob or rajah of Ferokabad, similar to that which had been concluded with Oude. Rajah Rajwunt Sing refused to acknowledge the treaty; siege was therefore laid to his fortress, and his power was subjugated. A number of zemindars who maintained a state of revolt for a short time were vanquished. Mr. Henry Wellesley having quelled all revolt, and established tranquillity in Oude, resigned his office.

The Marquis Wellesley carried his authority with a high hand, asserting the supremacy of the English wherever the least opening for interference was made by circumstances. The Nabob of Surat and the Rajah of Tanjore were among the lesser magnates who were compelled to recognise English authority by new forms and under new stipulations. The affairs of the Nabob of Arcot, which had so often involved the company in war, were almost as troublesome to the presidency of Madras as those of the Nabob of Oude were to the presidency of Bengal. Lord Clive conducted the negotiations with wisdom and skill worthy of his father. He succeeded step by step in asserting the supremacy of the English in Tanjore and the Carnatic, so as completely to absorb the authority of the rajah and the nabob.

While during the last decade of the eighteenth century the English were engaged in so many fierce struggles in Western, Southern, and South-eastern India across the peninsula, much uneasiness was created in the presidency of Bengal by events in the extreme East. The first quarrels with the Birman empire began during that period.

In 1782, Minderagee-praw, Emperor of Birmah, invaded the country of Arracan, on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal.\* His invasion issued in conquest:—"Many of the Mughs, or natives of Arracan, preferring flight to servitude, took refuge in the Dumbuck Hills, on the borders of the Chittagong district, and amid the forlorn wastes and

\* See the geographical portion of this work.

jungles skirting the frontiers; where, having formed themselves into independent tribes of robbers, they carried on unceasing hostilities against the Birmans. Some settled in the district of Dacca and Chittagong, under the protection of the British flag; while others, rather than abandon their country, submitted to the conquerors."\*

The Mughls settled in the eastern provinces of Bengal were industrious, and prospered exceedingly. The fame of their success soon spread to their countrymen, who were suffering in Arracan under Birmese oppression. They accordingly flocked in great numbers to Dacca especially, and so extensive was the emigration, that it threatened to depopulate the newly-acquired province of the Birman empire. The prosperous settlers in the British provinces aided their brethren who had fled to the mountains and there led a predatory life, as well as inhabited the shores of the numerous creeks, and carried on a constant piracy against their Birmese conquerors. In 1794 many of these sea warriors plundered the Birmese traders, and carried their booty into the British territory. His Birman majesty pursued them with an army. The British government sent Major-general Erskine with a force to oppose them. A truce was obtained, the Birmese recrossed the boundary river into their own territory, and the British, seizing the ring-leaders of the Mughls, delivered them into Birmese custody.

In 1797-98 the oppressions of the Birmese upon the Arracanese were so unendurable, that forty thousand of the latter escaped into the British territory:—"When they entered the province of Chittagong, the situation of the unfortunate wretches was deplorable in the extreme: numbers perished from want, sickness, and fatigue, while the survivors were constrained to live upon reptiles and leaves, until such time as the British government humanely relieved their wants by providing them with food and materials for the constructing of huts to shelter them from the then approaching rains. The Birmese having collected an army of about four thousand men, followed the emigrants into the province of Chittagong. The commander of the troops addressed a letter to the magistrate of the district, demanding the expulsion of the refugees. The magistrate of Chittagong replied that the Birmese troops should instantly retire from the province, or otherwise their commander must stand the consequence; and the magistrate further informed him that no negotiation would be entered into until such time as they had. The Birmese troops, in the mean-

\* *Modern Traveller*, part xxv.

time, fortified themselves with stockades in the mountains, and for many weeks carried on a petty warfare with the company's troops. They successfully repulsed an attack that was made upon their stockades on the 18th of July, 1799; but soon afterwards retired to their own boundary of Arracan. A British officer was then deputed by the government of Calcutta to the governor of Arracan, to endeavour to effect an amicable adjustment of differences."\*

The state of the emigrants in eastern Bengal engaged the serious attention of the supreme council at Calcutta, and Captain Cox was dispatched to the Birmese frontier to register the refugees, and allot them ground for their subsistence. Their number was nearly fifty thousand. This proceeding gave offence to his Birman majesty, who sent an ambassador to the governor-general to protest against any patronage being extended to those who had fled from his authority, and to require the English government to coerce their return. Lord Wellesley assured the ambassador that the fugitives were at perfect liberty to go or stay, but that they should not be interfered with so long as they conducted themselves peaceably.

The ambassador was not satisfied, and the governor-general was so anxious to conciliate him, that the effect produced was to leave the impression that the English feared a recourse to arms on the part of his Birman majesty. There was a strong disposition on the part of his excellency's advisers to reverse the liberal and hospitable policy which had previously been pursued, but which was vindicated at the time, and afterwards by the able Anglo-Indian statesman, Sir John Malcolm, who pronounced that "policy became enlisted on the side of humanity; that they should at least obtain a temporary asylum."†

In the latter part of the year 1800 the governor of Arracan addressed the English magistrate of Chittagong, conveying a threat of invasion if the emigrants were not forthwith expelled from British territory. The Marquis Wellesley doubting that the demand of the government of Arracan had been made with the authority of the King of Ava (as his Birmese majesty was frequently called), resolved to dispatch an embassy to that court to ascertain the fact, and to improve the general relations of the two governments. The question of the emigrants received no decision, but lay festering as a cause of quarrel between the two governments until, in 1811, it received a practical solution.

\* *A Political History of the extraordinary events which led to the Birmese War*. London, 1827.

† *Political History of India*.

It was towards the close of the 18th century that the great modern missionary enterprise began in India, under the auspices of the Baptist missionaries, Carey, Marshman, and Ward. This is one of the most interesting pages in Anglo-Indian history, yet one of the most discreditable to the East India Company and the British government. Considering his instructions, the Marquis Wellesley displayed more moderation than, with his own views and feelings, might have been expected. He was hostile to missionary operations, and to evangelical religion in any of its aspects, and he was surrounded by those who were even more hostile. The Baptist missionaries were not suffered to settle in British India, but were indebted to the liberality and Christian feeling of the Danes for a home and a sphere of operations. Eventually they were allowed to conduct their pious enterprises within English territory, but it was only when a determined expression of religious feeling in England created apprehension on the part of the company and the board of control that public opinion would influence the parliamentary elections, and initiate proceedings hostile alike to the company and the government.\* The whole conduct of the directors, the board of control, the cabinet, and of the supreme council of Calcutta was unjust, unchristian, and hostile to the spirit of British liberty. To show that the author does not allow any partial views to dictate so severe an opinion, the reader shall have opportunity of judging the event in the light in which it has been presented by a popular reviewer, by no means favourable to Christian missionaries as a class, nor to the principle of Protestant evangelical missions. While the tone of the reviewer is sometimes barely respectful to the missionaries, it extenuates the conduct of the British government, and of the Anglo-Indian government in Calcutta; yet there is sufficient truthfulness of narrative, and sufficient candour in the review, to place the history of the affair before the impartial reader in such form as to enable him to form a correct judgment of the conduct of all the parties concerned. Referring to Messrs. Carey, Marshman, and Ward, personally, the reviewer observes—"Under the auspices of the Baptist Missionary Society, the latter two, after some previous attempts by Mr. Carey, proceeded to Serampore, then under the Danish flag, in 1799. In the first instance, such was the apprehended danger

from their labours that they were required by the authorities at Calcutta to enter into engagements to return immediately to England. But the governor of Serampore protected them for a time, and eventually the English governor-general, Lord Wellesley, permitted them to remain. Indeed, the latter was content that they should establish their mission in a settlement beyond the reach of British interference, where he would be relieved from the necessity of disturbing them; and at Serampore, where Carey joined them, they set up a printing-press, printed tracts and testaments in Bengalee, and established boarding-schools, out of which they defrayed a portion of the expenses of their undertaking. In 1800 they entertained their first candidate for conversion, who, as the marginal abstract states, disappointed the missionaries themselves. His name, which was Fukeer, and his story are both symbolic. He was 'the first native, after seven years of severe and discouraging exertions, who had come up to the point of avowing himself a Christian. He was received as a Christian brother, with feelings of indescribable emotion.' The missionaries persevered against various impediments which were cast in their way by Englishmen as well as Hindoos. The English captured Serampore, and in 1802 the court of directors ordered the abolition of the college at Fort William, with which Carey had also connected himself, from a feeling of annoyance at its patron, Lord Wellesley. Lord Wellesley, who was annoyed in turn, requested the directors to revise their order, and in the meanwhile sustained the college for a time. The missionaries, on the other hand, in the commencement of 1803, actually baptized their first Brahmin, an amiable and intelligent youth named Krishnu Prisad. Before his baptism he trampled on his *poita*, or sacred thread, to indicate his rejection of the creed with which it was associated, and then placed it in Mr. Ward's hands, who records in his journal,—'this is a more precious relic than any the Church of Rome can boast of.' So far, however, did the missionaries condescend to the prejudices of caste, that 'Mr. Carey and his colleagues did not at that time consider it necessary to insist on a Brahmin's divesting himself of his thread, which they considered as much a token of social distinction as of spiritual supremacy.' The converts were therefore baptized, and preached to their fellow-countrymen with their *poitas* across their shoulders. But eventually they were induced themselves to discard them, while to the honour of these particular missionaries, it ought to be added that from the first they excluded all distinctions

\* *The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, embracing the History of the Serampore Mission.* By John Clark Marshman.—Longmans, 1859. *Christianity in India; an Historical Narrative.* By John William Kaye, &c. Smith and Elder, 1859.

of caste from the celebration of the holy communion. Where the Brahmin Christian had formerly received the elements before the Soodra Christian, in this very instance, when called upon to lay down a rule, they abolished every vestige of caste in this particular, and the Brahmin received the bread and wine after the carpenter, Krishnu. Their first baptism was soon followed by the first marriage of converted Hindoos, by which the Brahmin aforesaid was united to the daughter of the carpenter. So far another step was made towards the obliteration of caste distinctions, which the missionaries were undeniably anxious to effect. A week after this marriage Gentooism had its demonstration in return, in the celebration of suttee, when 'three women were burnt with their husbands on one pile, near Mr. Ward's house.' Then followed the first burial of a Christian convert, at which there was some difficulty in overcoming the caste prejudices of his companions, and inducing them to carry his body to the grave. Among the Hindoos the Brahmin only carries the dead Brahmin, and each caste the deceased of its own caste only. But again the missionaries stood out and conquered this inveterate reluctance, Mr. Marshman himself assisting as one of the bearers. A later triumph over caste may be ascribed to the love of science, when, about twenty years ago, the Brahmin students of the Medical College at Calcutta consented, for the first time, to handle a dead body in the dissecting-room. So far, however, the missionaries laboured with fair success in individual instances, and in 1805 they contributed largely, by their endeavours, to a much greater work—the suppression of the immolation of widows. To do them justice, we should bear in mind their great exertions in this behalf. From their first settlement at Serampore they had been unremitting in their endeavours to draw the attention of government to this practice. Its frequency at the time was little known in England, and it awakened no feeling of national responsibility. Few even in India were aware of the extent to which it prevailed, and the missionaries considered the first step towards its abolition was to bring the *number* of victims prominently into view. They accordingly deputed natives in 1803 to travel from place to place within a circle of thirty miles round Calcutta to make inquiries on the subject, and the number was found to exceed four hundred in the year. To obtain a more accurate return, ten agents were the next year stationed within this circle, at different places along the banks of the river, and they continued at their stations for six months, noting down every instance of suttee

which came within their observation. The result, even for this interval, gave the number of three hundred; and Mr. Carey instructed one of the members of council on this point, and he made a stirring appeal to Lord Wellesley, then on the eve of his departure. No immediate result followed that history can recognise. In fact, the question was substantially postponed for another quarter of a century, and twenty thousand more victims ascended the funeral pile before it was decided. But no one who reads these pages can doubt that Brother Carey and his coadjutors assisted very materially in preparing opinion in India and England to achieve this special glory of our creed and dominion.

"In 1808 the proceedings of the missionaries were so distrusted by the government that they were required to submit the manuscript of every publication to the inspection of the Secretary, and could not print a single page without his *imprimatur*. They were allowed, however, to circulate the Scriptures, and, as Lord Minto had happily recovered from the panic of the Vellore mutiny, when, in 1808, Serampore fell again into the hands of the English, the missionaries were empowered to extend their operations. On the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813, there was a parliamentary fight for their further liberation from restrictions, in which Wilberforce sustained them, and in which their efforts for the Christianization of India were effectually sanctioned. If these efforts have not been very successful as yet, nevertheless their subsequent history has some elements of interest, and it is not without some few ingredients of encouragement. The charter of 1813 was the commencement of a new era, from which we date a higher theory of our mission in the East. The prescriptive principles of Leadenhall Street were then abjured; Europeans were allowed freely to resort to India; the missionaries have been allowed to travel to every division of the empire, and have enjoyed a perfect liberty of the press. They have come in contact with the strongest religious prejudices of the people, and have distributed thousands of tracts exhibiting the absurdities of Hindoo superstition, in language more fervid than that which was considered fifty years ago certain to lead to an explosion; and during the formidable rebellion of 1857, when the whole of the north-west provinces were in a blaze of revolt, and the most strenuous efforts were made to expel us from the country, 'the missionaries,' according to Mr. Marshman, 'were treated with uniform deference and respect by the most influential classes in the country.'"

\* *The Times*.

This notice of the work of the missionaries, its commencement, progress, success, the hostility shown to it, is carried down to a period (1813) long subsequent to the government of the Marquis Wellesley. Its introduction here prevents the necessity of recurring to the events to which it refers, when relating the great political movements of the early portion of the nineteenth century.

At the beginning of 1801, both Lords Wellesley and Clive contemplated retiring from their respective governments, but the events which occurred in India compelled them, from patriotic feelings, to remain. Both those able men were surrounded by difficulties which were hardly appreciated in England, because of the brilliancy of their career. The financial talents of Lord Wellesley were not considered equal to his gifts in other respects, and his war against Mysore was waged at a prodigious expense. His lordship's opinion

of the powers necessary to a governor-general was regarded as too ambitious, and sometimes arbitrary, both by those who carried out his views in India, and by the directors and proprietary of the East India Company. He demanded the entire control of the whole financial resources of India, a demand which appeared to the directors unconstitutional, unreasonable, and unnecessary. These considerations influenced the noble marquis in a desire to retire from the onerous post which he had occupied with so much ability. Public considerations, however, decided the part he took, and the aspect of affairs in Europe and in India at the beginning of the nineteenth century justified his lordship in devoting his great energies, talents, and experience to the government of British India, however some portions of his conduct, and some of his opinions, might be regarded unfavourably in India or at home.

## CHAPTER CI.

RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH TO INDIA IN THE OPENING OF THE 19TH CENTURY—POLICY OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY IN REFERENCE TO FRENCH INFLUENCE IN INDIA, AND THE MAHRATTAS—WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL WELLESLEY—BATTLES OF ASSAYE AND ARGAM.

IN the beginning of 1801 some official changes took place in the supreme government by orders from home. Letters patent were issued by the crown, appointing the Marquis Wellesley captain-general in India. The differences of opinion and feeling between the king's and the company's officers rendered this step desirable. Officers holding the king's commission frequently murmured when called upon to serve under company's officers of superior rank, and sometimes obedience to such officers was refused, on the ground that they did not hold the king's commission. The letters patent invested the governor-general with full command over all military forces employed within the limits of the company's exclusive trade. They also required his lordship's obedience to all orders, directions, and instructions from the first commissioners for the affairs of India, or from any of his majesty's principal secretaries of state.

Lieutenant-general Gerard, afterwards Lord Lake, was appointed commander-in-chief by a vote of the court of directors, on the 1st of August, 1800, in succession to Sir Alured Clarke. In February, 1801, General Gerard assumed his new functions, and Sir Alured retired. Colonel Stevenson was appointed to command in Malabar and Canara, under

the civil jurisdiction of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley—shortly afterwards made major-general.

The proceedings of the French caused uneasiness in London and in India as to their designs upon that country. In May, 1802, Mr. Bosanquet, then chairman of the court of directors, wrote to the Marquis Wellesley, informing him that the French government was exceedingly jealous of British sovereignty in India, declaring his conviction that the peace recently made with France could not be lasting, and advising his excellency to be prepared for whatever might ensue upon its violation. Lord Wellesley had himself entertained the opinion that the French would spare no pains to unsettle the power of England in Asia, and he had distributed agents in all the countries of western Asia and eastern Europe, whence intelligence might be procured or where alliances might be formed. At Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Bussora, Alexandria, &c., British agents served their employers with great efficiency. A mission had been sent from Calcutta to Baber Khan, Shah of Persia, to ascertain the intentions of that prince, to form a more correct estimate of his military power, and to gain through his court precise knowledge of the relations

maintained with it by Zemaun Shah of Affghanistan, who had so frequently threatened northern Hindostan. The officer entrusted with the mission to the court of Persia had been instructed to gain its assent to some arrangement which would check the incursions of Zemaun Shah, and to form a treaty against the French, should they attempt by way of Persia to penetrate into India. Captain Malcolm had been selected for the performance of this delicate and important task. He arrived in Bushire in February, 1800, and in twelve months transmitted to Calcutta two treaties with Persia, one political the other commercial. He returned in September, 1801, having succeeded in all the objects of his mission. He also formed a good understanding between his government and the Pasha of Bagdad, which was considered politic, and an excellent provision against certain schemes supposed to be indulged by the French. The operations of the French in Egypt induced the governor-general to form a treaty with the Portuguese viceroy of Goa, in result of which eleven hundred British royal infantry, under the command of Sir William Clarke, were added to the garrison. Thus the governor-general, independent of any instructions received from home, made provision in all directions against the much dreaded designs of France.

The French were aware of all these proceedings. Their agents abroad and their spies in London informed them, for the most part correctly, of what the governor-general of India did, and of the tone of feeling, suspicion, and manœuvres of the English cabinet and the directors of the East India Company. Preliminaries of peace between France and England had been much hastened by the success of the English in Egypt. They were signed October 1st, 1801. The definitive treaty was, however, not signed until March 27th, 1802. The delay in signing the definitive treaty confirmed the English in their suspicions that the peace was not intended by France to be solid and lasting. Their suspicions were but too well grounded. In October Buonaparte, then elected first consul for life, addressed the Helvetic republic in terms which alarmed the English. The first consul plainly desired to control the Swiss nation in the exercise of its independent rights, and indicated that the system of propagandism and aggression, which the French had professed to give up, was still their policy. Lord Hawkesbury wrote to the French ambassador, M. Otto, that the English government would not surrender such conquests as might have passed to France and Holland under the articles of the late treaty of peace,

of which the conduct of the first consul to the Helvetic republic was considered a violation. Lord Hawkesbury also sent instructions to the Marquis Wellesley in accordance with his communication to M. Otto. On receipt of this intelligence, the governor-general regulated all his proceedings upon the assumed certainty of war with France and Holland.

On the 17th of June, 1803, England declared war against Holland, which was soon followed by a similar declaration against France. None of the vanquished possessions of France and Holland in Asia, which the English were to have surrendered at the conclusion of the peace, had been given up.

The proceedings of the British government and the governor-general of India, in reference to France and Holland, met with the approbation of the court of directors, but very strong difference of opinion existed as to the means to be employed. The Marquis Wellesley was for proceeding with all his measures on a gigantic scale of expense, proportionate to the grandeur and energy of his conceptions. Lord Castlereagh, then at the head of the board of control, concurred with the governor-general, and was as little disposed to economy. The directors considered that the operations of the company in India should be purely defensive, and should consist only in the defence of their trade and territory. Lords Castlereagh and Wellesley desired to employ the resources of the company for the purposes of imperial aggrandizement. The correspondence of these two notable persons, in reference to the court of directors, sometimes resembled that of enemies to the company, whose duty it was to turn its property to other account than its own use, rather than that of high functionaries of the king's government, bound to protect the company, to co-operate with it, and to regard its trading resources with the same sacredness of trust as the resources of any other company, or of any individual British citizens ought to be, and in most cases would be regarded, however indifferent the British government generally showed itself to the rights of private citizens, or of corporations, when such stood in the way of ministerial or party convenience. Whenever the company laid out money for political purposes in the service of the government, the accounts were disputed, payment was delayed, perhaps refused, or their settlement clogged with some unjust conditions.

In 1803 information reached Marquis Wellesley of a secret engagement between France and the Batavian republic, in virtue of which the latter ceded Cochin and other oriental settlements to France. M. Lefebvre, a staff officer at Pondicherry, wrote a memoir

justifying the French in resuming these possessions, under the treaty of Amiens. According to this memoir, while the English were wholly occupied in Western India against French aggression from that point, a secret expedition should be prepared to proceed from Spain, *via* Mexico, to Manilla, and thence to India. At the same time the Dutch republic should send an expedition by the Cape of Good Hope to the Spanish islands, and thence to Trincomalee. The author of the memoir predicted that if France did not deprive the English of their Eastern dominion, Russia, rapidly advancing in power, would attempt it.

A copy of this memoir was procured by the Marquis Wellesley, and he judged that although such a scheme might never be attempted by the governments in question, it was evident that the national feeling of France was directed to the acquisition of territory in India, and to the expulsion of the English thence, as freshly as when first the conflicts between the two nations gathered in "little wars" around Myhie and Tellicherry. The great error of the British had been in restoring Pondicherry when first conquered, but the exigencies of peace in the European relations of the two powers constrained what, received as an oriental policy only, was an error and misfortune.

The conduct of Lord Wellesley to the various branches of the Mahratta empire was based upon his knowledge and conjectures of the designs of the French. He perceived that the French hoped through the Mahrattas, as formerly through the Nizam of the Deccan, to gain a footing in India. The Mahratta sovereignties, stretching away from the shores of Malabar to the confines of the Punjab, holding sway in the heart of India, furnished means for French intrigue. If by disciplining and commanding their armies the French gained a military prestige among them, French generals might undermine the authorities they served, as well as organise and lead powerful, well equipped, and efficiently drilled armies against the English territories in numbers which, so led and disciplined, no resources derivable from England could repel. The policy of Lord Wellesley was that which Lord Cornwallis adopted in the Deccan—that of compelling or inducing the dismissal of all French and foreign mercenaries, and the employment of strong British contingents, the expense of which was to be borne by the governments which they ostensibly defended. This was a far more subtle plan than that of the French; it was indeed of French origin, for it was the scheme by which Dupleix and Bussy had so long before ruled the court of

Hyderabad, and used the power of the Deccan, in the disputes of peninsular India. The Marquis Wellesley had, by what was called the subsidiary treaty of 1798, secured the nizam as an ally. His highness was obliged to rely upon a British contingent; his French forces were gone, although he still reserved some officers and troops contrary to the treaty, and he was rather desirous to increase their number as a counterpoise to the overbearing influence of the English.

The Mahratta sovereignties at that time were the Peishwa, the Guicowar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. The Peishwa was supreme in *nominal* authority as in real rank. He was the grand vakeel of the Delhi emperor, but had been partly cajoled and partly coerced by Scindiah to make him his deputy in that office, who so used it as virtually to wield whatever was left of authority, and to bear whatever prestige remained of the name and dignity of the Great Mogul. The grand seat of Mahratta authority was then, as it had always been, at Poonah. Dowlut Row Scindiah might be considered rather as the chief sovereign in India than as a Mahratta chief owing allegiance to the Peishwa. Scindiah's territory lay in and around Malwa, to the west of Central India. The Guicowar dominated Gujerat, to the west of Scindiah's possessions. Holkar prevailed south of Malwa, and ruled in his capital of Indore. The Rajah of Berar, or as he was more frequently called, the Nagpore Rajah, reigned in the city of that name, over a wild people, and a country of rigid and uncultivated soil east of the other Mahratta chiefs, and contiguous to the British province of Bengal.

"Independently of the apprehensions created by their immense resources and their inveterate aggressiveness, the Mahrattas were evoking at this moment the dreaded vision of French influence and ascendancy. Though the peace of Amiens had checked the overt operations of our redoubtable rivals, their intrigues were still continued with characteristic tenacity. Napoleon had sent Decaen to India with strict injunctions to provide for war while observing the stipulations of peace. Nor was this all; for Peron, a French adventurer, who had arrived in Hindostan twenty years previously as a petty officer in Suffrein's squadron, was rising rapidly to the command of the whole Mahratta forces. He had disciplined and armed some fifteen or twenty thousand men for Scindiah's service, who were officered by his own countrymen, and who were not inferior to the trained battalions of the company. His influence with Scindiah was so

unbounded as actually to excite jealousy among the Mahratta chiefs; and if he had possessed the national spirit of Dupleix, or been opposed by any less a soldier than Arthur Wellesley, it is not too much to conceive that our Eastern empire might have hung upon a thread."\*

Holkar was as active as Scindiah in disciplining his troops by French officers, although he did not set the example, nor employ so large a foreign force. Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar were all competing for ascendancy at the court of Poonah, the Peishwa, their nominal and rightful lord, being not only unable to control them, but controlled by them in turn. The Guicowar would no doubt have been as forward in this competition as the other three, but his territory lying seaward, and other circumstances, brought him more into contact with the English. His territorial position gave him less opportunity of exercising any control at the Peishwa's court, and whatever the differences of the other three confederates, they were willing to coalesce against him. His pretensions were, as if by common consent of the other chiefs, excluded.

The policy adopted by the English was more easy of application in his case than in that of the Peishwa, or the other nominally confederated but really hostile chiefs. The English accordingly, having failed to induce the Peishwa to accept and support a powerful British contingent, treated with the Guicowar, with whom, for various objects, they had been in close negotiation, and upon whose power they had been gradually encroaching for years. The East India government, never wasting opportunities nor wanting pretexts, now discovered that Surat was shamefully misgoverned. This, and the nonpayment of the tribute, formed a good justification for annexing it to the company's territories; which plea was further strengthened by the constant difficulties arising out of the right of succession. The Nabob of Surat, like many other vassals of the Delhi empire, when strong enough, became virtually independent, and rendered his succession hereditary. But disputes having arisen respecting the inheritance, the British interfered and exercised their authority. A subsequent dispute upon the same subject, in 1789, afforded a further opportunity for the company, and the nabob was treated similarly to the ruler of Oude, being compelled to surrender the civil and military government of his dominions to the English, receiving in lieu a pension, and with it protection. But the chout,

or tribute, he had agreed to pay to the Mahrattas was not so easily settled. The Guicowar prince declared his readiness to relinquish his portion of the tribute to the company, but the Peishwa was not so yielding.

The Guicowar, further to secure the British alliance, yielded the Chourassy district. His death, in September, 1800, produced great disturbances; for his son was perfectly imbecile, and unfit to control the intrigues of the court of Baroda. These intrigues speedily brought on a war between the late prime-minister, Nowjee Apajee, and an illegitimate brother of the deceased Guicowar; but the English, siding with the minister, and furnishing troops, victory declared in his favour. Nowjee being unfettered, pursued his economical reforms by dismissing the Arab mercenaries; but this body refused to disband, demanding enormous arrears: afterwards mutinying, they seized Baroda and imprisoned the Guicowar. The English immediately invested Baroda, which surrendered in ten days. Contrary to capitulation, many of the mutineers joined the rebel Kanhojee; but were pursued, and ultimately, with the latter, driven from Gujerat.

The policy of the English towards the Guicowar was pertinacious, wily, and successful; it lay with the discretion of the Bombay government whether a contingent of its army should not occupy the capital of Gujerat. The British were also persistent in urging upon the government of Poonah the reception of an English force, to be paid for by the Poonah treasury; no French, nor other foreign officers or soldiers to be admitted to serve the Peishwa: but that dignitary, mainly under the influence of Scindiah, still resisted. Events, however, brought about what negotiation had otherwise failed to accomplish. The confederates became open enemies. Scindiah conducted hostilities with varying fortunes. The horrors of war rolled over the great Mahratta empire, advancing and receding like the flowing tide, but still coming nearer and nearer to the capital. The Peishwa fled to Bassein, and claimed the protection of the English. This was granted on the much-coveted condition of his admitting an English division to garrison his capital. He reluctantly consented, and signed an agreement afterwards known as the treaty of Bassein. Meanwhile, the flight of the Peishwa to Bassein was treated by Holkar, then in the ascendant, as an abdication, and he, with the other chiefs, appointed Ameerut Rao Peishwa in his room. Had it not been for this hasty proceeding of Holkar, the Peishwa would not, although indebted for his safety to the English, have signed the

\* *Travellers' Library*, 31.

treaty of Bassein. No sooner had he committed his hand to the hated stipulations than he intrigued for their violation. He opened up communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for that purpose. While he was intriguing against his protectors, they were fighting for him. He was, by prompt and expert military measures, reinstated in his government, and the usurping Peishwa was deposed. The latter, however, so conducted himself towards the English after his deposition, that they granted him a pension and assigned him a residence at Benares. The engagement concluded between the Peishwa and Colonel Close at Bassein, on the last day of the year 1802, was confirmed by the governor-general on the 11th of February, 1803. By the seventeenth article, "The union of the two states was so firmly connected that they were to be considered as one, and the Peishwa was not to commence, nor pursue in future, any negotiations with any power whatever." A subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual appointment of field-pieces and European artillerymen, was to constitute the contingent.

The circumstances attending the reinstatement of the Peishwa again brought General Wellesley into prominence. The government of Madras collected a force which Lord Clive, the governor, placed under the command of General Wellesley. General Lake was ordered either to remain in Oude at the head of the army there, or to proceed to Hurryhur and take the command of the force there.

The government of India was at this time singularly well served by diplomatists of talent. Mr. Webbe was then resident of Seringapatam, a man of extraordinary resources, who was regarded with implicit confidence and the highest respect, amounting to reverence, by General Wellesley. That gentleman was ordered to Nagpore, to watch the movements of the rajah, with whom the Peishwa, in whose interests these movements were taking place, was in traitorous correspondence. Major Malcolm, whose services in Persia had been of such signal importance, was appointed to Seringapatam, but he proceeded to the city of Mysore, where the new sultan resided, as a place affording him a better position from whence to watch the Mahratta intrigues. Upon these two experienced politicians devolved mainly the procuring of such intelligence as would influence the governor-general's orders.

The Madras army assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of the Hon. General Wellesley, who, on the 9th of March, 1802, commenced his march towards Poonah. On the

12th he crossed the Toombudra river. Holkar watched him, but moved away towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore. General Wellesley was joined by the son of Purseram Bhow, and other chiefs and sahibs, who came to avow their allegiance to the Peishwa and render their support. General Wellesley learned from his native coadjutors that the usurping Peishwa intended to burn Poonah when the British approached it. The general, to prevent such a calamity, performed one of the most splendid feats in his whole military history. Between the morning and the night of the 19th of April he accomplished a forced march of sixty miles, although detained in the Bhore Ghaut for nearly six hours. This march seems, in the present day, all but incredible. It saved the city; Ameerut Rao, the usurping Peishwa, had barely time to escape. On the 13th of May the Peishwa re-entered his capital, and resumed his seat upon the musnid. The Peishwa was hardly reinstated in his authority when he acted in all respects contrary to the advice tendered to him by the British government, and upon which he had undertaken to act. His extreme vindictiveness infuriated old enemies and made new ones. He neglected business, and so treated his troops that they began to disband, and the sirdars who had come to his standard in a generous devotion, separated to their jaghires.

General Wellesley sought to unite by negotiation Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar in the treaty of Bassein. These chiefs temporised, while preparing to reunite their forces against the British. They believed that their united arms could sweep from India all other powers, and concerted means to bring this belief to the test.

The governor-general found it impossible at such a distance as Calcutta to act with that celerity or effect necessary, when the tidings he received from day to day were so diverse, and the great Mahratta chiefs apparently so vacillating, while really resolved on war. He therefore entrusted his brother, while in command of the Madras forces, to conduct all affairs, civil and military, connected with Poonah, the Deccan, and Hindostan, and with full powers to decide any question that might arise, and to conclude any negotiations he judged beneficial to the state, with either Scindiah, Holkar, or the Nagpore rajah.

Everything done by those three potentates portended war. They were active and acute, full of vigour and sagacity. The Peishwa threw the whole burden of his own defence upon his ally. He engaged to add fifteen thousand men to the army of General Wellesley; he actually sent but three thousand,

and those wretchedly equipped, without ammunition, and no paymaster or means of pay. He had no intention of observing any of his engagements. Indian princes prided themselves on the ingenuity with which they compelled others to keep treaty, while they evaded all stipulations which belonged to it. The disposition of the English was as usual to postpone, and allow their enemies to gain time by bootless negotiations. Lord Wellesley, the Hon. General Wellesley, and Lord Clive were prompt and decisive, but the supreme council, as well as the councils of the presidencies, were continually creating delays by plausible obstructions of some kind. General Wellesley experienced much mortification from the defective organization of the commissariat of his army, and the Madras council was as incompetent as its predecessors in previous wars in furnishing adequate and opportune support. General Stuart, however, the commander-in-chief of the Madras presidency, co-operated efficiently with the governor in matters strictly military, and so far as he could without exciting the morbid jealousy of the council. At length, all being ready, and negotiations having proved fruitless, the series of stirring events commenced which have been designated—

#### THE MAHRATTA WAR.

The dispositions of the British forces, when the grand Mahratta conflict began, were masterly:—"The course taken by the governor-general, in concert with the governments of Madras and Bombay, was to order the assembly of a *corps d'armée* at all the points threatened by Holkar in the conduct of his operations against the Peishwa. A corps of observation was placed on the southern frontier of the Peishwa, to maintain the integrity of the British possessions, and the territories of the nizam and the Mysore rajah. Another was established on the north-west frontier of Mysore, while the Bombay government pushed troops to the eastern and southern confines of the territory which it controlled. The nizam was not inactive. The subsidiary force at Hyderabad prepared for service."

The Hon. General Wellesley made Poonah his point of support and base of operations. General Lake was appointed to command what was called the army of Hindostan; his theatre of operations was the Mahratta confines of Upper Bengal.

On the 6th of August, 1802, General Wellesley ordered the Bombay troops in Gujerat to attack Baroch, which was successfully accomplished. The general's command extended to that remote part, and this vast

extent of authority and responsibility involved on his part inconceivable care and anxiety. The general ordered Colonel Stevenson, his second in command, to move forward from Aurungabad. The 8th was the first day the weather permitted the general himself to march, and on the 9th he arrived at the fort of Ahmednuggur, which was stormed with great rapidity and terrible loss to the enemy. Scindiah, writing of this exploit, observed:—"The English are truly a wonderful people, and their general is a wonderful general. They came, looked at the pettah, walked over it, slew the garrison, and returned to breakfast: who can withstand them?"

After the surrender of Ahmednuggur, General Wellesley received such intelligence as led him to place a portion of his troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson on the 21st of September, directing him to march by a separate road on the 22nd, and form a junction with the corps under his own command on the 23rd, so as to attack the enemy with their united forces on the 24th. On the 22nd of September the two corps marched by separate routes, for the purpose, as General Wellesley alleged in his despatches, of preventing the enemy's escape by one route while the British were pursuing the other, and also because the whole army could not proceed, in one day, through a certain pass which lay in General Wellesley's line of march. These reasons for the course adopted are so distinct and convincing, that it is surprising that military critics should have animadverted upon the general's division of his forces. General Wellesley hoped that either corps could keep the enemy at bay, if encountered by him, until communication was opened with the other. This was not, however, so easy as the general supposed, for, according to Sir Archibald Alison, although the two British columns were only a few miles apart, they were separated by a line of rugged hills preventing mutual access.

General Wellesley having arrived at Naulniah, intended to encamp there, and form his projected junction with Colonel Stevenson. Having, however, learned to his surprise that the enemy was encamped in full force near the village of Assaye, he determined to attack them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. The force of the enemy has been very variously estimated. Thorn computes it at sixteen regular battalions of infantry (Pohlman's brigade), amounting to six thousand men; the brigade of Dupont, amounting to twenty-five hundred; four battalions of the Begum Shimroo,\* amounting to two thousand. The

\* This lady had been a dancing girl, whom Shimroo, the Swiss adventurer, who made himself infamous by the massacre at Patna, had married.

irregular infantry of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's infantry probably amounted to as many more. The cavalry Thorn alleges to have amounted to thirty thousand. There were one hundred pieces of cannon, numerous attended by artillerymen disciplined on the French system.

The force at General Wellesley's command is estimated by Thorn as twelve hundred cavalry, European and native, two thousand sepoy infantry, and thirteen hundred European infantry and artillery, constituting a force of four thousand five hundred. The Rajah of Mysore's and the Peishwa's cavalry were with this force, and amounted to three thousand men. The total force of the enemy could hardly have been less than fifty-five thousand men and one hundred cannon; that of the British, the Peishwa, and the Rajah, seven thousand five hundred. General Wellesley left a large detachment of native cavalry with his baggage and tents at Naulniah, and advanced against the enemy.

As the battle that ensued was one of the most sanguinary ever fought in India, and General Wellesley ran the risk of a terrible defeat, his generalship has been much criticised, many military critics alleging that the attack should never have been made. The reasons which influenced General Wellesley were, however, conclusive. It was of the utmost consequence that the enemy should not escape, and have an opportunity of initiating a mode of warfare which would have proved most harassing to the English. If General Wellesley had waited for Colonel Stevenson, he would have been attacked before that officer could have arrived to his support, and where the enemy's large cavalry force could have acted with advantage. In the position occupied by the Mahratta forces, their cavalry could not with much advantage be brought into action, and even the force of their artillery would be limited. The moral prestige of the English would be sustained by a bold attack, inaction would have lessened this power on the minds of the sepoys; they were more likely to act offensively with spirit than defensively with coolness and fortitude. The general knew his men, and knew his enemy, although he afterwards admitted that he had undervalued their discipline. Lieutenant-general Welsh, in his military reminiscences,\* affirms that the Mahrattas had intended to attack the two divisions in detail, and that when they saw only one of the corps advancing to assail their position they thought the English mad.

General Wellesley perceived the enemy

\* *Military Reminiscences of Thirty Years*, by Major-general Welsh, vol. i. p. 174.

posted near the junction of two rivers, so that if he could place himself between them and that junction, part of their artillery and the whole of their cavalry would be ineffectual. "They were drawn up in a peninsula, formed by the rivers Kaitna and Jootee, in a line facing the Kaitna, and about half a mile distant from it; the cavalry on the right in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun, reaching to their line of infantry, which, with the guns, was posted near the fortified village of Assaye. Their cavalry were on the right, and the infantry and guns were on the left. The village of Assaye was in rear of the enemy's left, and the distance between the rivers was about a mile and a quarter. The enemy, expecting their left flank to be turned, formed their right wing of infantry, with its right resting on the Kaitna, and the left on the village of Assaye; their left wing being formed to the rear, at a right angle with the left of the front line, *en potence*, and with their rear to the Jootee, the left flank resting on Assaye; there being nine battalions in the front, and seven in the second line. About a mile and a half in front of the enemy's new line was the junction of the two rivers, so that when General Wellesley formed his army in front of the enemy's front line, the battle field was in the form of a triangle, the enemy forming the base of it. General Wellesley occupied the centre of the space, by which means his flanks and rear were covered, the junction of the rivers being in rear of his centre. The enemy had more than half their guns in the front line, the rest in the other line (*en potence*). The general drew up his infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in his rear."\*

General Wellesley had left by far the greater part of his cavalry to guard his camp, and observe the masses of the enemy's horse. General Wellesley opened a cannonade, which, although well directed, was not successful; he had only seventeen cannons opposed to the whole front line of the enemy's artillery. His gunners fell fast, and the enemy's fire was not in the least slackened. He ordered his infantry to advance and carry the enemy's cannon with the bayonet. This was performed in a manner the most gallant. Under showers of shell and grape they advanced and bayoneted the gunners, many of whom remained at their posts to the last.

The British infantry re-forming, charged the second line of guns, which were supported by dense masses of infantry, with their numerous cavalry in the rear. The Mahratta line was well formed, their rear turned to-

\* *British Military Exploits*. By Major William Hough, Deputy-Advocate General, Bengal army. Allen and Co., Leadenhall-street.

wards the river Jootee. As the British advanced, the Mahratta cavalry continued to cross the rivers on either flank, and get in their rear, sabring the English gunners. Many of the artillerymen of the first or vanquished line of the enemy had pretended to be slain, a common artifice in oriental warfare, and finding their cavalry advancing against the rear of the British infantry, they started up, reloaded their guns and fired upon the advancing English. Some of the English cannon were also turned upon the English infantry. It will be naturally asked where at such a moment was General Wellesley's cavalry. Colonel (afterwards General) Welsh says that "they had just then charged a large body of the enemy in front, who had, with the assistance of a very heavy and destructive fire from their guns, not only galled, but nearly annihilated the gallant 74th, and pickets on our extreme right. This last line, although it stood well, was at length broken, and the guns captured; while our cavalry pursuing the fugitives, fell in with an immense column, who, though retreating, opposed them, and killed Colonel Maxwell, the brigadier; nor were they completely routed without a severe struggle, and heavy loss on our side. The second line being put *hors de combat*, the general, who was everywhere, placed himself at the head of the 78th regiment, faced about and charged the enemy, who were in possession of the first line of guns, and routed them with great slaughter. Here ended the conflict; those who had captured our guns making off as soon as they saw their danger, although about half-past five a body of ten thousand cavalry came in sight, and made some demonstrations, but dared not charge; and at eight o'clock in the evening they entirely disappeared."

The death of Colonel Maxwell had nearly occasioned the loss of the battle. He gallantly led on the charge, but received a musket ball which inflicted a fatal wound; he suddenly threw up his arms, and his horse halted; his men, supposing it to be a signal for retreat, turned right shoulder forward, and galloped along the whole of the enemy's line, receiving his fire. When the mistake was discovered the men were re-formed, and were so anxious to redeem their honour that they made one of the most desperate cavalry charges ever performed by the British even to the present day, contributing most effectively to retrieve the fortunes of this well-contested battle.

General Wellesley, in a letter to Major Malcolm, describing the conduct of both armies thus wrote:—"Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own,

and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time, whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably: the sepoy's astonished me. These circumstances and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer an equality of numbers. The enemy's cannonade was terrible,\* but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the pickets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did."

The loss of both armies was heavy, but the British suffered proportionately more than the vanquished, owing to the great disproportion of numbers. General Wellesley in his despatches computed the Mahratta loss as 1200 men killed on the field of battle, and four times that number wounded. He computed his own loss, in officers and men, to be 626 killed, 1580 wounded. The fruits of the victory were many. The enemy's guns were captured—more than one hundred in the field, and twenty pieces more in the pursuit. Much baggage and stores were seized by the auxiliary cavalry. The best disciplined of Scindiah's infantry, who offered the bravest resistance, were left *hors de combat* upon the field. The moral influence of the British general and his troops was much enhanced. Colonel Stevenson was enabled to conquer Berhampore and Asseergur on the 16th and 21st of October, while General Wellesley, with his small force now somewhat augmented by the troops of the Peishwa and British sepoy's, was free to act with effect in other directions. Scindiah sought a truce, and sent vakeels into the camp of the general. But he was not sincere in his negotiations, merely seeking to gain time. The general finding this to be the case, and indignant that the truce was violated, proceeded to attack the Mahratta army under the Rajah of Berar and Ragogere Boorslah, on the plains of Argaum.

Having formed a junction with Colonel Stevenson's corps, the general came in sight of the enemy on the 28th of November,

\* Despatches.

strongly posted near the village of Argaum. Their line extended five miles. The village of Argaum, with numerous gardens and enclosures, lay in the rear; in their front a plain intersected by watercourses. The task before the English was not so formidable as at Assaye, the enemy not possessing half the number of guns, nor were their artillerymen so well disciplined. The English force was more numerous, and native and European were veterans. This, however, did not much improve the quality of the native forces, who behaved shamefully, and so endangered the result of the battle to the English, that but for the courage and presence of mind of General Wellesley, the British would undoubtedly have suffered a defeat. No account of the battle of Argaum ever published possesses the united advantages of brevity, accuracy, and authority in the same degree as those accounts given by the conqueror himself in his despatches and letters. In his despatch he thus wrote:—"I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second and supporting the right, and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy's left." After alluding to the confusion caused by the unsteadiness of the native troops, the general stated that when his line was formed, "the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the first battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night."

In a letter to Major Shaw, military secretary to the governor-general,\* General Wellesley wrote—"If we had had daylight an hour more not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time if my native infantry had not been panic-struck and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably

in the battle of Assaye, being broke, and running off when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assaye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night."

The allusion of General Wellesley to the conduct of the sepoys at Assaye being better than at Argaum requires some qualification. In the advance upon the second line of the enemy at the former battle, two sepoy regiments in succession gave way, and it was only when the Highlanders, who had previously suffered much in storming the first line, advanced against the second that it was carried. The loss sustained by the enemy in the battle of Argaum was very great, but could not be ascertained with any approach to accuracy by the English. That of the latter was severe, considering how soon the action was over: 346 officers and men were put *hors de combat*. The British cavalry suffered little, but forty-five horses were either disabled or slain in the pursuit. This was the third action which General Wellesley had fought, and his reputation had been raised by each to a very high degree, although he had been severely criticised by military connoisseurs for his generalship. His first action against Dhoondia was simply a charge of cavalry, which the critics averred should not have been made on the occasion, according to the rules of war. The success of the general was regarded as a piece of good fortune. It is impossible, however, not to perceive, where no professional prejudice warps the opinion, that the means adopted were just such as were calculated to accomplish the end immediately in view. The battle of Assaye, it was admitted, was conducted in every respect properly, and was a great victory, but it was alleged that the attack should never have been made. Had it not been made, it is plain that no similarly favourable opportunity could have been found to strike a severe blow upon so numerous an enemy, while to evade a battle must have issued in a retreat before a cavalry four times more numerous than the general's whole army. The battle of Argaum was described as fought against military rule, and only won by the activity, self-reliance, and presence of mind of the general. No doubt he had a sufficient consciousness of his possession of those great

\* Despatches, vol. i. p. 533. 2nd December, 1803.

qualities to take his own gifts into account as elements of success. If he turned aside from the maxims of military science, it was with a happy audacity like that which Napoleon had been for some years displaying in Europe and Egypt. The opinion of that great man concerning the conduct of General Wellesley in India, and especially in the battle of Assaye, given many years after, showed a high appreciation of the genius of the English general, although the critique of his great rival was tinged by those personal, national, and political prejudices to which Napoleon the First so often allowed his mind to be subjected. The terror which the name of General Wellesley inspired in the southern Mahratta country was great, and wherever he turned, the enemy fled or made a comparatively feeble resistance. The fort of Gawilghur was taken from the Rajah of Berar \* on 14th of December, which was followed by the peace with him in three days, under the treaty of Deogaum.†

On the 30th peace was signed with Scindiah, by the treaty of Surgee Augengaum. Scindiah was probably influenced in signing a treaty, as was also the Berar Rajah, by the fear and defection of minor chiefs. Ambajee forsook the standard of Scindiah early in December, and formed a separate treaty with the English on the 16th. Ambajee was, however, treacherous to the English as to Scindiah, for he refused to deliver up the fort of Gwalior, so famous in India, and which, according to the treaty, had been ceded to the British. It was not surrendered until the 5th of February, 1804, after a breaching battery had opened upon it. In the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, Scindiah made his possession of this fortress a *sine quâ non*. In a letter to Major Malcolm, written May, 1804, General Wellesley declared—"I am convinced that I should not have made the peace if I had insisted upon Gwalior." The Marquis Wellesley differed from his brother on this question, but events proved that General Wellesley had a more intimate knowledge of the subject, and of the policy to be pursued, as might be expected from his opportunities as commander of the army by which the disputed treaties had been conquered. It was not until the 25th of December, 1805, when the Marquis Wellesley had returned home, after the death of the Marquis of Cornwallis, his successor, and when Sir George Barlow was governor-general *pro tempore*, that an end was put to the quibbles and questions connected with the fort of Gwalior.

While General Wellesley was conducting

\* Despatches, vol. ii. p. 583.

† Ibid., vol. ii. p. 588.

the war in one direction, General Lake was operating with a separate army in another, and after both armies had conducted successful campaigns, their respective commanders were kept in continued vigilance and action, from the wayward and uncertain conduct of Holkar and other chiefs, who regarded conventions and agreements simply as means of deceit or delay.

In February, 1804, Holkar, undismayed by the successes of the British, demanded from General Wellesley cessions in the Deccan. He immediately sent an agent to Scindiah, in order to induce that chief to violate his treaties and join him in an attack upon the British possessions. General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray, then commanding in Gujerat, to enter Malwa, and penetrating to Indore, attack Holkar in the capital of his dominions while another of Colonel Murray's detachments was to proceed to the Deccan, and act against Holkar there. Lake took measures on the opposite side of the Mahratta dominions, to render more easy of accomplishment the plan of operations from Gujerat laid down by General Wellesley. Throughout these proceedings the General displayed a sagacious foresight, and an intuitive perception of the conditions of Indian warfare, which must strike all persons acquainted with the character of the nations of peninsular India as indicating the great military genius and general intellectual capacity of the British general. His instructions to Colonel Stevenson, which were implicitly followed out by that officer, and ensured the success of his undertakings, prove the ability of General Wellesley to make successful war in India, while they show how little he regarded the received rules of war, where it was politic to depart from them:—"Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access, for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory.

Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground."

It was not reserved for General Wellesley to accomplish any very signal feats of arms in the Mahratta war, although the superintendence of military arrangements over a wide field continued to devolve upon him while he remained in India. Whether in the camp, the field of battle, the barrack-room, the stores of the commissary, his perfect power of military organization, his capacity alike for generalization and detail were observed by all. Nor was his genius less conspicuous in civil things. At the desk writing letters and despatches, in *viva voce* discussion with vakcels and ministers, in the durbar of native princes, in the chair of government administering the affairs of provinces, he displayed as masterly parts as when exercising the functions of what was regarded as his peculiar profession.

When tidings of the battles of Assaye and Argaum reached England, the directors paid no particular attention to them, and conferred no honours on the chief by whom they were won. The government conferred upon him the Order of the Bath. In India his deeds were highly appreciated, a sword valued at £1000 was voted by the British inhabitants of Calcutta. The general was not contented with the value set upon his achievements by either the crown or the company, although the Order of the Bath was in those days highly estimated. It will interest readers of the present day to peruse the general's own language expressing his sense of neglect. In a letter to Major Shaw he wrote :—"I have served the country in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the court of directors,

although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claims upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered on the scale on which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff of India, and if it had not been for the lamented death of General Frazer, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary."

In March, 1805, Sir Arthur Wellesley (as his Order of the Bath entitled him) left India for England. His health had suffered considerably, and his dissatisfaction with the ministers and the company contributed still more to induce in him a desire to quit India for ever. His service there had made impressions of a lasting kind. He had set an example of kindness in his treatment of the natives, and checked the arrogance of his countrymen wherever it came within his observation. He established the importance of promptitude, both in the field and in negotiations with native states. His letters and conduct had impressed upon the general staff of the army, and all officers on service, the necessity of acquaintance on their part with the people and topography of all countries made the theatre of war, or which were likely at any future period to become so.

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## CHAPTER CII.

### MAHRATTA WAR (*Continued*)—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAKE—BATTLES AND SIEGES—FINAL SUBJUGATION OF THE MAHRATTAS, AND TREATIES OF PEACE.

IN the last chapter the operations of General Wellesley against the Mahrattas were traced through the campaigns in which he vanquished Scindiah at Assaye, the Rajah of Berar at Argaum, and directed Colonel Murray's invasion of Malwa and Indore from Gujerat, in order to suppress the power of Holkar. It was intimated also in that chapter

that General, afterwards Lord Lake, operated against the Mahratta forces from Bengal. His first movements were directed against Scindiah, his subsequent campaigns against Holkar. The campaigns of Lake were more continuous, and involved a fiercer struggle over a greater area, but were not so interesting in their character as those of the com-

mander in the south. While Wellesley was gaining Assaye and Argaum, he was winning the victories of Delhi and Laswaree. There were three armies acting at the same time against the various Mahratta tribes. Two of these were under the supreme direction of General Wellesley, one of which was under his immediate command, of which for some time Colonel Stevenson commanded a separate corps; the other army which Wellesley directed was that which operated from Gujerat, but which was too far off for him to guide its details.

It will assist the memory of the reader to see the dates of the chief actions fought by these different armies presented in one view:—General Wellesley, on the 12th August, 1803, took Ahmednuggur. On the 29th August General Lake defeated Perron's troops at Coel; on the same day Baroch in Gujerat was taken by storm. Lake took the fort of Allyghur on the 4th September, on the 11th gained the battle of Delhi. On the 23rd September, Wellesley gained the battle of Assaye. On the 18th October Lake took possession of the fortress of Agra. On the 1st November he gained the battle of Laswaree. On the 28th November Wellesley gained the battle of Argaum. In October Colonel Stevenson had taken Berhampore and Asseergur; and Colonel Woodington had reduced Champa-neer and Powanghur. Colonel Harcourt had been successful in Cuttack; and Colonel Powell had attained advantages in Bundelcund. Both Scindiah and the Berar Rajah had pledged themselves to "retain no Frenchmen" in their service, or "the subjects of powers in a state of hostility to Great Britain; nor of any of our own, without permission." The Marquis Wellesley had by his proclamation of August, 1803, brought over most of the foreign officers, as well as all our own. In the four great battles we had taken above three hundred guns, and in the fortresses a great many guns, and great quantities of military stores.

To understand clearly the operations of General Lake both against Scindiah and Holkar, it is necessary to state that while both those chiefs were at war with the English, they were also carrying on hostilities with one another. On the 25th of October, 1802, a great battle had taken place between them at Poonah, in which Holkar had gained a great victory. His army at that time consisted of fourteen battalions of infantry, numbering each about one thousand men, commanded wholly by French officers, and as many more commanded by native officers. His cavalry numbered twenty-five thousand. He had one hundred pieces of cannon. Both

in the cavalry and artillery, especially the latter, French officers held important commands. At that date Holkar's object was not to attack the English, but to destroy the power of his competitors. Had he then directed his numerous and well-equipped army wholly against the British, it was the opinion of the best English officers that the confederated Mahrattas would have been too strong for us.\*

On the 27th of December, 1803, Lake moved after Holkar, with instructions if possible to engage him and destroy his army. In February, 1804, Holkar sought assistance from the Rohillas and Sikhs, with the view of extending a confederation through North-western India against the English. In March, 1804, so confident was Holkar of his power to cope with all enemies, that he demanded the cession of territory in the Doab and in Bundelcund, and asserted the right to collect the chout (one-fourth of the landed revenue). At the same time, he made overtures to Scindiah for united action against the English. While Scindiah's forces lay at Assaye, he sent an army under Ameer Khan to assist the rival Mahratta chief. The promptitude of General Wellesley in the meantime defeated Scindiah, and rendered the junction impossible. When at last Holkar resolved to confront the English, he found General Lake, flushed with victory over Scindiah, ready to encounter him. The Mahratta chief had outwitted himself; while the English were destroying the flower of Scindiah's troops, they were removing all impediments that lay in the way of attacking the still more formidable Holkar.

When the war on the Bengal side commenced in June, 1803, about a month after the Peishwa was restored at Poonah by General Wellesley, the following were the arrangements and amount of troops:—One thousand three hundred men under Colonel Fenwick at Midnapore, not far from Calcutta; two thousand men under Major-general Deare, stationed at Mirzapore, on the Ganges, as a protection to the province and city of Benares. Four thousand nine hundred and sixteen Madras and Bengal troops were assembled under Colonel Harcourt for the conquest of Cuttack, belonging to the Rajah of Berar. A force was assembled on the south bank of Soane under Lieutenant-colonel Broughton. Three thousand five hundred men, under Lieutenant-colonel Powell, were collected near Allahabad, for the purpose of invading the province of Bundelcund: while the grand army under

\* *British Military Exploits in India, Afghanistan, and China*, by Major W. Hough, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, Bengal army.

General Lake, commander-in-chief in India, amounted to ten thousand five hundred men; these acted under his excellency's orders. The total British force was about fifty thousand men. The Mahrattas were estimated\* at two hundred and fifty thousand: and forty thousand men organized and drilled by French officers under M. Perron; and one thousand guns.

The marquis was desirous of striking a blow before the cold season should allow the Mahrattas to cross the Nerbuddah into Hindostan. On the 29th August, 1803, General Lake defeated Perron's troops under the walls of Allyghur†—stormed and carried it on the 4th September, fought the battle of Delhi on the 11th September,‡ when he released the Emperor, Shah Alum, who had been imprisoned for many years by the Mahrattas. His eyes had been put out by Ghoolam Khadir. General Lake took Agra on the 18th October, 1803. M. Perron allowed his second in command (M. Pedron) to make his military arrangements, while he himself returned with his body-guard to Agra. The capture of Allyghur was effected by blowing open the gate.§

General Wellesley expressed much admiration of this exploit of General Lake, which, he declared, he had often attempted, without being able to accomplish. Allyghur would have proved a most formidable place for an escalade.

On the 7th of September Lake marched from Allyghur, and encamped near Delhi on the 11th. The enemy consisted of six thousand cavalry and thirteen thousand infantry, under the command of a French officer, M. Louis Bourquieu. Lake's force was only four thousand five hundred men. Bourquieu despised the English brigade which had advanced against an army. He had intrenched himself before Delhi, supposing that he would have been attacked by a very superior force. He resolved at once to attack the English, and for this purpose threw out his whole cavalry force, which, when they approached nearly to musket range, halted, and the infantry passed them. These were met by the English with close and successive volleys, by which their ranks were broken, and they fled behind their guns. Against these the English intrepidly advanced, under a terrible fire from cannon and musketry. The British infantry gave one volley and charged, opening their ranks to let the cavalry pass, whose charge was splendid. The battle was short,

sharp, and decided. The result,—Shah Alum was restored to his throne. He had been in the hands of the Mahrattas since 1771—since he left the alliance and protection of the English at Allahabad at that time. At the juncture of the battle of Delhi he was treated by Scindiah just as the Peishwa, the rightful sovereign of the Mahrattas, was treated at Poonah. He was obliged to issue the orders of Scindiah as the decrees of the empire.

General Lake was authorised by the governor-general to establish at Delhi a settled form of government in the name of the Mogul. He then departed for Agra. On the 24th of September Lieut.-colonel Ochterlony, deputy-adjutant-general of the Bengal army, was nominated resident at Delhi, where only a battalion of sepoy and four companies of recruits, gathered in the surrounding country, were left in garrison. There had been many British as well as French officers in the service of Scindiah; the former left his ranks as soon as proclamation of war was made by the governor-general. These officers having joined the corps under General Lake, were employed as guides, were used to strengthen regiments weakly officered, and were appointed to the command of Mewathies, as the recruits about Delhi were termed. It was one of those officers, named Lucan, that blew up the gates of Allyghur, and led the English safely through the intricate mazes of the place.

On the 2nd of October General Lake reached Muttra, where Colonel Vandeleur joined him with a detachment. That gallant officer afterwards earned distinction for himself as a good cavalry officer. An important event occurred at this place; several British officers and some French, in command of a detachment of troops sent by Scindiah to join General Perron, surrendered themselves prisoners of war to Colonel Vandeleur shortly before the arrival of General Lake. This detachment consisted of several regular battalions of Scindiah's army, and its surrender much weakened his force.

On the 8th of October the army arrived at Agra, and on the 9th the Rajah of Bhurtpore offered a treaty offensive and defensive. This was an immediate advantage to the British, for the rajah sent five thousand horse, such as they were, to operate with Lake's army before Agra. The garrison acted with vigour, arresting all the European officers at once, a measure of safety and of danger, for some of these officers were in the English interest, others were, however, true to the Mahrattas, and the loss of their services was irreparable to the city.

Seven battalions of the enemy occupied the

\* Thorn, p. 315.

† Ibid., p. 91.

‡ Ibid., p. 111.

§ *A History of British Military Exploits and Political Events in India.* By Major Hough.

glacis and the town, with a well-appointed and powerful artillery, directed, in many cases, by intelligent French officers who had not been placed under arrest. The first operation of General Lake, after going through the essential preliminaries in laying siege to a fortress, was an attack against the posts occupied by these battalions, which was successful. The enemy made an obstinate defence within the town, but Lake seized a large mosque, from which a heavy fire was kept up against the enemy. In two days after this success the enemy's infantry outside the fort surrendered, numbering two thousand five hundred men. This terrible reverse did not diminish the exertions of the troops within the fortress. It was not until the 17th that the breaching batteries opened. On the 18th, under the influence of an English officer within the fortress, the garrison surrendered. The Mahratta troops, five thousand five hundred in number, marched out prisoners of war. Twenty tumbrels of treasure, containing 22 lacs of rupces, equivalent to £220,000, were obtained in the treasury. The ammunition and stores were very valuable, as Agra was more a depot of arms and a treasury than a strong fortification. M. Perron, the French commander, had the falsehood and effrontery to claim the money as his personal property—a claim which was of course rejected, Colonel Hessian, the governor, having honestly avowed that the treasury contained only the property of the state.

General Lake's proceedings had been so well calculated, and so complete, that Scindiah's plans were soon entirely frustrated.

Two battalions of Scindiah's army had escaped from Delhi; these formed a junction with fifteen battalions, the remainder of the corps, the advance of which had surrendered to Colonel Vandeleur. Guns and a force of cavalry accompanied these battalions, making a very fine army, which hung upon the rear of the English, but did not attempt the relief of Agra. The main object was to watch Lake's movements, deceive him, and recapture Delhi, so as to regain possession of the person of the Mogul. The army of Scindiah seized convoys, harassed reinforcements, and bombarded Cotumbo. Lake having left Agra, was to the north-west of Futtehpoore Sikree, when the booming of the cannon at Cotumbo broke upon his ear. The next day (the 30th), by a forced march, leaving his heavy guns and baggage at Futtehpoore, the army advanced to Cotumbo, near which it encamped next day.

General Lake determined on an attempt with his cavalry to seize the guns and bag-

gage of the enemy, while his infantry was on the march. At eleven o'clock on the night of the 31st, Lake, with the cavalry, began a forced march, and after a progress of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy at sunrise on the 1st of November. Their force consisted of seventeen battalions of infantry, of much less than the usual strength, not exceeding together nine thousand men; a cavalry division of about five thousand men, and a powerful artillery of seventy-two guns.

The Mahrattas had heard of the approach of Lake, had magnified his army, and retreated rapidly from Cotumbo. They were making a forced and confused march when his advanced guard beheld the straggling crowds in their wild Mahratta costume, their guns showing darkly in the grey morning. The guns were ingeniously chained together, a circumstance which baffled Lake's cavalry, who found that they were unable to retain their conquests, for, as they retired to reform, the artillerymen jumped up from beneath the guns and bore them away. Lake checked the progress of the enemy until his infantry arrived at twelve o'clock. He formed them in two columns of attack. The enemy awaited the attack with two lines of infantry, the guns drawn up in double lines in front of the first rank of the infantry, the rear guns being placed in the intervals of the first line. The village of Mokaupore was between the two lines of the infantry near the right flank. It was fortified, and partly rested on a rivulet which covered the enemy's right. The Mahratta cavalry were well posted in the rear of their second infantry formation. The position was a fine one, and the appearance of the troops stalwart and confident.

Lake arranged a portion of his cavalry so as to watch that of the enemy, the remainder to support his attacking columns. What used in those days to be called "galloper guns" were arranged so as to support the advancing infantry. Lake himself with one of the columns of attack advanced against the enemy's right formation of battle. The column was badly formed, confusion arose in the ranks, the men came up slowly, and the sepoys showed a disposition to leave the fighting as much as possible to the Europeans. The officership of the British was bad, and only by hard fighting, and after terrible courage, did they succeed. The cannonade of the enemy was cool, prompt, and rapid:—"The effect of this fire, which was terrible in the extreme, was felt with peculiar severity by the 76th regiment, which fine body, by heading the attack, as usual, became the direct object of destruction. So great indeed was the loss of this corps, and such was the

furious fire of the enemy, that the commander-in-chief deemed it more advisable to hasten the attack with that regiment, and those of the native infantry, consisting of the second regiment, twelfth and sixth companies of the second battalion sixteenth, which had closed to the front, than to wait till the remainder of the column should be formed, whose advance had been delayed by unavoidable impediment."

The guns were captured. The enemy gave way on the left, as the success of the British on the right became assured. The dauntless indifference to danger shown by the Scottish soldiery struck the enemy with awe, and while the men opposed to them died at their posts, those on the left became so intimidated as to offer an inferior resistance. The day was won by the right attack. The loss of General Lake was extremely heavy. Major Hough thus details it:—"The loss in killed and wounded amounted to 824. Of these the cavalry lost 258; his majesty's 76th regiment, 213; the 2nd battalion, 12th, and the company's 16th native infantry,\* lost 188; leaving the remainder, sixty-five, to be divided among all the other corps—and 553 horses killed, wounded and missing. The guns captured were seventy-one in number." Lake's secret letter explains the nature of the battle. The following extracts are full of interest:—"These battalions (Scindiah's) are uncommonly well appointed, have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet; all the sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and if they had been commanded by French officers,† the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life, or anything like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again. Their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever; they have three times the number of men to a gun as we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort; all their men's knapsacks and baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance. We have taken all their bazaar, baggage, and everything belonging to them; an amazing number were killed—indeed the victory has been decisive. The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do anything without British troops, and of them there ought to be a very great proportion." "Had

\* The 16th were removed to the brigade in which his majesty's 76th were, owing to gallant conduct in the attack on the town of Agra in October, 1803.

† The proclamation brought them over.

we been beaten by these brigades, the consequences attending such a defeat must have been most fatal. These fellows fought like devils, or rather like heroes, and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe from the position they had taken we must have failed."

The general was of opinion that the organization of the British army was dangerously defective; that the sepoys would seldom fight well, unless mixed with a proportion of Europeans, which he thought should never be less than one to four, but, if possible, in a much greater proportion; and that under any circumstances their devotion was not to be relied on. He considered that the loyalty of the Bengal sepoys was not worthy of confidence, and that if they were trusted as the main strength of the army, British power in India was "suspended from a thread." These views of the general produced no effect upon the policy or opinions of the company.

In 1804 the operations of Lake and his lieutenants against Holkar were unfortunate. Lake dispatched Colonel Monson against him with the forces of the Rajah of Jeypore; while Murray, by the orders of General Wellesley, as before shown, acted against him from Gujerat. Holkar soon lost his possessions in Hindostan north of the Chambul, and was hemmed in between Murray and Monson. From these difficulties he extricated himself through the faults of his adversaries. Murray was tardy, Monson was utterly incompetent, and believed the sepoys to be disloyal. His rearguard, commanded by Baboojee Scindiah, was betrayed by that chief.

When the rainy season commenced General Lake went into cantonments at Cawnpore, too remote to render assistance to Monson. General Wellesley was of opinion, that had Lake fixed his head-quarters at Agra, Monson might have been saved from discomfiture and disaster. Lake was not as competent to manage the operations from Bengal as Wellesley was from the south. Indeed, General Wellesley threw much of the blame of Monson's ruin upon General Lake.

Lake marched from Cawnpore, and arrived at the general rendezvous at Agra on the 22nd of September. The strategy of Lake was unskilful; Holkar proved more than his match. After the bad arrangements of Lake had caused a considerable sacrifice of munitions of war and provisions, Holkar succeeded in engaging the general's attention with his cavalry, while he conveyed his infantry and artillery to Delhi, and laid siege to it. The Mohammedan population were insurgent.

An intense fanaticism against Christians animated the whole people, and Colonel Ochterlony had much difficulty in repressing insurrection. He called in the troops dispersed in the neighbourhood, strengthened the defences of the city, and gave the command of the forces to Lieutenant-colonel Burn, the senior officer.

From the 8th of October to the 15th the siege was maintained by Holkar, and Ochterlony, with his few irregular soldiers, conducted a defence not often surpassed in skill and valour. Like Colonel, afterwards General Williams, at Kars, half a century later, he was everywhere, superintending the detail of the army, but was not so successful in attaching to him the people of the city he defended. It is doubtful whether the enemy would not have succeeded, had not Ochterlony contrived to apprise Lake of his circumstances, the approach of whose advance guard was the signal for the retirement of Holkar's army, which consisted of twenty thousand infantry and one hundred guns. As he retired he plundered the country in every direction. Lake pursued the enemy with his cavalry, and overtook him while encamped at night. The general, instead of attacking the camp with his troopers, fired grape into it from his horse artillery guns, which allowed Holkar to escape. Lake still maintained a hot cavalry pursuit. Holkar, who was with his cavalry, would hardly have been so ready to fly, had he not heard of a signal defeat inflicted upon his infantry and artillery at Deeg. To that place Major-general Fraser had pursued them. A battle was fought, during which General Fraser lost his leg, and the command devolved upon Colonel Monson, who nobly redeemed his former ill fortune by good conduct and bravery; nearly two thousand of the enemy perished in this battle. The English lost three hundred and fifty, killed and wounded. Eighty-seven guns were captured, and the enemy were obliged to abandon the open country and take shelter in the fort of Deeg. This place belonged to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom, in 1803, Lord Lake had made a treaty offensive and defensive. He, like most of the native princes, proved to be a traitor. Lord Lake resolved to punish him as well as inflict further defeat upon the enemy he sheltered. The fort and citadel were taken by storm after an obstinate defence.

On the 25th of December the English were in possession of all the guns of the remaining artillery of Holkar's army, of the stores of the fort, and of that army. Two lacs of rupees were found in the treasury. In conquering the intrenched camp, fort, and citadel, Lake's

army lost only forty-three men killed, and 184 men wounded.

The general left a garrison in Deeg, and marched with his army on the 28th. On the last day of the year he was joined by Major-general Dowdeswell, with his majesty's 75th regiment and a supply of stores. The army halted until New Year's Day, and marching in the evening, reached Bhurtpore on the 2nd of January, 1805. This fortress was situated thirty miles W.N.W. of Agra. Having battered a breach, Lake attempted to storm on the 9th, and was beaten off with a loss of 456 men killed and wounded. He erected fresh batteries, as the enemy succeeded in stockading the breach. Major-general Smith, arriving with three battalions of sepoy and one hundred convalescent Europeans, and Ishmael Bey, a partisan of Holkar, having come over with a regiment of cavalry, a second storm was resolved upon, which took place on the 21st, when a breach was pronounced practicable, from intelligence gained by the following stratagem:—"To learn the breadth and depth of the ditch a havildar and two troopers of the 3rd native cavalry volunteered their services. Dressed like the natives of the country, and pursued by men as if deserters, they got to the ditch by the stratagem of pretending to be enemies of the English and wishing to enter the fort, by which plan they passed along the ditch to a gateway and saw the breach, then galloped back to the army. They were rewarded and promoted."\*

This storm also failed, with terrible loss. Eighteen officers were killed and wounded, and more than five hundred men. The remainder of the month the army lay before the fortress, watched by the cavalry of Holkar strongly reinforced, various affairs of outpost occurred, and Holkar's troopers made attempts more skilful than gallant to intercept or interrupt convoys from Agra, compelling Lake to keep a considerable portion of his army marching backwards and forwards, to ensure the safety of his stores and escorts.

The chiefs with Holkar quarrelled; some withdrew to Rohilkund, some to Rajpootana. General Smith was sent in chase of some of these parties, without much plan either on his own part or that of Lord Lake, and with little result beyond the loss of some officers and men in cavalry skirmishes, and the return of the troops wearied with incessant marching. On the 10th of February Major-general Jones arrived with a division of the Bombay army, consisting of two battalions of king's troops, four of sepoy, and about six hundred native cavalry.

\* Thorn.

Lord Lake had now a large army and a great many generals, and if Bhurtpore was not impregnable he must take it. He a third time, however, failed, with a loss of 894 men killed and wounded. The conduct of the soldiers was excellent. The sepoy fought with a quiet submission to the word of command, the Europeans with devoted courage. Neither Lake nor his generals showed much skill, and the task itself was most difficult. Cannon continued to play upon the place until the 22nd of February, when a fourth storm took place. The Hon. Brigadier Monson, who had shown such incapacity when co-operating with Colonel Murray in a previous campaign, commanded the stormers, who were in number more than three thousand. The brigadier fought with desperation, and kept his men fighting when no result could happen but their destruction; they were beaten, with a loss of nine hundred and eighty-seven men killed and wounded. Few assaults in Indian sieges, and few defences, were more terrible than this, as the following description shows:—"The bastion to be attacked was extremely steep, and there was no possibility of getting up to the summit. Several soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavoured by these steps to reach the top, but were knocked down by logs of wood, and various missiles, from above. The enemy from the next bastion kept up a destructive fire. Several efforts were made against the curtain. The enemy's grape told with fatal effect. The people on the walls threw down upon the heads of the troops ponderous pieces of timber, and flaming packs of cotton, previously dipped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, the explosion of which had a terrible effect. The struggle was carried on with the most determined resolution on both sides. Brigadier Monson strained himself to the utmost in maintaining the unequal struggle; but after two hours' arduous exertion, he was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attempt, and return to the trenches."\*

Lake might well be dispirited after so many failures. He had consumed an immense amount of stores and ammunition; his guns were worn out; the cost of his army had been very great. He still persevered, ordering supplies from Agra and Allyghur. At this juncture the rajah's treasury became exhausted. Lake had been recently exalted to the peerage, and the rajah made that circumstance the occasion of friendly overtures. He sent a vakeel to Lord Lake, congratulating him on his being ennobled, and expressing a

\* Major Hough.

desire for peace. On the 10th of April, 1805, the treaty was signed. The chief clauses of it were, that the rajah would pay twenty lacs of rupees (£200,000), never employ any Europeans in his service, and the fortress of Deeg was to be retained until there was no longer a possibility of renewed treachery on his part, or the English were satisfied of his amity.

Lord Lake was much chagrined at the failure before Bhurtpore, and attributed it mainly to his deficient material, the fewness of his officers of engineers and artillery, and men who understood sapping and mining. The British officers displayed dauntless bravery, and but little military ability. The first act of Lord Lake after the signature of the treaty was to make a cavalry attack upon the camp of Holkar, who hovered about seeking for a favourable moment by some bold manœuvre to raise the siege. Lake routed him, killing many of his men, and capturing many of his horses. The indomitable Holkar, however, soon found new recruits and new resources, and went about, like a Tartar chief, plundering all around. Lake then disposed of that portion of his army which he desired to keep the field along the western bank of the Jumna, well placed for co-operation as new events might demand.

Holkar retired into Joudpore and Rajpootana. Lake, with five regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and a strong body of horse artillery, followed and sought battle. The Mahratta requested the assistance of the Punjaabee chiefs. The Sikhs, in a grand national council, agreed to withhold all aid from the fugitive. This decided the fate of Holkar, who, as well as Scindiah, agreed to a treaty of peace. The treaty with the latter included various minor chiefs, such as the Rajahs of Joudpore and Kotah, the Ranee of Odeypore, &c. The treaty was ratified on Christmas-day, 1805. Peace, however, was not altogether restored. Ameer Khan, the best general of Holkar, and claiming to be an independent chief, felt aggrieved that he was not named in the treaty. His remonstrance having been treated carelessly, he sarcastically observed, "a fly may torment an elephant," and retired to his house. Soon afterwards he appeared in arms in Rajpootana, and caused immeasurable trouble. He managed his desultory warfare so well, that he acquired an independent position, and was afterwards recognised as a nabob by the English. Holkar became mad a few years after, and Ameer Khan became the vicegerent of Holkar's dominions, in the name of that chief's wife. It was not until the 9th of January, 1806, that the British army retraced their steps.

Thus ended the great Mahratta war. Some of the bitterest enemies of the English made good terms for themselves; it was the interest of the British to conciliate them. Some of the most faithful friends of the company, who were weak, were thrown aside and exposed to the vengeance of the Mahrattas. The Rajah of Jecypore was one of these, and it is to the discredit of Lord Cornwallis, in his second government, and of Governor-general

Barlow, that this injustice was perpetrated with their sanction, in spite of the indignant protests of Lord Lake, who, under the authority of a previous governor-general, Lord Wellesley, had formed a treaty offensive and defensive with the rajah. The bitter taunt of Hyder Ali was thus again justified—that no confidence could be placed in the English, as a treaty made by one governor-general was revoked by another, or by the company.

### CHAPTER CIII.

RESIGNATION OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY—MARQUIS CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS HIM—POLICY AND DEATH OF HIS LORDSHIP—APPOINTMENT AND REVOCATION OF SIR G. BARLOW—NOMINATION OF LORD MINTO—AFFAIRS OF MADRAS—MUTINY AND MASSACRE AT VELLORE—ARRIVAL OF LORD MINTO—HIS POLICY.

DURING the campaigns with the Mahrattas, and for some time subsequently, there were various changes in the presidential and chief governments, which affected the general policy of the English in India. Lord William Bentinck's arrival in Madras was beneficial to that presidency. The Marquis of Wellesley was apprised by Lord Castlereagh, in 1803, of the war with France, and was urged to make the expenses of India be paid by the revenues of India, which the noble governor's warlike policy rendered impossible. When the general government in Calcutta heard that France had taken possession of Holland, it increased the military ardour of his excellency. His brother's successes in the Deccan tended to the same result; and he became more and more committed to a policy much too warlike for the views of the board of control and the court of directors. In 1805, when intelligence reached Lord Wellesley that England declared war against Spain, and that his government relied on his prudence and vigour to protect the Eastern dependencies of England from any casualties in the result, his lordship's military ardour found renewed scope.

On the 30th July, 1805, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta, to assume a second time the united office of governor-general and commander-in-chief. Lord Lake, much to his mortification, was nominated to the command of the forces in the Bengal presidency. Lord Wellesley shortly after returned to England. The Marquis Cornwallis had received instructions from the court of directors and the board of control to carry out the policy which when before in India he had initiated, of holding no connection, and carrying on no hostilities, with the Mahrattas.

He scarcely waited for the Marquis Wellesley to quit Calcutta before he began to reverse all that that nobleman had done, or authorised his generals to perform, in connection with the late war. Treaties and arrangements were revoked, and alliances dissolved, so that his lordship, by his disregard of the actual state of things, sowed broadcast the seeds of future troubles all over India. Some of these were nipped in the bud, others grew and ripened. Blood and treasure had to flow again freely before this error and precipitancy of his lordship could be retrieved. The Marquis Wellesley might possibly have avoided both the Mysore and Mahratta wars, so, at all events, Mr. Secretary Webbe thought, whose opinion was as good as any in India; but these wars having been brought to an issue, and treaties framed resulting from such issue, it was perilous policy to act as if nothing had occurred, and to treat matters as if the *status quo ante bellum* had been suddenly restored by the hand of Providence.

While the stern and indignant remonstrances of Lord Lake and other officers were before him, the marquis sickened and died. He died at Ghazepore, on the 5th of October, 1805.\* Sir G. H. Barlow succeeded as governor-general. He adopted "the policy of his predecessor," abandoning all connection with the petty states, and generally with the territories to the westward of the Jumna."

On the death of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Lake, as the senior officer in India, assumed the command in chief, when he was about to retire from the country, indignant at his previous supersession.

Barlow was not long permitted to wear his new honours. The court and cabinet were jea-

\* Mill, vol. vi. p 658.

lous of the company's influence, and revoked Sir George's appointment, giving the high post to Lord Minto. The latter candidate had power and influence in parliament; Sir George had only his talent and long services. These qualifications availed little in comparison with parliamentary and court influence.

While these changes were passing in Calcutta, Lord William Bentinck was winning fame for himself by the administration of the affairs of Madras. He completely altered the fiscal management of Tanjore, where peculation prevailed among the natives to an extraordinary degree. The conditions of Malabar and Canara, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with Travancore, suppression of insurrectionary movements among the polygars, introduction of new judicial and revenue systems engaged the attention of his lordship, and repeatedly drew from the directors the expression of their approbation.

On the 17th of October, 1804, Sir John Cradock succeeded General Stuart as commander-in-chief of the forces in Madras. General Wellesley retired from Madras when his brother resigned the government of India.

In consequence of the war in Europe, Lord W. Bentinck retained Pondicherry. His attempts to introduce there good revenue and judicial systems, to govern the settlement fairly, were countervailed as much as possible by the French residents, who were nearly all spies of the French government. Among the many events in which Lord W. Bentinck had a deep interest there was none that so much affected his own interests and reputation as the mutiny at Vellore, which broke out in the month of July, 1806.

Sir John Cradock, when commander-in-chief, found no code of military regulations for the army of Madras; and in March, 1805, he proposed to Lord W. Bentinck the formation of one. His lordship recommended the council to adopt such as had already appeared "in orders;" other regulations approved by the general he commended to the consideration of council.

The tenth paragraph of the code thus formed ran as follows:—"The sepoys are required to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and the hair on the upper lip cut after the same pattern, and never to wear the distinguishing mark of caste, or their earrings when in uniform. A turban of a new pattern is also ordered for the sepoys." This last clause was added in the new regulations. This "tenth paragraph" of the new military code, having been inserted among the old orders, did not come under the consideration of the governor and council. The sepoys did not appear to take any particular notice of

this order. The first symptoms of dissatisfaction arose in the 2nd battalion of the 4th regiment of native infantry, which composed part of the native garrison of Vellore. On the 6th and 7th of May they objected to wear the turban, and did so with an insolent manner, and with indications of a mutinous spirit. They were reduced to order by the stern application of authority. The Madras government was surprised to hear of this; they had not noticed the paragraph until the reports of these demonstrations against the turban had reached them. Inquiry was instituted, and the native officers and men generally professed to have no objection to the turban. The governor issued an order to the troops, declaring that "no intention existed to introduce any change incompatible with the laws or usages of their religion." The commander-in-chief, a self-willed man, did not think it necessary, and it was not published. Probably if it had been promulgated no good would have resulted, for although the objections of the sepoys were conscientious and sincere, they were formed upon false representations made by political emissaries. This may readily be conceived, as Vellore was the place appointed for the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan; they were allowed a large sum for the maintenance of their dignity, and their retainers were numerous. Every vagabond Mysorean who wished to attract their notice settled in the neighbourhood, and treated them as sovereigns. The Mohammedans of all ranks regarded them as the rightful rulers of Southern India, and therefore as aggrieved by infidels and foreigners. They were held sacred by the devotees, as sons of the great apostle of Mohammedanism in Southern India. These princes encouraged this disaffection, and not only favoured, but expended, it was afterwards alleged, large sums of money to promote disaffection. A conspiracy amongst the Mohammedans of Southern India to overturn the British government by general insurrection of its own soldiers had been set on foot. The means of accomplishing this was by persuading them that their religion was endangered; that the English desired to make them Christians by force. Some pretext in the violation of caste privileges was sought, and, as the English officers were very ignorant of the native languages and prejudices, it was believed an opportunity would soon be afforded. The tenth paragraph of the military code furnished such an occasion. Fakeers went among the troops, with the connivance of the native officers, and persuaded them that the turban violated their caste, that the screw on the front of their uniform was a

cross, and that the order concerning their beards was an infringement of the Koran; that they must strike a great blow for their religion, or submit to be made Christians by force. These reports were spread not only among the troops at Vellore, but all the stations of Southern India, more especially among those which formed the contingent at Hyderabad, in the Deccan.

Information was given to the commander at Vellore, by a soldier named Mustapha Bey, that a conspiracy for revolt and murder existed among the native troops. His statement was absurdly referred to the native officers. They declared the statement false, and accused the witness of continued drunkenness, which at times affected his reason, and that he was then labouring under such hallucination. The want of vigilance, intelligence, and a proper knowledge of their troops by the European officers was such that the statement of the informer was discredited, and the accused were believed, whose interest it was to conceal the fact. The information probably hastened the revolt, and made it premature for the purposes of the general conspiracy.

On the 10th of July, at two o'clock in the morning, when the English soldiers of his majesty's 69th regiment were asleep, the sepoys rose and fell upon them. Colonel Fancourt, thirteen of his officers, ninety-nine non-commissioned officers and privates, were massacred, and fifteen others died of their wounds. Nearly all were injured to some extent. The rage and fury of the fanatics were boundless, and their thirst for blood such as has characterised Mohammedan zealots everywhere, in every age of their history. No quarter was given, no pity was shown. Comrades in arms, who had fought by their sides, and perhaps rescued them from peril, were murdered in their sleep, or cut down or shot as they rushed forth undressed to seek the cause of alarm. There was a searching eagerness for blood on the part of these men such as only Mussulmans can show. The massacre was not confined to the two companies of the 69th regiment; every European that the mutineers could reach they barbarously slew and mutilated. All the Europeans, military and civil, must have perished had not some awoke in time to arm, and made a most gallant and desperate defence. The common soldiers fought with discipline and courage when all their officers were killed or wounded. Even after their ammunition was expended they charged the revolters in line with the bayonet, and performed prodigies of valour. Mr. Thornton\* gives the following

condensed and faithful account of what ensued:—"About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of dragoons and some native cavalry, of the strength of four hundred and fifty men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieutenant-colonel Kennedy. On his arrival, Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns—a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to its legitimate authorities. About three hundred and fifty of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about five hundred were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled."

At Wallajabad, Hyderabad, and various other places the officers in command were more cautious; and when they heard of the terrible catastrophe at Vellore, they disarmed the Mohammedan sepoys, and their alarm amounted to panic.

Lord W. Bentinck instituted a commission of inquiry. His council and the commander-in-chief of Madras were for vigorous measures of punishment. The government at Calcutta was for a course between extreme severity, and that of extreme leniency insisted upon by Lord W. Bentinck. Finally, a temporary incarceration, and the banishment of some, were the punishments inflicted by Lord W. Bentinck. The Mohammedan soldiery believed that the English dare not punish their brethren, or so dreadful a massacre, inflicted with unrelenting bloodthirstiness, would never have

\* *Chapters on the Modern History of British India.*  
By Edward Thornton, Esq. London, Allen, 1840.

been treated so lightly. Neither Lord W. Bentinck nor General Cradoek was equal to the emergency, and the directors recalled both. The sons of Tippoo and their dependants were removed to the neighbourhood of Calcutta.

Dr. Hayman Wilson, in tracing a parallel between the mutiny of 1857 and that of 1806, attributes both to the same causes—religious fanaticism and caste prejudices, acted upon by agents of a political conspiracy. This is the true philosophy of both revolts. The learned doctor, however, is of opinion that in each case the British officers displayed most culpable ignorance of the habits of thought and prejudices of the troops they commanded, and that, in consequence of this ignorance, outrages were offered to the religious feelings of the soldiery sufficient to provoke revolt.

In 1806 the provocation was chiefly given to the Mohammedan soldiery; and the family of Tippoo, their abettors, and the chief Mohammedan families of the Deccan made use of the dissatisfaction thus excited to create a military revolution, in the hope of driving the English from India, and once more asserting Mohammedan ascendancy. In 1857 the same state of things as to the feelings of the soldiery and the folly of the English officers, in reference to both Mohammedan and Brahminical devotees, furnished the Mohammedan princes of the north-west with grounds for organizing a conspiracy which would include the Hindoo princes, and originate one more grand struggle for the expulsion of the English.

Mr. Petrie succeeded Lord William Bentinck in the government of Madras. The new governor had immediately to encounter a most extraordinary opposition from Sir Henry Gwillim, one of the puisne judges of Madras, whose language against him and his government from the bench shocked the notions entertained by the English of judicial propriety. The Indian judges had frequently proved themselves neither just nor temperate. The intemperate and political judge was ordered home by the king's government. Sir G. Barlow, having vacated the government of Bengal, was nominated to that of Madras. Mr. Petrie, who had held that post provisionally, resumed his former position as member of council.

Lieutenant-general Hay Maedowal succeeded General Cradoek as commander-in-chief of the Madras army. That presidency remained for years, as it nearly always had been, torn to pieces by the disputes of all classes of persons connected with the administration of its affairs.

Lord Minto having arrived at Calcutta at the end of July, 1807, he at once announced a policy opposed to annexation, and

to all interference with the native states. He ostensibly adopted the opinions of Governor Barlow and the Marquis Cornwallis, where these differed from the policy of Marquis Wellesley.

The general feeling of the small native states which had been betrayed by the policy Lord Minto came to India to perpetuate was irrepressible. His lordship perceived this, and was extremely anxious to do what lay in his power to soften it, but the directions from home were peremptory. The board of control and the directors were alike bent upon a timid time-serving policy towards peoples who were acute enough to perceive its weakness, and dishonest enough to take advantage of it, in spite of promises, conventions, treaties, and even their experience of the danger of arousing British power.

During the year 1808 the new governor-general was much occupied in the affairs of the Deccan; the nizâm became so bewildered by the intrigues of his ministers and the chief rajahs of his dominions, and the conflicts of these persons with one another and the English resident, that he abandoned all hope of directing the government, and sunk into supineness.

Various impracticable measures were urged upon Lord Minto by the board of control, which was little influenced by the conclusive reasons urged by Indian statesmen against them. An impression was at this time entertained at home that a balance of power might be established in India for the security of the several states, and for the interest of the whole; but such a system had never existed in that country: it seemed to be opposed to the character and constitution of those states. Rapine and conquest were their legitimate pursuits, being sanctioned by the principles of the religion professed by the Mohammedan power, which was dead to all semblance of public faith, justice, or humanity. In justice to the directors of the East India Company it must be remarked that their arguments, remonstrances, and protests with the board of control against a policy so injurious to India were as ceaseless as they were unavailing. Meanwhile, the strange policy of alienating the friends that had been faithful, and of conciliating every robber and assassin who had by the acts of villany common in the East, or by his audacity, made himself powerful, prevailed at Calcutta. Among the chiefs who received favour from the English was one Ameer Khan, referred to on a former page as Holkar's chief general, to which office he had risen from the condition of a private horseman. This person had, in spite of previous treaties, a considerable portion of Holkar's territory made over to him

by Lord Minto; and a formal treaty sealed the bond of amity between this desperate robber and murderer and the East India Company. Although Lord Minto engaged the alliance of this person, it was not until the government of the Marquis of Hastings that the plunder was perpetrated upon Holkar in his favour, and a treaty formed to secure it to him through no less a personage than Mr. Metcalfe. One passage of Ameer Khan's history will illustrate the character of the man, and the morality of English policy in those days; for there was no pressing necessity to force the English into an alliance with him to the disadvantage of other chiefs really worthy their protection and amity. This Ameer Khan had been literally hired to murder one Sevae Sing by a potentate who was the rival of the latter. The Ameer found in this commission an employment to his taste, and thus accomplished it:—"Sevae Sing had been persuaded to promise a visit to Ameer Khan, but when the hour came, the Rajpoot chief, who probably had received some intelligence of the designs against his life, hesitated. Ameer Khan, when he learned his irresolution, mounted, and proceeded with a few followers to the shrine of a Mohammedan saint, close to the walls of Nagore. He was here joined by Sevae Sing, whom he reproached for his fears, and asked him if he thought it possible that a man who cherished evil designs could show such confidence as he had that day done, by placing himself in the power of the person he meant to betray. Sevae Sing confessed his error. Presents, dresses, and even turbans (a pledge of brotherhood) were exchanged, and Ameer Khan swore at the tomb of the saint to be faithful to his new ally, who was persuaded to go next day to his camp, where splendid preparations were made for his reception, and a number of chiefs appointed to meet him. The troops were under arms, some on pretext of doing honour to the visitor, others apparently at exercise. The guns were loaded with grape, and pointed at the quarters prepared for the rajah, who, with his principal adherents, to the number of two hundred, were seated in a large tent, when it was let fall upon them at a concerted signal: and while the officers of Ameer Khan saved themselves, all the Rajpoots were inhumanly massacred by showers of grape and musketry from every direction. Of seven hundred horse that accompanied Sevae Sing, and continued mounted near the tent, only two hundred escaped; the rest were slain, and a number of Ameer Khan's people, among whom was one of his own relations, fell under the promiscuous fire of the cannon. Sevae Sing had been killed by grape, but his head

was cut off, and sent to Maun Sing, who rewarded Ameer Khan with a jaghire and a large sum of money." \*

To the close of 1813 the affairs of Baroda, Gujerat, the Guicowar, and the Peishwa, engaged the English in perpetual negotiations and mediations. It was also necessary to have recourse to arms on a small scale, and reduce several forts belonging to the Kattywar rajahs.

The affairs of Oude in 1810-11 gave great concern to the general government. The causes of anxiety were precisely similar to those which had always existed since Oude became a source of strength and weakness to the British. The vizier was anxious to gain from his zemindars high rents, utterly indifferent to the capacity of the land to yield them. The zemindars were turbulent and fraudulent; the poorer cultivators sleek, sly, treacherous, and dishonest. Oude and Ireland exhibited many features of resemblance in the relations of landlord and cultivator.

The external political relations of British continental India demanded the diplomatic skill, and drew largely upon the time and energies, of the governor-general, from his arrival to his departure. The French were, as usual, the bugbear of Calcutta politicians. At the close of 1807 it was rumoured that the French intended to invade North-western India by way of Persia and Afghanistan, and with the aid of these powers and of Turkey. It was feared that all Mohammedan India would rise in revolt at the appearance of an allied French and Mussulman force anywhere. Lord Minto appointed Colonel Malcolm (afterwards Sir John) his agent in Persia, with powers plenipotentiary in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkish Arabia, suspending the authority of the agents at Bagdad, Bussora, and Bushire. From Bushire he transmitted, in 1808, an historical review of the progress of French intrigues in Persia, and of the military proceedings of the Russians on the north-west frontier of that country. Colonel Malcolm was unable to reach the Persian capital, the intrigues of the French having succeeded in gaining a prohibition from the shah. The efforts of Colonel Malcolm were followed by those of Sir Harford Jones from England in 1807-8. He succeeded in making a treaty by which the French ambassador was ordered to leave Persia. In 1808-9 Colonel Malcolm travelled along the Persian and Arabian coasts, gaining intelligence, and watching vigilantly every indication of hostile influences. In 1810 he succeeded in gaining a gracious reception at Teheran, where he remained until Sir Gore

\* Sir John Malcolm.

Ouseley arrived there from England as ambassador from his majesty.

Soon after his arrival Lord Minto also dispatched an envoy to the court of Cabul, to counteract French and Russian influence in that quarter. The person selected for this office was the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who conducted himself with such temper, wisdom, and address, in exceedingly difficult and provoking circumstances, that he concluded a treaty in June, 1809, securing the alliance of the court of Cabul against the French contingent, upon any invasion of India. The revolutions in Cabul, and the constant dangers to which it was exposed from Persian invasion, rendered English diplomacy extremely delicate and cautious. All the qualities required in the arduous position were united in the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. Mr. Hankey Smith was dispatched upon a mission to the Ameers of Scinde, to promote the common object; the result was, "an agreement of friendship, which excluded the tribe of the French from settling in Scinde." The object of the Ameers was, however, the conquest of Cutch, and when they found the English indisposed to aid them in an aggressive war, they became very indifferent about the "agreement of friendship" and "the tribe of the French."

A mission to the Sikhs was confided to Mr. Metcalfe. The celebrated Runjeet Sing was then monarch of Lahore. That chief led troops to the north-west confines of the company's Bengal territory. The governor-general wisely supported the efforts of Mr. Metcalfe by troops, under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, taking care not to violate the territory of Runjeet. It was a species of diplomacy which the Sikh rajah very well understood, and he entered at once and heartily into the negotiations. The stipulations of a treaty were signed in 1809, which constrained Runjeet not to retain imposing military forces on the north side of the Sutlej, and the English not to interfere with the interests of that territory. The present of a beautiful carriage and pair of carriage horses wonderfully pleased Runjeet, who punished several inferior chiefs who had inflicted injury upon British officers.

From 1806 to 1814 disputes occurred with the Nepaulese on every supposable subject between two oriental border powers. The English underrated the power of Nepaul, and afterwards paid dearly for having done so.

In the Eastern Archipelago Lord Minto displayed great activity, but an account of events there must be reserved for a separate chapter.

The disputes with the King of Ava, which

had continued for many years more or less active, in consequence of the immigration of the Mughls to British India, broke out with more than usual violence in 1811. The origin of it was thus briefly stated in a letter from the Bengal government to the court of directors, 23rd January, 1812:—"In the early part of the past year, 1811, a native of Arracan, named Kingberring, whose ancestor, as well as himself, possessed lands to a considerable extent in that province, near the frontier of Chittagong, and who, in consequence of his having incurred the displeasure, and been exposed to the resentment of the King of Ava, took refuge, with a number of his followers, in the district of Chittagong, about fourteen years ago, meditated the design of embodying those followers, as well as other Mughls, who many years since emigrated from Arracan. This project he actually carried into execution in the month of May, 1811, having either by persuasion or intimidation, induced a large body of Mughls to join his standard. Partly owing to the secrecy and caution with which he carried it into effect, and partly to the negligence of the darogas (native magistrates) of the Thannas on the frontier, his proceedings were unknown to the magistrate of Chittagong until he had crossed the Nauf river, which forms the common boundary of the two countries."

This account, although official, is inaccurate. It is painfully difficult to rely upon any documents published by the board of control. They generally consist of extracts, partially culled out of official despatches, and often garbled or curtailed. It would appear from other documents in possession of the Bengal government, that Kingberring's plan of organizing an attack upon Arracan was known to the local magistrate, who declared, in a report made to his government, that, in consequence of being apprised of it, he sought to arrest that person, but could not succeed. The local authorities displayed such culpable negligence, that they appeared to connive at the raids of the Mughls, and gave to the government of Ava much just cause of complaint, and war was imminent. Lord Minto dispatched Captain Canning as envoy to Rangoon, to appease the government of Ava. Captain Canning promised that Kingberring and his associates should find no shelter in the British territory. This promise was violated. Captain White, in his narrative of the disputes with Birmah, goes so far as to allege that the promise was made to deceive; that neither the envoy nor the government of Calcutta were sincere in their stipulations.\*

\* *A Political History of the Extraordinary Events which led to the Burmese War.* By Captain W. White.

The result of Kingberring's invasion of Arracan was thus announced to the court of directors by the government of Calcutta:—"Your honourable court will observe from the tenor of these last advices, (from the magistrate of Chittagong, dated the 11th and 14th of January,) that, contrary to expectation and appearances, the government of Ava has found the means of collecting a force of sufficient strength to defeat the troops of Kingberring, who, deserted by most of his followers, has become a fugitive. That numbers of his people whom he drew from Chittagong, and the inhabitants of Arracan, have fled for refuge to our territories, and more are expected. That the magistrate, with a view to prevent the probable incursions of the Birmese troops in pursuit of the fugitives, has instructed the commanding officer of the station to proceed with the whole of the disposable force and take post on the frontier, furnishing him with directions for the guidance of his conduct, until our orders should be received regarding the course of proceeding to be observed with respect to the fugitives; for the surrender of whom it may be expected that demands will be made on the part of the government of Ava, even if the forces of the latter should not penetrate into the province of Chittagong, for the purpose of seizing or destroying them."

Early in January, 1812, the troops at Chittagong assembled at Ramoo, the head-quarters of Colonel Morgan. The passes and other strategical positions were immediately occupied. The Birmese forces, commanded by the rajah of Arracan, advanced to the boundary of the province upon the river Nauf. His excellency demanded the surrender of the two principal leaders of the invasion. The magistrate referred the matter to his government. An answer not arriving soon enough to please the rajah, he sent another demand, couched in language very imperative, demanding the surrender of all the fugitives, and of Dr. M'Rae, whom he alleged had assisted the invaders. The magistrate replied, that the ringleaders should be secured, and their followers prevented from doing mischief. The disposal of those taken into custody he alleged must be settled at Rangoon between the English viceroy and the Birmese government. The magistrate warned the rajah against violating British territory. More troops advanced to the frontier to support the English magistrate, and a ship of war, a cruiser of twenty guns, to convey the envoy in safety in case of a rupture between the two states.

Early in 1812 the Birmese crossed the frontier, attempted to stockade themselves within the English territory, and sent parties in different directions to arrest the fugitives. The Arracan rajah sent at the same time vakeels to the English camp to negotiate. The British commander demanded as a preliminary to any negotiations the retirement of the Birmese troops within their own confines. The Birmese proved faithless in their negotiations at Ramoo, as the English had done at Rangoon. A viceroy of the King of Ava administered affairs at Rangoon, and the negotiations of Captain Canning were therefore tedious and circuitous, leaving opportunity for difficulties on the frontiers to ripen and increase. At Rangoon the situation of Captain Canning became dangerous; designs to kidnap him and to destroy the British ships were put into execution, and only defeated by the vigilance of the British. Finally, the envoy was withdrawn, the Birmese soldiers re-crossed the Arracan frontier, and the English troops retired to their usual cantonments. The English government published a manifesto, that if the King of Ava had any complaints to make, or redress to demand, he must do so through a vakeel at Calcutta.

While matters were taking a peaceable turn, Kingberring again collected a force for the invasion of Arracan, and on the 4th of June, 1812, actually invaded the province. He was again defeated, and found shelter in the British territory. The Birmese troops did not pursue across the boundary, but the viceroy at Rangoon treated with scorn the pacific allegations of Captain Canning, whose recall was revoked by the governor-general. The indefatigable Kingberring collected fresh forces in October, and possessed himself of the frontier hills and jungles. This time British troops were ordered to disperse the gatherings of the insurgents within the company's territory, which was not effected without bloodshed. The desperate leader escaped, and at the end of the year, for the third time, invaded Arracan with results similar to those which attended his previous raids. He was a man of dauntless intrepidity, and the most wonderful perseverance. Courage and persistence were also shown by his followers. The troubles on the Arracan border continued during the remaining period of Lord Minto's government, and the relations between it and the government of Ava were most unsatisfactory. Disputes also arose on the frontier of Nepaul. On the 4th of October, 1813, the Earl of Minto resigned the government of India to the Earl of Moira.

## CHAPTER CIV.

GOVERNMENT OF THE EARL OF MOIRA—BORDER FEUDS ON THE CONFINES OF ARRACAN—WAR WITH NEPAUL—DIFFICULTIES IN OUDE—THE PINDARREE AND SECOND MAHRATTA WAR—HOLKAR, SCINDIAH, AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR SUBJUGATED.

THE first matter which called for the attention of the Earl of Moira was the desperate efforts of Kingberring to reconquer Arracan for the Mughls. In consequence of his proceedings, Birmese troops entered the British province of Chittagong, and plundered numerous villages, during the month of January, 1814. In February the English government invited the Birmese commander to enter the territory and clear it of the Mughls, who were preparing an invasion, as the English found it impossible to prevent their gatherings. This the Rajah of Arracan refused to do, believing that so extraordinary a communication would never have been made by the English, if they had not meditated some treachery. The object and policy of the Mughls in this persevering border warfare were thus pointed out in the despatch of the Bengal government on the 5th of February, 1814:—"Mr. Pechell (the magistrate) observed that it had been suggested to him at different times, and from a consideration of all the events of the last two years, he was himself strongly inclined to believe it, that the Mughls despaired of regaining Arracan by their own means, but that their object was, by working upon the unreasonable jealousies and arrogance of the Ava government, by a continuance of their periodical incursions into Arracan, ultimately to embroil the British government in a war with the state of Ava, the consequence of which might possibly be the expulsion of the Birmese by the British power, and the re-establishment of themselves in Arracan under a government of their own."

Early in April, 1814, Kingberring made his fourth descent on Arracan. He was as usual beaten, and was pursued into Chittagong, where the pursuers committed some murders, but retired on the approach of British troops. After this failure Kingberring and his more active followers remained fugitives in the province of Chittagong until April, 1815, when he died. This circumstance ensured peace only for a few months, for in the following October, Rynjungzing, an enterprising friend of the deceased chief, gathered the Mughls into a fresh aggressive confederacy, which plundered the frontier villages of Arracan, and bore their booty in safety to the hills. This course he continued to follow until May, 1816, when, fearing arrest and capital punishment at the hands of

the English authorities, he delivered himself up. In 1817 another daring leader, one Cheripo, having committed frontier ravages, was seized by the English magistrate, but set at large on promise of keeping the peace. Matters continued for years along the line of the Chittagong and Arracan frontiers in nearly the same state. In 1819 a quarrel arose between the Birmese and other native states at a great distance from Arracan, but which occasioned renewed disturbances in that quarter, and complicated the English relations with Birmah.

The province of Assam had been in a state of anarchy during the whole period of the government of Lord Moira (Hastings) up to 1819. This endangered the peace and prosperity of the British district of Rungpore, and was regarded with uneasiness by the government of Calcutta. The Birmese placed one Chunder Kaunt upon the musnid of Assam, in opposition to the reigning Rajah Poorundur Singh. The rajah fled for refuge to Rungpore. He at once appealed to the British government for assistance to regain his throne, offering to pay the expenses of the troops employed in his restoration, and to become tributary to the English. The government of Calcutta declined interfering with the affairs of foreign states, but assured the rajah that he and his followers should be protected so long as they resided peacefully at Rungpore. The rajah did remain peacefully so far as English interests were concerned, but he formed various plans for raising a sufficient force of his own countrymen to reconquer his throne. The Birmese resented this, and the sanctuary of British soil was violated. The mode in which the Birmese proceeded in the affairs of Assam led the governor-general to believe that that power was forming a conspiracy and acting on a plan to drive the English from Eastern India. This idea received colour from the fact that the Birmese interference in Assam began soon after a formal demand had been made upon the governor-general for cession to his Birmese majesty of Ramoo, Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, on the ground that they had been dependencies of the Birmese government. The despatch of the governor-general, in 1818, when this demand was made, conveyed his views to the court of directors in these terms:—"There is no way of accounting for this extravagant

step on the part of the court of Ava, but by supposing it to have originated in a secret agreement with the Mahrattas. The governor of Merhege, a Birman chief of great eminence, had been permitted to visit the upper provinces for professed purposes connected with religion. There is reason to surmise that his real object was to ascertain the real strength and determination of the Mahrattas, in consequence of previous overtures from them; and it is probable that he had adopted delusive notions of both. The King of Ava immediately after the transmission of the message, which was really a declaration of war, would learn that the views of his expected allies had been anticipated, and that the Mahrattas were crushed. Thence his hostile intentions subsided without further explanation." Sir John Malcolm instituted an inquiry into this transaction, and reported to the government that the court of Ava was engaged in hostile intrigues with the rajahs of central India and the devotees of Benares.

In 1820 the usurper of Assam and his patron, the Avanese monarch, demanded that the English should give up the fugitive rajah, which they indignantly refused to do. The Assam usurper quarrelled with his patron, and cut off the head of a Birmese, who held the high post of prime-minister. On account of these transactions the Birmese invaded Assam again, and their former *protégé* was driven from the musnid, and, like his predecessor, fled to the company's territories for shelter. The Birmese, with their usual insolence and arrogance, pursued him across the frontier, bringing fire and sword upon many peaceful villages inhabited by British subjects. Satisfaction was, however, offered for this injury before the English government had time to demand it.

The English had now two ex-rajahs of Assam in their hands at Rungpore. The second fugitive had, while rajah, captured the commander-in-chief employed by the first, a half-caste native gentleman named Bruce. Through his former captive he applied to the British government for arms and ammunition to regain the throne which he had usurped, and from which those who placed him there had for his treachery expelled him. Lord Hastings—not following the principle of non-interference pursued by Lords Minto and Cornwallis, and which in common with them he avowed—allowed arms to this adventurer from the public arsenals, affording the Birmese a *casus belli*. The application on behalf of the exiled *quasi* rajah was made by the British resident, Mr. Scott. Lord Hastings, in his homeward despatch, thus alludes to

the transaction:—"We informed Mr. Scott, in reply, that we had directed the sanction of government to be conveyed to Mr. Bruce, for the transport of three hundred muskets, and ninety maunds of gunpowder, intended as a supply to Rajah Chunder Kaunt. The necessary orders, we informed Mr. Scott, would be issued through the territorial department, to give effect to any pass he might himself hereafter grant; and in case of application being made at the Presidency, the sanction of government would be given, as in the present instance."

Sir John Malcolm admits that the Birmese received great provocations, but denies that the government of Lord Hastings had done anything to incense them, whereas it was his administration which was responsible for the chief exasperations which sprang up. Captain White, who served long upon the Birmese frontier at Chittagong, thus notices the mode in which Sir John disposes of the merits and demerits of our relations with Birmah up to the end of 1821:—"The whole of these events have not only been omitted to be noticed by Sir John Malcolm, in his *Political History of India*, but he goes further, and pronounces, 'those reasonable grounds which the Birmese had for discontent had certainly not increased during the administration of Lord Hastings.' How far Lord Hastings may feel obliged to Sir John, for not only passing over the facts recorded, but for such an unqualified assurance, it is difficult to say; but one thing is certain, the statement appears totally at variance with candour and truth." Towards the close of the year 1821 a most arrogant demand was made by the King of Ava,\* for the surrender of the ex-rajahs and all their adherents. In reply to this request the Birmese chief was informed "that it was not the custom of the British government to deliver up persons who might take refuge in its territories on account of political disturbances."

The ex-rajahs of Assam continued each on his separate account to make war on the Assam frontiers, but were defeated, and in July, 1822, the commander-in-chief of the Birmese army in Assam announced to the English authorities in Rungpore that if the fugitives again found hospitality there, he would cross the frontier at the head of 18,000 men. The government of Calcutta ordered that all fugitives should be disarmed and sent to a distance from the frontier. Notwithstanding the order, they collected troops and prepared for fresh inroads. Lord Hastings, among the last acts of his government, dis-

\* His majesty was called by this title and by that of Emperor of Birmah indiscriminately.

armed them, and many were sent into the interior. The whole of his lordship's policy towards the Birmese empire was inconsistent and capricious, and laid the foundation for the great Birmese war which so soon followed. Lord Hastings' chief officers, military and official, had declared that it must soon come; but no preparation was made by him or them for the emergency.

Birmah was not the only neighbouring country with which the government of Lord Hastings quarrelled. In his summary of his administration he says, "There were made over to me, when the reins were placed in my hands, no less than six hostile discussions with native powers, each capable of resorting to arms." The sixth named in his list was the first which encountered his arms; this was the Goorkha state of Nepal.

#### THE NEPAULESE WAR.

Very early in the administration of Earl Hastings he was called upon to declare war with Nepal. For a series of years that state had made border aggressions, and as these were perpetually protested against by the English, and menaces held out in case of their repetition, and yet no armed resentment shown, the Nepaulese calculated upon impunity, after the manner of orientals generally. When the British at last appeared to be in earnest, the Nepal monarch supposed them so occupied in Hindostan, and Eastern and Western India, as to be unable to molest him. He opened communications with the Pindarree chiefs and their Mahratta sovereigns, with the Sikhs, and with the Birmese. The King of Ava, either relying on his own unaided power, or suspicious of Nepal, refused any complicity with the projects of the latter power, although the border feuds on the confines of Arracan and Chittagong were then raging.

Lord Hastings regarded with great anxiety the symptoms of an approaching war with Nepal. In his summary of his administration, published long afterwards, having enumerated other warlike discussions which he found when he assumed the government, as occupying the supreme council, he refers to this one in the following terms:—"The sixth contention, with Nepal, remained for decision by arms. A struggle with the latter was unpromising. We were strangely ignorant of the country or its resources; so that overlooking the augmented abilities latterly furnished by science to a regular army for surmounting local obstacles, it was a received persuasion that the nature of the mountains, which we should have to penetrate, would be as baffling to any exertions of ours as it had

been to all the efforts of many successive Mohammedan sovereigns: no option, however, remained with us." On the 29th of May, 1814, the Nepaulese attacked the company's frontier police. War was declared, and an army ordered to the field.

The relative situation of the Nepal or Goorkha country to that of the company has been sufficiently explained in the geographical portion of this work, to which the reader is also referred for its geographical and topographical peculiarities. A perusal of the descriptions there given will enable the reader to apprehend the plan of hostilities adopted by Lord Hastings. He ordered a division to the western extremity of the line of frontier, numbering 6,000 men, under Major-general Ochterlony. The Dehra Doon was to be occupied by Major-general Gillespie, who was to besiege Jeytak. The force under his command was a strong brigade of 3,500 men. Major-general Wood was directed to march from the Gurruekpore frontier with a small division of 4,500 men. He was to take his course through Bhotwul and Shooraj to Pulpa. A small *corps d'armée*, under Major-general Marley, numbering 8,000, was to force its way through the valley of Muekwanpore to Katmander.

On the south-east frontier Captain Latter was placed with the local battalion of Rungpore and a regular battalion of native infantry. He was to guard that line of territory, but to act defensively or aggressively as circumstances allowed or demanded. The entire force ordered against Nepal was about 30,000 men and sixty guns.

The force of the enemy was not estimated at more than 12,000, but their artillery appointments were believed to be good, and their country was more easily defended than any on the Indian frontiers. Major-general Gillespie's column was the first to come into action. In the third week of October his troops were before Kalunga, upon which the Goorkhas fell back. On the 31st the fort was stormed, although no proper breach had been made. There were four columns of attack, who were to give the assault simultaneously, on the firing of a signal gun. Three of the columns had to make a considerable detour, and never heard the signal. The enemy made a sortie which was repelled, and the general, thinking that the troops might, by pursuing them hotly, enter with them into the fort, ordered those at his disposal to make the attempt. The men did not succeed in entering with the retiring Goorkhas, and could not force the gate. The scaling ladders, as mostly the case in English assaults, were too few and too short. The general madly urged on his

men to accomplish impossibilities. In his wild attempts to force the soldiers against stone walls, which they could not conquer by escalade, he was shot through the heart. The arrival of one of the stray columns covered the retreat of the unfortunate and ill-directed assailants.

On the 25th of November the British again appeared before the place; breaching batteries were erected. On the 27th at noon a breach was considered practicable. The troops appointed for the assault advanced with unloaded muskets. The breach was found to be impracticable, and was defended by spearmen and matchlock men—a species of arms well adapted for such a defence. The English, unable to return the enemy's fire, could not keep the position which they had gained in and near the breach long enough for fresh troops to arrive. The result was defeat, with a loss of 680 men. The total incapacity of those in command was so obvious to the soldiery, that they were unwilling to advance under such leaders.

It was found that the garrison obtained its supply of water from beyond the fort; it did not occur to the British commanders to cut off the supply. A bombardment was resorted to. The fortress was only defended by 600 men, and the outer walls were its only defence. The place soon became untenable. The garrison stole away in the night with perfect impunity, the English commanders not having sufficient vigilance and skill to suppose the like practicable, or take measures to prevent it. The Goorkha commandant joined a fresh body of troops, and defied pursuit. A gallant and enterprising English officer of inferior rank went after them with a small detachment, suddenly fell upon them, cutting up many, and totally dispersing the remainder. Kalunga was destroyed. The Goorkhas were much encouraged by the slaughter of the English around its walls, and despised their antagonists. Lord Hastings, annoyed and disappointed, felt it necessary to augment the army of operation, as well as recruit extensively the whole army of Bengal. Colonel Mawby, who commanded this division after the death of General Gillespie, was ordered to form a junction with General Ochterlony. Before forming the junction Major-general Martindel reached the division, and it was resolved to attack the fort of Jytate, situated on the summit of a mountain 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. The British advanced against it in two columns. The Goorkhas had stockaded several positions commanding the approaches. The English violated every rule of warfare; the Bengal sepoys fought with reluctance and without

spirit. The British were beaten at every point; nearly 500 men and officers were put *hors de combat*. The whole conduct of this division of the army had been disgraceful. The contempt which the Goorkhas entertained for the British after the affair at Kalunga much increased.

To the west the operations of Ochterlony were guided by a skilful mind. He was confronted by the best general of the Goorkhas. The country was difficult, but that circumstance only tested the ability of the English general. His opponent's points of support were strong forts on mountains thousands of feet above the level of the sea; every important point in the approaches was stockaded. Ochterlony "turned" some of these, shelled others, and by strategy conquered them all without sacrificing his men. The strong places fell before him, and he was only checked in his career by tidings that the co-operating column had failed in the task allotted to it, with terrible loss of men and prestige. Ochterlony resolved to wait for reinforcements. As these came up in detachments his patience and temper were tried by the want of firmness and courage on the part of the Bengal sepoys, and the deficient management of the officers. He made roads, organized irregular levies, brought up wild and hardy Sikhs, turned them all into soldiers by his example and activity, and again resumed the offensive.

On the 27th of December Colonel Thompson was dispatched to prosecute directions given to him for intercepting convoys of the enemy, cutting off their lines of communication, and spreading along their rear, conducting a desultory warfare. By the amazing skill of his dispositions, celerity of his marches, number of his detachments, all operating at once, and yielding one another effective support, he dislodged the enemy from many of their strong places without striking a blow or losing a man. The foe bewildered, as detachments of British confronted them in every direction where they supposed it was impossible the English could penetrate, gave up one fort after another, not knowing where to make a stand, or from what direction danger was to be apprehended.

The snows fell heavily among the mountains of Nepaul during the winter of 1814-15. The elements alone protected the enemy from being circumvented and deprived of all their defences in the direction in which General Ochterlony acted. Nevertheless, by the 1st of April, 1815, he was before the great fortress of Maloun, which he invested. The armies acting on the opposite extremity of the line were unsuccessful. The third division, under General Wood, was at Gurruckpore at the be-

ginning of November, but the army was in no respect fit for action, and continued unable to move at all until the middle of December. The march from Bhotwul to Pulpa lay through a difficult mountain pass. The first obstacle encountered by General Wood was a strong stockade. He and his staff came upon it unexpectedly, and many of his escort fell by the fire directed from it. When his troops came up they were attacked by a sortie from the stockade, and thrown into disorder. Wherever the general was there was confusion. Captain Croker, who led an attack on the flank of the stockade, achieved great success, but was left unsupported. The general did not know what to do. Loss of life, defeat, and shame resulted. He made no attempt to redeem his country's honour or his own. He lingered about with the army until malaria swept numbers of his men to an untimely death.

Wilson affirms that Earl Moira's chief reliance for the success of the operations was upon the division which was directed to march against the capital. It assembled at Dinapore, on the right bank of the Ganges, and on the 23rd of May began its march. Major Roughsedge, with a local battalion, operated to clear the country of Goorkha outposts, for the advance of the division. The major acted like a true British soldier. He swept the patrols and detachments of the enemy back in every direction, penetrated the jungle, surprised Purseram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was encamped with four hundred men. They were so suddenly attacked they could make no resistance, fifty were slain, many drowned in the Bhagmati. Captain Hay and Lieutenant Smith carried out the major's orders in this good work so well, that the whole district known as the Tirai was occupied, and proclaimed annexed to the company's territory. The division advanced, and had a marvellous list of apparently good reasons for not being able to do anything. They had to wait for so many things, that the Goorkhas regained heart, finding that the major who had cleared the way for the division was much more formidable than the division itself. The English officers in command of detachments in the country, which Major Roughsedge had so speedily cleared for them, took no precautions, were left in isolated positions, no plan of mutual support laid down for them, they were attacked and beaten in every direction. The officers, and in some cases most of the men with them, perished. The principles of war did not appear to be understood by these men, nor even the commonest attainments of their profession, beyond mere drill and the personal use of arms.

General Marley gave up the Tirai without a single operation worthy of a general. Reinforcements swelled his corps to thirteen thousand men, having a large proportion of Europeans. He was afraid to move. Having wasted all January, 1815, he suddenly abandoned his army. Colonel Dick assumed the command, and awaited the arrival of Major-general Wood, to whose command the corps was originally entrusted. While awaiting the arrival of the general, Colonel Dick and his officers cleared the Tirai of the enemy with hardly the loss of a man. General Wood was indisposed for active warfare; he thought the season too advanced, and another month was thus wasted. He broke up his army and cantoned it from the Gunduck to the Kusi.

The various corps advanced in 1816, encountering the enemy in stockades and forts. There was great sameness in these campaigns, the operations being similar in every direction. The chief interest, however, was connected with the army of Ochterlony, who after the news of surrender of Maloun reached England, was created a baronet. It would be endless to describe the errors, mistakes, and dauntless acts of bravery of British officers in detached posts. This mountain warfare was so new to them, that they only began to adapt themselves to it when the war was coming to a close. On the 12th of February Ochterlony marched through "the great forest," an extent of nine miles. By the efforts of his engineers he discovered a pass which the enemy had not stockaded nor defended. Leaving his camp standing, he penetrated it with a brigade, and "turned" the pass, which the enemy had prepared to defend. Seeing his tents, and the sentries performing their usual duties, the Nepaulese supposed that the whole force remained in the encampment. A single action, and that not a general battle, decided the campaign. On the 6th of March a ratified treaty was brought to camp. Among its stipulations was one to the effect "that the cession of territory exacted from Nepaul should comprehend the country conquered in the actual campaign and the valley of the Rapti." It appeared, during the negotiations for the treaty, that the Nepaul Rajah had sent an embassy to China for help, alleging that the English made war upon them for not offering a free passage to their troops for the invasion of China. The Chinese ministers laughed at them, telling them that "if the English meant to invade China, they would take a shorter way than through the mountains of Nepaul." The war with Nepaul being thus terminated, the Nepaulese Rajah professed to be an ally of the company, and on some occasions subsequently gave proof of alliance.

It is almost unnecessary to say that Oude was among the number of his lordship's difficulties, and that its financial management and general government caused continual uneasiness at Calcutta. No state possessing its power, wealth, area, and a population so gigantic, ever displayed so much poltroonery. Boastful, arrogant, tumultuous, and seditious, the soldiery and people were ever ready to revolt, and commit the most cruel murders, and as ready to fly before the face of a military force. The vizier, voluptuous and greedy, like his predecessors, robbed his people and squandered his revenue, so that he was unable to meet the exigencies of his government, and pay the stipulated tribute, on condition of which he held his throne. Lord Moira, after much trouble and difficulty, brought some arrangement into the distracted affairs of his court and his dominions.

A war having broken out with Nepaul, Seindiah and the Rajah of Nagpore considered it a good opportunity to resume their old ways, and make a little war for themselves. They meditated the reduction of the small state of Bhopal. Lord Moira, apprised of their designs, frustrated them by opportune measures, and at the close of the year 1816, those old Mahratta chiefs were again subdued.

During the year 1816 a British force was engaged in the territory of Cutch, reducing forts, deposing petty rajahs, reconciling conflicting allies, and reducing rebellious subordinates of the Guicowar and the Peishwa. Fierce disputes arose between these two branches of the great Mahratta family of chiefs, which involved the governments of Madras and Bombay in anxiety.

#### THE SECOND MAHRATTA, OR PINDARREE WAR.

This war, which received both these designations, properly began in hostilities with the Pindarrees alone, but ended in a war with the great confederated chiefs of the Mahrattas.

The Pindarrees, or "free companies," were literally bands of military freebooters, who followed chiefs, Hindoo or Mohammedan, who were bold enough or rich enough to organize a free corps. These Pindarrees were dispersed throughout the Mahratta states, but the places from which they mainly sallied forth on their expeditions of murder and plunder were Malwa and Central India. They were mostly subjects of Holkar and Seindiah. These chiefs pretended a great horror of the dishonest doings of those fierce robbers, but in reality profited by them. The English agents, officers, and commercial people suffered much from them. They constantly plundered the territories of allies whom the English were bound to de-

fend, and the superior Mahratta chiefs sometimes joined in those expeditions. The attack upon the Rajah of Bhopal, a faithful friend of the English, by Seindiah and the Nagpore Rajah was simply a Pindarree incursion in the first instance, incited by those chiefs, and then turned to account for their own aggressive ends. The troops of both Holkar and Seindiah became in fact Pindarrees, supporting themselves by pillage, and only recognising the standard of their sovereigns when a grand national war took place. Ameer Khan, whom the English petted so much, was simply a Pindarree leader—a recognised military robber.

The princes of Rajpootana were held in subjection by their own nominal troops, who were nearly all Pindarrees. Professor Wilson thus describes the condition of some of them:—"The Rajah of Odeypore, indolent and improvident, was bearded in his capital by military adventurers,\* and robbed of his domains by his own feudatory chiefs and clansmen. The Rajah of Joudpur, affecting idiocy, abandoned the reins of government to the hands of a dissolute prince, whose career was soon after cut short by the hand of an assassin. The Rajah of Jeypore, a slave to an infatuated attachment to a Mohammedan dancing girl, preserved only a portion of his hereditary possessions by the sufferance of Ameer Khan. Every vestige of regular and orderly government had disappeared, and complete dissolution of the bonds of society must have ensued, had not the government of British India obtained, by persevering representation and remonstrance, from the authorities in England a reluctant and qualified permission to effect the extirpation of that part of the predatory system which consisted in the peculiar organization of the plunderers, termed Pindarrees, as preliminary to the overthrow of the whole scheme of military depredations."

As early as 1812 the Pindarrees had made attempts upon the British provinces. When first known to the British authorities,† the Seindiah Shahi Pindarrees, who were by far the most numerous of the two, were under the leading of a number of sirdars, of whom Cheetoo, Karim Khan, and Dost Mohammed, were the principal. None of the Holkar Shahi chiefs were leaders of much note. Blacker‡ gives the following estimate of their numbers:—"The Seindiah Shahi, 18,000

\* His palace on the bank of the lake was besieged, and as Colonel Tod said, the servants bringing up water were plundered. Our government allowed him in 1818, the sum of 4000 rupees (£400) a month, till his country yielded some revenue.

† Wilson, p. 105. See *Papers Pindaric War*, pp. 24, 25.

‡ *Memoir of the War* (1821), p. 18.

horse, 13,000 foot, and fifteen guns; the Holkar Shahi, 3,000 horse, 200 foot, and three guns. To add to these sources of disorder, the mountaineers on the south and west of Malwa, and the Bhils and Mhers, and the petty Hindoo chiefs on the south and east of the same country, were committing unchecked ravages in retaliation for invaded rights\* or disregarded claims."† "The Pindarrees threatened Mirzapore, plundered Ganjam, Masulipatam, Guntore, and the Northern Circars. It was expected that any attack on these hordes, as being under the protection of Scindiah and Holkar, might cause a war with those chiefs. It was, moreover, known that these chiefs and the Berar rajah advocated the supremacy of the Peishwa, who again, in 1816, was collecting armed followers at no great distance from Poonah.‡ The governor-general, therefore, resolved to be prepared for all events."§

The great difficulty of suppressing the Pindarrees was the countenance given to them by the Mahratta sovereigns. They in fact were themselves Mahrattas, and subjects of those princes, and to a great extent controlled their nominal rulers. Besides, the whole of the Mahratta chiefs were bitterly hostile to the English, and the abrogation, or modifications amounting to abrogation, of the treaties with Lord Wellesley by Lord Cornwallis, followed up by a policy in the same direction by Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto, so elated them that they calculated upon the instability of English treaties, whether for or against them, and presumed upon ultimate impunity.

The treaty of Bassein had been repeatedly broken by the Peishwa's ministers, and it required the firmness, temper, and intelligence possessed by the English resident at the court of Poonah, Mr. Elphinstone, to avert recourse to arms for the redress of British wrongs. Murder, assassination, and treachery in every form were the instruments with which the ministers of the Peishwa worked, and it was necessary for the English to interpose resolutely in order to prevent the confines of their territory from becoming scenes of anarchy. This success lasted only a few years. The Peishwa and his ministers, as well as all the Mahratta chiefs, were encouraged to resume their intrigues against the English by the latter being occupied with two wars which were supposed sufficient to strain their resources, the Pindarree and the Nepaulese; by the disturbed state of Oude, and by the perpetual contentions with Ava, which, it

was rumoured all over India, would lead to a war most perilous to English power. Accordingly, early in the year 1817, Trim-buckjee Daughiah, an assassin and murderer, who possessed the Peishwa's confidence, and had held the chief authority in his dominions, collected forces, with the connivance of the Peishwa, for the purpose of surprising and murdering the English contingent at Poonah, after the manner in which the mutinous sepoys at Vellore massacred their comrades. Means were at the same time taken to seduce the British native soldiers from their allegiance.

The English assembled troops in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and denounced the contemplated movement of the Peishwa. Mr. Elphinstone demanded a new treaty instead of the violated treaty of Bassein as the alternative of a declaration of war. At the same time, Mr. Elphinstone demanded the surrender of the leader and originator of the plot.

The following sets forth, in as brief a form as it is possible to give it, the revolution in the Mahratta empire which the Elphinstone treaty created, for the Peishwa, terrified by the military preparation of the English, signed it. The preliminary convention provided that the Peishwa should surrender several of his strongest forts, as a guarantee that the treaty would be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded on the 13th of June, and ratified on the 25th of July, 1817:—"The most important feature in this treaty was the disavowal of the Peishwa's paramount right, as the head of the Mahratta confederacy, and the cessation of the mutual reception of vakeels by the Peishwa and all other states; and the restriction imposed upon the communications of his highness with the foreign powers, except through the medium of agents of the British government, as such vakcels had been known to carry on clandestine intercourse. The Peishwa renounced all future claims on the Guicowar, which claims had, in fact, arisen from his position as head of the Mahratta confederacy. He was also to be excluded from all concern in the affairs of Gujerat, and he agreed to restore to the Guicowar, in perpetuity, the Ahmedabad farm, at the former rent of four and a half lacs. The tribute from Kattywar was transferred to the company. Provision was made to enable the Guicowar to reduce the claims of the Peishwa, by the payment of four lacs per annum, or standing on arbitration. In lieu of the contingent force to be supplied in virtue of the treaty of Bassein, the Peishwa was to place at the disposal of the British government funds for 5000 cavalry and 3000 infantry. The company acquired the Northern

\* By the Pindarrees.

† Wilson's Notes.

‡ Wilson, p. 215.

§ Major William Hough.

Circars, with the Peishwa's possessions in Gujerat, and the Kattywar tribute, with an extent of country in the Carnatic, including the strong forts of Darwar and Koossegul. The fort of Ahmednuggur, held by the company through sufferance, was transferred to them in perpetual sovereignty; likewise all the Peishwa's rights in Bundelcund and Hindostan. He was thus excluded from all connection or concern with the countries north of the Nerbuddah. Provisions were also made relative to the services of the southern jaghiredars.\*

It is difficult to suppose that any one acquainted with the Mahrattas could believe that the Peishwa would observe a treaty subversive of all his honour and power, and so utterly humiliating. He did not observe it. He had scarcely signed it when he began secret military preparations, and efforts to seduce the Hindoo portion of the British troops. He gradually assembled a large army near the British camp. English officers were waylaid and murdered in every district of his previous dominions, more especially in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and it became at last absolutely necessary to enforce the treaty at the point of the sword. Mr. Elphinstone had but a small brigade of English near the capital, which was speedily reinforced by several sepoy detachments and a European regiment. The Peishwa commenced operations by burning and plundering the British residence at Poonah. But for the sound judgment, presence of mind, and calm intelligence of Mr. Elphinstone, the ruin of the British detachment must have been effected. His measures secured it from surprise, averted the seduction of the sepoy battalions, and placed the brigade in a position to act with promptitude and effect. He ordered Lieutenant-colonel Burr to advance and attack the forces of the Peishwa, which were made with triumph from the destruction of the residency.

On the 5th of November 1817, a battle was fought between these forces. The golden pennon (zurree pulkah), the grand standard of the Mahrattas, held in veneration by all the tribes, was borne by Mozo Dickshut, a trusted chief of tried valour, but he fell defending it, and this circumstance being deemed ominous by the superstitious soldiery, deprived them of confidence, and they did not any longer maintain the contest with spirit. Colonel Burr gained a victory, but only by desperate fighting, nearly all the survivors of his force being severely wounded. His gallant little army numbered 2500 men, the host of the Peishwa was 25,000. On the 17th of No-

vember General Smith advanced at the head of a formidable force, swept all before him, entered Poonah, and planted the standard of England on the palace of the Peishwa, who fled at his approach.

While these events were transpiring in Western India, the Marquis of Hastings was carrying out his project for the destruction of the Pindarrees, a work which required various especial alliances, military conventions, and temporary engagements of different descriptions with other chiefs of the Mahrattas, the Patans, and numerous tribes in Central India, and bordering on the Bengal frontiers. The Patan chief, Ameer Khan, referred to in the account given in a previous chapter of the operations against Holkar under Lord Lake, was presumed to be a suitable instrument of the designs of the government, and he was accordingly made the object of these favours, an account of which was anticipated in the chapter relating the war against Holkar.

The intrigues between the English and Meer Khan against the integrity of Holkar's dominion were not honourable to our nation. In connection with them, all persons about the court, all parties in that state, intrigued for and against the English, and for and against one another. Perjury, perfidy, abduction, assassination, murder, plunder, revolt, and civil war rent and stained the realms which had owned the sovereignty of the once far renowned Holkar. That chief died in 1811, and his successor was a child; the regent, his mistress, mother of the child, who was young, beautiful, talented, despotic, and profligate, and who was betrayed and murdered. As the only release from anarchy, the government of young Holkar appealed to the English for protection, and Mr. Metcalfe was nominated to conclude negotiations. Before he could accomplish anything, Scindiah, who had been plotting against the English and watching for an opportunity to attack them ever since the defeat of his forces by Wellesley and Lake, succeeded in inducing a change among the ministers of the young chief, and confederated with them for purposes hostile to the company.

In November a British force, under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, crossed the Nerbuddah. The advanced divisions, under General Malcolm and Colonel Adams, were to act against the Pindarrees; Sir Thomas was ordered by the governor-general to advance into Malwa, although the resident warned his excellency that the rajah would in consequence declare war.

Early in December the whole of Holkar's army assembled within twenty miles of Mahidpore, and, after a council of war, marched

\* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii. p. 524-5.

against that place. On the morning of the 20th of December young Holkar was playing in his tent, when he was enticed away, and at the same instant a guard was placed over Toolsah Bacc, the mistress of the deceased sovereign: at night she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the Seepra. The Patan chiefs loudly demanded to be led against the enemy, and began to plunder the baggage of the English. General Hislop ordered an instantaneous attack upon Holkar's army, which was well posted on the banks of the Seepra, nearly opposite to Mahidpore, their left flank protected by the river, their right by a deep ravine, while their line, which could only be approached by one ford, was protected by ruined villages. The bed of the river afforded some cover for the British troops in forming, and as their flanks were all but impregnable, it was determined to attack in front. The plan of battle was simple, and the execution of it prompt, orderly, and gallant. In crossing the river many men were lost, but the foot artillery, well arranged on the right bank, covered the passage. The horse artillery crossed to the enemy's side, and silenced many of their guns. The whole army effected the passage, and stormed the defences of the enemy, carrying them all with sword and bayonet. When the Mahrattas began to retire, a charge of cavalry turned their retreat into a rout. Sir John Malcolm commanded the right wing; Major J. L. Lushington, afterwards General Sir James Law Lushington, and Lieutenant-colonel Russell commanded the two lines of cavalry in the final charge.

Signal as this defeat was, it did not secure peace. Various zemindars and rajahs in the Doab held fortified places, which were stormed. The Patan population in Rohileund rose in arms, and various troublesome dispositions of troops and weary marches were necessary before the insurrection was suppressed. Scindiah, who had led the government of Holkar into the disasters thus experienced, did not strike a blow, but hastened to make such accommodations as would screen himself from penal consequences. He made a new treaty on the 5th and 6th of November, 1817, by which he bound himself to an alliance offensive and defensive, and to furnish a large cavalry contingent for the Pindarree war.

Incredible as it may seem, none of these events, disastrous as they were to the Mahrattas, and triumphant to the British, had any effect in deterring the Rajah of Nagpore from correspondence with Bajee Rao, the fugitive Peishwa, and organizing an army to attack the English. It was plainly intimated to him that his treason was discovered, and he was

warned that military operations would be directed against him if he took a single hostile step. He attacked the residency, which Mr. Jenkins, the resident, afterwards M.P., and a director of the East India Company, defended with great spirit and success. Happily there was a small body of troops at hand, but the best and bravest of them were surpassed by the devoted courage and activity of the civilians, some of whom fell. Reinforcements arriving, the rajah's capital was attacked in force. He sought terms: they were granted. He endeavoured to turn them to account by an act of treachery for the destruction of the British. He was suspected, his scheme defeated, and his capital stormed. He was made prisoner. Mr. Jenkins, for political reasons, reinstated him, on condition of the surrender of his chief forts and much of his territory. His officers refused to surrender the forts, and his servants retained possession of the territory, and he connived at their defection. The territory was conquered, the forts stormed, and the rajah himself being detected in a correspondence with the ex-Peishwa for a united attack upon the English, Mr. Jenkins seized his person, and declared the musnid vacant. The rajah and two of his chief ministers were sent in custody to Allahabad. On the way he escaped.

In 1818 pursuit of the Peishwa occupied the attention of the governor-general and the military chiefs. When his highness fled from Poonah, he found many abettors and followers. All the petty rajahs of his dominions were ready to take up arms on his behalf against Europeans. He collected an army stronger than that which had been beaten at Poonah. They took quarters at Corygaum. A British officer named Staunton was on his way to Poonah, with a weak battalion of infantry, a few squadrons of horse, and a considerable detachment of artillery; arriving at the heights of Corygaum, he beheld the Peishwa's army in the plain beneath. Staunton immediately made for the village with the design of occupying it. He had only just succeeded in doing so when he was attacked by the whole army of the enemy, probably numbering 40,000 men. The attack continued all day until 9 P.M. The mosques and pagodas were again and again taken by each party. All the British officers were put *hors de combat*, except Captain Staunton and two others. All the artillery men were killed or wounded. The cavalry were cut up or exhausted. There was no water. Some wells were discovered in the night, and the fainting soldiers were relieved from the pangs of thirst. In the morning the Peishwa did not renew the attack, but withdrew his army. The captain brought

off his guns and colours, his sick and wounded, to Seroor, which place they entered on the third day, during which they had no refreshment but water. The gallant conduct of Captain Staunton and his troops was much applauded in India and in England. The East India Company voted him a purse of 500 guineas, and a splendid sword of honour, with an inscription panegyricizing his courage, skill, and fidelity to duty. The rewards bestowed upon his chivalrous soldiers bore no proportion to their deserts.

Soon after this event Generals Smith and Britzler marched against the formidable fortress of Sattara, which was soon reduced. Mr. Elphinstone raised the standard of the Rajah of Sattara, announced the protection of the company, a just system of revenue, and the establishment of religious liberty. In the whole of this transaction Mr. Elphinstone acted with sagacity and justice. His activity and precision everywhere that his presence and influence could reach, entitled him to the gratitude of his country.

General Smith maintained a hot pursuit of the Peishwa, whose army he overtook at Ashtee, where he gained a signal victory, taking the Rajah of Sattara and all his family prisoners, who were sent to Mr. Elphinstone, who conducted them to their palace at Sattara. Gocklah, the best general in the Peishwa's army, fell in the battle of Ashtee, which circumstance depressed the troops. The Peishwa fled from the field of his defeat, and was joined by Holkar and his infantry in his retreat; they both took refuge in Candeish, where Gumput Rao, with what was left of the Rajah of Nagpore's army, joined them. The jaghiredars\* of Candeish, timid of the consequence to themselves of favouring such refugees, corresponded with Mr. Elphinstone. This led to desertion by many of the followers of the confederated Mahratta chiefs. The Peishwa led the life of a fugitive for six months, pursued by Generals Smith, Hislop, and other British commanders. During that time, Brigadier-general Munro conquered many forts, and, in command of a small body of troops, performed many glorious enterprises, which were, however, connected with a warfare so desultory, and involving operations so similar, as to preclude a detailed account. The Peishwa sought to reach Malwa, but Sir John Malcolm's dispositions effectually thwarted that purpose. On the 27th of May, being pressed by the forces of Sir Thomas Hislop, the Peishwa intimated, by his vakeel, to Sir John Malcolm an intention to surrender. At Keree, on the 2nd of June, Sir John visited the Peishwa. The

events which followed this visit are thus described by M. Auber:—"He appeared low and dejected, and retired for a private interview, when he said that he had been involved in a war he never intended; that he was treated as an enemy by the state which had supported his family for two generations, and was at that moment in a position that demanded commiseration, and believed that he had a real friend in Sir John Malcolm. The latter replied that every moment of delay was one of danger, and that he should either throw himself at once on the British government, or determine on further resistance. 'How can I resist now?' he exclaimed, 'I am surrounded.' Sir John Malcolm remarked that he was so, but he could not complain; that he still had the power of escape as much as ever, if he wished to become a freebooter and wanderer, and not accept the liberal provision designed for him. He replied, with the flattery of which he was master, 'I have found you, who are my only friend, and will never leave you; would a shipwrecked mariner, after having reached the port he desired, form a wish to leave it?' Still, upon the plea of a religious ceremony, and that it was an unlucky day, he wished on the third to postpone till the next day surrendering himself up and accepting the propositions, by which he engaged to proceed to Hindostan, a pension of not less than eight lacs of rupees per annum being secured to him. To this delay Sir John Malcolm most positively objected. The firing of some guns in the quarters of Asseer had a considerable effect upon him, and at eleven he determined to come to Sir John Malcolm's camp."

The fortunes of the other Mahratta chiefs are thus briefly summed up:—"Trimbuckjee, on learning the dispersion of Bajee Rao's force, retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he was taken prisoner by Major Swanton, sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar. The exertions of Mr. Elphinstone were very successful in effecting the introduction and establishment of the new government.

"The settlement of the Bheels in Candeish was prosecuted by Captain Briggs, under Mr. Elphinstone's direction, and the state of Sattara was likewise making favourable progress.

"The condition of the newly acquired provinces, and the measures adopted by the British government, (subjects of deep interest,) properly form matter for a separate work. The remaining fugitive, Appa Sahib, the ex-rajah of Nagpore, would have been captured near the fort of Asseerghur, but for Jeswunt Rao Sar, who sallied forth and saved him from his pursuers. He proceeded from

\* Holders of jaghires or estates.

thence to Lahore, where he was allowed to live in absolute privacy, on a very scanty allowance from Runjeet Singh; a permission extended by that chief in a manner which showed his sincere desire not to dissatisfy the British government." It became clear in the course of the proceedings connected with the temporary surrender of the fort of Asseerghur, required from Scindiah under the treaty of November, 1817, that secret communications and engagements were carried on by him in the Peishwa's interest while he was making ostentatious parade of alliance with the English. He humbled himself, besought pardon, and was forgiven, provided his future conduct proved true.

This troublesome, expensive, and sanguinary war arose from the ignorance of the board of control, who sent out the Marquis of Cornwallis the second time with express instructions to revoke the policy of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Cornwallis entered heartily into these instructions, for he had always been adverse to any connections with the Mahrattas. Still he had himself been obliged to form treaties and military connections with them, and he did not continue long enough in power during his second government to perceive the alteration of circumstances which rendered the severe policy of Lord Wellesley necessary after the first Mahratta war. Had Lord Cornwallis been spared, there can be no doubt, from his clearness of perception and wisdom, that he would have allowed Lord Wellesley's arrangements to remain, and not have exposed the company and his country to the dangers and costs of a second Mahratta war, to assert that ascendancy he so unfortunately revoked. Had the treaties of Lord Wellesley been permitted to stand, there is abundant reason to believe, from all the evidences which were evoked during the second Mahratta war, that so great a calamity would have been averted.

During the year 1819 Mr. Elphinstone was actively employed in arranging the government of the Mahratta states. It is a curious circumstance that in 1859, forty years after, a copy of his proclamation to the landholders should be called for in the British legislature, and was actually printed in the returns, according to which it appears that the proclamation was to be circulated freely, with a view to convince the amildars and pattels of the hopelessness of the Bajee Rao's cause, and

to assure the natives of the good treatment and protection which they would experience from the British government. Villages that had distinguished themselves by expelling or resisting the rebel troops were to be rewarded by large remissions, and by permanent marks of favour. Conspirators and all banditti were to be treated as rebels and punished "promptly and severely." The necessity of adhering to the customs of the country was strongly urged during the provisional government, even to the exemption of Brahmins from capital punishment, except when guilty of treason. No new imposts were to be levied, and those that seemed oppressive or unpopular were to be repealed. All lands held free of revenue were to remain so, and to be left with the present proprietors, who were, however, to prove their titles by showing their "sunnuds." The conciliation of the Bheels and Ramoosees was to be effected "by every means."

Upon the conclusion of the war the Marquis of Hastings carried out the whole scheme of policy originated by the Marquis Wellesley, a scheme which Lord Hastings had himself denounced when imperfectly acquainted with Indian affairs. Blacker states that the number of British officers killed and wounded was 134, and the number of all other ranks 3,042. The campaign, or series of campaigns, lasted from November 5, 1817, to May 13, 1819.\*

In 1819 treaties were made with the Rajahs of Odeypore, Jeypore, Joudpore, Jesselmer, and Bicanur, also with the petty chiefs of Banswara, Dungepore, Pertabgerh, Sirohi, Krishnagerh, Kerauli, Bundi, and Kotah. "With each of these formal engagements were contracted, upon the general basis of subordinate co-operation and acknowledged supremacy." During the more quiet periods of his government Lord Hastings made considerable alterations in the financial and judicial systems. He also organized a superior police force. After an unusually protracted period of government, Lord Hastings retired in January, 1823. It was on his passage home that he drew up the summary of his administration, which has since been so much quoted. His arrival in London led to many debates in the India-house, and notable rewards were conferred upon his lordship and his successor in the title.

\* Blacker's account of the Pindarree War.

## CHAPTER CV.

PROGRESS OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA AND THE ARCHIPELAGO, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MARQUIS HASTINGS—CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS AND BOURBON; OF THE MOLUCCAS; OF JAVA, AND THE ISLES IN ITS VICINITY.

IN China the century opened with the eventful circumstance of the American flag having been first hoisted at Canton. This occurred on the 2nd of January, 1801.

On the 5th of November, 1803, the court of directors informed the select committee of Chinese merchants that hostilities had recommenced between the English government and the French and Batavian republics.

On the 22nd of May, the same year, the court of directors of the East India Company were informed by the board of control that his majesty intended to address a letter to the Emperor of China, and send him presents; and it was recommended that the chairman should send a letter to the viceroy and the hoppo. Lord Castlereagh sent a letter to the prime-minister of the Chinese emperor. One of the king's gardeners was sent to Canton to collect specimens of the vegetable productions of that part of China, and he was accompanied by a botanical painter to take drawings.

On the 14th of February, 1804, a squadron of French men-of-war, commanded by Admiral Linois, encountered the English homeward-bound China fleet in the Straits of Malacca. The French admiral counted upon an easy victory, as his force was very formidable. His own ship, the *Marengo*, carried eighty guns. Two of his vessels were large fast-sailing frigates, a corvette of thirty guns, and a Dutch brig of eighteen guns. Captain Dance was the commodore of the English vessels. He sailed in the *Earl Camden*, a good ship. Captain I. T. Timins, of the *Royal George*, bravely and skilfully seconded the commodore. All the captains and their crews entered into the action with alacrity and spirit. There was much to defend, for the value of the fleet and cargo was estimated at nearly eight millions sterling.\* The *Royal George* received sixty-six shots in her hull and rigging, and bore the brunt of the

enemy's fire. The enemy's squadron was beaten off, and the company's fleet proceeded in safety.

In 1805 the letter of his royal majesty to his imperial majesty was delivered to the viceroy, after innumerable delays and obstacles created by the Chinese officials. A "chair," fancifully and richly decorated, was sent for the conveyance of the box containing his majesty's letter. The supercargoes went in procession to the palace. On the 22nd of January the royal presents were formally presented; the chair containing the letter was laid down before the front entrance to the palace. The supercargoes were conducted, under a salute of three guns, into the hall of audience by a side entry, while the letter was borne through the grand entrance. The viceroy and hoppo were seated under a gorgeous canopy at the upper end of the hall, attended by numerous mandarins in their official costume. The letter was then presented to the viceroy, who, with the hoppo, rose to receive it, and remained standing some time in token of respect. The letter was then carried to an inner apartment, and the grand officers resumed their seats. The viceroy declined receiving the letters sent by Lord Castlereagh and the chairman of the court of directors, on the ground that it was contrary to the laws of China to receive presents or communications from any foreign minister or mandarin. The president of the supercargoes requested that the letters might remain, pending permission being granted by his imperial majesty to receive them. To this arrangement the viceroy consented. The supercargoes retired under another salute of three guns.

On the 8th of May, 1806, a letter from the emperor to the King of England, with presents, arrived at Canton. They were delivered to the president on the 19th, with precisely the same ceremonials as those observed in receiving the letter from his Britannic majesty. The letter of his imperial majesty was very unlike the communications made to the English by former emperors, and was couched in terms of singular propriety, although clothed with an air of strange originality of manner, and pervaded by a tone of eccentric and unique thought. The

\* M. Auber, in his *History of British Power in India*, gives this estimate. His work was published in 1837. It is to be presumed that he intended to correct a former estimate of the value of this fleet made in another of his works, "*China*," published in 1834, in which he names sixteen millions as the value. Both works are regarded as standard authorities, yet they present this striking discrepancy. The discrepancies among other authorities also, take a wide range as to the value of the homeward-bound China fleet of that year.

following extracts will no doubt much interest the reader.

"Your majesty's kingdom is at a remote distance beyond the seas, but is observant of its duties and obedient to its laws, beholding from afar the glory of our empire and respectfully admiring the perfection of our government. Your majesty has dispatched messengers with letters for our perusal and consideration; we find that they are dictated by appropriate sentiments of esteem and veneration; and being therefore inclined to fulfil the wishes and expectations of your majesty, we have determined to accept of the whole of the accompanying offering.

"With regard to those of your majesty's subjects who for a long course of years have been in the habit of trading to our empire, we must observe to you, that our celestial government regards all persons and nations with eyes of charity and benevolence, and always treats and considers your subjects with the utmost indulgence and affection; on their account, therefore, there can be no place or occasion for the exertions of your majesty's government."

In 1806 the directors of the East India Company permitted a Mr. Maning to go to China at their expense, who professed to have for his object the pursuit of science and the exploration of the country. Some curious circumstances arose out of that gentleman's mission. In 1807 he arrived at Canton. He presented a petition to the hoppo, "to be received into the service of the Emperor of China." He offered himself for employment by his imperial majesty as "Astronomer and Physician." His services were refused. In February, 1808, he proceeded to Cochin China, hoping to be allowed to stay there some time, and thence to effect an entrance to China. This scheme also failed, through the jealousy of the Cochin Chinese. He then proceeded to India, intending, if possible, to gain an entrance by way of Thibet, Bhotan, or Tartary. On all these frontiers he found an accurate description of his person and purposes in possession of the Chinese authorities, and he was baffled. Finally, this persevering gentleman accompanied the embassy of Lord Amherst to Peking, in the year 1816.

In the year 1807 the company's trade was stopped in China in consequence of the death of a Chinese in an affray with some sailors belonging to an English ship. The dissipated and disorderly conduct of the English sailors had done much to prevent the friendly intercourse of the British and Chinese. The Chinese demanded the death of an Englishman for that of their countryman who had fallen. The conduct of the merchants on this

occasion, as on other occasions in the history of the English in China, was cruel and unjust. They were quite willing to sacrifice the life of some one of the sailors, although none of the men could be fixed upon as having committed the manslaughter. The courage and firmness of the English naval officer on the station alone saved his country and his countrymen from this degradation, and rescued the man whose life was fixed upon by the English merchants as an atonement to save their trade. It is to the honour of the directors of the East India Company that they not only approved of the gallant conduct of Captain Rolles in saving the life of his countryman, but presented him with £1000.

Sir George Staunton, whose services to the company at Canton had been very considerable, was appointed interpreter to the factory.

In 1808 the English at Canton were alarmed by rumours of a French invasion of Macao, and they represented to the governor-general of India the necessity of strengthening the defences of that place in a manner which it was beyond the power of the Portuguese to effect. In September of that year a considerable French force was off Java, and in consequence Admiral Drury led an English squadron to Macao. Troops were landed and the defences made stronger. The hoppo protested against any foreign troops being landed there without permission of his imperial majesty, according to the treaty existing between him and the Chinese. The English and Portuguese were unwilling to retrace their steps, and the Chinese prepared for a barbarous system of warfare.

Conflicts on the river between his majesty's ships and the Chinese forts occurred, although war was not declared. "Admiral Drury seems not to have possessed that cool and deliberate judgment which was essential to the business he had been engaged in."\*

The committee were so alarmed for their trade by the occupation of Macao by the French, and were so animated in their resentments against that nation, that they were willing to risk a war with China to accomplish their purpose. The British naval officers acted with prudence and forbearance, as well as courage, and decided that the imperial treaty with Portugal forbid the occupation of the island by any but Portuguese. The committee at last gave way. The directors were so displeased with the conduct of "the select committee" for managing their affairs in China, that they displaced them, and appointed servants in inferior positions above them.

In 1809 the insolent and haughty conduct

\* Parliamentary papers.

of an English naval officer at Canton had nearly embroiled his country with the United States of America. Captain Pellew, R.N., impressed American seamen, or seamen on board American ships, into the service of the king. The American government demanded redress, which had to be conceded to avert war, the pride and petulance of this British officer thus causing humiliation to his country.

From the years 1806 to 1810 the Chinese Ladrones, native pirates, called after their brethren the Portuguese of Macao, infested the coasts of China.\* These men were similar to the pirates who infested the Chinese seas in the seventeenth century, from whom the Dutch settlers in Formosa suffered so severely. Mr. Davis, afterwards Sir J. F. Davis, governor of Hongkong, has given the following curious and interesting description of the character and history of these Chinese pirates:—"Not the least remarkable feature about this formidable fleet of pirates was its being, subsequent to the death of its original chief, very ably governed by his wife, who appointed her lieutenants for active service. A severe code of laws for the government of the squadron, or of its several divisions, was enforced, and a regular appropriation made of all captured property. Marriages were strictly observed, and all promiscuous intercourse, and violence to women, rigorously punished. Passes were granted to the Chinese junks or boats which submitted to the pirates: but all such as were captured in government vessels, and indeed all who opposed them, were treated with the most dreadful cruelty. At the height of their power they levied contributions on most of the towns along the coast, and spread terror up the river to the neighbourhood of Canton. It was at this time that the British factory could not venture to move in their boats between that place and Macao without protection; and to the Ladrones, therefore, may be partly attributed the origin of the valuable survey of the Chinese seas by Captain Ross; as the two cruisers which were sent from Bombay, at the select committee's requisition, to act against the pirates, were subsequently employed by them in that work of public utility, the benefits of which have been felt by the whole commercial world.

"Finding that its power was utterly unavailing against the growing strength of the Ladrones, the Chinese government published a general amnesty to such as would submit, and return to their allegiance, a stroke of

policy which may be attributed to its acquaintance with the fact, that a serious dissension had broken out between the two principal commanders of the pirate forces. This proceeded even to the length of the black and red squadrons (which they respectively headed) engaging in a bloody combat, wherein the former was discomfited. The weaker of the two now submitted to accept the offers of the government, which promised free pardon, and kept its engagements; the leader was even raised to some rank in the emperor's service! Being thus weakened by the desertion of nearly half her forces, the female chieftain and her other lieutenant did not much longer hold out. The Ladrones who had submitted were employed by the crafty government against their former associates, who were harassed by the stoppage of their supplies, and other difficulties, and a few more months saw the whole remaining force accept the proffered amnesty. Thus easily was dissolved an association which at one time threatened the empire; but as the sources and circumstances, whence piracy has more than once sprung up, are still in existence, the success and impunity of their predecessors may encourage other bands of maritime robbers to unite in a similar confederacy at no distant period."\*

Difficulties between the English merchants and the Chinese authorities were perpetuated by the frequent fatal conflicts of the English sailors and the natives, and the sternness of the Chinese penal code, which exacted blood for blood, life for life.

The Chinese officials were constantly finding pretexts for stopping the trade. An inexorable jealousy of foreigners characterised the policy of the imperial government. In consequence of this, objections were taken to the presence of European ships of war in the Canton river, and to the service of the natives at the foreign factories.

His majesty's ship *Doris* exercised a blockade against the American merchantmen during 1814. The ship captured an American vessel, which offended the Chinese, who ordered the committee of the English factory to send the *Doris* away. This, they explained, was beyond their power, the ship of war belonging to his Britannic majesty, not to the East India Company. The Chinese could not understand this explanation, or affected to be unable to do so. Captures and re-captures of American ships in the river followed the making of the first prize, and inflamed the resentment of the Chinese. They interrupted communications between the East Indiamen and the English men-of-war; their magistrates

\* *The Chinese: a General Description of China and its Inhabitants.* By John Francis Davis, Esq., F.R.S., &c., Governor of Hongkong. London: C. Cox, King William-street, Strand, 1851.

\* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 63, 64.

seized and subjected to cruel punishment all who took service with the English; the mandarins violated the sanctuary of the factory; and, in fine, all the long-conceded privileges of the English were infringed. What followed has been well described by Mr. Davis.

"The committee, seeing the hostile disposition of the government, determined on the bold measure of stopping the trade, as the only means of arriving at a remedy. The Chinese, somewhat startled at their old weapon being turned against themselves, began to display a more conciliatory temper, and, after some debate, a mandarin was appointed to meet Sir George Staunton, who was deputed to conduct the negotiation on the part of the committee. Accordingly, on the 20th of October, Sir George proceeded to Canton, accompanied by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe and Mr. Davis. The first subject of complaint was the arrest of the linguist Ayew, for performing a service which was merely complimentary on the part of the English, and expressive of their respect for a dignified officer of government, who had conducted the first embassy through China, and been on friendly terms with its members. It was immediately replied that his seizure was on account of a totally different affair, and that there was no intention of condemning the proceeding. Several meetings took place with the principal mandarins and one or two assessors, but little progress was made towards an adjustment; when the viceroy suddenly determined on breaking off the negotiation. The committee upon this resolved on issuing a notice to all British subjects to quit Canton: Sir George Staunton and the gentlemen with him embarked in the *Wexford*, and the whole fleet proceeded down the river.

"This step had the effect of completely curing the obstinacy of the viceroy. A deputation of Hong merchants was sent down to the ships, with authority to state that mandarins would be sent to discuss the remaining points in dispute if Sir George would return. On his reaching Canton, an attempt was made to retract the pledge, but this could not be persisted in; and, after several long and tedious audiences with the mandarins, the principal points in dispute were gained, and incorporated in an official paper from the viceroy, as the only security against a breach of faith on the part of the Chinese. The privilege of corresponding with the government under seal, and in the native character, was now for the first time established; an assurance was given that no Chinese officer should ever enter the British factory without leave previously obtained; and licence was given to native

servants to enter into the service of the English without molestation from the petty mandarins; together with some other points."\*

Mr. Davis has summed up the concessions of the Chinese on this occasion in language improperly vague for a work professing to give complete information on the subject of British relations to the Chinese government. M. Auber has been more complete on this head, although prolix in his narrative of the events that led to such an issue. According to that writer, the relations between the Chinese and English were placed in 1814 upon the following basis, which includes the matters mentioned by Mr. Davis, and "some other points," which he leaves his readers to guess:—

"On the 29th November a communication was made by Howqua of the decisions passed by the viceroy, to the following effect:—

"1st. Permission given to address the government in Chinese through the Hong merchants without the contents being inquired into.

"2nd. The use of offensive language not very satisfactorily answered.

"3rd. The local magistrate not to visit the factory without giving due previous notice.

"4th. The communication by boats between Canton and Whampoa to be open and free as usual.

"5th. Natives may be employed as coolies, porters, tea-boilers, cooks, and in other similar capacities, but persons not to be hired under the denominations of *keupan* and *thawan*.

"6th. Ships of war to remain at their usual anchorages while the ships are at Whampoa, but when they depart, the ships of war to depart.

"7th. Boats to receive passes at certain stations.

"8th. The country ships have been fired at as due notice to the Bogue Fort.

"9th. Merchantmen only admitted to Whampoa.

#### "Additional Articles.

"1st. Address to be laid before the emperor to be written in the foreign character as before.

"2nd. Important affairs to be addressed to the viceroy, commercial affairs to the hoppo, local district affairs to the local magistrates.

"3rd. Further arrangements respecting the boats passing the Bogue; the people will then be directed to behave courteously.

"4th. The opening or not of the trade will not be inquired into.

\* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 72, 73.

"5th. Notice will be given when natives are tried implicating foreigners.

"An edict confirming the same was issued on the 2nd December."

The year 1814 was signalised in the history of the British in India by the commencement of the compilation of an Anglo-Chinese dictionary, by the Rev. Dr. Morrison, a missionary of the London Missionary Society, and an English congregational minister. The perseverance and devotedness of this remarkable man made him in this, as in so many other respects, a benefactor to the Chinese people, to the English in China, and useful to the relations of the two nations. The directors of the East India Company favoured this great undertaking, as did their select committee at Canton. Sir G. Staunton, at the request of the committee, superintended the issue of the work. The whole work was not completed until 1824, Dr. Morrison having been interrupted in his labours by attendance at the embassy in 1818.

In 1816 it was determined by his majesty's government and the court of directors that an embassy should be sent to the Chinese emperor from the Prince Regent of England. Lord Amherst was fixed upon as a suitable person for this important mission. The ostensible objects of this embassy were briefly stated to be—"a removal of the grievances which had been experienced, and an exemption from them and others of the like nature for the time to come, with the establishment of the company's trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious, arbitrary aggressions of the local authorities, and under the protection of the emperor, and the sanction of the regulations to be appointed by himself."

The embassy embarked at Spithead, on board his majesty's ship *Alceste*, on the 8th of February, 1816, and arrived at the mouth of the White River, Gulf of Pe-tche-lee, on the 28th of July. The disembarkation did not take place until the 9th of August, when the imperial legate visited Lord Amherst. It was arranged that negotiations should not be entered into until the arrival of the ambassador at Tien-Sing. On the 12th his excellency arrived there, and was met by a second imperial legate, when a discussion at once arose as to the performance of "ko-tow"—the homage demanded by the emperor from all representatives of foreign princes. Lord Amherst refused. His excellency and suite, accompanied by the legates, proceeded up river. On the 16th of August his lordship was roused from his bed at a very early hour by the Chinese officials, for the purpose of informing him that the homage or "ko-tow"

must be performed, or his further advance stopped. Lord Amherst objected to the ceremony as an indignity to the king his master, and to the British nation. He argued that if the ceremony were merely a form, as the Chinese officials pretended, then he had no objection to practise it, provided a written declaration were made to him that a Chinese ambassador would perform the same ceremony at the court of his Britannic majesty in case such were sent there. The legates refused to give any such pledge, and made the "ko-tow" the alternative to the dismissal of the embassy. The legates proposed that a rehearsal should be performed, in order that the ambassador might try how far his scruples were unrelenting, but it was intended that this rehearsal should be public and ceremonious, and was evidently intended as a trap for his excellency, who declined any rehearsal whatever, adhering to his previous stipulation, which he repeated. The voyage was prosecuted to Tong-choo-foo, where the navigation of the river ends, and whence the journey to Peking, only twelve miles, is performed by land. At this place the legates proposed that the ambassador should write home for instructions. His lordship declined doing so, and was treated rudely by the mandarins. He insisted upon sending a letter to the emperor; upon producing the superscription, the evidence of his lordship's high rank seemed to awe the officials, and their rudeness gave place to obsequiousness.

In the afternoon of the 28th the embassy arrived at Peking, which it was not permitted to enter, but was conducted round the walls, and at sunrise was in the neighbourhood of Yuen-min-yuen. The ambassador was not allowed to see the emperor, or personally to deliver his credentials to the prime-minister, as he still persisted in refusing a homage which amounted to idolatrous worship, and which recognised the Emperor of China as the sovereign of the universe, and the King of England as his tributary.

His excellency and suite were compelled to return; *en route* to Canton he was treated with respect. He arrived at the factory on the 1st of January, 1817. The frustration of the mission was mainly due to the viceroy, and other officials at Canton, who knew that its chief object was to complain of their insolence, violence, oppression, and extortion.

During the passage of Lord Amherst up the river, and overland to Peking, and even while returning, the Canton authorities behaved with ill will to the British naval officers in the Canton river. The captain of the *Alceste* (Lord Amherst's vessel) was refused anchorage at Whampoa. Of this circum-

stance Mr. Davis observes:—"It was intended to degrade the British ambassador below the tribute-bearer from Siam, whose junk has free leave to enter the river! The *Alceste*, however, proceeded very leisurely on her way; and Captain Maxwell, on being fired at by the junks, and the fort at the river's mouth, silenced the junks at a single shot; while one broadside sufficed to send the garrison of the fort scampering up the side of the hill, down which that defence is somewhat preposterously built. The effect of this decisive conduct was evinced in the short space of one day, by the arrival of all sorts of provisions to the *Alceste* at Whampoa, by a free consent to load the *Hewett*, and by the publication of a statement that the firing at the entrance of the river was an affair of saluting! Those who composed the embassy were gratified to find on their arrival at Canton, on the 1st of January, that Captain Maxwell had not been deterred by any unnecessary apprehensions for their safety from duly maintaining the dignity of the British flag."

The duties and annoyances of Lord Amherst were not over on his arrival at Canton. The emperor had written a letter for the Regent, and committed the delivery of it to his viceroy at Canton, who was personally to place it in the hands of the British ambassador. This ceremony was performed in an eminently uncivil manner, which the ambassador took care to rebuke in a way which comported with the dignity of his bearing throughout. This ceremonial terminated Lord Amherst's business in China. Barrow relates\* that Lord Macartney's embassy cost the Chinese government £170,000. Mr. Davis was of opinion that the embassy of Lord Amherst cost it an equal sum. The letter of the emperor to the Prince Regent was intolerably insolent and arrogant. The following passages from it will suffice to disclose its character:—"Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an ambassador so far, and be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing seas;" and in a vermilion edict† the following passage:—"I therefore sent down my pleasure to *expel* these ambassadors, and send them back to their own country, *without punishing the high crime they had committed*."

Immediately after the departure of the ambassador various acts of cruelty were perpetrated by the Canton authorities, which were intended chiefly as insults and threats to the English. The failure of the embassy was much discussed in England, very many

were of opinion that Lord Amherst should have complied with the Chinese customs, whatever they were. Dr. Barry O'Meara, in his *Voice from St. Helena*, represents the imprisoned Emperor Napoleon I. as deriding the English and Lord Amherst for their pride and impracticability in not stooping to any humiliation the Chinese thought proper to impose, which the ex-emperor considered indifferent, whereas the commercial advantage to be obtained was substantial. The opinion of so renowned a person was much quoted in Europe, and especially in England after O'Meara's book was published, whenever Chinese affairs brought up the subject. The Emperor Napoleon was however a bad judge on points of ethics or honour, however sagacious in matters of war or policy. He could assume the language and conduct of a Mohammedan in Egypt, a Romanist in Italy, and an atheist in France, when political and personal objects were to be promoted by so doing. Lord Amherst's honour and principle were of a higher cast, and regulated by a sense of duty drawn from purer sources than any acknowledged as authoritative by Napoleon Buonaparte. Lord Amherst did not, like his French imperial majesty, place the Bible on his *political* book-shelves; he had another and more becoming compartment for it. Duty to the person of his king, the honour and dignity of his country, and to the religion he professed, forbid Lord Amherst to render the idolatrous homage and recognition of supremacy demanded by the Tartar emperor. He acted conscientiously, and the present generation of Englishmen at all events approves. Had Lord Amherst participated in the degrading and dishonourable ceremonial proposed, he would not in all probability have obtained any advantages for his nation, and the English would have been reminded at Canton by the viceroy that their king was the emperor's slave. At it was, the firmness of the ambassador much impressed the Chinese authorities, and notwithstanding their first outbursts of resentment, made them more wary of affronting a people who might assert their independence in a very troublesome manner. At all events, Mr. Davis, who had opportunities of personally observing the effects, thus expresses a similar opinion:—"It has often been a subject of just remark, that this *unsuccessful* mission was followed by a longer interval of tranquillity and of freedom from Chinese annoyance than had ever been experienced before. From the year 1816 to 1829, not a single stoppage of the British trade took place, except in the affair of the *Topaze* frigate in 1822; and then the Canton government was glad to

\* *Travels in China*.

† From its being written on paper of that colour by the emperor's own hand.

make the first advances to a resumption of the suspended intercourse, as we shall see. In 1820 an accidental occurrence took place, which gave rise to transactions of a very remarkable nature, proving in the strongest manner the anxiety of the government to avoid a discussion with the English. Some boats from one of the company's ships were watering in the river, when they were barbarously attacked by a party of Chinese with stones. The officer in charge of the boats fired over the heads of the assailants to make them desist, but the shot unfortunately took effect among some boys on a high bank opposite, and killed one of them. The Chinese, as usual, demanded that somebody should be given up; but the committee insisted on the urgent emergency which led to the discharge of the gun, as well as on the accidental nature of the case. In the meanwhile, the butcher on board one of the ships committed suicide; and the Chinese, on hearing this, immediately took it up, thinking proper to assume that *he* must be the individual who had shot the boy! The utmost eagerness and haste were shown by them in appointing an inquest of mandarins, who proceeded to examine the body; and, as it was decided by them at once that the deceased butcher must be the homicide, the trade proceeded as usual. It must be observed that the committee only granted permission for the ship to be boarded by the mandarins when they demanded it, and that the whole proceeding showed the extreme anxiety of the local authorities to accommodate the affair."

The English abstained, however, from all compromise in the transaction, as is known by the distinct testimony of the Rev. Dr. Morrison, the congregational missionary, and Chinese interpreter to the company. This narrative shows at once the difficulty the English had in carrying on trade peaceably with the Chinese, and the good effect of firmness tempered by justice and discretion in dealing with the Cantonese authorities. No other events of interest occurred in connection with English relations to China during the period to which this chapter refers.

#### CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS.

During the Marquis of Wellesley's government various measures were contemplated by him to frustrate the purposes and humiliate the power of the French and Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago. The expedition of Buonaparte to Egypt disconcerted these measures. General Baird and General Wellesley, who were nominated first to command the military portion of an expedition to the Mauritius, and then against Batavia, received

other commissions. The admiral who was to command the naval part of these enterprises did not make his appearance at the rendezvous, Trincomalee; and General Baird was dispatched with the troops to Egypt, General Wellesley to Mysore. No opportunity for prosecuting either of the meditated attacks occurred until 1810, during the government of Lord Minto. The capture of Mauritius does not properly come within the range of this history; it is therefore here only necessary to observe that the expedition against the Mauritius was successful, and that the conquest much reduced French influence in the East.

At the same time the Isle of Bourbon was captured, but was restored to France at the peace of 1814.

#### CONQUEST OF THE MOLUCCAS.

Lord Minto's career as an Indian statesman was closed with more *éclat* than it otherwise would have been, by his acquisition of the Moluccas and the Island of Java. "An empire, which for two centuries had contributed to the power, prosperity, and grandeur of one of the principal and most respected states of Europe, was wrested from the short usurpation of the French government,\* added to the dominions of the British crown, and converted from a seat of hostile machinations and commercial competition into an augmentation of British power and prosperity."†

In the year 1808 Mr. Raffles, afterwards Sir Stamford Raffles, was secretary to the government of Prince of Wales' Island. Ill health compelled change of scene, and he proceeded to the Moluccas. There he acquired considerable information as to the trade and general condition of the islands near and beyond the Straits. He also obtained very precise information of the power of the Dutch, and the value of their possessions in the great Archipelago. Mr. Raffles drew up reports of the condition of Penang and Malacca, which influenced the government in modifying their intentions in respect to these settlements, and their views of the importance which should be attached to them. Mr. Raffles drew up a paper on "the Malayan Archipelago," which so pleased Lord Minto, that he desired to make the gifted author governor of the Moluccas. With this intention other claims interfered. In the document drawn up by Mr. Raffles, he insisted upon the necessity to the ultimate interests of

\* The Moluccas and Java, with its minor islands, were subjected to France, when Holland, the parent country, was conquered by the French.

† Auber's *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. ii. chap. xii. p. 470.

England in the East, that French influence should be completely extirpated throughout the Archipelago. The governor-general resolved to carry out the opinions of Mr. Raffles, and to proceed himself with an expedition against Java.

Previous to the accomplishment of his purpose, some other achievements were performed in consonance with the general object, such as the reduction of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands.

In the middle of February, 1810, Captain Tucker, with his majesty's ships *Dover*, *Cornwall*, and *Samarang*, and part of the Madras European regiment, under Captain Court, arrived off the island of Amboyna. The ships opened a heavy cannonade. Under their fire four hundred of the Madras regiment were landed in two detachments, one under Captain Court, the other commanded by Captain Philips. Philips attacked a battery in front, and carried it by storm. Court made a circuit and took some of the redoubts in reverse. The next morning the guns of the captured batteries were directed against the town and fort. The Dutch governor was summoned to surrender, and obeyed. Thirteen hundred Dutch and Malay soldiers laid down their arms. The former were sent to Java,—a very questionable policy, as that place was about to be attacked. The Malays were enlisted in the English service. Thus the English at last, and finally, avenged the insults and outrages inflicted upon them so long before by the Dutch at that place. The whole of the Moluccas were soon afterwards captured, the Dutch in every case making a feeble resistance, unworthy of their former glory. The garrisons of the Batavian republic were swiftly swept from the Archipelago, except from Java and its neighbouring isles. The last of the Moluccas that yielded to British power was Ternate, the scene of so much competition and contention between them and the Dutch in the early enterprises of the traders of those nations among the Spice Islands. There exists but little information concerning the attack on this place, once so famous as a battle-field for the maritime rivals in the Archipelago. Mill has compressed some fragmentary accounts in the *Asiatic Register*, vol. xii.—the official despatches and old newspaper correspondence. His narrative is brief and clear, and supplies all that is worth relating. "Ternate was taken by Captain Tucker with a detachment of Europeans, the seamen and marines of the *Dover*, and some of the newly enlisted Amboyna corps. Captain Tucker arrived off the island on the 25th August; but light and baffling winds kept him off the shore, and a landing was not practicable till the 28th. A hundred and seventy

men were landed in the night, with intent to surprise the forts and batteries which guarded the bay. The difficulties of the approach frustrated the scheme, and the men were re-embarked. Early in the morning they were again put on shore; and, whilst the frigate engrossed the attention of the enemy, they proceeded unobserved to an eminence supposed to command the Fort of Kayomaira, the principal Dutch post. They arrived on the hill at noon; but to their great vexation they found that the fort was screened from their view by an intervening forest. They then endeavoured to proceed by an inland route, but, after incessant exertion throughout the day, it was found impossible to disencumber the path of the immense trees which had been cut down and piled across it. Turning to the right, they followed the course of a rivulet which led to the beach, and brought them about ten o'clock within eight hundred yards of the fort before they were discovered. Disregarding a smart fire of grape and musketry, they rushed forward, escalated the walls, and carried the fort. On the following morning the combined operations of the detachment and frigate overpowered the other defences of the bay, and by the evening the town and island were surrendered. Few casualties impaired the exultation of the victors. Their conquest completed the reduction of the Moluccas, and Java with its dependencies alone remained in the possession of the Dutch."

#### CONQUEST OF JAVA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

Having wrested the Moluccas from the united grasp of France and Holland, the English were eager for the meditated attack upon Java. The governor-general determined upon personally superintending the operations; some delay was therefore necessary. The delays perpetually interposed by the naval commanders were, however, the chief difficulties in the way of all enterprises which the Indian government had hitherto attempted by sea. This want of alertness was shown at Mauritius and the Isle of France, Amboyna, and Ternate; and but for the intelligence of Mr. Raffles, and the determination of the governor-general not to be impeded by the admirals, and to carry out his purpose promptly and resolutely, the undertaking would have been deferred that year,—probably for ever; for it is certain that the French and Dutch would have made desperate efforts to send reinforcements and supplies, and the garrisons would have made the defences infinitely more formidable. In pursuance of his object Lord Minto proceeded to Madras on the 9th March, 1811. Troops

were ordered to proceed from Bengal on the 15th and 16th; on the 18th of April he reached Penang. The extent of information with which Mr. Raffles was enabled to furnish the governor-general on all points relating to countries of which scarcely anything was known, and the comprehensive views with which he accompanied his reports, proved of infinite value. An incident that occurred at this stage of the proceedings marked the judgment and decision of Mr. Raffles. The late period when the expedition reached Malacca caused some anxiety on account of the favourable monsoon, which was nearly terminating. A question arose as to which of two passages should be followed in the course towards Java. The point called for an immediate determination; the choice was to be made between the northern route, round Borneo, which, from the little known of the navigation of those seas, was thought to be the only practicable one, especially for a fleet; but how the dangers of the Bartabac passage, where only one ship could pass at a time, were to be avoided, no one could suggest. Mr. Raffles had strongly recommended the south-west passage, between Caramata and Borneo, and "staked his reputation on the success which would attend it." The naval authorities were opposed to it; but Lord Minto reposed full confidence in the judgment and local information of Mr. Raffles, by embarking with him in his majesty's ship the *Modeste*, commanded by Captain the Hon. George Elliot, on the 18th of June, 1811, and leading the way on Mr. Raffles' sole responsibility. The result was entirely successful. The fleet, consisting of sixty sail,\* was in six weeks in sight of Batavia, without a single accident. The *Modeste* alone would have done it a fortnight sooner.† In the progress of the expedition from the roads of Madras, much danger was incurred by storms. His majesty's ship *Dover*, and many other vessels which remained longest, were driven on shore at Madras, and wrecked. Happily, the transports, with the troops on board, left in time, and escaped. The first division of the army left Madras April 18th,‡ 1811, under the command of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie. When Lord Minto arrived at Malacca, he learned that General Daendels had been recalled by the French government, and that General Jansens had replaced him, and had brought out strong reinforcements.

\* Mill computes them at 100 sail. He probably reckons a description of vessels which Auber does not include in "the fleet."

† M. Auber's *Rise of British Power*, &c.

‡ Thorn's *Memoir of the Conquest of Java*. London, 1815.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the British commander, was led by the information which reached him from various quarters, to decide on attacking Batavia, as the place where the contests for the Franco-Dutch colonies of Java and dependencies was likely to be decided.

On the evening of the 3rd of August the vanguard of the fleet made Cape Carawang, and early next morning ran in for the mouth of the Mirandi river. During the lulls which occurred between the land and sea breezes, the ships safely anchored. Early in the evening the first division of the troops landed. The fleet, when all had assembled, consisted, according to Major Hough, of four sail of the line, fourteen frigates, seven sloops, eight of the honourable company's cruisers, fifty-seven transports, and seventeen gun-boats, under the command of Rear-Admiral Stopford, who joined the expedition at Batavia. When at Malacca, the military force was officially reported\* to be as follows:—

*General Abstract of the Army, Malacca, 4th June, 1811.*

	OFFICERS.	NATIVE OFFICERS.	N. C. O. & PRIVATES.	TOTAL.
European forces	200	—	5144	5344
Native forces	124	123	5530	5777
	324	123	10,674	11,121
Pioneers, Lascars, &c.				839
				Grand total 11,960

Of this force 1,200 were left behind sick at Malacca; 1,500 of the remainder became ill on landing at Java. The cause of this sickness was not the climate of Java, but the bad, and, in some cases, disgusting quarters afforded to the men while on board the transports, together with the rough weather encountered on the passage.

Colonel Gillespie and the advance brigade first landed at Chillingching, a village ten miles or so to the eastward of Batavia. He immediately took up a position over the road to Cornelis, to gain possession of that road, and protect the landing of the rest of the troops, which was safely effected.

On the 7th of August the advance guard of the British crossed the Augale river by a bridge of boats, and halted themselves.† The next day Batavia was summoned. The inhabitants, such as the French had not driven away, were eager to surrender; and our troops had therefore no difficulty in taking possession of the town.

It was expected that the French and Dutch would make a stand at Weltevreden. Against that place the army began its march on the 10th. The cantonments were abandoned on

\* Major Thorn, deputy quartermaster-general at Java.

† Wilson, vol. vii. p. 356.

the approach of our army, but General Jumel, the French officer second in command, had intrenched a camp for a division of the Dutch army in a strong position, overlooking the road to Cornelis, about a mile from Weltevreden. Two villages covered the position of the Dutch infantry. The enemy met our advance with grape and musketry; the English general skirmished in front, using his horse artillery and rifles freely, and turned with his main force the left flank of the defence. Having set fire to the villages, the British troops charged through the smoke and burning houses, dispossessing the Dutch infantry and artillery of every strategical point, and driving them in headlong retreat until they found protection under the cannon of Cornelis. In the arsenal of Weltevreden a large amount of military stores and 300 guns became the prize of the victors. General Jansens was confident that Cornelis would defy the whole force of the governor-general until the rainy season would render it impossible to occupy trenches or a camp in its vicinity, and cause great loss in sickness to the English if they attempted a blockade. Jansens held an intrenched camp, his flanks protected between two rivers, the Sloken and the Batavia river. It was a position resembling that which Scindiah occupied when General Wellesley fought the desperate battle of Assaye. The Batavian river near Cornelis was unfordable, and the banks broken in abrupt acclivities. The Sloken was with difficulty fordable, but it was defended by powerful batteries and redoubts. There was a strong redoubt on the British side of the river to protect the only bridge left standing. Between the two rivers the trenches were protected by formidable redoubts, and the inequality of the ground concealed the strength of the defences, and gave the defenders opportunity to manœuvre against any assailants, whatever quarter the attack came from. The camp, both in front and rear, was protected similarly, both by art and nature. The circumference of the lines was nearly five miles, and was mounted by 280 pieces of cannon. Seldom had the English in all their daring assaults on strong places, a position presented to their attack more undesirable.

On the night of the 20th of August the English began regular approaches, and as the works progressed, a heavy battering train was mounted. The main attack was upon the *tête du pont*. Having battered the redoubt, and considerably weakened the enemy's fire, the moment for the assault arrived. Colonel Gillespie took the command. He was the same officer who (related in our account of the Goorkha campaign), as Major-general Sir

R. R. Gillespie, was killed on the 31st of October, 1814, at Kalunga, in Nepaul. He had some dismounted dragoons, the body-guard, and a body of marines; besides the grenadier and light and rifle companies of the 14th, 59th, 69th, and 78th regiments, and grenadiers of 5th and 6th volunteers, Madras pioneers. Lieutenant-colonel Macleod and Major Tule were ordered to advance, the first named against a redoubt in the angle of the enemy's front and left, the other upon the bridge leading to the rear.

On the night of the 26th of August the English began their formidable task. Gillespie led his men on in silence; at dawn the enemy's videttes perceived him: the British, as commanded, abstained from firing a shot, but rushed upon the pickets with the bayonet, nearly all of whom perished, and the advance redoubt was carried nearly as soon as the alarm was given. The promptitude, celerity, and discipline of the English gave effect to valour, and this first step of their progress was accomplished without loss. The 78th regiment, without entering the redoubt, carried the bridge over the Sloken. Gillespie crossed with them, and without firing a shot dashed at once against the redoubt within the lines, which also commanded the passage of the bridge. Each of these redoubts had twenty eighteen-pounder guns, besides several of twenty-four and of thirty-two pounds. Colonel Gibbs, who was guided to the scene of action by the enemy's fire, crossed the bridge after Gillespie, and while that officer stormed the redoubt to the left, Gibbs turned to the right, where another redoubt was also in a position to command the bridge; he at once stormed it, relying solely on the bayonet. When the bulwark was conquered a Dutch officer set fire to the magazine, which blew up, causing terrible havoc and destruction. The devoted man who thus sacrificed his own life to what he considered the honour and interests of his country, inflicted by his suicidal act severe loss upon his enemies. The grenadier companies (there were two on the occasion) of his majesty's 14th regiment were blown up. Many other English soldiers perished. Contrary to the intentions of the Dutch officer, his act also slew many of his own countrymen. The magazine was fired before the Dutch and French could make good their retreat. By these events a way into the intrenched camp was conquered, and the English poured over the bridge impetuously, spreading in every direction most likely to make their conquest sure. Cornelis was entered, and the enemy driven out. The whole of this work was performed in the dim grey

light of early dawn, but by the time it was accomplished the sun was above the horizon, and both armies were presented to one another in full view. The enemy was dispersed, broken, or bayoneted in the redoubts and trenches. The English were mustering in order, undisputed victors of the position. The enemy had strong reserves which had made no effort to save the place; these were drawn up on a plain in front of the barracks and lesser fort, protected by its guns. There were several battalions of infantry, a considerable body of cavalry, heavy guns in position, and twenty pieces of horse artillery in line. There appeared a prospect of a new and fierce engagement. His majesty's 59th regiment at once advanced, and the enemy shamefully gave way. The 59th entered and captured the fort, and Colonel Gillespie coming up with the dragoons and horse artillery, the retreat of the enemy broke into a disgraceful flight. For ten miles Gillespie maintained the pursuit, pouring grape into the flying masses, and passing between the different bodies with his cavalry, cut them up, unless as their cries for mercy stayed the hands which wielded the British sabres. Six thousand were thus spared; a regiment of French voltigeurs, fresh from France, laid down their arms. The number slain was not computed; at all events, no correct reports remain to attest it. The English lost eighty-five officers killed and wounded, and eight hundred men. There were besides seventy-three seamen and marines numbered among the British who fell. General Jansens escaped with a small body of his light cavalry to the eastern coast. A squadron of frigates, with extra detachments of marines, was sent to Cheribon, the place surrendered to Colonel Wood.

While Sir S. Auchmuty went in pursuit of Jansens, a naval expedition was directed against the Island of Madura, off the north-east coast of Java; it was captured. Jansens collected a force of native cavalry at Jater, six miles from Samarang. Auchmuty landed at Samarang, from which the inhabitants fled. He went at once in quest of the enemy's camp, which was drawn up on a range of hills difficult of access, their steep slopes presenting a surface of sharp and broken crags. The occupants of the camp were chiefly natives, and numbered about eight thousand men, with twenty guns in position. Auchmuty's force was one thousand strong, a very excellently formed body, all Europeans, engineers, sappers and miners, artillery, &c., being in proportion to the companies of the line. He had a strong detachment of pioneers, and six light field-pieces. The summit of the

range was level and grassy, fit for cavalry, of which the native army was composed. There were also slopes by which the troopers could ascend or descend along the opposite sides with ease. As soon as Auchmuty's pioneers began their work the troopers took to flight, leaving the guns behind them, which, with the exception of occupying the field, was the only honour or advantage won by General Auchmuty. General Jansens shortly after surrendered the island to Great Britain, and the troops yet in arms as prisoners of war.

The conquest of Java and the Moluccas led to the promotion of Lord Minto in the peerage; he was made an earl. Mr. Raffles was knighted, and made "lieutenant-governor of Java and its dependencies." Colonel Gillespie obtained the command of the troops. This officer manifested a strangely hostile feeling to Sir Stamford Raffles. He could regard no subject in the same light as the governor. The latter was a statesman, a scholar, and a philosopher, and Colonel Gillespie was unable to apprehend the extent or depth of the governor's views. The colonel desired to occupy Java with numerous forces; the governor believed it unnecessary, and insisted upon economy in the new government. Gillespie resented this, and brought so many and such serious charges against his excellency, that it became necessary for the governor-general of India to institute an official inquiry, which issued in the honourable acquittal of Raffles from all the impeachments so petulantly brought against him. The commander-in-chief was displaced.

While yet Colonel Gillespie continued in command, his services were actively demanded in various ways to preserve in order the territory which he had so gallantly done his part to conquer. The French and Dutch stirred up the natives against the English by all sorts of misrepresentations. The Sultan of Yadtryakaita proclaimed war against the invaders. Gillespie attacked his capital, and carried it by storm. The sultan himself was taken prisoner and exiled to Penang. His son was placed by the English on the vacant throne. The capture of Yadtryakaita appalled the young sultan, and made him submissive to the English. It had been defended by one hundred thousand men, who showed much courage, but their weapons and discipline were so inferior, that they were unable to defend the place even against a few thousand Europeans.

On the north-east coast of Sumatra the Sultan of Palembang defied the power of the English. Gillespie sailed from Java in March, 1812, and the sultan fled without striking a blow for his independence. The English

commander dethroned him, and placed his brother on the throne. The expedition was taken because the sultan had entered into an engagement with the Dutch, refused subsequently to revoke it, and bound himself not to admit them or the French to his dominions. The position in which the English then were positively demanded the adoption of a policy, towards the neighbouring sultans, of treating all as enemies who were not allies: otherwise the French and Dutch would form points of support on the different islands, and endanger the British possessions. Batavia had too long proved a source of peril to English commerce in the Eastern seas, for the English quietly to allow French or Dutch, when vanquished in one place, to create a position of power in another.

On the 18th of May Colonel Gillespie left Sumatra for Bauea, of which place he took possession. Java remained in the quiet possession of the British until 1815, when a circumstance occurred which created considerable alarm. The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of a Bengal light infantry battalion conspired, in October, with some other sepoys and their officers, to murder all Europeans upon whom they could lay their hands, and desert, or, subverting the constituted authorities, join the natives of Java in effecting a revolution. The cause of this atrocious conspiracy lay as usual in a breach of faith committed by the government. The conspirators were volunteers, who, contrary to the prejudices of their caste and nation, freely offered to join the expedition to Java, on condition of being restored to their country at the expiration of the third year of service. The government was very glad to make the bargain, but the English officials had no concern about keeping it. It was scandalously and tyrannously violated. The sepoys, despairing of all hope of again seeing their country, and smarting under a sense of wrong, gave way to the vindictive passions which characterise the Bengalees, and the hatred of Europeans and Christians, which is as strongly characteristic of them, and formed the sanguinary purpose which, had it not been timely discovered, would have been ruthlessly executed. It is remarkable how the sepoy has ever proved himself the same sanguinary monster, whether at Vellore, or Java, or Cawnpore. It is equally remarkable that after such decided proofs of their readiness, men and officers, to assassinate their comrades and defenceless Europeans, upon any provocation from the government, both the government and British officers continued to trust them until the mutiny of 1857, and the horrid butcheries

of Cawnpore. Some of the criminals of Java were executed, the rest were drafted into battalions returning home. A sanguinary outrage was in truth the shortest way to obtain justice, when the soldier in India was robbed or wronged by his superiors.

In 1816 Java was given up to Holland. The overthrow of Napoleon Buonaparte in the campaign of 1813 led to general rearrangements among the European governments, all of whom showed jealousy of England, upon whom the brunt of the war fell in the coalition against France. The ministers of England were deficient in intelligence, patriotism, and diplomatic talent. They were far more solicitous to prop up the despotisms of continental Europe, to flatter, and to caress them, than they were to secure the commercial advantage and national honour of the United Kingdom. The authorities in India made strong representations against the surrender of Java. The East India Company was anxious for its retention. Sir Stamford Raffles pointed out, in an able despatch, the vast resources of that island, as one of the richest and most fertile places on the globe. He showed that the time must come when a mighty trade would be carried on through the Straits with China, and that whatever European power or powers would possess the islands of the Eastern Archipelago could command that trade. The despatch of the eminent statesman, the lieutenant-governor of Java, was not even read by the minister of the day: and other important despatches were at the same time treated with similar insolent contempt or culpable neglect. The grand object with the ministry was the upholding and extension of despotic government everywhere. The opposition were influenced in their arguments, and perhaps in their motives, by party. When Java was conquered, Sheridan, who knew nothing of the subject, and who, except for party purposes, seldom paid attention to any matter of public interest, derided the conquest as not worth the expense incurred. The object of the eloquent declaimer was to damage the ministry; he took no trouble to ascertain the truth. The object of the English ministry was to satisfy the Holy Alliance: English commerce, and the interests of the English people, were secondary objects. No surrender of territory ever made by the English was more impolitic. The abandonment of Borneo at a later period, although a most injurious step to English interests, and in spite of the expressed will of the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers of England, as well as the merchants of Singapore and India, was not so purblind as the surrender of Java. In 1814, when England agreed to surrender

Java to the Dutch, the revenue of the island was more than half a million sterling. The government of Holland was so occupied by the return of Napoleon from Elba, and the campaign in Belgium and France in 1815,

that it was unable to take advantage of the cession made by "its generous ally." It was not therefore until the end of 1816 that the Dutch flag again floated over the queen of the eastern isles.

## CHAPTER CVI.

### HOME EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CHARTER IN 1833-4.

THE century opened as to the home affairs of the company with a grave discussion concerning "the shipping interest." The company's ships were the finest merchantmen in the world; capable of coping in battle with the martial navies of other countries, even with those of Holland, France, and Spain. The peculiar manner in which these ships were held as property, by persons holding votes in the proprietary, gave a distinct preponderance of this particular interest over other separate interests in connection with the company. The result was a monopoly which proved injurious to the company and the country, which was offensive in England as in India, and objected to by the parliament and the board of control. The measures of the Marquis Wellesley in India, in taking up Indian-built ships to carry freights to England, shook the monopoly, and led to a fierce opposition on the part of the proprietary to the encroachments of the crown. After a contest, the details of which would afford no interest to the reader in these days, the crown triumphed. The circumstance is important, as it was the beginning of successive encroachments upon the exclusive privileges of the company which rapidly transpired in the course of the present century, until the East India Company ceased to be a trading society. The disputes with the shipping interest were not concluded, when new differences arose between the company and the board of control about "the private trade." M. Auber, commenting upon this quarrel, wisely observes, "A combination of circumstances frequently gave rise to feelings that never would have existed had the causes which produced them been disposed of as they arose." At the close of 1802, Mr. Bosanquet, being chairman of the court of directors, and Lord Castlereagh president of the board of control, there was more harmony than usual between the two branches of Indian government. Still there arose discussions upon finance that were vexatious. The company possessing the exclusive trade of India and China, the English public

and parliament were unwilling to render any aid to the company towards bearing the expenses of the great wars carried on in India. Besides it was alleged that the conquered territory should pay the expense of the conquest. Yet, whatever might be the ultimate relation of the revenues of the new territory to the expense incurred in obtaining them, they seldom repaid it for many years. Most of the wars in the East with European powers have been, through the whole period of British connection, initiated by the board of control, or by the governor-generals, who were its nominees and in secret correspondence with its chief. These wars were frequently opposed to the policy and directions of the company. The board was exacting upon the directors. The directors complained that their profits were swallowed up by the expenses of a policy adverse to their interests and their wishes, and entirely the work of the government. Frequently, when it appeared to the world as if the company and the board were of one mind, the former was obliged to submit to the latter, under threats of bringing their differences before parliament, and overthrowing their monopoly by an appeal to the principles of one class and the prejudices of other classes of the British people. In fact the company was in continual danger of having their ships, stores, and funds employed for the advantage of the general public, under the orders of the secret committee of the board of control, or under the direct and arbitrary orders of the crown. Whenever the company requested the reimbursement of the immense property thus squandered by the state at their expense, their accounts were disputed, or they were told that the public exchequer would not allow of the repayment. Hints and threats were generally added that if they made any noise about the matter, the parliament and public would be appealed to against the monopoly. From the time the company was rich enough to become an object of plunder, the crown and parliament were ever ready iniquitously to deprive it of its property, under

threats, if it did not submit, of destroying its privileges. Among the most blunt and uncourtous of the company's tyrants at the board of control was Lord Castlereagh. The mild but severely just remonstrances of the company's chairman, Mr. Bosanquet, in 1803, rebuked the officious and unprincipled statesman with a dignity and power which any other minister but his lordship would have felt.

The directors in 1803, as indeed at all times, wrote to the governor-general, urging economy and the liquidation of the debt. The governor-general urged that money should be sent from England for the investments. Lord Wellesley, and all other governor-generals appointed by the board of control, treated Indian finance as if the East India Company was an association conveniently existing for the purpose of providing England with funds to make war in the East against other European nations, offensive or defensive, as the case might be, and for adding to the glory of England by Asiatic conquests. Clive, Hastings, Barlow—in a word, the company's own servants, when invested with supreme power, acted as if the object of their government was to consider and to promote the interests of a great commercial association, called the East India Company, which they were bound to serve as their employers. In their conquests, while they were patriotic and jealous for the renown of England, they regarded battle and victory as a part of their business as agents of the company. Under the board of control, the governor-general was a leading member of the aristocracy, appointed for party purposes, as a reward for home services, rather than his fitness for India; and he acted as if his main business was to fulfil his period of office in such a manner as would redound to his own glory, prove the cabinet which nominated him wise in their nomination, and assist in keeping up or creating a parliamentary majority for his party. The company, who created the English interest in India by its own resources and at its own risk, has been generally treated as a troublesome appendage to the board of control, interfering with the patronage of the president, the cabinet, and the governor-general. The double government never worked well, not because it was a double government, as was supposed by many, but because the objects of the two governing bodies were opposed. Either the board of control should have been so constituted as to be a check, in the interest of the nation, upon the improper exercise of the privileges entrusted to the company, or the company should have been abolished when the board was formed. The president of that

board aimed at objects altogether alien to the privileges and existence of the company, and in the interest, not of the nation, but of a dominant party of the crown, and of the ministry of the time being.

In the beginning of 1804 the directors were alarmed at the drain of specie caused by the wars of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Castlereagh encouraged the marquis in disregarding the opinions of the directors, who, whenever they complained of the expenses caused by wars, were set at nought by the joint action of the person at the head of the board at home, and the person at the head of the council abroad. While war was raging, and the directors dreaded bankruptcy, the board of control was engaged in costly plans connected with the Calcutta college and other projects.

In 1805 the policy of Lord Wellesley was impugned with great severity in the house of commons by Paull. This gentleman had been a servant of the company, and resident in Oude. In that situation he received much kindness from Lord Wellesley, which he repaid with ingratitude. The dissolution of parliament in 1807 stopped Mr. Paull's proceedings. This gentleman did not again obtain a seat in parliament. He committed suicide in 1808.

Lord Folkestone took up the impeachment of Lord Wellesley. He was aided by a considerable number of members, but their in-criminatory resolutions were rejected by large majorities. Still his lordship's transactions in Oude were regarded as precisely similar to those of Hastings, and it was demanded that his aristocratic connexions should not screen him. The whole of these discussions were set at rest by a resolution, asserting his personal honour, public zeal, and usefulness, being proposed by Sir John Anstruther, which was carried by an overwhelming majority. This did not satisfy the directors of the East India Company, who persisted in regarding the policy of Lord Wellesley as one of aggrandizement and war, injurious to the trade and ruinous to the finance of the company. They believed that neither the war with Tippoo nor the Mahrattas was necessary, that both should have been allowed to pursue their course of intrigue in their own way, the governor-general simply providing for the security of the company's territories in case of invasion.

Throughout these proceedings in the commons the noble marquis received the support of the crown and the cabinet. He was even offered the seals of the foreign office during the progress of the parliamentary proceedings. His lordship, with a high sense of honour, such as all who knew him would have expected, declined office while charges were hanging over him.

In 1809 he was deputed ambassador to the junta in Spain; in 1810 he was invested with the Order of the Garter, and throughout his long career held many offices of distinction, and always with honour.

When Lord Cornwallis assumed the government of India, his first care was that most usually the trouble of all governor-generals—*finance*. He was very popular with the directors; they were therefore filled with astonishment and alarm when they learned that he had taken treasure intended for the Chinese investment out of the ships at Madras, to the amount of a quarter of a million sterling. When, in February, 1806, intelligence of his lordship's death reached England, the directors received it with the deepest concern. Apart from the personal esteem which they entertained for him, he had initiated a policy of retrenchment to make up for the quarter of a million sterling, and to compensate for the war policy of his predecessor. So attached were the directors to his lordship, and so highly did they approve of his plans, that they bestowed upon his son and successor the sum of £40,000.

On the 20th of January, 1806, Mr. Pitt died, a man whose policy had exercised a decisive influence upon the affairs of the company. But for him it is probable the board of control had never been formed.

A fierce contest ensued between the board of control and the court of directors in naming a successor to Lord Cornwallis. It was agreed on all hands that Sir George Barlow should occupy that post temporarily, but the board wished to force upon the directors Lord Lauderdale; the directors contended that Sir G. Barlow, their own servant, was competent. They knew nothing of Lord Lauderdale, had no confidence in him, and would not be parties to his appointment. The court refused to revoke the appointment of Sir George. Lord Minto had succeeded Lord Castlereagh as president of the board of control, and he intimated to the directors, on the 29th of May, that the king had revoked the appointment of Sir G. Barlow. The court of directors presented an indignant remonstrance. As a compromise, Lord Minto himself was appointed. The whole proceeding was discreditable to the crown and the cabinet. Whatever the merits of Lord Minto ultimately proved to be, Sir G. Barlow was competent, and there was no ground for his removal but the desire on the part of the ruling party in the state to wrest the patronage from the company, and make the office of governor-general of India an appointment dependent upon the services rendered in English party politics by the person obtaining it.

This mode of disposing of the high office of governor-general of India was as strikingly illustrated by the way in which Lord Minto himself was replaced by the Earl of Moira (Marquis of Hastings). Professor Wilson states that on the change of ministry in November, 1811, the ministry were obliged by circumstances to confer the office on Lord Moira. His lordship had been engaged to form a ministry, and this was to be his reward.

"A resolution was accordingly moved by the chairman (of the court of directors), under the dictation, no doubt, of the board of control, that Lord Minto should be recalled. No reason for the measure was assigned; but it was adopted in opposition to the tenor of a letter received from Lord Minto's friends, expressing his wish to be relieved in January, 1814. This letter was assigned as the reason for the immediate appointment of Earl Moira; but, as objected by one of the opponents of the arrangement, Mr. Charles Grant, the plea was delusive, as no one could pretend to assign it as a sufficient reason for proceeding to the choice of a governor-general in November, 1811, whose presence at Fort William could only be necessary in January, 1814."

In the years 1813-14 the amount of the debt of India was £27,000,000; the interest, £1,636,000, a permanent diminution of £592,000 annual interest. But taking the sicca rupee at two shillings, the debt would be only £23,183,000, and the interest only £1,402,287.

The year 1813 was one of great importance to the East India Company. It was then the first great inroad was made in its exclusive privileges. From the beginning of 1811 a very warm discussion was maintained by the mercantile public, and by political economists, with "the East India interest." A very considerable power was brought to bear upon the members of both houses of parliament against the renewal of the company's charter.

On the 22nd of February a petition was presented to parliament by the company praying for a renewal of the charter, and setting forth the grounds upon which such prayer was urged.

On the 13th of March the house of commons, on the motion of Lord Castlereagh, resolved itself into a committee, when his lordship submitted resolutions altering the constitution of the company. The company demanded permission to give evidence, and to be heard at the bar of the house. On the 30th of March their first witness was produced, no less a person than the great Warren Hastings. Afterwards the subject was con-

sidered by select committees, and the results published in two large quarto volumes.\* The minister was not moved by any evidence submitted by the company: neither were the commons. They passed the resolutions of Lord Castlereagh, and a bill founded on them. The lords hastily passed it.†

In the chapter on the government of India, notice was taken of the various changes made in the power and authority of the company by successive acts of parliament. It is therefore unnecessary in this place to enlarge upon the subject of the changes in 1813. The following abstract of the modifications then made is, however, necessary to enable the reader to take a comprehensive view of the new condition of the company, and the way in which the affairs of India were influenced by them:—

“The trade of India was thrown open in ships of a given tonnage, under license from the court of directors, on whose refusal an appeal lay to the board, to whom the directors were to transmit the papers with their resolution thereon. The resort of parties to India for commercial and other purposes was placed under similar provisions.

“In order to satisfy the doubts which had arisen regarding the outturn of the company’s commercial affairs, the accounts were, in future, to be separated, under the two heads of ‘territory’ and ‘commerce,’ according to a plan approved by parliament. It exhibited what portion of the extensive establishments, both in India and at home, came under each head of charge, and showed the result of the company’s financial resources, whether arising from commerce or territory.

“A general authority was given to the board over the appropriation of the territorial revenues, and the surplus commercial profits, which might accrue after a strict observance of the appropriation clauses.

“The board were to have control over the college and seminary in England. The offices of governor-general, governors, and commanders-in-chief were now made subject to the approval of the crown. Restoration of suspended or dismissed servants was not valid without the consent of the board; neither could the court of directors grant any sum beyond £600 without their concurrence.

“An episcopal establishment was also authorised.”

The revenue measures of the Marquis Hastings occupied the attention of the court of directors during several years, beginning in 1816. His reports on criminal justice and

\* *Reports of the East India Committees*, 1813-14.

† 53 George III., cap. 155.

civil judicature made in 1818, also engaged much of the attention of the directors.

In 1819 the directors were so pleased with the labours and successes, civil and military, of the Marquis of Hastings, that they recommended the court of proprietors to vote a sum of £60,000 out of the territorial revenues of India, to purchase estates in any part of the United Kingdom for his lordship’s emolument.

From the year 1819 until the termination of the government of Lord Hastings, disputes were maintained between the British and Dutch governments concerning Eastern affairs. The occupation of Singapore, where Sir Stamford Raffles had asserted British authority, provoked the jealous susceptibilities of the Dutch, who, after the surrender to them of the Island of Java, laid claim to a monopoly of the trade of the Archipelago. Mr. Canning was then president of the board of control, and he spared no pains to qualify himself to meet the Dutch commissioners, who were appointed to press upon the English government an adjustment of the dispute. For five years these debates continued, frequent reference to India necessarily deferring a settlement. At last, in 1824, a treaty terminated the contest. By this agreement the Dutch were to surrender to the English all their settlements in continental India; Malacca and Singapore were to be recognised as English settlements. The Dutch were to obtain Sumatra. Great public dissatisfaction was felt by the British mercantile public with this treaty. To the influence of Sir Stamford Raffles it was due that the English minister who in 1814 had surrendered Java, did not surrender all the Straits’ settlements. Lord Castlereagh cared little for commerce, or the commercial classes; his aim was to satisfy the despotic governments of the continent, and maintain an intimate alliance with them. His successors for many years were as little disposed to study the interests of the mercantile classes.

Sir Evan Nepean having resigned the government of Bombay in 1818, Mr. Canning intimated to the directors his desire to appoint as governor of that presidency some eminent servant of the company, or distinguished otherwise in public employment. This was an invasion by Mr. Canning of the custom of the board of control in grasping at the patronage of India for party and ministerial purposes. The directors made choice of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.\* He was nominated governor of Bombay in October, 1818.

In 1823 the Marquis of Hastings was re-

\* Subsequently this gentleman acquired great celebrity by his work on India, especially the Mohammedan period of Indian history.

ceived, upon his return to England, with distinguished manifestation of approval by the government and the company. It was resolved by the latter to confer upon him some further substantial mark of their approbation. This consisted in a vote of £20,000 to his son, which, however, was not conferred until 1827.

When, in 1822, the Marquis Hastings resigned the office of governor-general, the Right Hon. George Canning was nominated to that office. This was the spontaneous act of the directors, in consequence of Mr. Canning's intelligent and conciliatory direction of the board of control. This arrangement was, however, doomed to disappointment, for the death of the Marquis of Londonderry (Lord Castlereagh) led to a reconstruction of parties, and of the ministry, and on the 18th of September Mr. Canning accepted the seals of the foreign office.

In 1819 Sir Thomas Munro was appointed governor of Madras, and it was generally expected that, upon the resignation of Mr. Canning, he would be promoted to the vacated office. Two other candidates of greater influence, however, stood forward, Earl Amherst and Lord W. Bentinck. The interest of the former nobleman prevailed. He assumed the office on the 1st of August, 1823. Mr. Adam the senior member of council, had filled the chair from the departure of the Marquis of Hastings.

For several years after the departure of Earl Amherst to his government, the company and parliament had little to occupy them concerning India of a nature to interest the general public, except returning thanks for victories gained by British troops in fresh wars, and the distribution of prize-money won by their exploits.

In 1827 the company was deprived of a valuable servant by the death of Sir Thomas Munro. He had rendered great advantages to the presidency of Madras by his improvements in the judicial and revenue systems, and possessed the highest confidence of the court of directors and proprietary. His opinions on Indian affairs are quoted as decisive authority, yet few men of eminence in India, and of equal ability and experience, have more frequently erred in their views of the probable prospects of the people and the country. The directors found it a difficult task to select a suitable successor to Sir Thomas Munro. Their choice fell upon the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, Jan. 1827. On the same day, Major-general Sir John Malcolm was appointed governor of Bombay, in the room of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.\* Nei-

ther Mr. Lushington nor General Malcolm left England for India until the July following the date of his nomination to office. The year which witnessed the appointment of Mr. Lushington and Sir John Malcolm to the government of the minor presidencies, saw the departure of Lord Amherst from India, and the appointment of Lord W. Bentinck as governor-general. He did not, however, leave England for his post of honour until February, 1828. He and Lord Amherst met at the Cape of Good Hope.

The uneasiness of the court of directors during 1828-9, concerning the increase of the public debt in India, was very great. From 1824 to 1828 it had increased more than thirteen millions sterling, in consequence of war, and the acquisitions of territory causing the extension of the civil service. The revenues of the company did not keep pace with this accumulation of debt. The instructions of the board of directors to the governor-general to effect retrenchment assumed a tone of great urgency.

In 1830 the proposition for constituting a legislative council occupied the government in Calcutta and in London. In the month of October in that year the draft of a proposed bill was sent to the court of directors by the governor-general, for the purpose of being submitted to parliament. This draft underwent modifications, after much discussion at the board of control and the court of directors, and finally formed a part of the new act upon the renewal of the company's charter in 1833.

In the month of May, 1833, Lord William Bentinck was appointed commander-in-chief in India; in the room of Sir Edward Barnes. This was the third instance of a governor-general being at the same time commander-in-chief. During the whole time of Lord William Bentinck's government the correspondence between the company and the governor-general on the subject of revenue was constant. The revenue papers of this period are most voluminous, and disclose the labour and ability of his lordship, and the diligence and talent which were then in the court of directors.

The employment of natives in various departments of the state was strenuously advocated by Lord William Bentinck, and perhaps too readily acquiesced in to the extent of his recommendations by the directors. Native agents must be employed in India, but they constitute the grand difficulty of administration. Evils for which the government of the presidencies, the supreme council, the board of control, and the court of directors have been held severally or together responsible.

\* This enlightened historian, diplomatist, statesman, and administrator died in 1859.

have originated in the native agencies, which are almost always corrupt, mercenary, cruel, and perfidious.

During the government of Lord William Bentinck the home authorities were much occupied with the consideration of the dilatory modes of communication between India and England. Except in certain instructions regulating the personal conduct of the governor-general, little was done to remedy an inconvenience intensely felt. The subject of steam navigation, as applied to India, had been brought under the notice of the court in 1823 by a despatch from the government of Bombay, but in the meantime nothing had been effected. In the year 1825 the voyage to India by steam had been accomplished in the ship *Enterprise*, commanded by Captain Johnson. She was, however, under sail without steam a fourth of her voyage. This ship, with other steamers, had been employed in the Birmese war, yet no organized method of utilizing steam, for the benefit of our Indian empire, and English communication with it, had been adopted. The enterprising labours of Mr. Waghorn, in order to establish steam navigation *via* Egypt, engaged the attention of the English in India and in England during a considerable portion of Lord William Bentinck's administration. It was not until 1834 that the subject was thoroughly taken up by the house of commons. It was deemed expedient to extend the line of the Malta packets to such ports in Egypt and Syria as would complete the communication between England and India, and that a grant of £20,000 should be made by parliament for trying the experiment with the least possible delay. The enterprises of Colonel (General) Chesney in proving that the Euphrates was navigable, and that its navigation might be made to facilitate the intercommunication of the East and West, also engaged parliamentary discussion.

The dreadful bankruptcies of commercial houses in Calcutta and other parts of India, in 1833-4, produced great alarm in London, and in several respects embarrassed the court of directors. In the commercial chapters of this work an account was given of this state of things in India, and the causes which produced it.

In a former chapter a history of the different charters was presented to the reader, rendering it unnecessary in this place to enter into minute detail. The affairs of the company, however, assumed in 1833-4 an aspect so entirely new as to require a relation of their progress. On Thursday, the 13th of June, 1833, Mr. Grant, in a committee of the whole house, brought before the commons the consideration of the charter. He made a general

statement on behalf of the government, and proposed a series of resolutions. The statement partly conveyed the purposes of the government, and partly the opinions upon which their project was based. The following, stripped of the arguments and eloquence of the speaker, is an abstract of his statement:—"The whole of the transaction was to be entirely free from the finances of this country. The ability of the Indian territories was not to be doubted. The intentions with regard to the internal government of India were then pointed out. It was proposed to establish a fourth government in the western provinces; to extend the powers of the governor-general; to appoint a supreme council, to whom power was to be given to make laws for India, and to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay were to be made more subordinate to the governor-general, and their councils reduced. The following resolutions were then moved:—

"1st. That it is expedient that all his majesty's subjects shall be at liberty to repair to the ports of the empire of China, and to trade in tea and in all other productions of the said empire, subject to such regulations as parliament shall enact for the protection of the commercial and political interests of this country.

"2nd. That it is expedient that, in case the East India Company shall transfer to the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, all assets and claims of every description belonging to the said company, the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, shall take on itself all the obligations of the said company, of whatever description; and that the said company shall receive from the revenues of the said territory such a sum, and paid in such a manner, and under such regulations, as parliament shall enact.

"3rd. That it is expedient that the government of the British possessions in India be entrusted to the said company, under such conditions and regulations as parliament shall enact, for the purpose of extending the commerce of this country, and of securing the good government, and promoting the moral and religious improvement of the people of India."

These resolutions, and the bill founded upon them, a copy of which was sent to the directors on the 29th of June, led to much discussion between the company and the ministers of the crown. On the 3rd of July the bill was laid before the court of proprietors, having been presented to parliament and read a first time on the 28th of June. The second reading of the bill took place in the

commons on the 11th of July, and a third time on the 26th. The bill went up to the lords with such powerful support that it rapidly passed that house, being read a third time on the 16th of August. On the 28th the royal assent was given to it by commission. The rapidity with which the bill was carried was thought as extraordinary as the change which it effected in the character of the company.

M. Auber makes the following comment upon the parliamentary success with which the government measure was crowned, and the policy of the East India Company in reference to a bill which deprived it of so much of its authority and privilege:—"The change which it has made in the character of the company is as great as the rapidity with which it was effected was extraordinary. Scarcely six weeks intervened between the announcement of the scheme to the general court and its adoption in principle by a ballot of eight to one in its favour. It was a strong testimony to the judgment and foresight manifested by the court of directors in the management of the company's commercial affairs, that, on so sudden and unexpected a termination of those operations, the financial

out-turn should have secured a continuation of the same rate of dividend as had been enjoyed by the stockholders for the preceding forty years, when the company were in possession of their exclusive privileges, and also provide for the foundation of an accumulating guarantee fund for their principal of twelve millions."

The commercial character of the company was now at an end. From 1813 to 1834 it existed in a restricted form; in April, 1834, it ceased for ever. Its title of "East India Company," and its territorial lordship, remained. All the commercial property of the company was sold. Their *real* capital was estimated at twenty-one millions sterling. Their dividends were guaranteed by the act of 1833, on a nominal capital of six millions, at  $10\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. These dividends were made chargeable on the revenue of India. Although subsequent events did not confirm such expectations, the charter of 1833-4 ostensibly threw open India to British adventurers, and natives and settlers were eligible to office. How the new charter worked, and its effects upon affairs, home or Indian, must be reserved for other chapters.

## CHAPTER CVII.

### GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST—BURMESE WAR—CAPTURE OF RANGOON—ADVANCE UP THE IRRIWADDY—OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BENGAL—TREATY WITH BURMAH.

LORD HASTINGS left Calcutta in January, 1823, and Mr. Adam, as senior member of council, assumed the government *pro tempore*. That gentleman only retained the high office seven months, during which he obtained much odium and much praise. Some of his measures were well calculated to confer benefit on India; others, although well meant, were not fortunate, and some were very unfavourably received. None of them were of sufficient importance to bring before our readers. That which involved Mr. Adam's administration in most discussion at home was his attempt to impose restrictions upon the press, which the Marquis of Hastings had removed. Mr. Adam believed that the natives who possessed some education would use the press seditiously, and that European settlers would employ it to the detriment of the company. It was explained in the last chapter how Mr. Canning was elected to the post vacated by Lord Hastings, and resigned the

office before sailing for India. It was also shown how Lord Amherst secured the interest requisite for an appointment which began to be regarded as desirable by the highest of the aristocracy. When, on the 1st of August, 1823, Earl Amherst arrived, he found serious cares remaining for the government. There was nothing in the first few months during which he administered affairs to call for remarks from the historian, but he was then obliged to maintain a war with the Burmese, which, as shown in former chapters, had for many years menaced the frontiers of Assam and Arracan. This formidable quarrel was the more an impediment to the civil administration of his lordship, as his government was much opposed by the partizans of Lord Hastings, and he was himself averse from several of the noble marquis's proceedings, especially in the affairs of Calcutta and Bengal. Captain White observes:—"It is almost impossible to imagine the arduous, difficult, and

perplexing situation in which Lord Amherst stood. For besides the important duties he had to perform as governor-general, he had a most formidable opposition to contend against in the council chamber. This was produced by the *change of men* in the change of governor-generals. Lord Hastings had generally left much to his council or his favourites, who were men certainly not of the most brilliant talent. Lord Amherst, not wishing to imitate the example of the noble marquis, determined to judge for himself, and not by proxy. There were other causes, too, which tended to create difficulty, and render his lordship unpopular. These were unfortunate circumstances to have happened at any time, but more particularly so at that critical period; because they all tended not only to embarrass the mind of his lordship, which required the utmost tranquillity, but to impede the progress and welfare of the operations of government."

The captain was himself a partizan of Earl Amherst, and some allowance must be made when he draws a comparison invidious to Lord Hastings. It was, however, plain enough that the noble earl inherited from the noble marquis some very troublesome questions, which the friends of the former would have preferred to find in a satisfactory course of settlement.

#### BIRMESE WAR.

The *immediate* cause of hostilities with Birmah was rival claims concerning the Island of Shuparee, situated at the entrance of the Nauf river. This river was the boundary between the two territories, and, flowing between the island and the Birmese side, the English naturally claimed it as their own. The Birmese contended that it had been theirs centuries before; but if this claim had been good, they might also be the owners of Chittagong and Moorshedabad. The Birmese had made no pretension to this island until 1821, nor did they then urge any alleged right. Their demand, therefore, in 1823 had all the appearance of seeking an occasion for war.

Early in January, 1823, a "Mugh boat," laden with grain, was passing near the island. It was stopped by the Birmese, and the steersman was shot. The object of this was to deter the ryots of the company from cultivating the island, which being a mere sand-bank, was certainly not an enviable possession for either British or Birmese. When the magistrate of Chittagong heard of the cruel outrage, he posted a sergeant's guard of sepoys upon the island. Immediately the Birmese assembled a much stronger force on

their bank of the Nauf. The English magistrate increased the strength of the post to fifty men. Early in May the Birmese authorities of Arracan made a formal demand to the magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the troops, or there would be war. Late in May the demand was renewed more sternly, and in language of stronger menace. The magistrate replied that the island had belonged to the British for a lengthened period, but if the King of Ava had a claim, it would be negotiated at Calcutta, in conformity with justice and the friendship of the two nations, but that force would be repelled by force.

On the 3rd of August a vakeel from the governor of Arracan waited upon the magistrate of Chittagong, and made a written demand for withdrawal from the island, which, it alleged, belonged not to the British, but to the "Golden Government." The governor-general himself replied to this communication, asserting the right of the Bengal government to the island, but offering to send an officer of rank to negotiate, and bring all disputes, if possible, to an amicable termination. The Birmese had no faith in the English government from the repeated violations of pledges in former disputes, they therefore resolved to bring the matter to the arbitrament of force. On the night of the 24th of September a party of 1000 Birmese landed on the island, attacked and routed the guard of sepoys, killing and wounding several. What Sir John Malcolm had predicted had come to pass, and in consequence of the neglect, on the part of the government of Bengal, of those means which he had recommended. The Birmese did not remain on the island, and as soon as they evacuated it, another party of sepoys was sent there.

The governor-general, anxious to promote peace, treated the attack on the island as one by the governor of Arracan, unauthorised by his imperial majesty of Ava. A letter was sent to Rangoon, by ship from Calcutta, addressed to the viceroy, mildly expostulating against the outrage committed, and expressing the expectation that the act of the governor of Arracan would be disavowed. The governor-general also addressed a letter to the governor of Arracan, expressing his astonishment and indignation. The rajah replied:—"The island was never under the authority of the Moors or the English; the stockade thereon has consequently been destroyed in pursuance of the commands of the great Lord of the Seas and Earth. If you want tranquillity, be quiet; but if you rebuild a stockade at Shein-ma-bu, I will cause to be taken by force of arms the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged

to the great Arracan Rajah, whose chokies and pagodas were there." \* The rajah also verbally informed the messenger dispatched with the letter that if the British government attempted to retake the island, they would invade Bengal by Assam and Goolpara, and would enter Chittagong by the mountains from Goorjeeneea, up to Tipperah: adding that the King of Ava had armies ready for the invasion of the British dominions at every point; and that they had driven them from the Island of Shuparee by his majesty's command.

It was evident from this reply, written and *viva voce*, that the Birmese emperor had been long preparing for war, and had laid his plan of operations.

On the 11th of November the agent to the company on the north-east frontier announced to the government that a large force had been dispatched from the Birmese province of Assam for the conquest of Cachar; bordering on the company's province of Silhet. The English government had made a tributary convention with Cachar, and in virtue of this demanded that the Birmese troops should make no offensive demonstrations against that state. The Birmese, however, claimed an older prescription for a connection of the same kind. The English, therefore, threatened as they were along the whole line of the north-east frontier,—the Birmese openly avowing their intention to wrest from them Moorshedabad, Dacca, Tipperah, and Chittagong,—could allow no incursion in that direction by the troops of Bir-mah. On the south-east frontier of Chittagong, large armies were collecting for the purposes of invasion in that quarter. "It was no longer a question for the surrender of fugitives and rebels, but a far more important one—who should be the supreme sovereigns of India."

In January, 1824, the sepoys were withdrawn from the island at the mouth of the Nauf, in consequence of its unhealthy situation. The Arracan rajah then offered to regard it as neutral territory, but accompanied the proposal with insulting menaces of invasion in case of non-compliance. The governor-general refused to accept a proposal so made.

On the 15th of January four ministers of rank from Ava arrived on the frontier, crossed to the island, and hoisted the standard of the Birmese empire. The ministers sent invitations to the officers of the company's troops on the frontier to visit them, and to the officers of vessels in the river, in the hope

\* *Political History of the Events which led to the Birmese War.*

of accommodating matters by friendly conversation. The officers of the pilot schooner, *Sophia*, attended by two lascars, landed in acceptance of the invitation. They were all seized and sent into the interior of Arracan. The military officers were sufficiently wary not to place themselves in the power of a people who made war so treacherously. This perfidious and violent act of the Birmese emperor's ministers alarmed the people on the Chittagong frontier, who fled with their families, fearing that they might be seized and made slaves. The English government demanded the restoration of the kidnapped officers and lascars, and reparation for the offence. No notice was taken of the demand. The British employed themselves writing and negotiating when they ought to have been acting, and in this way increased the public danger, and caused eventually a heavier loss of human life.

At the end of January, 1824, the Rajah of Arracan formally refused, in the name of the emperor, to deliver up the officers and men of the *Sophia*. Early in the same month Cachar was invaded by two Birmese armies. The English met this demonstration by several well-written letters on the part of their agent, which probably amused more than edified the Birmese commanders; and certainly, after all that had occurred between the two states, was not likely to deter the Birmese officers from executing the commands of their superiors. The general wrote a letter in reply, the substance of which might be comprised in one of its sentences—"We have eyes and ears, and have the interest of our sovereigns at heart."\*

The regions of Cachar and Assam were torn by factions, which facts were made available by the Birmese to promote their own designs of aggrandizement. The English resolved to make these local feuds instrumental in checking the Birmese. Accordingly, on the 18th of January, the officer on the frontier, learning that a united Birmese and Assamese force had passed into Cachar, at the foot of the Birtealien pass, and were stockading themselves at Bickram-pore, and that two other forces had penetrated in other directions, resolved also to enter the Cachar country. The first blood drawn was on the 17th, the English fell in with a Birmese stockade, from which a fire was opened upon them. Major Newton, who commanded the British, stormed the blockade in the most gallant manner with trifling loss, and put 175 Birmese to the bayonet. The Birmese army, six thousand in number, advanced within five miles of the company's

\* There were two kings or emperors at Ava, the temporal and the ecclesiastical.

territory. Major Newton withdrew his troops to the frontier post of Bhadrapore. The English wrote letters, and sent messengers requesting the Birmese to do what they had so many times declared they would not do. Instead of attending to these epistolary expostulations, they published flaming manifestoes, strongly stockaded themselves on the English frontier, and demanded that Major Newton and his soldiers should be given up to the Birmese authorities to be executed! The English, of course, again replied, and it is difficult to say how long they would have continued to substitute arguments for arms, if events had not compelled a more decisive course. The release of the kidnapped mariners, who had been treated kindly in their captivity, possibly deferred a little the final blow; but it at last fell—the governor-general proclaimed war against the Birmese empire. The justice of his doing so has been arraigned by a party in England who are ever ready to denounce the proceedings of their own government, and more especially in India. The following opinion and statement of facts, from the pen of the immortal Sir Henry Havelock, the saviour of India, is a just defence of the war:—"Previous to this invasion of our little island territory, the question of the direct invasion of Bengal had been discussed in the hall of the Lotoo, or grand council of state, and the king, though a man of mild disposition, and not caring much to encounter a war with the governors of India, had yielded to the arguments of his councillors, and, amidst the applauses of the assembly, had sanctioned the invasion of Bengal. At that grand council the Bundoola, with vows and vehement gestures, announced that from that moment Bengal was taken from under the British dominions; his words being: 'Henceforth it has become in fact, what it has ever been in right, a province of the Golden King. The Bundoola has said and sworn it.'"<sup>\*</sup> It was a war, said Havelock, "for the vindication of the national honour, insulted and compromised by the aggressions and encroachments of a barbarous neighbour. A war for the security of the peaceable inhabitants of the districts of Chittagong, Moorshedabad, Rungpore, Silhet, Tipperah, menaced with the repetition of the atrocities perpetrated the year before in Assam. That would indeed have been a parental government that should have consented to have abandoned its subjects to the tender mercies of Bundoola and the Maha Silwa!"<sup>†</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> *The Good Soldier: A Memoir of Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.* By Rev. W. Owen. London.

<sup>†</sup> It is not generally known that "the good soldier,"

The measures taken by the commander-in-chief of the British army were as follows. He recommended three brigades of three thousand men each to be stationed on the eastern frontier, at Chittagong, Jumalpoore, and a flotilla on the Burrampooter towards Assam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The troops on the frontier were ordered to defend those provinces, and if necessary or politic, to cross into the frontiers of the enemy, but not to seek conquests in those directions. The grand attack was to be made on the maritime provinces of the Birmese empire.

Thus, while the emperor meditated an invasion of the contumacious territory of the British, the latter, barely defending that line, carried war along the coasts of the emperor. The troops to conduct the defensive operations belonged, as a matter of course, to the Bengal army. The forces destined for offensive operations were partly from Bengal, and partly from Madras, royal and company's regiments: from Bengal his majesty's 13th and 38th foot, two companies of artillery, and the 40th native infantry (marine corps), 2175 men; from Madras his majesty's 41st and 89th foot and Madras European regiment, and, including seven native regiments, 9th, 12th, 28th, and 30th Madras native infantry, artillery, and pioneers, 9300 men, or grand total, 11,475 men. The object was to occupy Rangoon and the country at the mouth of the Irrawaddy river. The Bengal troops sailed in April, 1824. Besides transports, there was

Sir Henry Havelock, was an author. On this subject our readers will peruse with interest the following remarks of the Rev. W. Owen, from his most interesting memoir of the general:—"Havelock had not been long in India before the outbreak of the first Birmese war called into action his qualities as a soldier, and subsequently gave him an opportunity of employing his pen as a 'soldierly writer.' Owing to the publication of his 'Memoir' in Serampore instead of London, and six months after the excitement had died away, the work never acquired the popular favour which its merits should have commanded. The volume has nearly fallen into the class of rare books, and it is said that one copy only can be found in London. This book affords an opportunity of presenting Havelock before the public as the narrator of the various scenes in which his military prowess was first called into exercise. The memoir of the three campaigns of Sir Archibald Campbell's army in Ava was written when Henry Havelock was a lieutenant in the 13th light infantry, and deputy-adjutant-general to the forces of the Rangoon expedition. The writer, who speaks of this production as his 'first essay in military history,' tells us that he 'was employed on the general staff of the Rangoon expedition; and that he has devoted a very few hours of his leisure of peace to tracing this memorial of the operations of an army, a part of the sufferings of which he shared, and the last successes of which he had the happiness to witness.' Havelock describes this war as one directed 'against barbarians, a struggle against local difficulties, and as excluding the promise of those splendid achievements which illustrate the page of history.'"

a flotilla of twenty-gun brigs, and as many row-boats carrying an eighteen pounder each. There were his majesty's sloops *Larne* and *Sophia*, and several company's cruisers, and the *Diana* steamboat. Major-general Sir A. Campbell, commander-in-chief of the forces; Brigadier-general Macbean commanded the Madras troops. The Bengal troops reached the rendezvous about the end of April (Port Cornwallis in the great Andamans). They were joined by his majesty's frigate *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, and *Slaney*, sloop-of-war. The last Madras division left on the 23rd of May, and joined at Rangoon in June and July. More troops were sent from Madras in August and September; and, by the end of 1824, his majesty's 47th regiment and the governor-general's body-guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign 13,000 men. Captain Canning went as political agent and joint commissioner with Sir Archibald Campbell.

On the 9th May, 1824, the expedition arrived off the Rangoon river, and the same evening (in nautical phrase), "stood in." Before arriving at Rangoon, detachments were sent to seize the islands of Cheduba and Negrais.\* There were various other operations in the neighbourhood of Rangoon, all of them successful, scarcely any opposition having been offered. The approach of the fleet to Rangoon caused the greatest consternation. The account given by Major-general Sir Henry Havelock (as he ultimately became) is graphic and striking:†—"The arrival of the British fleet off the mouth of the Rangoon river filled the court of Ava with consternation, and was immediately followed by some of those demonstrations of rage and cruelty which display the barbarous character of the people against whom the expedition was directed. The subordinate officer left in command of Rangoon immediately directed the seizure of all the English residents in the town, an order which included all 'who wore the English hat.' In consequence of this order the American and English missionaries, the British merchants, the American merchants, and other wearers of the English hat were seized, loaded with fetters, and thrown into prison. The sufferings to which these persons were exposed, and their subsequent release, depicted by Havelock in vivid colours, correspond in a striking manner with recent exhibitions of Indian cruelty, while their release might be regarded as a sort of promise of future acts of deliverance in which Havelock was to bear a

leading part. The historian tells us that 'they had been dragged from their homes under every circumstance of brutal indignity; their clothes had been torn off, their arms tied behind them with ropes, tightened until they became instruments of torture rather than means of security. They had been followed by the execrations of the populace, whose national barbarity was heightened into frenzy by the terrors of the crisis. They had been loaded with chains. They spent a night of hunger, pain, and agonizing uncertainty. But no sooner had the fleet appeared in sight, than an order from the Rewoon was delivered through the grating of their prison. The prisoners, all of whom were acquainted with the language of the country, listened intently to catch its import. Suspense was converted into despair. The Rewoon had commanded that, if a cannonade should be opened against the town of Rangoon, every prisoner should be put to death. The first gun was to be the signal for their decapitation. Instantly the gaolers commenced their preparations. Some spread over the floor of the Taik-dau a quantity of sand to imbibe the blood of the victims. Others began to sharpen their knives with surprising diligence. Others brandished their weapons with gestures and expressions of sanguinary joy over the heads of the captives. Some seizing them, and baring their necks, applied their fingers to the spine with an air of scientific examination. The Birmans, coerced for ages by dint of tortures and frightful punishments, have acquired a kind of national taste for executions. The imagination cannot picture a situation more dreadful than that of these foreigners placed at the mercy of such fiends. These prisoners, who were subsequently brought still nearer to death, were at length set free by the entry of the British troops.'" The authorities and the inhabitants of Rangoon fled, after opening a feeble cannonade, so that the English entered the place almost unopposed. Both Commodore Grant, who commanded the naval squadron, and Sir Archibald Campbell, the military commander, were of opinion that by the river the forces might proceed to the capital; an opinion combated by the naval and military staff. Neither of the commanders was acquainted with Indian warfare. Sir Archibald had served well in Spain, which did not particularly qualify him for war on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. The army was in fact incapable of going anywhere, by sea or land, in consequence of the defective state of the commissariat—the old deficiency of English armies everywhere. To remain, inadequately supplied with provisions and the place deserted, was almost as difficult as to proceed to

\* Official documents.

† The author of this history quotes from the Rev. W. Owen, who has, with indefatigable pains, selected all the salient points of the gallant general's history of this war.

any other place. The army was also numerically too small, had it been supplied with provisions and land transport, for such operations as might bring the war to a speedy close. To secure the discomfiture of the British by famine, the retreating Birmese laid waste the country. Whatever the effect upon the convenience or comfort of the English, starvation was the result to a large portion of the population. The English contrived to obtain provisions by sea, but the pestilential atmosphere of Rangoon affected their health. In proportion as the troops were kept in activity, the malaria affected them less, even although in their operations they were obliged to travel rice swamps, and the marshy lands on the river's banks. Sir Thomas Munro, writing from Madras to Lord Amherst, strenuously urged the advance of General Campbell upon the capital of Ava by the Irrawaddy. But the councils of the English at Calcutta and Madras, as well as at Rangoon, were hampered by the questions of systematic supplies and well organized transport, questions which seem to have embarrassed the administrators, civil and military alike. When at last, by enormous trouble and expense, and after the failure of innumerable contrivances, Sir A. Campbell obtained such supplies and such amount of conveyance as enabled him to move, he left a garrison at Rangoon, composed of native troops with invalid Europeans, and forming the remainder of his force in three divisions, he advanced against the enemy. Previous to this movement, the British had various skirmishes with the enemy, who formed a cordon around Rangoon to hem in the British, and also to prevent the natives seeking any communication with them. In these skirmishes the Birmese fought with far more obstinacy than the sepoys, but their stockades and huts were generally forced and carried by the bayonet, the English soldiery mainly achieving these exploits, the sepoys swelling the numbers, thereby deterring the enemy, and sometimes directing an efficient musketry fire in answer to the ginjals and matchlocks of the Birmese.

When General Campbell commenced his advance, he headed the first division in person,\* which consisted of only twenty-four hundred men, and was called by way of distinction the land column. The troops composing it were his majesty's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three native battalions, the body-guard, a troop of Bengal horse artillery, and part of the rocket troop. The second division was under Brigadier-general Cotton, consisting of his majesty's 89th, 1st Madras European regiment, two hundred and fifty of the 18th Madras native infantry, foot artillery, and

part of the rocket troop, amounting to only twelve hundred men. The third division, his majesty's 13th and 12th Madras native infantry, with details of artillery, not numbering more than six hundred men. This detachment was under the command of Major Sale.

The plan of operations was for the first division to proceed by land to Prome, situated on the Irrawaddy. The division under General Cotton was to proceed by river, forming a junction with General Campbell at Prome, after carrying the enemy's intrenchments at Panlang and Donabew. The river division was to be accompanied by a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, under Captain Alexander, R.N. Major Sale's small detachment was to operate by sea, in pursuance of which order it proceeded to Cape Negrais.\* Major Sale was directed to proceed against Bassein,† and after clearing the neighbourhood of Birmese troops, to cross the country and join the main body at Henzada, on the Irrawaddy. This little detachment was very successful, landing and destroying the enemy's works, and ascending the Bassein river to the town of that name, from which the enemy retreated, setting it on fire as they retired.

General Cotton's division advanced to Yougan-Chena, where the Rangoon branch separates from the Irrawaddy. The column reached Panlang on the Rangoon river on the 19th of February, and found both banks stockaded. The enemy were without much difficulty shelled out, and as they fled were galled by flights of rockets. A detachment of the Madras native infantry was left as a garrison, and the flotilla proceeded. On the 6th of March they took up a position before Donabew. The works were on the right bank of the river, of great strength, and commanding the whole breadth of the current. "The chief work, a parallelogram of one thousand by seven hundred yards, stood on a bank withdrawn from the bed of the river in the dry season, and rising above it. Two others, one a square of two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre, and the other an irregular work, four hundred yards from it, stood lower down on the river, forming outworks to the principal stockade, commanded and supported by its batteries. All three were constructed of squared beams of timber, provided with platforms, and pierced for cannon; and each had an exterior ditch, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed bamboos, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. One hundred and forty guns of

\* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 119.

† Not to be confounded with a place of the same name near Bombay.

various calibre, and a greater number of ginja's, were mounted on the parapets, and the garrison consisted of twelve thousand men, commanded by the most celebrated general in the service of Ava. General Cotton had left his native regiment at Panlang, and part of the Europeans to guard the boats and stores. His whole available force did not, therefore, exceed six hundred bayonets, a force manifestly inadequate to the storming of Donabew.\*

General Cotton having unconditional orders to attack, determined to obey them. On the 7th of March he formed two columns, composed together of five hundred men. They advanced against the smaller stockade, under cover of the fire of two field-pieces and a rocket battery. It was an easy conquest. The next attempt was directed against the second intrenchment; two hundred men were ordered against it, but they were overwhelmed with numbers and driven back. The disparity of force rendered the attempt absurd if not criminal. General Cotton was obliged to fall back, and, re-embarking, to drop down the river to Yung-Yung, and await orders from the commander-in-chief.

It was painfully evident that the whole force sent upon the expedition to Rangoon was too small. The government at Calcutta had formed no correct notions of the task to be accomplished, and it does not appear that Sir Thomas Munro, at Madras, had seen matters much more plainly than Lord Amherst. His high reputation gave favour to views which were inexperienced and impracticable.

While Cotton waited for orders, he heard that Sir Archibald Campbell also found himself too weak to advance against Prome, and was obliged to fall back. The commander-in-chief had laid his plan of campaign in ignorance of the resources of his enemies. The plan itself had in the main been recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, and in a tone more confident, if not imperative, than his knowledge of the subject warranted. Sir A. Campbell, by his retrograde movement, came before Donabew on the 25th of March. His army encamped near the river, *above* the works—the flotilla was below them. The flotilla advanced on the 27th, and landed heavy guns and mortars. Before batteries were erected, shells and rockets were thrown into the stockades and intrenchments, causing alarm and loss of life to the enemy, and slaying their commander-in-chief. On the 3rd of April the cannonade of the English opened; the Birmese retired without firing a shot. The post was garrisoned, and Sir

A. Campbell resumed his progress towards Prome. The total loss of the British at Donabew was thirty killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded. The wounded and slain of the enemy probably did not exceed that amount.

On the 8th of April the commander-in-chief was joined at Tharawa by Brigadier M'Creagh, with his majesty's 1st Royal Scots and the 28th Madras native infantry, and a good supply of draught cattle and elephants. The Birman army, rallied by the Prince of Tharawaddi, fell back for the defence of Prome. The commander-in-chief appeared before Prome on the 25th of April. There, as at Donabew, the enemy retired, burning the stockades. At this place General Campbell lingered long without effecting anything, although his force was five thousand men, and fifteen hundred more at Rangoon had received orders to join him. An armistice was agreed upon, to extend from the 17th of September to the 17th of October, in order to enable the English agents and Birmese vakeels to come to terms of peace. In September Sir James Brisbane, commander-in-chief of the British navy in the Indian seas, joined the army.

The Kyi Wungyi met the British general in October, to form definitive terms of a treaty on the plain of Narenzik. It soon became obvious that the demands of the English appeared to the Birmese negotiators as arrogant and unreasonable. They remonstrated, and endeavoured to dissuade the British from making such requisitions; but finding the English general inexorable, they demanded an extension of the armistice until the demands of the English were referred to the emperor. The conditions on which the English general insisted were as follows:—“The court of Ava was expected to desist from all interference with Assam and Cachar, and to recognise their dependence of Manipore. Arracan, with its dependencies, was to be given up to the British, and an indemnity of two crores of rupees (£2,000,000) was to be paid for the expenses of the war; until the discharge of which sum, Rangoon, Martaban, and the Tenasserim provinces were to be held in pledge. A resident was to be received at Ava, and a commercial treaty to be concluded, by which the trade with Rangoon should be relieved from the exactions by which it had hitherto been repressed.”\*

The demands of the English were indignantly spurned by the Birmese court. A new army advanced upon Prome, and being very numerous, nearly invested the British lines, with the intention of intercepting their

\* Deputy judge-advocate-general of the Bengal army.

\* Wilson, vol ix. p. 130.

communications. A powerful detachment of the grand army of Birmah was thrown forward twenty miles from Prome. General Campbell saw that it was essential to the preservation of his communications to dislodge them. On the evening of the 15th of November, Brigadier-general M'Dowall, with five regiments of Madras native infantry, advanced in three columns. The ground was flooded and marshy, and did not admit of the use of field-pieces. The division brought no battering guns. Confusion and ignorance prevailed in the British columns. They were repulsed with heavy loss, the commander of the division was killed, an officer mortally wounded, and nine officers disabled. The total loss killed, wounded, and missing was two hundred and sixteen. It was an experiment with a little army of sepoy infantry. The Birmese showed no apprehension of them, and after their victory, spoke of the sepoys with contempt.

The Birmese were now encouraged to attempt the English lines at Prome. They advanced and intrenched themselves within a few miles of that place. The English, under Campbell and Cotton, attacked them on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, defeating them on every occasion, slaying many, with only a loss of three officers killed, two wounded, one mortally; twenty-five soldiers killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded. The Birmese army was completely routed.

The British reached Meaday on the 19th of December, accompanied by the flotilla. A flag of truce was borne by the enemy to the naval commander, offering to negotiate. Lieutenant-colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., had conducted the previous negotiations, and those officers were again employed to meet the Birmese negotiators. Nevertheless the British, resolved not to be obstructed by delays under the guise of negotiations, advanced, until army and flotilla arrived at Patanagoh, opposite to Melloon, on the 29th of December. On the 30th the negotiators undertook to meet in a boat in the middle of the river. General Campbell, Admiral Brisbane, Mr. T. C. Robertson, the civil commissioner, and their suites, went on board, where four great officers of the imperial government waited to receive them. The demands of the English were repeated, and renewed expostulations and arguments against them were made by the Birmese. At last they gave way, consenting to surrender the territory, but declared their government unable to pay the indemnity. The British, therefore, reduced the demand to a crore of rupees (a million sterling). A definitive treaty was executed on the 3rd of January, 1826. An armistice was settled to extend to the 18th of that month,

to give time for the ratification of the treaty, the Birmese ministers not being plenipotentiaries. On the 17th a deputation of Birmese requested an extension of the armistice. The British, perceiving that the object was to gain time, refused, and demanded the evacuation of the camp of Melloon by sunrise on the 20th, under menace of attack. The Birmese refused to abandon the camp; neither did the ratification of the treaty arrive by the 20th. Melloon was attacked, stormed, and captured.

By far the most interesting account of this action extant is that which is contained in General Sir Henry Havelock's account of this war. He was then a humble lieutenant, but had the genius of a general, and the pen of an accomplished and proficient military writer. The reader of this history will be deeply interested in the perusal of Havelock's most graphic and eloquent description of this battle, of which, in part, he was an eyewitness, and in part a participator. As the work written by the lamented historian and general (as he afterwards became) is not accessible to the public, the following extract will be read with the more interest:—

"When the day broke on the 19th (Jan. 1826), the left bank of the river was seen already lined with batteries. The engineers had accomplished so much of their task in the night, that the bustle in the British camp did not appear lively enough to indicate any extraordinary exertion. A battery of eighteen-pounders and heavy mortars confronted the centre of the grand stockade. Another of lighter pieces had been prepared to batter the pagoda work to the southward. The guns and howitzers of the horse brigade were in battery opposite to the left of the central work. By eleven o'clock, twenty-eight mouths of fire were ready to open on the Melloon. The whole strength of the rocket brigade was ranged near the right of the battery of the centre. At eleven Sir Archibald Campbell, in person, gave the word. The roar of the first salvo shook the ground, rent the air, reverberated amongst the rocks and woods behind Melloon, and died away in sullen echoes from the more distant hills. In an instant it was repeated. The deafening peals succeeded with a rapidity which suggested the image of unchecked vengeance falling in thunder upon the heads of the deceitful barbarians. The British officers on the left bank, stooping and coming forward, bent the eye anxiously to discern the effect upon the hostile camp. It was evident that the artillerists had hit the range at once. Balls were seen to strike the work, raising a cloud of dust and splinters, demolishing the defences, and ploughing up the area of the square. Shells

hit sometimes a few paces from the parapet, behind which the garrison was crouching, bursting among their ranks, sometimes upon the huts of the troops and marked points of the pagodas. The rockets flew in the truest path. Many fell upon the barbarians; many shaped their course direct into the pavilions of the chiefs. Partial fires were soon seen to break out at Melloon. Twice the line of the barbarians which manned the eastern face gave way under the dreadful fire; twice they were rallied by their chiefs. The storm of fire, of shells, and bullets, continued without intermission for an hour and a quarter. Fifteen minutes before one, the boats of the flotilla began to move from a point two hundred yards above the light battery. The first brigade had been embarked on board the leading vessels. The flank companies of the 87th, the 41st, and 89th British, and strong native detachments, found themselves afloat almost at the same moment on board the remainder of the flotilla. General Cotton directed the movements of the troops last mentioned. Lieutenant-colonels Godwin, Parlby, and Hunter Blair served under him as brigadiers. This force was to gain the right bank a little above the great work, and operate against its northern face, now cruelly enfiladed by the horse brigade. As one of its columns was intended to intercept the retreat of the Birmans, the whole body ought to have been put in motion antecedently to the first brigade, the movement of which should have been consecutive; but the attempt which was made to render the advance of both simultaneous, ended in inverting the order of their operations. The first brigade came too soon, and the turning columns too late in contact with the enemy.

"All eyes were now fixed upon the progress of the first brigade. Its boats began to fall rapidly down the stream. Colonel Sale was seen in the leading man-of-war's boat, far a-head of the heavier vessels. The brigade was to attack the south-eastern angle of the great work, the abatis of which was said to be defective. Thus it had to receive the fire of the whole eastern front of the fortification. The Birmans opened every musket and ginjal upon it as soon as the first boat was on a line parallel to the stockade. The stream carried the British within half-musket shot of their numerous enemies, who, relieved from the severity of the cannonade, which the intervention of the boats necessarily caused to be suspended, had now full leisure to direct their fire. It caused a sensation of nervous tremor amongst the unoccupied spectators on the right bank, to see these two old tried corps thus silently enduring the storm of barbarian

vengeance. A dense cloud of smoke from the Birman musketry began to envelop the boats. Now and then, by the flash of a nine-pounder from one of the gun-vessels, she was seen to present her bows for an instant to the line, and direct a pairing shot against the works. But the moment of retribution was at hand. The headmost boat was seen to touch the sand. A body of troops sprang ashore. They formed themselves with the alacrity of practised *tirailleurs* under the slope of the bank. They were a part of the 38th. They began to answer and check the fire of the Birman bastion near them. The vessels followed as rapidly as possible; but all seemed too slow for the wishes of those who looked upon the animating scene. They felt the inexpressible desire to urge on, by the power, as it were, of imagination, to press forward, to impel to the point the headmost boats, which, though dropping quickly, yet seemed to the eyes of impatience to lag. More soldiers leaped upon dry land with a cheer; others followed. The spectators looked for the leader of the brigade. They did not yet know that a ball had struck him between the shoulder and the breast, and that he lay swooning, from the loss of blood, in the boat. The numbers of the column speedily increased; it quickly assumed shape, and was in motion. The advance ceased to fire; the mass of the 13th (this was Lieutenant Havelock's regiment) and the 38th, pressing on, was in a moment at the foot of the works. The soldiers began to spread and seek for a gap, or entrance, with the ready tact produced by experience in such affairs. There was a pause of three seconds, then a move again. The British were seen at once overlooking the works. The Birman fire ceased along the line; all was decided. The barbarians began to rush in headlong flight across the great area; the British column to direct its course full upon the pagodas, which marked the head-quarters of the chiefs. The second column had landed, and was manœuvring upon the north-western angle. The Birmans, warned by the priority of the attack in front, were already issuing from it in large bodies. This was the conflict at Melloon."

The generalship of the English in this battle was severely criticised by Havelock. It was his opinion that, by a different plan of action, a brilliant advantage might have been gained, which was not obtained. As this is not a military work, it would be inappropriate to quote the extended critique of Havelock. It is modestly and gracefully written, and is pervaded by clearness of view, precision of thought, and proves the writer to have been, even at that early period of his military his-

tory, profoundly read, and a deep thinker in military science.

On the 8th of February the army approached within five miles of Pagahm-mew. This place had once been the capital of the Birman empire, and was regarded as a holy city. It was solidly built, and capable of offering much resistance to an enemy, if governed and garrisoned with skill and valour. The Birmese appeared determined to make a stand there, and Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to lose no time in attacking, and, if necessary, storming the place. In the description of what occurred we shall again gratify our readers by a passage from the narrative of the good and great Sir Henry Havelock:—  
 “The British advanced along a narrow road, thickly hedged in on either side with the tree called by the inhabitants *ber*, by the English jujube, and by philosophers *zizyphus jujuba*. It bears a fruit resembling the plum, and varying equally in size. It is in some countries dwarfish, but in this district of Birmah rises to the height of ten or twelve feet, and is commonly defended with thorns. The small force of the British raised clouds of dust in passing over the sandy soil. The Birmans fired the first shot. The advance of their right opened a random fusillade, out of distance, at the head of the column of the 43rd, and then retired. The vanguard of the British (in which Havelock was engaged) in a moment after became engaged with the advance of the barbarian centre, posted at the base of Loganunda. It drove it in. But as the column under the major-general reached the foot of the monument, the enemy showed considerable force in its front, and on its right. As the British moved on, the barbarians rushed forward to meet them. They presented themselves with wild, frantic gestures, and hideous shouts. The whole of the 13th were extended, *en tirailleur*, to resist this sudden onset. The horse artillery got into action. The body-guard supported at the centre. These three corps now formed the true vanguard of the British. The 13th dashed among the barbarians in extended files. They overthrew them. The thickets were soon strewn with their bodies. The barbarians were hotly pursued, thundered upon by the guns of the horse artillery, and cut down by the sowars wherever they could be overtaken. The rest of the force, in seconding this manœuvre, found it difficult to debouch. It was impossible to escape very rapidly from the narrow mouth of the single defile into which the troops were closely wedged together with the carriages of the foot artillery, their rockets and tumbrels. The heat was excessive, and two of the battalions

were harassed by the night march. All this was not sufficiently borne in mind in following up the first advantage. The companies of the 13th, spread along a considerable line, became engaged with formidable masses of the enemy before they could receive any support from the corps of the main body. The barbarian general took advantage of this with a laudable adroitness. He promptly moved up large bodies of horse and foot to the aid of his worsted advance; he caused a mass to debouch from his extreme left, menacing the right flank of the British, and another to press down from his centre to cut off their vanguard from the road. The ground was a succession of hillocks planted with the jujube. Many of the little summits were covered with the ruins of pagodas; others with monuments less worn by time. Thus, the adverse lines were hardly aware how closely they approached each other. A noisy fire was supported along either front. The 13th were very widely extended. The major-general, accompanied by the principal officers of his staff, was in the very centre of the attack of the vanguard. His person must have been distinctly seen by the barbarians. Large bodies advanced within a few yards of him. Their shouts seemed already to announce a victory. The situation of the major-general was for many minutes critical. He had with him only fourteen men of the 13th, sixteen sowars of the body-guard, and two field-pieces of the horse artillery; but their guns threw grape and round shot rapidly and truly amongst the enemy; their quick discharges disconcerted them, and the firm countenances of the troopers and infantry soldiers filled them with uncertainty. They could not in a moment make up their minds to one of those decisive movements by which battles are won. The opportunity which might have saved their capital escaped them. Their masses began to take up the ground from which they had first moved, but remained there steadily and in great force. A heavy firing was at this instant heard on the left. The major-general retired before the enemy's advance, which pressed after him. The Hindostanee troopers displayed a memorable coolness. They waved their sabres proudly to the shouting barbarians, turned their backs only for a moment, then rapidly fronted and resumed their attitude of defiance, riding down the boldest of the Birmans who ventured close to them. Constantly calling to the infantry, which they covered, to quicken their pace, but never quickening their own, thus retiring and fronting in succession, they finally gained a little pagoda mount, on which the major-general had taken his stand. Sir

Archibald Campbell then caused the 13th to be recalled and concentrated by sound of bugle. The guns and howitzers armed the plateau of the mount. Its ruinous brick-work supplied an irregular rampart. The enemy stood formed in immense force directly in front of the hill, their foot backed by squadrons of the Cassay horse. They still showed a disposition to turn the British by both flanks. The major-general surveyed them for a few minutes through his telescope. He then said calmly, as the troops re-formed, 'I have here the 13th and the body-guard; the whole Birman army shall not drive me from this hill.' Nevertheless, some anxious moments had to be passed in this little position. There was yet no intelligence of the movements of the left. The enemy's detached parties of either arm yet inundated the valleys and thickets to the right and left. Some even penetrated to the rear; but, at length, the 89th arrived, and was seen to take up its position in support. All was secure in this quarter, which had been so seriously menaced. The British again prepared to attack the troops of 'The King of Hell';\* but they perceived that he had already sensibly diminished his force in their front. A staff-officer, who had succeeded in communicating with General Cotton, brought news which accounted for this retrograde movement.

"The right flank of the Birmans, and their communications with Pagahm, were already in jeopardy. When General Cotton debouched beyond the Loganunda pagoda, he was opposed, as the major-general had been, by advanced bodies of the barbarians. The 38th routed them, and followed closely the line of their retreat. The Birmans at length threw themselves into a field-work near the bank of the river. Nearly the same thing happened which had before taken place at the outworks of Donabew. The 38th wheeled round the work, under the fire of its defenders, entered it by the rear-ward opening, and began to make a carnage of all within. The barbarians, thus screwed into their own places of defence, leaped in terror over the western parapet. Hundreds rushed headlong down the lofty and most vertical bank of the waters of the Irrawaddy. 'The King of Hell' was compelled to abandon his first position and retire on Pagahm. As soon as the success of the left was announced to General Campbell, he put his column in motion. The statements of prisoners indicated an obstinate

defence in Pagahm. It was thought that only half the day's work was achieved. In half an hour more the lines of manoeuvre taken by all the columns of battalions, except the 43rd, converged upon a single point in the eastern wall of the city. The 13th was the most advanced. The main road descended into a ravine. Beyond this, a village and pagoda intervened, and screened the walls of Pagahm. The enemy were posted here in force. When the firing commenced, the horse artillery were dispatched at full speed to the right, to enfilade the village, and take every successive position of the enemy rapidly in flank; but the leading companies of the 13th had already descended into the valley. The enemy's balls began to strike the huts and trees around them. It was in vain to dally here, exposed to a fire from behind walls. The regiment formed in line quickly, but with the steadiness of a field-day. It advanced at the charge with a loud huzza, and in redoubled time. The levies of 'The King of Hell' had not a chance of remaining. They were driven before the onset of this regiment from position to position, from pagoda to pagoda, from eminence to eminence, back upon, over, within, and again beyond their walls; then from walled inclosure to inclosure, finally into their boats on the Irrawaddy, or along the route to the capital, as panic urged them. All their standards were captured. The major-general and his staff entered by the eastern gate of Pagahm.

"The sound of the last cannon shot had scarcely ceased to echo among the pagodas when the major-general thus conveyed his sentiments to his troops in general orders:— 'Providence has once more blessed with success the British arms in this country; and in the decisive defeat of the imposing force posted under and within the walls of Pagahm-mew, the major-general recognises a fresh display of the military virtues which have characterized his troops from the commencement of the war.'"

Having narrated the successful exploits of the British in their campaign from Rangoon, it is necessary, before stating the final results of the war, to relate the main incidents of the operations from eastern Bengal. Three brigades were stationed at Chittagong, Jumal-pore, and Goalpara; and a flotilla was placed on the Burrampooter river, towards Assam, and in the neighbourhood of Dacca. The English resolved to defend Cachar and Manipore, and carry the war in that direction into the territories of the enemy, if occasion offered. Colonel Innes quartered his brigade at Silhet, Colonel Shapland at Chittagong, Brigadier-general M'Morrice at Goalpara. One of the plans of the British was to penetrate from Cachar through Manipore into the valley of

\* An army of the Birman Emperor, entitled "Retrievers of the King's Glory," was commanded by a savage warrior styled *Nee Woon Breen*, which has been variously translated as "Prince of Darkness," "King of Hell," and "Prince of the Setting Sun."

the Ningti river, which falls into the Irrawaddy. Colonel Shuldham, at the head of 7000 men, attempted this route and failed. Another plan was to pass from Chittagong into Arracan, and across the mountains into Ava, and effect a junction with the army sent from Rangoon. General Morrison, at the head of 11,000 men, attempted this enterprise. His force consisted of his majesty's 44th and 54th regiments of the line; the 26th, 42nd, 49th, 62nd Bengal native infantry, and the 2nd light infantry battalion; the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry; a Mugh levy; a body of local horse; a strong party of native pioneers, and a fine detachment of the Bengal artillery. A flotilla of sloops and gun-brigs was to co-operate with this division of the army. Commodore Hay commanded the flotilla, and his especial work was to carry troops and supplies along shore. This little army began its progress in the beginning of January, 1825. A portion of the force remained at various stations on British territory, to be sent after the army if necessary. His majesty's 54th, 10th Madras native infantry, and left wing 16th native infantry, went by sea. The field-battery, his majesty's 44th, 1st light infantry battalion, four companies 42nd Bengal native infantry, five companies 62nd native infantry, right wing Madras 16th native infantry, and two troops of Gardner's local horse went by land. The 26th and 49th Bengal went by boats along the coast. There were 1,500 Europeans, and 8,000 native troops; total, 9,500 men. The approach to the town of Arracan lay across a narrow valley, skirted by hills of an average height of four hundred feet. Stockades were placed on these hills in advantageous positions, garrisoned by 9,000 Birmans. On the 29th of March an unsuccessful attack was made on these stockades. On the evening of the 31st of March, Brigadier Richards (afterwards better known as Lieutenant-general Sir W. Richards), commanding a brigade, which consisted of six companies 44th foot, three of the 26th, three of the 49th, thirty seamen, and thirty Gardner's dismounted horse, ascended the hills by a circuitous route, and established his troops on the summit before he was perceived by the enemy.\* Next morning the brigade took the Birmese in flank, while the commander-in-chief took them in front. The enemy were beaten out of all the stockades, and fled precipitately through the passes, leaving Arracan to the victors. The illness of General Morrison caused the command to devolve upon General Richards. The British troops continued to hold Arracan through the summer, but made

no effort to prosecute their way toward the heart of the Birmese empire. On the 31st of October, Brigadier Richards, while commanding "the south-eastern division of Arracan, reported the impracticability of passing through the mountains. This was an error, no survey of the roads and passes having been made by Richards, in consequence of the insufficiency as to numbers of his engineer staff, and the sickness which prevailed among that portion of his officers. The troops in Arracan suffered severely from miasma rising from the pestilential marshes which then covered so large a portion of the low country. He might, however, have wintered in Ava, as was proved by Captain Ross, who, with the 18th Madras native infantry, and a number of elephants, marched to Pakangyet, on the Irrawaddy, eight marches from Yandaboo, and thence, after crossing the river to Sombew Ghwen, quitted the low country in three days, and in eight more crossed the mountains, by a practicable route to Aeng, in Ava." The war was decided by the Rangoon army before anything was effected by the army of Arracan, except the conquest of that province. After the war was over, a portion of the sepoys were conducted through the mountain passes from Ava into Arracan, proving the practicability of that route on any future occasion of war.

The treaty concluded with the Birman emperor was one of great importance to the British. His Birman majesty agreed to renounce all claim to Assam, and the principalities of Jyntia and Cachar, and recognised the independence of Manipore. He consented to cede in perpetuity the four divisions of Arracan, namely, Arracan Proper, Ramri, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and also the three districts of Tenasserim, Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui, or the whole of the coast belonging to Ava south of the Sanlue river; to receive a resident at his capital, and sanction the conclusion of a commercial treaty; and, finally, he agreed to pay a crore of rupees (or about £1,000,000), in four instalments, the first immediately, the second within one hundred days from the date of the treaty, and the other two in the course of the two following years. The British engaged to retire at once to Rangoon, and to quit the Birman territory upon the payment of the second instalment. The discharge of the promised indemnity was tardily and reluctantly complied with. On the receipt of the ratification of the treaty the army broke up from Yandaboo. Rangoon was held by the British until after payment of the second instalment of the indemnity.

The English suffered from a dreadful mortality, one-fourth of all who had not been

\* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 106.

killed or wounded died of the diseases engendered by the unhealthy situations in which they were quartered; and before the English abandoned Rangoon, half of the troops left alive were in hospital. The mortality has been compared to that of the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren in 1809; but the latter was not so fatal as the expeditions in the Birmese war.

While the English were in occupation of the country it was deemed important to gain as much intelligence as possible of its people, and to conciliate as far as might be the emperor and his court. In pursuance of this policy, Lieutenant Havelock was selected, with Captain Lumsden and Assistant-surgeon Knox, of the Madras army, to bear presents to the emperor from his conquerors. These officers went upon their interesting and peculiar mission, encountering many obstructions from the jealousy of the Birmese. The American missionaries, who had acquired considerable influence over many persons about the imperial court, rendered the English gentlemen many services. On their arrival at Ava they learned that six prisoners were detained. They drew up a protest, declaring that this was an infraction of the treaty, and declining to wait upon his majesty without an order were issued for the release of these men. After a most vindictive resistance this was at last conceded. The day after the reception, the prisoners were set free. The prudent and gentlemanly conduct of Lieutenant Havelock did much to smooth the difficulties of dealing with the Birmese court, and at the same time to maintain in full lustre the dignity of England, through that of her representatives. Indeed throughout the Birmese war the usefulness and devotion to duty of Mr. Havelock were an honour to his country, and attracted the notice of the whole army, particularly that of the commander-in-chief. The following is a striking specimen of the piety and earnest religious zeal of Mr. Havelock:—"In the temple of Rangoon, when the city was taken, he was seen in the temple—the idol temple—filled with the images and cross-legged infernals of that country. *He placed the lamps in the hands of the idols*, and by the light sat down to teach, to lead the devotions of the soldiers, and to open to them the Scriptures."\* Another interesting incident in the life of Havelock occurred during this war. The gallant commander of the 13th, Major Sale, then holding the local rank of Lieutenant-colonel, required a detachment for some particular service, and directed the company of Captain ——— to undertake it. The adjutant replied that the men were intoxicated. Sale immediately observed, "Turn out Havelock's men;

he is always ready, and his men are never drunk." Havelock was then a lieutenant, but was at the time in command of his company. He brought out his men, who were like himself "ready," and "never drunk," and the duty was accomplished. At this juncture, also, an event occurred in the life of that remarkable man, which bore upon his prospects, and at the same time illustrated his character. The incident is given as written in the interesting and able memoir of Havelock, by the Rev. William Owen, of London:—"On the adjutancy in his corps becoming vacant, an application was made to the governor-general to give it to Havelock. His lordship demurred, on account of what had been said to Havelock's disparagement as being an enthusiast and a fanatic. Bitter was the hostility which beset him on that occasion, and only in this manner it was overcome: a return was ordered of the offences committed by the men of the several companies throughout the regiment; and having examined the return, the governor-general said he found that the men in Havelock's company, who had joined in his religious exercises, were the most sober and best behaved men in the regiment. The complaint against the men, he said, was that they were Baptists, and he added that he wished that the whole regiment were Baptists, too. The result of the inquiry was, the bestowal of the adjutancy upon Havelock, and the entry in his memorandum-book simply mentions the fact, with the addition of the following words:—"Continue religious instruction to the soldiers, and do everything to promote temperate habits among them."\*\*—This anecdote is as favourable to the character of Lord Amherst as to that of Havelock. His lordship never allowed his religious, political, or personal feelings or prejudices to interfere with the just administration of his high office, and what was due to his king and country.

The Birmese war had proved one of the most costly which we had waged in India. Various writers estimate it at fourteen millions sterling; and the loss from all causes, in the field and in garrison, along the Bengal frontier of Assam, in Arracan, and along the Irrawaddy, at twenty thousand men. The European soldiers, and especially the officers, perished in greater proportion than the sepoys or Mugh auxiliaries; indeed the loss of life among the last was not great.

After the treaty was signed between the Governor-general of India and the Emperor of Birmah, Mr. Crawford was appointed envoy to the court of Ava, to arrange a commercial treaty. The mission returned to Rangoon in

\* The Rev. Paxton Hood.

\* *The Good Soldier.*

January, 1827, having accomplished its object. He was not gratified with his reception, and he dissuaded his government from enforcing the article of the treaty providing that a British agent should reside at the court of Ava. No further intercourse was held until 1829, when Lieutenant-colonel Burney was sent to Ava on a British mission. In 1824, the colonel, then Captain Burney, had been

dispatched to the court of Siam, to congratulate the monarch of that country on his accession to the throne. His mission to that court it was supposed qualified him to proceed to that of Ava. His term of residence there was a long one. He remained until 1837, when he was obliged to quit, in connexion with events to be related when our narrative shall arrive at that period.

## CHAPTER CVIII.

GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST (*continued*)—SIEGE, STORM, AND CAPTURE OF BHURTPORE—DEATH OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO—TRANSFER OF THE CROWN OF DELHI AND EMPIRE OF HINDOSTAN TO THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—ARRIVAL OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK IN INDIA—HIS GOVERNMENT AND REFORMS—HIS DEPARTURE FROM INDIA AND RETURN TO ENGLAND.

DURING the progress of the Birmese war the state of India was unsatisfactory. The deposed princes, especially the Peishwa at Benares, were as usual intriguing to foment disturbance and shake British power if possible. When at the beginning of the war the Birmese in Arracan made a successful entrance into Chittagong, the natives of eastern Bengal, and of all Lower Bengal, felt extreme alarm. Agents of the Peishwa circulated false intelligence, and represented the Birmese as invincible, and at last the native merchants of Calcutta were panic-struck, and could with difficulty be dissuaded from removing their property and withdrawing from Bengal.

At the end of 1824 disturbances broke out in an extremity of India precisely opposite to that endangered by the Birmese. In Cutch there was a revolt which appeared to assume political importance. It was discovered that the Ameers of Seinde had incited it.

The whole of India was swarming with military adventurers, the relies of defeated armies, or the mercenaries who had served the English in their various wars as irregular cavalry. There were numbers of men ready to join the English against any enemy, or to join any power, foreign or native, against the English. On the whole, they were more willing to serve against than for the prevailing power. Notwithstanding that Bengal and Central India had been subjected to them, the British were in the predicted condition of the Arabs,—their hand was against every man, and every man's hand was against them. While yet the Birmese war exhausted the exchequer and drained the garrisons of India of European troops, war was waged elsewhere.

The Bhurtpore territories which were independent passed through a series of violent

commotions and revolutions up to 1824, and in that year. The Jauts, who inhabited that principality, were disposed to regard the English as protectors against foreign enemies, but were not desirous to see them interfere with their home concerns. Sir David Ochterlony did interfere, and the governor-general, contrary to the advice of his council, revoked the proceedings of the resident, who resigned. Sir David died soon after, at Meerut, much regretted in India, where his talents, civil and military, had been a great advantage to his country. Sir David had assembled an army to besiege Bhurtpore, and by force of arms adjust the disputes there which menaced the peace of Hindostan. On the 19th of December, 1826, when a vote of thanks was passed to the army at Bhurtpore, Sir J. Malcolm observed, "If the siege had failed, it would, in all human probability, have added to the embarrassments of the Birmese war that of hostilities with almost every state."

After much hesitation, and great reluctance to have another war on his hands while that with the Birmans was raging, policy determined Lord Amherst to engage in a conflict with Bhurtpore, the strongest fortress in all India. Lord Combermere had arrived at Calcutta the 2nd of October, 1825, as commander-in-chief of the forces in India. He went up the country, and fixed his headquarters at Muttra. According to Captain Creighton, of his majesty's 11th Light Dragoons, the forces at Lord Combermere's disposal consisted of upwards of twenty-five thousand men, and more than a hundred pieces of artillery, with abundance of material. The force of the enemy's garrison was estimated at twenty thousand men, chiefly Rajpoots and Jauts, with some Affghans. The

greatest security of the fortress however, according to Major Hough, was in the thickness and toughness of its walls, constructed of clay hardened in the sun.

#### SIEGE OF BHURTPORE.

The English now, for the second time in its history, besieged Bhurtpore, and this time with better fortune than had attended the siege conducted by Lord Lake. On the 10th of December, 1825, the army of Lord Combermere stood before the great fortress. During the siege conducted by Lord Lake, twenty years before, the great ditches which surrounded the place had been filled from the Mote Jhil, an extensive piece of water. To hinder the enemy from accomplishing a similar object, Lord Combermere placed detachments of troops, so as to render the opening of sluices or cutting of embankments exceedingly difficult operations. This proved of great importance in the progress of the siege, for the ditch continued dry. The extent of the fortress was so great that it could not be completely invested, but posts were appointed all around.

On the 24th of December the breaching batteries were opened, but while they broke the material of the walls, they did not breach them, from the peculiar material of which these bulwarks were composed. Sometimes the round shot entered the embankments, as the walls might be called, and remained there, rather adding to their strength. Shells crumbled some portion of the surface, which fell away, but no breach was effected. Thus it was not at Sebastopol that gigantic earthworks resisted, for the first time, a numerous and scientific army. The fortress of Bhurtpore was a series of vast earthworks, more solid and enduring than those thrown up before Sebastopol. Before the English army had collected before the place, discussions had been maintained as to the probable results of a cannonade and bombardment, the experience of Lord Lake in 1805 having suggested these discussions: besides, British officers had become acquainted with all the peculiarities of the fortress. Mining was at last resorted to, under the auspices of Lieutenant-colonel Forbes, or, as some maintain, of Sir A. Galloway. Major Hough thus notices this controversy:—"Wilson (page 197, note 1) alludes to the claim of the late Major-general Sir A. Galloway, who was at the siege in 1805, and in 1825—but his memoir was given to Lord Combermere when before the fort,—Lieutenant (Colonel) Forbes, when in Calcutta, gave his plan to Lord C., and the credit is due to him. The latter was wounded and disabled

near Jhil. He had been instructed in mining under Sir C. Paseley, before he went to India. Sir A. Galloway published a pamphlet on the attack on mud forts; and was wounded in the pioneers at the first siege."\*

On the 17th January, 1826, the largest mine, containing two thousand pounds of gunpowder, was exploded. The explosion formed breaches. The next day the assault was made. The columns which attacked the breaches were commanded by Major-general Reynell and Major-general Nicolls (afterwards Lieutenant-general Sir Jasper Nicolls, commander-in-chief of the forces in India). The Jangina gate was stormed by a column under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Delanaine. The whole of the assailing force amounted to eleven thousand. All the columns of attack were successful, although they met with an obstinate resistance, from the belief entertained by the garrison that the place was invulnerable. The artillerymen fell under the bayonets of our soldiers, defending their guns to the last extremity. No less than seven thousand of the garrison perished, including every chief of note. A very great number were wounded. The loss of the British was 103 men and officers killed, and 466 wounded.

The day after the capture, the young rajah, Bulwunt Singh, on whose behalf the war was undertaken, was reinstated on his throne, under the protection of the British.

The prize money amounted to forty-eight lacs of rupees (£480,000). Lord Combermere was created viscount when the intelligence of his victory reached England. No doubt the signal failure of Lord Lake, in the memorable siege of 1805, influenced the government and the country to exaggerate the exploit of the capture of Bhurtpore; still it was a great undertaking, and some idea of its magnitude may be formed by the prodigious expenditure of material—upwards of sixty-one thousand missiles of all kinds having been used.

The fall of Bhurtpore was the termination of this short war, and at its conclusion the condition of India, regarded from a British point of view was most striking, and calculated to afford a comparison with the past which greatly enhanced the glory and renown of England and of her East India Company. The following is a truthful and graphic description of the relation of the British to the states of India when affairs had settled down after the Birmese and Bhurtpore wars, before Lord Anierst resigned his government:—"The progress of the British had now

\* Hough's *History of British Military Exploits in India*.

reached a point where campaigns could no longer be required within the limits of India. Powerful enemies they had none. In 1827, all the chiefs of Malwa, with the Mahratta princes, sent missions to the government which they had once dreamed of destroying. Holkar was dead, and Scindiah died in the following March, leaving no wreck of the dominion which had formerly spread over the largest provinces of Hindostan, and bearing no malice against the stately power which had deprived him of it. In the same year, also, the crown of Delhi was in name, as it had long been in reality, transferred to the company; while the title of the king, acknowledged until now, was extinguished. The English put an end to the vain folly of acknowledging themselves vassals to a man who had lost every attribute of power, except its rapacity and pride."\*

The rapid termination of the siege of Bhurtpore restored the waning influence of Lord Amherst. A feeling adverse to his lordship had arisen in England, in consequence of the slow progress of the Birman war, and the disastrous loss of life in connection with it. His lordship, however, was really not to blame. The officials of the East India Company at Calcutta have been stigmatised, even by the most zealous advocates of that body, for their culpable ignorance of everything connected with the Birmese empire. Still it must be pleaded on their behalf, the vast empire of which they were in charge, and the rapid revolutions and terrible wars which they had to assist in directing and bringing to a fortunate close. Lord Amherst was a diligent governor, a just and a brave man. He dealt with good faith to native chiefs, with dignity and leniency to open enemies, with sagacity and caution to false friends. He watched over the prosperity of the army and rewarded merit. He served his king, his country, and the East India Company with fidelity, and ruled numerous nations with an honest, intelligent, and benevolent concern for their good. The government of this nobleman has never received its due meed of praise. Had his lordship followed the advice of those around him he would, on the first reverses in the Birmese war, have abandoned offensive tactics, defended Chittagong and the north-east frontier, and have taken up a defensive position at Rangoon. His courage and wisdom resolved otherwise, and his perseverance and industry were crowned with success. He was very effectually aided by Sir T. Munro, the governor of Madras, whose exertions were extraordinary to provide troops, munitions of war, and supplies. It is certain that but for

the aid of the Madras presidency, Bengal could not have carried on the war on the eastern shores of the Bay and up the Irrawaddy with success, whatever power they might have wielded against Assam and the north-east frontier of Bengal to Birmah. There were many minor difficulties arising out of the hostile feeling prevailing throughout Hindostan against the British which tested and proved the firmness and address of Lord Amherst, his adjustment of which was not noticed as he deserved. There were also some little wars, troublesome and irritating, the more so as the most trifling incident of open revolt or hostility on the part of any petty state might have set all India in a blaze of conflict. These he settled with rapidity and decision, the only wise mode of dealing with refractory chiefs and rajahs. The Rajah of Colapore gave the Bombay presidency much trouble, and an appeal to arms was necessary to quell his fierce efforts to inflame that part of western India. Colapore was a small Mahratta state, and was pervaded by the predatory spirit of that uncertain, vindictive, and warlike race. Colonel Walsh, with the troops quartered at the station of Belgaun, very soon reduced his highness of Colapore to a quieter frame of mind, and left his soldiery and people no heart for further aggressions upon their neighbours. There was no state in India too small, no rajah too insignificant at that date to create the necessity for armed intervention. It is strange that a minute Mahratta territory, too small to be taken into account in the alliances and wars with the Mahrattas, should become aggressive and provoke a campaign, when Scindiah, and Holkar, and the Peishwa stooped to the conquering sword of England, and dared not to flaunt a hostile banner in the presence of a sepoy soldier of the company. Yet such were the eccentric and thoroughly oriental fickleness and presumption of the Mahratta race, and of all the races of India, that no statesman could foresee which chief would rise in hopeless insurrection, or in his independence proclaim hopeless war. No Indian statesman could say where in India a firebrand might not fall, spreading the flames of insurrection, of military revolt, or of declared war.

In 1827 Sir Thomas Munro ceased to live and labour for India and for his country. A life of this remarkable man has been published by the Rev. Mr. Gleig, the author of a memoir of Clive, and another of Hastings. Like the latter works, it is full of panegyric of its hero; and his errors and weaknesses are passed over in a manner which would be unfaithful, were it not that the writer is so earnest and sincere in the excess of admira-

\* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii.

tion with which he regards his hero. This feeling may well be excused when exercised towards one who rendered India fiscally, judicially, and martially such important services, and in whom the East India Company and the British government held the most entire confidence.

In 1827 Lord Amherst proceeded to the upper provinces. He had the honour of adjusting the relations in which the British government remained to the King of Delhi until the great revolt and rebellion, in 1857, swept away the dignity of that title for ever. Previous to 1827 the people of India regarded the East India Company as the vassals of the King of Delhi, whatever the power the English displayed. In that year, and by the hands of Lord Amherst, the crown of Delhi and of the empire of Hindostan was transferred to the East India Company. M. Auber beautifully and truly says:—"The event is said to have been viewed with deep melancholy by the royal family and their dependants. They felt, whatever privations they might have suffered from the Mahrattas, their title to the sovereignty of India had been invariably acknowledged. They were now, for the first time, divested of it. The feeling of the public, however, corroborated the opinion expressed by General Wellesley, that the natives were the most indifferent people, as to their governors, of any he had met with. They seemed on the present occasion to be unconcerned in the matter, and contemplated, without surprise, our assumption of a character 'which had been purchased with the talents, treasure, and blood of our nation.' Lord Amherst having returned to the presidency, embarked in H.M.S. *Herald*, at the close of March, for England, resigning the provisional government into the hands of W. B. Bayley, Esq."

Although the administration of Lord Amherst was one of mingled military effort and social reform, the advent of the latter had arrived, and become stronger in the English mind than any desire for humiliating enemies, or enlarging territories. Miss Martineau represents the period of "comprehensive domestic amelioration" as beginning in 1823, and as predominating until 1855. This representation is partly correct, although the last years of the company's raj, terminating before this work was wholly published, eclipsed the glory of all former eras in the melioration of the condition of the people of India, and the initiation of public works. Miss Martineau gives the honour of the great change to the Marquis of Hastings, and does justice to the claims of Lord Amherst in having followed in the same direction:—"After long waiting,

and many discouragements, the time at length arrived when wars ceased within the peninsula of India, and the energies of its rulers could be devoted to the improvement of the condition of the inhabitants, and the retrieval of the affairs of the company. There was war in Birmah, as has been seen; but long before Lord Moira's (henceforth to be called Lord Hastings) term of office was over, there was such a state of peace from the Himalaya to Ceylon as enabled him to give the crowning grace to his administration, by instituting social reforms as important as his military successes were brilliant, and his political scheme definitive and successful. The system which was conceived by Clive, professed by Warren Hastings, thoroughly wrought out and largely applied by Lord Wellesley, so as to be fairly called his own, and reversed for a time by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, under orders from Leadenhall Street, was accomplished and firmly established by the Marquis of Hastings. British authority was supreme in India; and not only had it no antagonist for a long course of years, but it availed to prevent warfare among the states of the great peninsula. Reforms, political, social, and moral, at once ensued; and they were vigorously continued through three vice-regal terms. They may be most clearly apprehended by being surveyed as the harvest of twenty years of peaceful administration, beginning with the close of Lord Hastings' wars, and ending with the resignation of Lord William Bentinck, in 1835.

"Lord Hastings left the company's revenue increased by £6,000,000 a year; and a considerable part of the increase was from the land, indicating the improved condition of the people who held it. He was succeeded by Lord Amherst, who had the Birmese war to manage in the first instance; and the Mahratta and Pindarree wars had left behind them the difficulty dreaded by every pacific governor-general—an unsettled and unorganized population of soldiers, whom it was scarcely possible to deal with so as to satisfy at once themselves and their neighbours. The reforms already conceived, and even begun, had not yet checked abuses or remedied grievances; and there were real causes of disaffection, in the new provinces especially, which gave a most mischievous power to a marauding soldiery at the moment of finding its occupation gone. A vigorous rule was therefore necessary, and almost as much military demonstration as in warlike times. The improved revenue did not meet these calls, and much less the cost of the Birmese war; and a new loan and an increased taxation marked the close of Lord Amherst's term. He left the

territory in a peaceable state, with not a single fort standing out, as Bhurtpore long did, against British authority, while the company's territories were largely increased by the Birmanese forfeitures. He won not a little European popularity by ascertaining the fate of the expedition of La Perouse, which had been as much a mystery as that of our Franklin expedition ever was; and he came home in 1828 full of confidence that the reforms inaugurated by his predecessor, and promoted by himself, would retrieve all financial difficulties, if they were but duly taken in hand by his successor. For such an object the very best choice was made. If our raj were really over, as the deluded sepoys now suppose, and the last Briton were to leave India for ever, tradition would preserve the memory of Lord William Bentinck, in the gratitude of the native population for centuries to come, though he overruled whatever was intolerably mischievous in their notions." Before, however, the great reform of Lord William Bentinck had begun, or his lordship assumed the office of governor-general, much had been done to adjust the judicial and revenue departments to the interests of the company and the desires of the Hindoos.

In 1827, before Lord Amherst quitted the country, nearly all civil suits instituted throughout the Bengal provinces were decided by native judges. In consequence of this, Lord William Bentinck extended the experiment which he has generally received the credit of having originated.

By law all British subjects were competent to serve on juries in India. Custom, however, had pronounced that half-castes were not British subjects, and law sanctioned this strange decision. It was for Lord Amherst to redress this grievance. In 1826 it was decreed that all "good and sufficient residents" were competent to serve on juries, with this restriction, that only Christian jurors should sit on the trial of Christians.

Thus when Lord W. Bentinck landed at Calcutta on July 4th, 1828, although he entered upon his arduous office under circumstances calculated to try his nerve and his judgment, he found the principle of reform established in the Indian government, and various improvements of the most important kind already initiated, which only required his helping hand to be confirmed in the customs of Indian administration.

Gradually the expenses of all the establishments in India had increased, whereas the revenue did not proportionately increase. The occupiers of land resorted to forgery and every species of fraud to cheat the officers of revenue; and the *native* officers, by ex-

tortion and plunder, rendered the occupiers still less able and less willing to pay. The zemindars were to a great extent bankrupt. The efforts of Lord Cornwallis to introduce the feudal system of Europe to India, and create a native aristocracy in Bengal, somewhat after the model of Britain, was a ridiculous failure and a cruel wrong. The finance of India from all these and other causes became embarrassed. In three years, previous to the arrival of Lord W. Bentinck, the public debt of India had increased £13,007,823.\* The East India Company and the board of control had charged his lordship to effect, if possible and by all means allowable, a great financial, economical reform. On his arrival he at once invited the opinions of all classes, and left the press unfettered to discuss his measures. No man perhaps was ever less shackled by the prejudices of "his order" than Lord W. Bentinck. Class, caste, and creed were nothing in his eyes where justice and truth were concerned. He resolved, if it could be done by industry and the fearless discharge of duty, to place Indian finance on a solid and equitable basis.

His first practical procedure of a definite kind was the establishment of finance committees. He vigilantly superintended their inquiries, examining everything with herculean industry. He found it practicable and right to enforce reductions of expense in every direction, and incurred vast odium from "the departments" for so doing. In reply to many complaints and much abuse he observed, "I have done my duty; and this conviction, as I learn from dreadfully dear-bought experience, is the only consolation that defies all contingencies."

The committees of finance which excited so much displeasure in India were not devised as an original scheme by Lord William. The Marquises Cornwallis and Wellesley had appointed the like, but they did not personally look so closely into their investigations, and in those days there was not so much to look into. Lord William intended the investigations to bear fruits, and he resolved to carry out to their consequences all results flowing from these inquiries.

From the commander-in-chief of the army to the humblest ensign, and even to the most inane sepoy, there arose a murmur of dissatisfaction, followed by a cry of anger against the economic governor-general. Batta, half-batta, quarter-batta, were the words most frequently in the lips of the heroes of all the presidential armies. The privileges which these epithets expressed were revised, threatened, or reversed, as the facts brought to light by the

\* Finance Report, 1832.

committees seemed, in the governor-general's opinion, to warrant. The company at the same time urged economy as essential to the future government of India. Arduous indeed was the office of governor-general in the hands of Lord W. Bentinck.

In 1829 his lordship actively employed himself in visiting the provinces of Eastern Bengal, and the whole of the provinces along the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. This resulted in abrogating the separate government of Prince of Wales's Island and its dependencies, and of annexing these territories to the government of Bengal. He also in this year invited native gentlemen of all degrees to meet him and make known their views on the condition of India, and the invitation was also extended to all European settlers. "A communication was likewise invited of all suggestions tending to promote any branch of the national industry; to improve the commercial intercourse by land and water; to amend any defects in the existing establishments; to encourage the diffusion of education and useful knowledge; and to advance the general prosperity of the British empire in India. The invitation was addressed to all native gentlemen, landholders, merchants, and others, and to all Europeans, both in and out of the service, including 'that useful and respectable body of men,' the indigo planters, who, from their uninterrupted residence in the Mofussil, had peculiar opportunities of forming an opinion upon the various subjects."

While these matters proceeded, extensive labours were imposed upon the governor-general in reference to "residencies, agents, collectors," &c., in every province of India, but especially in the provinces of Central India, newly acquired by the Pindarree and Mahratta wars.

This year was made memorable by the abolition of suttee. To the firmness and humanity of Lord W. Bentinck, in spite of the cowardice and political and religious indifference of many around him, this great reform is to be attributed. It must, however, be admitted that one of the sources of the revolt and insurrection of 1857 existed in the resentments which the abolition of suttee awakened in the minds of the heathen portion of the people of India. This interposition of the state on the side of humanity was never forgiven. The Brahminical women of India, in whose interest it was made, never forgave it. The women of *heathen* India believe that their condition is less honourable since the abolition of suttee, and they have inculcated bitter hostilities in consequence to their sons. The abolition of female infanticide, a later

reform, caused a still more intense animosity to the English on the part of the women of heathen India. The removal by murder of a portion of the female offspring of a family, left it possible to give a larger marriage portion to the survivors than can now be afforded. The women of India therefore, forgetting that they might have perished but for the abolition of the atrocious custom, regard the English as having by their philanthropic views deprived them of fortune, and by their religious interference decayed and impaired the social condition of the Hindoo people.

His lordship made a comprehensive tour to the upper provinces, inciting the higher classes of natives to exertion for the improvement of the country. The education of the natives was one of his lordship's favourite ideas, and he endeavoured, by such means as were at his disposal, to carry it out. The establishment of a legislative council, which entered into the charter of 1833 (see last chapter on home affairs), was originated by Lord Bentinck in 1830. A good understanding between the celebrated Runjeet Singh, the Sikh chief, and the governor-general, was established during the tour of the latter through the upper provinces. His lordship's patronage of Lieutenant Bruce, the justly celebrated Asiatic, and subsequently African traveller, was useful to the company, and a means of extending in Europe a better knowledge of the vast range of nations lying between the Indus and the Caspian Sea. Outrages perpetrated in Delhi upon the court of the king and the people of that city by the English resident, and the English in his service, excited a spirit of revolt, and rendered the interposition of the governor-general necessary.

Colonel Pottinger was sent at the close of 1831 to negotiate a friendly treaty with the Ameer of Scinde. While Colonel Pottinger was rendering the Ameers of Scinde more amicable, Mohammedan fanatics were disturbing the whole face of the country near Calcutta, attacking the Hindoos and the government, plundering, murdering, and assassinating. Troops were at last dispatched against them; many of the offenders were slain, and the rest were imprisoned or dispersed. The glory of the Mohammedan religion was the object of their coarse outrages and sanguinary atrocities.

In 1831-32 the affairs of Cachar and Assam occupied the attention of the supreme council. Disputes with Birmah were originated, which led to new complications with that government. The judicial systems, the registered debt of India, steam navigation, and the state of commercial credit at Calcutta, occupied

incessantly his lordship's attention from 1831 to 1835. The government of the nizam required the interposition of Lord W. Bentinck. The state of Mysore was such that it became necessary to assume its government as an English province. It was not for his lordship to escape trouble with Oude, which had been more or less a thorn in the side of every governor-general from the days of Clive. M. Auber strikingly observes on this subject:—"The imbecility of the king had defeated the reforms that were effecting in his country, and its affairs were fast relapsing into their ancient condition of anarchy and confusion. The misgovernment of that kingdom has been a subject of frequent and earnest remonstrance on the part of the British government, during the whole of the thirty-two years which have elapsed since the conclusion of the subsidiary treaty. Lord W. Bentinck was fully empowered to take final and decided measures for assuming the government for a certain period. In consequence of the appearance of a real disposition on the part of the king, though at this late hour and probably under an impression of alarm, to reform his administration, the governor-general determined to suspend the

execution of this extreme measure, to which all the authorities both in India and in Europe had always entertained so strong a repugnance: and thus to afford the king another opportunity of retrieving his character and that of his administration."

During the war with Mysore great services had been rendered (see chapters on that war) to the British government by the Rajah of Coorg. In 1833 the possessor of that dignity acted contumaciously and injuriously to the government of India, and after protracted efforts of negotiation an armed force was sent against him. This tyrant had murdered every legitimate descendant of the throne of the rajahlik, and perpetrated atrocities that rivalled those of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sahib. He was subdued by a force acting under Brigadier Lindsay, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, Colonels Waugh, Miles, and Foulis. Coorg was "annexed."

When in March, 1835, his lordship prepared to depart from Calcutta, addresses were poured in upon him from every part of India and every class of the community; and upon his arrival in England, the court of directors and the board of control were lavish in their encomiums upon his government.

## CHAPTER CIX.

### PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SIR CHARLES METCALFE—GOVERNMENT OF LORD AUCKLAND —RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN—PERSIAN INVASION OF HERAT—BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE PERSIAN GULF—TREATY OF LAHORE.

ON the retirement of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe assumed, provisionally, the government of British India. His administration was too short to admit of many incidents. There was one measure which Lord William Bentinck had initiated, but which Sir Charles Metcalfe fully carried out, which was of a nature to influence India extensively for good or evil—freedom of the press. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the mode in which Sir Charles carried out his favourite idea. It met with much opposition and much advocacy. A public address was presented to his excellency at Calcutta, on the part of a numerous and influential portion of the inhabitants, highly eulogistic of his excellency's views, and the practical application of them. Unfortunately, for a long time, the natives who used the press had no sympathy with liberty, civil or religious; and almost the only use made of the freedom conceded was to give expression to a furious fanaticism and a bitter

hostility to the government. Military revolt and civil insurrection were more promoted by the native press than by any other means, not excepting even the preaching of fakeers. The government certainly obtained the advantage of knowing, by the columns of the native press, the state of feeling which the more educated classes of the natives cherished; but it is to be feared that very little use was made of the knowledge thus derived, while the advantage was more than counterbalanced by the incitement to sedition which the native newspapers supplied.

The fact that Sir Charles held the government merely as the *locum tenens* of some nobleman, to be selected by the English cabinet, deprived his acts of the authority they would otherwise have possessed. Had this enlightened man been allowed to remain, as the directors and the proprietary of the East India Company earnestly desired and urged, it had been well for England and India. It,

however, became an understood thing that the post of governor-general of India should be held by a nobleman, and by the direct nomination of the cabinet. Mr. Canning, during his presidency of the board of control, laid it down as a principle that no servant of the company should be permitted to occupy the high post of governor-general. He alleged that the office ought to be so held as to constitute a link between the imperial crown and the people of India as well as the company. This was more specious and popular than convincing or sincerely urged. The real object of Canning and of all ministerial parties was, to grasp the patronage of India from the company. In carrying out such an object, India has been more than once endangered, the company exposed to loss, and England to obloquy.

On the 5th of March, 1836, Lord Auckland arrived as governor-general. The appointment of this nobleman was against the wishes of the court of directors, and led to much animadversion in England. It was regarded as a discreditable party nomination; and the whigs at that time having been unfortunate in several of their *élèves* of office, there was a disposition on the part of the English public to find fault with any one upon whom they conferred any post of an important nature, unless his claims were very manifest:—"His lordship was the son of one of the most steady adherents of the administration of Mr. Pitt, under which his services were rewarded by a peerage. He acquired distinction as a diplomatist, and also as a statistical and economical writer. His son forsook the politics of his family, and attached himself to the whig party."\*

The general tone of the public, and of writers on Indian affairs, concerning this appointment is indicated by the following passages from an author who has written well on subjects connected with India, although his work is not extensively known:—"The advent of Lord Auckland as governor-general of India was destined to prove a momentous epoch in the Anglo-Indian annals. On this appointment being made known, the public were somewhat at a loss to guess what peculiar quality of his lordship had formed the justification of the act. None knew what his administrative ability might amount to; and all who took the trouble to form any opinion on the subject were unanimous that the name of Auckland could by no human possibility become distinguished in connection with the government of the vast territories over which it was decided that he should hold an almost

uncontrolled sway. But these cavillers were mistaken; they knew not their man. Before these sceptics in the achievements of an Auckland were three years older, they had the strongest possible reasons for according to his lordship a distinction and a notoriety as world-wide and as indelible as any achieved by a Clive or a Wellington. It was Lord Auckland's destiny to place the British arms in a position they had never previously occupied on the continent of India; to carve out for the British forces a career as disastrous as its origin was unjustifiable and unworthy; to peril our position in the East; to sacrifice an army of brave men; and, finally, to clothe half the nation in mourning, and to overwhelm the other half with shame and indignation."\*

The commencement of Lord Auckland's administration has been thus described by Edward Thornton:—"The first year of his administration of the government of India was completed without the occurrence of any event sufficiently remarkable to require notice, and the first half of the ensuing year passed with equal tranquillity. The calm was then interrupted by some violent proceedings in that perpetual seat of trouble and disquiet, Oude."

The disturbance thus alluded to was no less than a struggle for succession to the throne, of a nature which, although attended by some bloodshed, and which might have caused still more serious loss of life, was, nevertheless, ridiculous. The King of Oude, as the prince previously called Nabob was then generally styled, died. The English recognised as successor the claimant who, according to Mohammedan law, was the rightful heir. This was very well known by the various branches of the royal family, who, professing the Mohammedan religion, and ready to sacrifice, if they dared, the life of any person who would oppose it, yet were willing to violate its institutions and precepts when their own corrupt or ambitious desires could be gratified in so doing. Scarcely had the British prepared to place the heir upon the musnid than the begum, or queen-dowager, at the head of a numerous train of followers, appeared at the gate of the city to place upon the throne a very young candidate, whose cause she espoused. The English had but a small force. Reinforcements could soon be obtained, but the arrangements made for bringing them to the capital were bad. The gates of the city were, however, closed. The begum demanded, in the name of "the rightful sovereign," that they should be opened. The resident refused. The queen-dowager

\* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton, vol. vi., chap. xxix., p. 73.

\* *The Three Presidencies of India.* By John Capper, F.R.A.S.

ordered one of the gates to be forced by elephants, which command was successfully obeyed. Captain Paton was knocked down and made prisoner. The rabble of retainers proceeded with the begum, took possession of the palace, and placed the youthful aspirant to sovereignty upon the musnid. British troops arrived, forced an entrance to the city, slew thirty of the begum's retinue, wounded many others, and dispersed the rest. The legal candidate for the throne was then invested with the dignity of his office, and the begum and her *protégé* made prisoners. This, however, did not terminate the troubles of succession; for when did any difficulty arise in Oude without peculiar complications, such as could hardly occur elsewhere? Various royal personages made public declaration of their right to the sovereignty of Oude, but none dared to prosecute his claim by arms. After relating these facts, Mr. Thornton notices another competitor whose mode of prosecuting his claims was peculiar. The terms in which that historian denounces the advisers of this last on the list of claimants deserve quotation. The name of this prince was Akbul-ood-Dowlah:—"This personage, under European advice, proceeded to England, and there addressed the court of directors of the East India Company. The folly of undertaking a long voyage to assert a claim known to be absolutely and undoubtedly bad, and with a certainty of its being rejected, need not be dwelt upon. What profit the advisers of the claimant derived from the expedition cannot be known; but they were fully aware that none would accrue to the person on whose behalf they affected to act. Such occurrences are not now, indeed, uncommon in the history of British India, and they will probably never cease altogether until native powers shall acquire sufficient acquaintance with the principles of British policy to prevent their becoming the dupes of unprincipled adventurers."

Soon after the conclusion of the Oude disturbances, questions arose in connection with the Rajah of Sattara, destined to occupy a more prominent place in English interests. When the Mahratta empire was destroyed, the chief of that confederation, the Peishwa, became dependent upon the mercy and generosity of England. The Marquis of Hastings conceded to the prince the dignity and independence of a sovereignty, and he became known in India and to England as "the Rajah of Sattara." The previous position of the prince resembled that which for a long time was filled by the Mogul. It was one of titled humiliation. The Mogul had been no better than a prisoner to the various Indian princes

who ruled ostensibly in his name. The Peishwa was held in durance by his chief minister. The Mahratta chiefs, Scindiah and Holkar, ruled Peishwa and Mogul, and the people in their name. From this vassalage Lord Hastings took the Peishwa, and made him independent in fact as well as name, as Rajah of Sattara. This favour was conferred on him when he had violated treaties, and by the fortune of war lost everything. He was not grateful, but conspired against his benefactors, setting up claims to the sovereignty of Hindostan and the Mahratta empire. To accomplish his absurd aims, he attempted to corrupt the sepoy soldiery, more especially the native officers, a plan which had at last become the hope of every plotter among the native chiefs. The English had ample proofs of his guilt, but treated his power with so much contempt that they took no pains for a considerable time to punish him. Sir James Cawar arriving in Bombay as governor of that presidency, it was deemed expedient by the higher authorities of the company to commit to his management this affair. Sir James was popular; the native princes esteemed him; there existed among men of all parties confidence in his judgment, the purity of his motives, and his moderation. Contemning the rajah's power, yet wishing to avert possible complications and disturbances, Sir James adopted the course of exposing to the rajah the evidences of his guilt, of which the English were in possession, and urging upon him to abandon his conspiracies and projects of ambition. After long and fruitless efforts to induce him to adopt the course which was alone compatible with the treaties he had signed with Lord Hastings, all hope of bringing him to reason was abandoned; he was deposed, and his brother placed upon the throne. The deposed rajah followed a similar plan to that adopted by the unsuccessful applicant for the throne of Oude. He hired advocates in England, and sent over diplomatic agents, whose business was to accuse before the directors the conduct of their servants in India; failing in that, to arraign the directors themselves before the court of proprietary, and that proving fruitless, to impeach the East India Company before the parliament and the country. These agents denied all that had been alleged against the rajah, of which the company and the board of control had the most conclusive proofs. In public assemblies, where such statements might be safely made, the rajah's rights to an extensive sovereignty in Southern and Central India were made the subject of declamation. Many benevolent persons who favoured the "Society for the Protection of

Aborigines," and many members of the "Society of Friends," who always sympathise with the aggrieved or oppressed, gave a willing ear to the advocates of the rajah, some of whom were men of surpassing eloquence. The result was, a long continued agitation in favour of the deposed prince, which issued in no advantage to himself, while his long hoarded treasures were dissipated in largesses and stipends to those whom he employed in his advocacy in England.

When Lord Auckland arrived in India, he found rumours of a projected Russian invasion prevailing at Calcutta, and, indeed, all over the peninsula. Political and philanthropic parties in England have ridiculed these rumours as foolish, or denounced them as created by the military to promote a war, and ensure distinction and promotion. Members of the "Peace Society," who seem to believe, by constantly endeavouring to make others believe, that England can never have a just war, were the foremost in pronouncing that these apprehensions of Russian intrigue were groundless. The British government was, however, in possession of conclusive evidence that Russia sought to create an influence in Central and Western Asia inimical to British interests in India, and calculated to spread the prestige of her own greatness, and prepare the way for the advancement of her own empire.\* The chief instrument of Russia in her projects was Persia. Through the influence of the shah, it was believed that a way might be opened to British India. The czar determined to buy, or conquer, or cajole alliances to the very gates of Hindostan. Moreover, Persia was incited to encroach upon Affghanistan, so as to bring her boundary nearer to India; because, while the czar encroached from the Caspian upon Persian territory, Persia would complain less if indemnified on her Affghan frontier.

A most interesting correspondence was published, under the authority of government, entitled, "Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Persia and Affghanistan." It consisted of 117 official letters, diplomatic notes, and reports; besides the documents corroborating the important facts connected with the subject. Embracing a period of about four years and three-quarters, it begins with a despatch, dated St. Petersburg, 15th January, 1834, addressed to Lord Palmerston, announcing the probable settlement of the succession to the throne of Persia, and closes with a circular from the Foreign-office,

\* The author, in his *History of the War against Russia* (Virtue & Co., Limited, City Road and Ivy Lane, London), has entered into this question, and afforded proof of the intrigues of Russia in the direction noticed.

dated March 20th, 1839, assigning the motive which induced our government to withhold, for a time, all diplomatic intercourse with that country. In reference to these papers, Sir John McNeill observed — "The evidence with which these documents abound of a deep-rooted hatred of our prosperity cherished by that power, and of a settled and well-digested plan of progressive hostility, not the less dangerous from disguise, or the less effectual from the cautious and wary steps with which it is generally prosecuted, is so circumstantial and so palpable that any endeavours to set that evidence in a stronger or clearer light would weaken instead of confirm the effect."

Persia, incited by Russia, made war upon that portion of Affghanistan which she wished to seize. Colonel Borowski, the Russian ambassador at the court of Teheran, urged the invasion of Candahar and Herat.\* Russian agents spread themselves all over Persia, urging the people to war. The czar's ambassador openly encouraged the Persian court to seize upon the coveted territories before the British could interfere for their defence.† Mr. McNeill (afterwards Sir John) succeeded Mr. Ellis as the envoy of England to the Persian court. Through him the English government offered its mediation‡ between Persia and Cabul. This was done in a manner exceedingly calculated to dissuade the young shah from his ambitious designs. Nevertheless, the Persians advanced against Herat, accompanied by Russian officers. The following abstract of the state papers published on this subject is attributed to Sir John McNeill himself:—"Upon receiving the above intelligence, Lord Palmerston directed the Earl of Durham (Paper No. 34, January the 16th, 1837) to ask Count Nesselrode whether the extraordinary conduct held by Count Simonich in Persia was in accordance with the instructions he had received from his court. Lord Durham, in his answer,§ asserts most positively, in the name of Count Nesselrode, that Simonich had no instructions of the kind inferred by Mr. McNeill, and that the charges brought against the Russian minister arose no doubt in misapprehension. This assurance was still further confirmed by the next despatch of Lord Durham,|| wherein his

\* Parliamentary paper, No. 11. Despatch of Mr. Ellis from Teheran, Nov. 13, 1835.

† Despatches of Mr. Ellis from Teheran, from No. 12 to 28; beginning 24th Dec., 1835, ending Aug. 22nd, 1836.

‡ Despatch of Lord Palmerston, June 2nd, 1836. Paper No. 29.

§ No. 35, Feb. 16, 1837.

|| No. 36, Feb. 24, 1837.

lordship states the substance of a conversation he had had with Mr. Rodofnikin, Russian under secretary of state, who protested most solemnly against any supposition injurious to the sincerity of his court, offering to exhibit to Lord Durham the original book, containing the instructions transmitted to Count Simonich. In the meantime the shah's army, harassed by numerous detachments of Turcoman horsemen hanging on his flanks and in his rear, abandoned the siege of Herat, and returned to his capital, where we find Count Simonich again urging, on the 30th December, 1836, the expediency of resuming the expedition against Herat in the spring, and offering, by way of further encouragement, the assistance of his own military services. Agents from Cabul and from Candahar, secretly instigated by Russian emissaries, made at this period their first appearance at Teheran, and endeavoured to conciliate the favour of Count Simonich and of the shah. They offered to co-operate with Persia against Herat, and sought protection against the Sikhs. Kumber Ali Khan was sent by the shah on an embassy to Dost Mohammed Khan, of Cabul, who was represented as having applied for the assistance of Russia and of Persia.

"Taj Mohammed Khan (despatch No. 40), agent from Candahar, at Teheran, accompanied by the Persian minister for foreign affairs, visits the Russian ambassador, and receives from him a letter and presents for his master. He is forbid to visit Mr. McNeill, whose influence is now in a rapid state of decline; while Russian intrigue is everywhere active and triumphant among the numerous nations or tribes of central Asia, according to the several inclosures contained in this despatch.

"On the 2nd of May, 1837 (No. 42), Mr. McNeill communicates to Lord Palmerston that he had renewed his offer of mediation between Persia and Affghanistan, and on the 1st of June, of the same year (No. 43), he justified himself against Count Nesselrode, renewed his charges against Count Simonich, and supplied various further most conclusive details in proof of the accuracy of his former statement, nor was it long before the progress of events removed whatever doubts might still attach to his unequivocal assertions; as on the 15th of July, 1837, Mr. Rodofnikin placed in the hands of Mr. Millbank a copy of a despatch, dated May 28, 1837, and addressed by Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, conveying the intelligence of a renewal of the expedition against Herat. This was soon confirmed by Mr. McNeill himself (despatch No. 45, 3rd January, 1837), who at the same time informed Lord Palmerston that the preparations for war had been kept a profound secret

entirely on his account. It appears further that Mr. McNeill called upon Count Simonich (No. 47, June 30, 1837,) and the conversation which passed between them in the presence of Captain Sheil is a striking example of that solemn kind of mystification which the presumption of superior power ventures sometimes to put on the credulity of the weak, not in the hope that it will be believed, but merely to avoid the harshness of stating an unwelcome truth. Count Simonich acknowledged, in reference to the denial of Count Nesselrode, that in his official capacity he was bound, if not to dissuade, at least to abstain from encouraging the warlike mood of the shah; but he at the same time states that his own individual opinion was quite at variance with his public duty. Having to choose between two opposite lines of conduct, and to make his election whether in this matter he should advocate the wishes and intentions of his master the emperor, or his own, he preferred the latter." Mr. McNeill threatened to withdraw from the Persian court, and remove Colonel Sheil,\* the English commissioner, from the Persian camp. This alarmed the shah, who endeavoured to dissuade so extreme a course on the part of the English minister, and Mr. McNeill consented to remain. The Russian minister, intensely desirous to effect the removal of both McNeill and Sheil, succeeded in influencing the Persian court to measures intolerably insulting to the English officials, so that after many efforts of a conciliatory nature, Mr. McNeill withdrew from the court,† sending however a letter of useless remonstrance. There was a want of firmness both in the despatches of Lord Palmerston and the tone of Mr. McNeill, which weakened the influence of the latter, both with the Russian envoy and the Persian court. The menaces of the English agent "wanted precision of means and limitation of time," which rendered them inoperative.

Mr. McNeill left the camp of the shah of Persia on the 7th of June, 1838, and at once proceeded towards the borders of Turkey. The departure of the English ambassador created alarm amongst the shah's advisers, and messengers were sent beseeching him not to cross the frontier, and means would be speedily adopted to bring about a reconciliation. This conciliatory conduct on the part of the shah was quickened by intelligence which reached his camp, that an English force had arrived in the Persian Gulf, and had taken possession of the Island of Karak. Lord Auckland also had issued a manifesto, and

\* Brother of the Right Hon. Richard Lalor Sheil, celebrated in the agitations of Roman Catholic emancipation.

† Paper No. 85, June 25, 1838.

made a demonstration upon the Indus, which constrained his Persian majesty to adopt more moderation in his policy. The consternation which filled the people also acted upon the court; the wildest ideas spread, not only in Teheran but the provinces, as to the powerful army with which the English were about to invade Persia. It was in vain that the czar's envoy ridiculed the idea of the English being able to send a large army anywhere, the credulous Persians believed the rumours of English power and purpose as readily as they before received the news circulated of Russian greatness and resolve. They were actuated, like all orientals, by display of force, or the conviction that it could and would be put forth,—diplomacy, resting upon international law and the faith of treaties, had no meaning for them. Even Count Simonich, the Russian envoy, and Captain Vicovich, the Russian military commissioner, became really alarmed, supposing that a sufficient substratum of truth lay beneath the reports which had been circulated to give just grounds for apprehending that the English were at last roused, and were about to put forth their might. The Persian monarch taunted the Russian diplomatist with having deceived him as to the relative power of the two great European countries, and demanded some practical proof that Russian assertions of capacity and resources were something more than empty boastings. The only answer his excellency could make to such an appeal was his withdrawal from the Persian court and camp. He retired from Herat September 9, 1838.\*

Uncertain as oriental courts proverbially are, there has been always a peculiar levity about that of Teheran. After the departure of the Muscovite envoy, the shah, as if from sheer folly or passion, refused to abandon his designs upon Herat. Simonich had left secret agents, Russian, Affghan, and Persian, well supplied with Russian gold, to effect what his presence would render more difficult of accomplishment as things stood. These men played their game well, and succeeded in inducing his majesty to order the resumption of hostilities, when the spring of 1839 rendered a campaign practicable.† Mr. McNeill also obtained precise information of a treaty between the chief of Candahar and the Shah of Persia, *under the guarantee of Russia*, hostile to the independence of Affghanistan and the safety of British interests in India. The promises made to induce Mr. McNeill to return to the court were evaded, and he reluctantly crossed the boundary into Turkey and returned to England.

\* Government papers, Nos. 90, 92, 94, 95, 98.

† Government papers, No. 106. Nov. 28th, 1838.

While these transactions were passing in Asia, matters in connection with them assumed a serious aspect in Europe. Lord Palmerston, then holding the seals of the English Foreign-office, demanded from Russia a categorical explanation of the conduct in Persia of the accredited agents of the government of St. Petersburg. The Marquis of Clanricarde was then the British ambassador at St. Petersburg; he waited upon the Russian minister for foreign affairs, and presented the draft of a note from Lord Palmerston, worthy of the great diplomatic talents of that extraordinary man. The note concluded with the following passage, the firmness, force, and dignity of which produced a great effect upon the Russian minister and his master:—"The British government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with regard to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too conscious of her strength, and too conscious of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British government considers itself entitled to ask of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia, and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and Mr. Rodofnikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Mr. Vicovich."\*

The Russian government disavowed its agents. The Russian foreign minister addressed a note to the ambassador from his court to the court of London, November 1st, 1838,† declaring that Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich were unauthorised in adopting the course which they pursued towards Persia, Affghanistan, and England. This despatch alleged that Captain Vicovich was not really a military commissioner with the shah's army before Herat, but a *commercial agent*, sent to secure for his country commercial advantages which the English sought to monopolise in Asia. Notwithstanding the disavowal of the offending agents which the despatch contained, its tone was resentful and arrogant. The despatch assured the British minister that Count Simonich was recalled, and General Duhamel sent to Persia in his stead. Captain Vicovich was also recalled.

Lord Palmerston's replies to this and subsequent despatches of Count Nesselrode are

\* Government Papers, No. 106. October 23, 1838.

† Government Papers, No. 110.

characterised by remarkable sagacity, adroitness, and firmness tempered with courtesy. His lordship declared that the resumption of diplomatic intercourse with Persia would depend upon entire satisfaction being rendered to the English government for past insults and injuries, and the abandonment by the shah of all ambitious designs upon territory contiguous to British India. The active and ostensible interference of Russia was thus brought to a termination; the mischief it had effected remained, and furnished occasion for the Affghan war.

While this series of events was passing in Persia and on the Affghan frontier, another series not less important was going on elsewhere. Lord Auckland, on his arrival in India, directed his attention to the navigation of the Indus,\* and formed commercial treaties with the Indian states bordering on that river. These proceedings excited jealousy on the part of the Affghan chiefs, the Persian shah, and the czar, and no doubt incited the hostile proceedings which they adopted. It is necessary here to glance at the state of Affghanistan at this period, and of the Sikh territory.

Runjeet Singh, whose reputation for courage and sagacity pervaded all north-western India, ruled over the country of the five rivers. He had a fine army, disciplined by French officers. His power and resources were great, and his ambition at least equalled them. He was desirous of enlarging the bounds of his dominions, whether from the British, the Amcurs of Scinde, or the Affghans, he cared not, so as his acquisitions were valuable, and his means of conquering them safe. The English deemed it wise to stand well with Runjeet; he was a barrier to Affghan and Persian. The Sikh ruler appears to have been keenly alive to the process of absorption of native states by the English, although he felt it to be his policy to remain on friendly terms with so powerful a neighbour. It is related of him that in a conversation with a company's officer, he pointed to a large map of India before him, on which the British territories were defined by a narrow red band, and exclaimed, "When Runjeet dies, company's red line swallow up all Punjaub country."†

The various states or chieftainships of Affghanistan (as the reader will see by turning to the geographical portion of this work) lay beyond the Punjaub. The chiefs of Candahar and Cabul were the most important of these, and the latter was regarded as the supreme chief of Affghanistan. Shah Sujah, the imbecile ruler of Affghanistan, had been expelled

that country, in the ordinary Eastern style, to make room for one far better able to rule such a turbulent people as were his subjects; and the deposed chief appeared well satisfied to find himself with his head on his shoulders, eating the company's "salt" within the walls of the British fortress of Loodianah, one of the north-western frontier stations.\*

The brother of Shah Sujah, named Mahmoud, was the successful competitor for the throne of Cabul. He was indebted for his fortunes to a chief named Futteh Khan. This chief was murdered by the man he raised to a throne; for what ingratitude is too base, or what sanguinary deed too cruel for an oriental Mohanmedan prince? The relatives of the khan determined to avenge his injuries. They promoted a successful revolution, and Mahmoud fled to Herat, where he reigned over a limited territory. The brothers of the murdered khan divided the dominions of Mahmoud. Amongst these brothers the most energetic and sagacious was Dost Mohammed Khan, and he reigned in the seat of Affghan empire, Cabul. The other brothers resided at Candahar. Shah Sujah, the ejected monarch, twice attempted to recover the throne from which Mahmoud had expelled him, but his efforts were unsuccessful.

Amidst these turbulent proceedings, the vigilant and enterprising monarch of the Punjaub found opportunity to annex the rich Affghan province of Peshawur, "the gate of Hindostan." The Shah of Persia supposed it possible that he also might gain something by the turmoil, and the weakness which it created, and he began that course of intrigue and aggression, in which he was encouraged by Russia and resisted by England, chiefly because his success would give Russia a position of relative strength dangerous to English dominion in India. A memorandum drawn up in January, 1836, by Mr. Ellis, the predecessor of Mr. McNeill, as British envoy to the Persian court, sets the danger apprehended by England in its true light, with great perspicuity of statement and perspicacity of language.

"The Shah of Persia lays claim to the sovereignty of Affghanistan as far as Ghizni, and is fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat in the spring. Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamram Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with his royal highness the late Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his vizier, Yah-Mohammed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the shah a full justification for commencing hostilities. The success of the shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their

\* Government Papers, No. 3. September 5, 1836.

† *The Three Presidencies.*

\* *The Three Presidencies.*

minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken. Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the commercial treaty, the residence of a Russian consular agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Affghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Affghanistan is tantamount to the advance of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British government that the obligations of public faith will permit; but while the British government is free to assist Persia in the assertion of her sovereign pretensions in Affghanistan, Great Britain is precluded by the ninth article of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and the Affghans, unless called upon to do so by both parties; and, therefore, as long as the treaty remains in force, the British government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian empire."\*

To thwart the projects of Russia, and make eastern Affghanistan the barrier for the defence of British India, became the objects of the British government. Lord Minto had previously conceived this idea, and Lord Auckland believed that the time had arrived for carrying it out. In order to ascertain whether it could be accomplished, a mission, ostensibly commercial, was sent from India in September, 1837. Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes, was selected for this purpose. He had travelled in Affghanistan, and knew the character of its chiefs. On his arrival at Cabul, he perceived that the agents of Russia and Persia were active there, as Captain (Colonel) Sheil found them at Herat, and Mr. Ellis and Mr. McNeill knew them to be at Teheran. The Candahar chiefs had solicited Russian aid to expel Runjeet Singh from Peshawur. They had previously desired to make a convention with the English for that purpose, whose connections with Runjeet did not allow of any interference with his ambition when not directed against themselves.

Captain Burnes, apprised of the proceedings, used every influence he could bring to bear with the Ameer of Cabul and his brothers at Candahar to detach them from Russian and Persian alliance. Dost Mohammed pretended to concur in Captain Burnes's arguments and policy. It is probable that the ameer preferred British alliance, but he had no reliance

upon British faith. He averred that what Captain Burnes promised Lord Auckland would probably disallow; that Lord Auckland's promises would be probably repudiated by his successor, or the company, or the Queen of England. He was so situated as to be obliged to come to terms with one side or the other, and the projects and promises of Russia and Persia were clear, distinct, and definite; those of Captain Burnes were vague and general, on the plea that his authority was limited. The Russian ambassador wrote from Herat to Cabul and to Candahar, offering sufficient money to secure the conquest of Peshawur. The Russian government would send the specie to Bokhara, and the khans should procure the means of conveying it safely thence.

The determination of the Affghan chiefs to recover Peshawur from Runjeet Singh, and the inability of the English to offer any hopes of securing that object or assisting it in any way, weakened the power of English diplomacy. Finally, Captain Burnes withdrew from Affghanistan, the chiefs assuring him that they preferred English alliance, but that Russia was the greater power, and they found it necessary to place their country under its protection.

Lord Auckland was prepared for such an issue. He had determined upon preventing the conquest of Herat, or if conquered, to compel its restitution. Contemporaneous with the presence of an English squadron in the Persian Gulf, a treaty between Runjeet Singh, the ex-king of Cabul, and the governor-general, led to the formation of a plan for a military campaign against Affghanistan. India was tranquil, and secure on every frontier, so that his excellency was enabled to organize an army of twenty-five thousand men, and send it across the Indus.

Meanwhile Russia was moving troops in central Asia in a manner which caused great agitation from the Oxus to the Indus. The following extract of a despatch from Mr McNeill to Viscount Palmerston strikingly exhibits the fact and the effect:—

*Teheran, December 30, 1837.*

I learn through native channels of information, which are not unworthy of credit, that a large body of horse, consisting of many thousands, had marched from Khiva two months ago to the aid of Kamran, and that, after long doubt and hesitation, the government of Bokhara had at length decided on sending a considerable body of horse to Kamran's assistance. This force, the number of which was not stated, had, it was said, been paid and mustered at Bokhara, preparatory to its setting out for Herat, when the letters containing this information were written. The same informant states, that all the principalities bordering on Persia to the eastward, having become alarmed for their own safety, had determined to send succours to Herat, believing that if that city fell they should have to defend themselves in their own territories. A general,

\* Correspondence relating to Persia and Affghanistan, presented to both houses of parliament by command of her Majesty.

indeed an universal, opinion prevails in all those countries, that Persia is pushed on and supported by Russia in her schemes of conquest; and I must confess that the demonstrations of joy which Count Simonich manifested on the fall of Ghorian were well calculated to confirm that impression, for they far exceeded the expressions of gratification which might have been expected, even from the Persian government itself.

The Persian army before Herat amounted in the spring of 1838 to forty thousand men, and although the chief of Herat destroyed all means by which the enemy could procure supplies within a considerable distance of that city, ample provisions were obtained. This circumstance was much dwelt upon by Mr. McNeill in his communications to Lord Palmerston, as showing that Persia was well supplied with money, and that food and provender for a large army could with ease be ordinarily found, if operations against India were undertaken in that direction.

The importance of preserving Herat, the basis of Lord Auckland's policy in the emergency that arose, may be seen by the English reader from the perusal of two documents, one an extract of a despatch from Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston; the other a despatch from his lordship to the British envoy.

*Camp before Herat, April 11, 1838.*

In the meantime, Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabul, and I learn from Captain Burnes's communications, that the success of his negotiations there will in a great measure depend on the failure of the shah's enterprise against Herat. At Candahar our position is even more precarious; and I have the honour to inclose a translation of a draft of a treaty between the shah and the chief of Candahar, which it is proposed to conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat and Candahar under a chief, who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia. I am unable to inform your lordship what progress has been made towards the conclusion of this treaty, or what view the shah may have taken of the position in respect to these countries, in which, by this arrangement, he would be placed; but the treaty is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am not without very serious apprehensions, that even before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced to co-operate with the shah; while in the event of Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the chief of Candahar will consider it to be for his advantage to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than with England. I therefore continue to be of opinion that the fall of Herat would destroy our position in Afghanistan, and place all, or nearly all, that country under the influence or authority of Russia and Persia. I need not repeat to your lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia for purposes injurious to British interest is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original

object to give additional security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only power that threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain; and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract; I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of the treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat.

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1838.*

SIR,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the treaty between Persia and Great Britain is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears on the contrary, that the shah is occupied in subverting those intervening states between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected himself with an European power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests and the security of her dominions may suggest.

Urged by the Russian agents the shah continued the siege of Herat, the defence of which was directed by a young subaltern of the East India Company's army, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, brother to Sir Henry Pottinger, so distinguished as an officer and diplomatist in India.

In July, 1838, a breach was effected by the Persian cannon, and the troops of the shah gallantly attempted to storm it. The Affghans charged them sword in hand, drove them out, and pursued them across the ditch, making extraordinary havoc. The number of the killed and wounded amounted to between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred men. The loss in officers was most serious, a number of Russian officers assisting in the direction of the shah's forces having perished; amongst them was Major-general Barowski. Two of the principal khans in the Persian army were killed, and four others wounded. Nearly all who fell received wounds from the Affghan scimitar. This event was most humiliating to the Russians, more especially as Count Simonich planned the attack. This dreadful repulse did not cause the shah to abandon the siege. He probably would have done so, but Russian obstinacy and perseverance prevented such a result. The shah's army, aided by the Khan of Candahar's, be-

came more active in the neighbourhood, and subjected the subsidiary forts and towns.

Colonel Stoddart, who was afterwards murdered by the King of Bokhara, was employed by Mr. McNeill to bear despatches to the shah, in the autumn of 1838. The colonel presented his majesty with the final demands of England, which were:—

“1st. That the Persian government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries.

“2nd. That the Persian government, according to the stipulations of the general treaty, shall conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain on the same footing, with respect to privileges, &c., as the consuls of other powers.

“3rd. That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahommed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished; and that a firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations.

“4th. That the Persian government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British minister.

“5th. That the governor of Bushire, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished; and that measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings.”

When this document was presented, a scene took place of a singular character, which, as being so recent a transaction, and depicting so strikingly the manners of the Persian court, cannot fail to interest the reader. Colonel Stoddart describes it in a despatch to Mr. McNeill.

*Royal Camp, before Herat, August 12, 1838.*

I have the honour to inform you, that I arrived yesterday, at 11 A. M., and proceeded direct to the Hajee's tent. Omar Khan, the son of the Candahar chief, Kohundil Khan, with eight Affghans, were there. The minister himself was with the shah, and on his return received me in a friendly manner, ordered a tent for me in my old quarters, near my stable, made me his guest, and fixed to-day for my reception by the shah. He inquired what news there was, and I told him I should have been here two days before, had not Thamasp Meerza thought proper to send seven horsemen, with Mahommed Khan Jaleelawund, after me from Ghorian, who detained me by force, which indignity he excused by saying he considered it the interest of Persia to detain me, without having any orders to do so. This I should represent to you I said, as I was not at liberty to enter on any other subject than those with which I was specially charged.

To-day, at half-past 10 A. M., I received an official note from the deputy-minister for foreign affairs, Meerza Ali, requesting me to accompany him, agreeably to the shah's

directions, to the royal presence. I accordingly went, and was handsomely received. After delivering your letter, I delivered the message in Persian. On my coming to a pause, in the part requesting him to turn from ill-disposed advisers and refer to his own wisdom for the interests of Persia, his majesty said, “The fact is, if I don't leave Herat there will be war, is not that it?” I said, “It is war; all depends on your majesty's answer. God preserve your majesty,” handing the original English written message. He said, “This was all I wished; I asked the minister plenipotentiary for it, and he would not give it, alleging that he was not authorised.” I said, “He was not then, but now he is ordered to give it. No one could give such a message without especial authority from his sovereign.” He declared again that such a paper was all he had wanted, and turned for assent to his chamberlains. He complained the paper was in English, which he could not read, and three times requested me to give him what I had read from in Persian, or to translate it for him, which I declined, referring him to the original. I said that was according to our custom, and requested his majesty would soon favour me with an answer, that I might forward it without delay. He said, “Immediately and without delay, they shall translate it for me. Meerza Baba and Meerza Sauleh shall translate it, and the answer shall be given immediately, it will not take long, to-day or to-morrow.” His majesty then read your letter, and I took my leave. The shah's manner throughout was marked by more than his usual kindness, both towards myself and in inquiries after you. He was in a raised room, up six or seven steps, the room was small and full, and the deputy-minister did not take me into the room, but the shah made me come up close to him, and as his majesty spoke very kindly in welcoming me, I did not think it a fit occasion to stickle for ceremony; otherwise I would not have delivered the message without entering the room.

This interview with the shah was speedily followed by another, which Colonel Stoddart thus relates:—

*Royal Camp, before Herat, August 14, 1838.*

I have the honour to inform you that the shah summoned me to an audience this morning, at which his majesty formally gave an answer to the message I had the honour of delivering in writing on the 12th instant. His majesty stated, “We consent to the whole of the demands of the British government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all.” I replied, that I thanked God his majesty thus regarded the true interests of Persia. His majesty then said, “The British will, I trust, arrange for us this matter of Herat.” I replied, I was commanded, in case of his majesty's desiring British mediation between Persia and Herat, to acquaint him, that I was empowered to conclude, on your part, the original arrangements that had been made; and drawing the paper of terms out of my pocket, I said, “Here are those terms, by which the envoy extraordinary is still ready to stand.” His majesty read them, and said, those were his own terms, and added all we want is one thing, that they should not make incursions into Khorassan. There is a great Mollah come to camp from Herat, with whom we will arrange the matter.” I replied, “It is most easy;” and assured him, that the British government was most anxious to put an end to this slave-taking. He wished to retain the paper of terms, but I told him I had not another copy, and would give him a copy of it, which in the afternoon I furnished to the deputy-minister for foreign affairs for his majesty. On coming from the shah's presence, I acquainted deputy-minister, that as far as it went, the answer of the shah was most satisfactory; but that we

now looked to the fulfilment of his majesty's words; and I hoped no delay would take place, as every hour was valuable, and I could not undertake to say the operations of our troops would be suspended by anything less than the shah's actually carrying into effect what he was called upon to do by the British government. The deputy-minister saw this in the light I desired, and on my returning his call in the evening, said the shah had given orders about returning hence; and that his majesty would probably place the arrangement with Herat in my hands, and that respecting the reparation for the treatment of the Gholam, his majesty was considering it, and would order it as soon as he had decided what to do with Hajee Khan. The deputy-minister assured me the whole would be carried into effect immediately.

Notwithstanding the assurances so positively, publicly, and formally given to the British agent, the very next day a heavy musketry fire was opened by the Persian infantry against the defences of the city. Colonel Stoddart at once adopted a tone so indignant and firm that the assurances were renewed, and the Persian foreign minister sent a formal declaration to Mr. McNeill of the acquiescence of his majesty in all the demands of Great Britain.

On the 6th of October, 1838, Mr. McNeill, in a despatch to Viscount Palmerston, informed him that the shah had raised the siege, and that Colonel Stoddart had dispatched a person who had accompanied the army fifty miles from Herat. In this despatch the British envoy bore the following honourable testimony to the wisdom and courage of Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger:—

“In concluding this despatch, I hope I may be permitted to solicit the favourable consideration of her majesty's government for Lieutenant-colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who have both, during this protracted siege, been exposed to all the hardships and privations, the one, of the besiegers' camp, the other, of the besieged city. Colonel Stoddart has brought to a

successful conclusion his duties in camp, and Lieutenant Pottinger has thwarted all the military efforts of the Russian officers of superior rank, who for some months conducted the siege, and all the intrigues by which the Russian mission sought to sow dissension and excite alarm amongst the defenders of Herat.”

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Persian army from before Herat, the shah was unwilling to give up several minor forts and districts which he occupied, and showed such reluctance to fulfil his agreements on various points, that Mr. McNeill was obliged to defer his return to the Persian court, and to carry on a voluminous correspondence with Colonels Stoddart and Sheil, and with his government. The shah addressed a diplomatic note to various European governments, reflecting upon the whole proceedings of the British government, and this opened new ground of contention between the envoy and the Persian court. Finally, the influence of Russia was brought to bear upon the Persian court to induce submission, in consequence of the firm and able conduct of Lord Palmerston, in London, and the Marquis of Clanricarde, in St. Petersburg.

The British government was determined, in order to its own security, to place Shah Sujah, the expelled ameer of Cabul, upon the throne, and to depose Dost Mohammed. As before noticed, Runjeet Singh joined in a convention for that object. This agreement was called “the treaty of Lahore.” It has been also noticed, on a former page, that Lord Auckland advanced 25,000 men across the Indus. The alarm in Affghanistan and Persia created by this step had much influence in deciding Persian policy. Another chapter will relate the conduct and results of the Affghan war.

## CHAPTER CX.

THE AFFGHAN WAR—BOMBARDMENT OF KURRACHEE—SUFFERINGS OF THE TROOPS—STORMING AND CAPTURE OF GHIZNI—ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH ON CABUL—SHAH SUJAH PLACED UPON THE MUSNID—GENERAL WILLSHIRE STORMS AND CAPTURES KHELAT.

THE following was the arrangement as to the quality and amount of force in this expedition:—“Bengal and Bombay were each to furnish a portion of the British force, and the command of the whole was to be entrusted to Sir Henry Fane, commander-in-chief in India. From Bengal were provided two troops of horse and three companies of foot artillery, the whole under the command of Brigadier Graham. The Bengal cavalry brigade, under

Brigadier Arnold, was formed of the 16th lancers and the 2nd and 3rd light cavalry. One division of infantry, comprehending three brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd), was commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; another, consisting of two brigades (4th and 5th), by Major-general Duncan. The first brigade was composed of her majesty's 13th light infantry, and also of the 16th and 48th native infantry; it was under Brigadier Sale. The second

brigade, commanded by Major-general Nott, contained the 2nd, 31st, 42nd, and 43rd regiments of native infantry. The third, under Brigadier Dennis, comprehended the Buffs, and the 2nd and 27th native infantry. The fourth brigade, composed of the Bengal European regiment and the 35th and 37th native infantry, was placed under Brigadier Roberts; and the fifth, comprising the 5th, 28th, and 53rd regiments of native infantry under Brigadier Worsley. An engineer department under Captain George Thomson was provided, together with two companies of sappers and miners, native soldiers, with European non-commissioned officers. The equipment of this force was completed by a siege-train of four eighteen-pounders, two eight-inch and two five-and-a-half-inch mortars, with two spare howitzers, one a twenty-four, the other a twelve-pounder.

"The Bombay force under Sir John Keane, the commander-in-chief at that presidency, consisted of two troops of horse and two companies of foot artillery, under Brigadier Stephenson; a brigade of cavalry, composed of two squadrons of her majesty's 4th light dragoons and 1st Bombay light cavalry, under Brigadier Scott; and a body of infantry, consisting of her majesty's 2nd and 17th, and of the 1st, 5th, 19th, and 23rd native regiments, under the command of Major-general Willshire. The Poonah auxiliary horse were to accompany this force, which also brought into the field an engineer department, a detachment of sappers and miners, and a siege-train, consisting of two eighteen-pounders, and four nine-pounders.

"Law has its fictions, and so has statesmanship. The force, of which a detailed account has been given, though, in fact, intended for the conquest and occupation of Affghanistan, was regarded only as an auxiliary force aiding the operations of the Shah Sujah-ool-Moolk, at the head of his own troops. Under the sanction of the British government, an army had, indeed, been raised ostensibly for the service of the shah; and this as a point of decorum was to be regarded as the chief instrument by which he was to regain possession of his dominions. The shah's army consisted of a troop of native horse artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and five of infantry. Major-general Simpson, of the Bengal army, was appointed to the command of this force, for which a staff and commissariat were duly organized, a military chest established, and satisfactorily provided. The whole of the above force was to advance by Candahar on Cabul. Another force, assembled in Peshawur, was to advance on Cabul by way of the Khyber Pass. This

was called the Shazada's army, Timur, the son of Sujah, having the nominal command. It consisted of about four thousand eight hundred men, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, obtained from various sources—British sepoys and adventurers, raised for the occasion, partly regular and partly irregular, and armed with almost every conceivable variety of offensive and defensive weapon, sword, shield, matchlock, musket, and rifle. With this force acted the Sikh contingent of six thousand men, under General Ventura.\* The whole of this combined force was under the command of Colonel Wade. Another Sikh force, under one of Runjeet's native officers, was posted on the frontier of Peshawur, as an army of observation."

On the 1st of October, 1838, the governor-general, by proclamation, dated Simlah, gave an *exposé* of his motives for this expedition, which have been already incidentally adverted to in the relation of the intricate, complicated, and varied transactions which the intrigues of Russia had brought about. The governor-general insisted in this document upon the necessity of the East India Company possessing a friendly and allied state or states upon the north-west boundaries of their dominions. At the same time his excellency appointed Mr. W. Hay Mac Naghten minister on the part of the government of India to the court of Sujah-ool-Moolk. The staff of agency nominated to assist Mr. Mac Naghten were Captain Burnes, Lieutenant D. E. Todd, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Lieutenant B. Leech, and Mr. P. B. Lord, a surgeon in the company's service, who afterwards much distinguished himself. Lord Auckland designated the force by which the reinstatement of Sujah upon the throne of Cabul was to be effected "the army of the Indus."

At the end of November the Bengal army was encamped at Ferozepore. At this place a series of remarkable interviews occurred between the governor-general and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, which were conducted with ostentatious magnificence.

While the Bengal army was quartered at Ferozepore, it was determined that a smaller force should be employed, as being equally efficient, and more easily subsisted. Sir Henry Fane, feeling the difficulty of selecting the troops to advance—all the Europeans among them being eager to proceed—determined it by lots. The following portions of the army had the fortune to win:—the 1st, 2nd, and 4th brigades of infantry; 2nd troop 2nd brigade horse artillery; and the camel battery of nine-pounders. Sir Henry Fane remained behind from ill health.

\* One of Runjeet Singh's French officers.

Major Pew took the command of the artillery instead of Brigadier-general Graham. The command of the Bengal force, which advanced, devolved upon Sir Willoughby Cotton; and it was ordered that when a junction was formed with the Bombay army, the united divisions should be commanded by Sir John Keane.

Early in December, 1838, Shah Sujah's army marched. It was followed in a few days by the Bengal troops. Early in January the allies arrived on the banks of the Indus. The shah's troops then began to desert, but the desertion was not carried to any great extent. The Bengal sepoys were also exceedingly unwilling to enter Affghanistan. Those among them who were Mohammedans were reluctant to fight against their co-religionists. Those who were Brahminical feared to fight at all; they apprehended that in a strange country, beyond the boundaries of India Proper, they would of necessity be deprived of the means of preserving caste. This apprehension was well founded. When the Bombay sepoys joined, they were found far more willing for the performance of duty. This irritated their brethren of the Bengal army against them, so that frequently in performing work supposed to be somewhat beneath the dignity of caste, the Bengal sepoys jeered and taunted those of Bombay for doing what the Bengalees either neglected or refused to attempt. There was a disloyal spirit among the Bengal sepoys which does not appear to have extended to the native officers, nor even non-commissioned officers, and was concealed in the presence of Europeans. Indeed, something of enthusiasm appears to have been simulated; for Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Havelock, describes the whole Bengal army as animated by military ardour.

Captain Burnes had concluded a convention with the ameers of Seinde, by which the British were to take possession of the fortress of Bukkur, "situated on an island in the Indus, between the towns of Roree on the eastern bank, and Sukkur on the western; the eastern channel being that which separates it from Roree, and by which the British force approached, is about four hundred yards in width."

The services of Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Pottinger, were of great importance in Seinde at this juncture, as the tardiness of the government at Calcutta, and the want of direct dealing on the part of the Seinde ameers, rendered hostilities in Seinde not improbable. The Bombay army was accordingly delayed on its march, and the Bengal army was in consequence directed to march

against Hyderabad, the capital of Seinde. Fresh intelligence having arrived of the success of Captain Pottinger's negotiations, the Bengal army halted, and after a short delay, to make sure of the good faith of the ameers, it returned to Bukkur. Captain Havelock gives a graphic description of those changes, and the emotions which they excited in the army:—"At this period the spirits of every soldier in the Bengal contingent were buoyant and high. Before us lay Hyderabad; it was known to contain the accumulated wealth of the most affluent as well as powerful of the branches of the Talpore family, amounting in specie, jewels, and other valuables, and ingots of gold, to eight crores of Seindian rupees well told, or not less than eight millions sterling. Such a prize is not often in a century, even in India, presented to the grasp of a British army." \* A few pages afterwards he says, "In a moment all our visions of glory and booty were dispelled; it was announced to us that the ameers were at length brought to a sense of their impending danger, and that, compelled to comprehend that a few days would, according to every calculation of human prudence, deprive them at once of their independence, their capital, and the accumulated treasures of years, they had accepted unreservedly all the conditions of the treaty laid before them by Colonel Pottinger." † "Vainly repining, therefore, at the change in events which had given this small sum (ten lacs) to the state, instead of endowing the army with eight crores, its officers and men, with light purses and heavy hearts, turned their backs on Hyderabad, from which they had hoped never to recede until they had made its treasure their own, and put to a stern proof that Beloochee valour which had so loudly vaunted its power to arrest their further progress, and fix on the banks of the Indus the war which they had set out resolved to carry into the centre of Affghanistan." ‡

The tone of these extracts is hardly in keeping with the softness of character attributed to the late Sir Henry Havelock. He was, however, a stern soldier, although a kind and pious man. He was ambitious of military distinction, as far as honour and principle allowed, and he had an intense desire to become a good military historian, and to make Xenophon his model in that respect.

On the 20th of February it was deemed expedient that the Bengal column should take the lead, and, accordingly, the irregular force of Shah Sujah fell behind. It was thought

\* *Narrative of the Campaign in Affghanistan.* By Captain Havelock, vol. i. p. 151.

† P. 155.

‡ P. 157.

possible that in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore the ameers might offer some opposition, notwithstanding their recent treaties, and it was better to ensure a speedy chastisement, such as the Bengal force would inflict, whereas the Shah Sujah's army might be defeated, and occasion a general violation of the convention by the ameers.

The progress of the Bombay army was unsatisfactory, the Seinde ameers having violated those terms of the convention by which camels and supplies were to be provided. It was not until the end of December, 1838, that it arrived at Tatta, where it was met by Sir John Keane, and was detained for a considerable time. On the 4th of March, 1839, this army was "officially declared to have become part of the army of the Indus."

Previous to the arrival of the Bombay division at Tatta, other events occurred still further provocative of the ill-feeling existing among the ameers to the British. Brigadier Valiant was placed in command of a reserve, consisting of her majesty's 40th regiment of the line, two thousand two hundred Bombay native infantry, consisting of the 2nd grenadiers, the 22nd and 26th regiments, and detachments of pioneers and artillery. By the request of Captain Pottinger, Sir Frederick Maitland, commander of the naval forces on the Indian station, proceeded with the ship *Wellesley*, the 40th regiment, and the artillery, to Kurrahee. The *Berenice* and *Euphrates* steamers, with the native troops on board, arrived on the 1st of February before Kurrahee. Sir Frederick summoned the commandant of the fort to surrender it to the British forces. He refused. Five companies of the 40th were landed; they took up a position in the rear of the fortress. The *Wellesley* brought her broadside to bear within eight hundred yards. In an hour the face of the fortress exposed to its fire was a heap of ruins. The soldiers of the 44th charged through the open space, no enemy offering resistance. To the astonishment of the conquerors, the garrison only consisted of twenty men, who having hid under the cliffs, escaped injury. They were made prisoners by the 40th. On the 2nd of February the British flag floated over the ruined walls of the fort of Kurrahee.

On the 16th of April the Bengal column was at Quettah, having marched through the Bolan Pass without encountering any resistance. On that day Sir John Keane arrived with the advances of the Bombay army; the main body was several marches in the rear. Both columns were harassed by bands of robbers, who seemed to contemn death where there was a prospect of plunder. It was

generally believed in the army that in the Kojuk Pass advantage of its precipitous and varied formation would be taken by the enemy. There were difficulties in getting through this pass, irrespective of the dangers. Dacoits and other predatory wanderers appeared at intervals, but no attack was made by an Affghan force. On the 20th of April the Bengal army reached Candahar; the Bombay force did not arrive until seventeen days later. The sirdars fled. Shah Sujah advanced through a line of his own troops, occupied a temporary musnid, and was proclaimed sovereign of Affghanistan. The commissariat of the army was execrable, no proper forethought had in this particular been exercised. The march to Candahar was in consequence attended by great suffering and great loss. "It must be confessed," says Captain Havelock, "that hitherto our task has been escorting, not campaigning, but this pacific duty has been performed under arduous circumstances; and the exposure to the vicissitudes of climate, the fatigue, and the deficiency of food and water, which tried the strength and resolution of our troops, between Quettah and Candahar, as well as the active hostility of the predatory tribes, ought never to be despised as military difficulties. How gladly would our army have exchanged them for the most determined opposition of the Affghans in the field! How often did our officers long for a battle to raise the sinking spirits of the soldier, and make him feel that he was not labouring and suffering in vain." \* Captain Havelock also thus wrote concerning the sufferings of this army:—"The plain on which our camp is now pitched is not, like the level of Siroab, watered by deep and well-supplied kahreezes,† carrying coolness and the promise of fertility down their slopes. A small cut through which we found water flowing from a spring-head in the mountains has alone supplied us with the useful element since first we advanced to this point. This little channel the Candahar sirdars have caused to be dammed up near its source in the hills, and behold two bold brigades and the levy of the shah reduced to the greatest straits. Horses, already half starved for want of grain and good grass, were throughout the day panting in all the agonies of thirst; and in the evening a few drops of water could not be obtained even to mix the medicines of the sick in our hospitals, or to supply them with the refreshment and comfort of a few spoonfuls of tea. All ranks have been taught to understand to-day how little prized when plentiful, how outrageously demanded when scarce, is that

\* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 332, 333.

† Subterranean aqueducts.

bounteous provision for the wants of God's creatures, water! Weary of the delays which had kept us so long at Dundi Goolae, we moved forward on the 21st\* into the plains which we had surveyed from the summit of the Kojuk Pass, recognising all the distinctive peaks of the scattered hills which we had observed from that commanding height. We saw them now magnified as we approached them, and casting a dark shade over the plains which they overhung. Anxious looks were from time to time cast towards these green eminences, and their bases were carefully searched for any small streams which might supply the urgent wants of a thirsting force. It was not very pleasant to discover that this day, too, we must depend for a supply of the indispensable element on the stream of a small and imperfect kahreez. Its water was brackish, and flowed scantily and sluggishly. Thousands of brass *lotas* and leathern buckets were soon dipped into the little channel; and though proper regulations were promptly established, one-half of the force had not been watered before the scarcity commenced. Soon diluted mud alone could be obtained, and whole regiments, under a burning sun, with parched lips, sighed for night to cool them, and then for morning, that they might move on to a happier spot. The troops were buoyed up towards evening with fallacious hopes of the waters of a spring, actually discovered in the hills, being brought down to their relief into the plains; but up to the hour of early march no stream had begun to flow into the dry bed of a nullah,† on which many were gazing in hope. The sufferings of the soldiers, both European and native, were for some hours so great as nearly to tempt some for a moment to forget the restraints of discipline; and never do its principles achieve a greater triumph than when troops are seen obedient and respectful, and trying to be cheerful under this form of privation. At Killa Puttoollah officers of the highest rank were brought to acknowledge the value of this simple element. This was no time for the luxurious ablutions which, under the sun of Central Asia, preserve health and restore strength; no time to waste a single drop of the precious fluid on any bodily comfort, or for any purpose but preparing food, or slaking a raging thirst; and thousands felt this day that all the gifts of that God whose public praise and ordinances were forgotten on this Sabbath of unwilling penance, would have been worthless to man, if in his anger he had withheld the often-despised blessing of water. The kindness and consi-

deration with which some officers of no low rank shared the little portion of the much-coveted fluid which they could obtain with the privates around them, was creditable to their humanity, and ought to have won the confidence and affections of those whom they commanded."\*

On the following day, the army, unable to find water, was compelled to advance:—"Forward the brigade moved, to finish a second march of ten miles, their horses dropping from drought and exhaustion as they toiled on, and leaving in the mountain passes melancholy traces of this day's sufferings and perseverance. When the cavalry had thus got over five miles, in the course of which British dragoons and native troopers were seen eagerly sharing with their chargers muddy and foetid water drawn from puddles at the side of the road, the very sight of which would, in Hindostan, have equally sickened all to whom it was offered, they struck into a by-road on their left, and winding their way by a narrow path through an opening in the undulating eminences, found themselves towards evening on the banks of a plentiful stream. The rush of unbridled indulgence of the troops and their horses into its waters, after all the privations of the morning, may fairly be described as uncontrollable. What moderation was to be expected from man or beast breaking forth from the restraints of a two days' unwilling abstinence?"†

Well acquainted with this distress, the Affghan banditti hovered about the camp at Candahar, presuming that the men on outpost duty would be too weak to be on the alert, or to avenge such robberies as might be perpetrated upon the convoys and material. The British chiefs in command seemed incapable of making provision for the commissariat of an army, and even in Candahar no adequate arrangements existed to supply the troops.

Shah Sujah spent money freely in attempting to enlist under his standard the Affghan chiefs. They accepted his gold and cheated him. He had neither power nor popularity, and indications were already numerous that the British would have to establish him on the throne of Cabul in spite of the tribes. The army was obliged to remain in Candahar until the 27th June, unable to procure provisions. During the time the shah and his British auxiliaries were marching to Candahar and occupying that place, "the Lion of the Punjaub," as old Runjeet Singh was termed, was operating by way of Peshawur. His martial career in connection with the

\* April, 1839.

† Artificial watercourse.

\* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 319—322.

† *Captain Havelock's Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 323, 324.

tri-partite alliance was not destined long to continue, for before the forces of the other two parties to the alliance left Candahar, he died. Shah Sujah, and the British commanders acting with him, were happily ignorant of the event, or it would have probably deterred them from marching to Cabul, as it was apprehended in India that the death of the Maharajah would be followed by great changes, and perhaps violent revolutions, the consequences of which to the alliance might be of the most serious kind.

At last the march for Cabul began, the soldiers being put upon half rations, although a most difficult task lay before them. There were plenty of provisions left behind in Candahar, the army having no means of conveyance. While the troops were encamped they were half starved, because provisions could not be procured by the ill-managed commissariat. When about to march, abundance of food was at their command, but the mis-managed transport service could not bring it with the army. There was force in the mingled sneer and compliment which a native prince had made long before, that "the English ought to be carried in palanquins to the field of battle, and then set down to fight." His highness considered them more adapted to fighting than campaigning.

The army reached Ghizni on the 22nd of July. The English generals were without intelligence as to the strength of the fortress. Worse still, they were under impressions on the subject positively false. The battering train had been left in Candahar, *under the impression that it would not be required*. The English officers were even informed that no defence would be made at Ghizni, cowardice and treason combining to place the fortress, without a struggle, in the hands of Shah Sujah. Captain Thomson, chief engineer of the army of the Indus, thus describes the first impressions of the scientific department of the army on approaching the place:—"We were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty feet high, flanked by numerous towers and surrounded by a *fausse braye* and a wet ditch. The irregular figure of the *enceinte* gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged; screen walls had been built before the gates; the ditch cleared out and filled with water (stated to be unfordable), and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it." Such was the impression made by the first near

view of the fortress of Ghizni. "The works," Captain Thomson adds, "were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering train, and to attack Ghizni in form a much larger train would be required than the army ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading."\*

The allies met with an unexpected advantage, by which their task was facilitated. A nephew of Dost Mohammed deserted to the English, and afforded valuable information. Upon a careful reconnaissance the intelligence thus derived was found to be correct, as far as such means of confirmation could be of service. The fortifications showed no weak part. The gates had all been built up with strong masonry, except the Cabul gate. The engineers reported that there was no feasible mode of attack but by blowing open that gate with powder, and charging through the smoke and fire, over the *débris*, into the place.†

This plan having been resolved upon, it was necessary for the army to change ground, an extremely difficult operation under the circumstances of the case. The troops were without proper rations; they had endured excessive fatigue, and the weather, as is usual at that time of year in the elevated districts of Affghanistan, was cold, and would be especially felt by hungry and harassed men. The army had not been encamped three hours when it was ordered to march in two columns. The men murmured, but not disloyally, at this movement, the necessity of which they did not perceive. It was necessary, however, for as Captain Outram (afterwards General Outram, and one of the heroes of Lucknow) relates—"It was confidently stated that Dost Mohammed Khan himself marched on the 16th (of July).‡ The distance is eighty-eight miles (we made seven marches), and by regular marches he would have reached Ghizni on the 22nd (next day), and as this day (21st) he would have been within one march, and would have heard the firing, he would, it was to be supposed, push on; so that there

\* Memoranda of the engineers' operations before Ghizni in July, 1839.

† In his *Narrative of the Affghan Campaign*, Major Hough asserted that none of the gates were built up, and that therefore all the gates were accessible to the same means of assault as the Cabul gate. In a later work describing the same campaign the major omits the statement. He was with the army.

‡ From Cabul.

was a great object in not delaying in changing ground. As in 1834 Dost Mohammed had moved from Cabul to defend Candahar against the shah, the presumptions were in favour of his march to Ghizni. We knew from Dost Mohammed's own nephew that two of the three gates were blocked up; and it was argued by some that the sudden movement to the Cabul gate, which was said not to be built up, would put the enemy on their guard, and cause that gate also to be secured; whereas, by a march in the morning, it would not appear so suspicious. The movement was a delicate one, being a march in two columns by two different routes; for it involved a night march for the rear and much of the baggage, if not for the troops, as we were not to march till four in the afternoon, and the route for both columns could not be well known. The march in two columns would, it was concluded, expedite the movements, but then there were two columns of baggage to protect, and we could not protect that of the column on the right. The march of the baggage at all that night was inconvenient, and we gained no time by it."

The necessity of making the change so promptly, and of executing it so rapidly, caused much suffering on the part of the troops. Captain Havelock describes their sensations on the night when their march was executed, as they took up their miserable quarters:—"A son of the Ameer of Cabul had marched down from the capital with the view of deblocking Ghizni, and was now close to us. The forces of the Ghiljies, Abdoolruhman and Gool Moohummud were in the field at no great distance. A party, also, of fanatics from the Sooluman Kheils, who had taken arms when a religious war had, as a last resource, been proclaimed by the tottering Barukzyes, now occupied the heights to the eastward of the valley in which the fortress stands. Reflections on these circumstances and on our want of a battering train, the glimmering of the lights on the hostile battlements and in the plains, and the chill of the night air, effectually chased away slumber until day broke on the 22nd."\*

When day dawned, many of the sick were still pursuing the tedious march, and it was necessary to send out parties to bring them in. Many of the camp followers had lost the track of the columns, and parties of cavalry had to scour the country for their protection. These miserable camp followers had suffered horribly. The author of *The Three Presidencies* affirms that 100,000 persons of this description left the banks of the Indus with the grand army, and that of these not 20,000 returned, the rest perishing by sword, famine,

\* *Havelock*, vol. ii. p. 65.

or cold. With considerable difficulty the sick and the stragglers were rescued before the appearance of any of the forces intended to raise the siege. Scarcely was the safety of these helpless persons secured, when crowds of ferocious irregulars descended from the hills to attack the head-quarters of Shah Sujah. The shah's cavalry charged and defeated them. Captain Outram led a portion of his Affghan majesty's irregular infantry into the fastnesses of the neighbouring hills, to beat up the nests of the fanatics. This raid was attended with success, having been accomplished with the gallantry and judgment so eminently characteristic of that resolute and talented officer. He made many prisoners, and captured the banner of green and white, a standard of fanaticism under which they had been gathered to wage a holy war against the English infidels. When the prisoners were brought in, a terrible event followed. They cursed the shah in his presence, and some of them drew weapons and stabbed the shah's officers. He ordered them to be put to death, an order which was executed upon sixty most formidable and fanatical ruffians.

In the evening the officers received their orders for the assault, which were soon communicated to the soldiers, when a display of that heroic emulation characteristic of the English soldier took place. The whole of the European troops were ready to volunteer for the assault. Dr. Kennedy, in his narrative of the campaign, relates:—"On visiting the hospital tents of her majesty's 2nd and 17th regiments, I was surprised to find them clear of sick; the gallant fellows had all but risen in mutiny on their surgeons, and insisted upon joining their comrades." The sick were employed as sentinels, and some of the more convalescent on outpost duty. The night was spent in preparations for the attack. Storms prevailed throughout, so as to render the movements of the English inaudible in the city. Ghizni seemed to sleep in perfect stillness; not a signal-light gleamed through the gloom which overhung it, nor a sound from its garrison reached the parties preparing to assail it. It was necessary to make a feint in order to conceal the real plan of attack. Three companies of the 35th regiment of native infantry, under Captain Hay, marched round to the north side of the fortress and opened an unremitting fire of musketry, which could scarcely be heard amidst the bellowing of the storm. The balls, however, telling upon men stationed on the parapets, and at the loop-holes, the fire was returned. The field artillery and camel battery of nine-pounders

\* *Narrative*, vol. ii., p. 46.

opened, the former from heights which commanded the citadel, the latter from the low grounds directed a fire against the walls. Even the fire of the nine-pounders could hardly be heard, except in the lulls which occurred in the storm. The enemy employed all the guns they could direct against this cannonade. Previous to the dispatch of Captain Hay's detachment against the north face of the defence, four companies of the 16th native infantry, and two of the 48th, succeeded in occupying a position on the outskirts of the town. Within an hour of dawn, the officers of engineers had stealthily advanced near to the gate against which the assault was to be made. The party consisted of Captain Peat, of the Bombay engineers; Lieutenants Durand and M'Leod, of the Bengal engineers; three sergeants and eighteen men of the sappers.\* Captain Havelock represents Captain Thomson, the chief officer of engineers, as having himself undertaken this task, which is an error; the service was committed to the officers named. The enemy, suspecting that some hostile plan was in progress without divining what, burned blue lights. These were, however, burned upon the top of the walls, instead of being cast below. Captain Peat believed that had the latter course been adopted, the plan of attack would have been discovered and frustrated. Captain Havelock has fallen into another error in representing the engineer party as conveying nine hundred pounds of powder for the purpose of blowing open the gate. The charge was three hundred only, and this was far above the amount usually deemed necessary for blowing open gates, which was from sixty to one hundred pounds. The bore was placed and the train laid without the plan being detected, or any serious casualties occurring.

Behind the engineer party a fine column of infantry was placed on the Cabul road, ready to rush forward when the train should be fired. This column was constituted as follows:—"The advance was composed of the light companies of the Queen's, the 17th, and the Bengal European regiment, and of Captain Vigor's company of the 13th light infantry. It was led by Colonel Dennie. The main column, under the immediate command of Brigadier Sale, was made up of the remainder of the Queen's and Bengal Europeans, whilst, as an auxiliary to its efforts, the whole of the 13th, excepting its storming company, extended as skirmishers along the whole of the assailed point of the fortress. The support was, her majesty's 17th regiment, led by

\* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton.

Colonel Croker. The reserve, commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton, was composed of the remaining companies of the 16th, 35th, and 48th."

Before dawn approached the signalled moment arrived; the train was about to be fired. At that instant a brilliant blue light burnt up above the gateway, and a crowd of the enemy's staff was seen pouring down, if possible, to discover the cause of the movements of men, which were again indistinctly heard by the sentinels. The match was touched by the British engineers, a rumbling noise rolled along the earth where the assaulting column stood, and beneath the city a dense compact column of smoke shot up where the glare of blue light had been illuminating all around; a crash followed, the gate was shivered to atoms, the huge masonry above it fell in ruins, burying the chiefs and soldiers who had an instant previously looked forth so wistfully from its battlements. High above the din of the cannonade, the rattle of musketry, and even the rushing of the tempest, the British bugle rang out shrill and clear, and, as if in a single bound, the column of the assailants leaped forward and pierced the opening of the chasm which now yawned to receive them. The Affghans recovered from their surprise with creditable promptitude, and, sword in hand, pressed towards the fatal breach. The English had no sooner set foot within the entrance, than the concussion of large bodies of men, hand to hand in deadly strife, swelled above the tumult of the night. The clashing of arms, the shouts of the combatants, the scattered and desultory fire of such as used their musketry, went forth over the hosts within and without, creating intense excitement and suspense. The principal fighting devolved upon the advance, which at last made good its entrance, took up a position which covered the entrance of the main column, and by their triumphant cheers encouraged their followers forward. Yet, at this moment, all was nearly lost, and those who had gained an entrance were exposed to danger of destruction. This event has been better told in Havelock's narrative than elsewhere:—

"Brigadier Sale, whilst his skirmishers were closing by sound of bugle, had steadily and promptly pressed forward to support the forlorn hope. As he moved on, he met an engineer officer suffering from the effects of the recent explosion, and anxiously inquired of him how the matter went. This gallant person had been thrown to the ground by the bursting of the powder; and though he had not received any distinct wound, fracture, or contusion, was shaken in every limb by the concussion. His reply was, that the gate was

blown in, but that the passage was choked up, and the forlorn hope could not force an entrance. Brigadier Sale was too cool and self-possessed not to be able at once to draw the inference that to move on under such circumstances was to expose his troops to certain destruction. He ordered the retreat to be sounded. The tempestuous character of the weather, and the noise of the fire of all arms, did not prevent this signal from being heard, even by the reserve; but it conveyed the order which British soldiers are always slowest in obeying. The column, however, made a full halt in the path of victory; but the check was not of long duration. The brigadier, perfectly calm at this moment of supposed difficulty, addressed himself to another engineer officer, with whom he happily fell in at this interesting moment. He assured him that though the passage of the gateway was much impeded, the advanced stormers, under Colonel Dennie, had already won their way through it. The brigadier promptly gave the signal to move on.

"But the delay, short as it had been, was productive of mischief. It had left a considerable interval between the forlorn hope and Brigadier Sale's column, and just as the latter, in which the Queen's regiment was leading, had pressed into the gateway, a large body of Affghans, driven headlong from the ramparts by the assault and fire of Colonel Dennie's force, rushed down towards the opening, in the hope of that way effecting their escape. Their attack was made upon the rear company of the Queen's, and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment. The encounter with these desperate men was terrific. They fiercely assaulted, and for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. One of their number, rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp shumsheer.\* The Affghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling, but the pummel, not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Affghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of the brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of his trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt of his shumsheer; but he had an active and powerful opponent, and was himself faint from loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the 13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened, in the *mêlée*, to

\* Asiatic sabre.

approach the scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognised and called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his drawn sword through the body of the Affghan,\* but still the desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the brigadier, for a moment, got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre, which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mohammedan once more shouted, 'Uo Ullah!' † and never spake again." Sale regained his feet, and persisted in directing the efforts of his soldiers, who were still fighting, and had yet to make sure their way. At last the walls were everywhere conquered, and there were street-firing and close conflicts where scattered groups of British and Affghans met. The commander-in-chief, perceiving the entrance was open, ordered the cannonade to be directed against the citadel, against which also Sale, who seemed to regain strength under the excitement, directed the soldiers of the 13th.

Colonel Croker and the support came on slowly, being obstructed by the *débris* of the gateway and masonry, and by the wounded, whom the surgeons were bringing beyond the walls. The reserve came up with the retarded supports, and entered in one body. The Affghans, however, gaining courage by the slow progress of the supports, mounted the walls and skirmished; some, finding concealments, picked off the English soldiers. When the last of the reserves had entered, the anxiety of the British was not over. The citadel was strong, and might offer considerable and even dangerous resistance. Events relieved their anxiety in an unexpected manner. The commander of the place, Mohammed Hyder, was paralysed by the suddenness of the onset, and the astonishing manner, as it appeared to him, by which the British effected an entrance. He abandoned the defence in despair. The 13th and 17th English regiments forced the gates and entered the citadel, scarcely any resistance being offered. They at once planted their colours, and as these flaunted in the breeze, and displayed their unmistakeable symbols in the morning light, the whole army, within and beyond the walls, raised a prolonged cheer of victory.

Sir J. Keane was conqueror of Ghizni. Desultory efforts were still, however, made by the enemy. A fire was poured from the ramparts upon the reserve, heavier than that which galled the support. On entering the place, the reserve ascended that rampart. The Affghans,

\* Kershaw went on into the battle.

† "Oh God."

finding that every shelter was penetrated by their persistent enemy, made a gallant charge, sword in hand, to cut a passage to the gateway, in the hope of escape. The track over which they rushed was studded with groups of wearied soldiers, doolies containing wounded men, and the horses of the Affghans running wildly about. As the fugitives pressed forward, they cut indiscriminately at everything, even the horses, but their chief desire was to destroy the wounded and helpless. This enraged the British soldiery; the scattered groups gathered along the route, and not one Affghan passed the gateway,—they were shot down or bayoneted to a man. In the streets groups of Affghans still remained, who kept up a dropping fire, and then, retiring to the houses, reserved their shots for the officers, who especially suffered from this cause. These desperate men refused quarter, so that the houses had to be stormed and the defenders put to the bayonet. Sir John Keane entered the city escorting Shah Sujah to his fortress, won for him by the dauntless valour of his allies.

During the storming of Ghizni a son of the ruler of Cabul remained with 5000 horse in observation. He saw the result of the struggle—the British flag floating near the citadel. He fled to Cabul to report the disaster. The cavalry of Sir John Keane instituted a hot pursuit, inflicting some loss upon the enemy.

The army advanced upon Cabul, where it met with no resistance, and Shah Sujah was elevated to the musnid without any manifestation of joy or regret. Thus the conquest of the throne of Dost Mohammed was achieved with little loss by arms, though with enormous sacrifice of life, arising from the defective organization of the British army in the transport and commissary departments. The loss of the English in killed and wounded in Ghizni was not more than two hundred men, amongst whom not one officer was slain,

although a large proportion fell wounded by the fire from the houses.

Colonel Wade, who was at Peshawur, as soon as he heard that the commander-in-chief had marched from Candahar for Cabul, also set out for the same direction, penetrating the celebrated Khyber Pass. The chief obstacle to the progress of Wade's brigade was the fort of Ali Musjed. It was stormed with a loss within ten men of that sustained by the British at Ghizni, and a greater proportion of killed. Wade entered Jellalabad unopposed, and marched thence, without meeting an antagonist, to Cabul.

While the British remained in full force at Cabul, various minor expeditions were undertaken against villages, fortified rocks, and country forts; the Affghans generally refusing quarter, and dying with the utmost enthusiasm, indicating the most vindictive animosity, believing that they perished for the faith of Islam, and gained Paradise. The most important of these lesser enterprises was the reduction of Khelat. That fort and territory were governed by a Beloochee robber-chief. He had inflicted many mischiefs upon the British, and manifested to them an intense resentment. The conquest of this stronghold was committed to General Willshire, an officer who proved his competency for the trust reposed in him. The robber khan defended his fortress with more valour than skill. The English with surpassing courage took by storm the surrounding heights, battered in the principal gate of the fortress by cannon, and took the place by assault. The slaughter was great, the Beloochees and Affghans fighting with furious valour and desperate self-sacrifice. The chief himself died, sword in hand, at the head of his devoted adherents. Captain Outram represents the prisoners as 2200, including the wounded; the slain he computes at nearly one-fourth that number. Thus ended the first stage of the great Affghan war.

## CHAPTER CXI.

AFFGHAN WAR (*Continued*)—MARCH OF SIR ROBERT SALE FROM CABUL TO JELLALABAD—DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN—MAINTENANCE OF THE POSITION UNTIL RELIEVED BY GENERAL POLLOCK.

WHEN the British had, as they thought, established the throne of Shah Sujah, the whole Affghan races were plotting the destruction of the invaders and their *protégé*. The robber tribes in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass succeeded in plundering and rout-

ing the Sikhs by whom they were guarded. Mr. Mackinson, Colonel Wheeler, and other officers, civil and military, made agreements with the Khyber chiefs, and even subsidized them, but the Mussulman chieftains kept faith with none.

Under circumstances of such general hostility, it is strange that Lord Auckland should deem it expedient to remove a great part of the force which should have remained to protect the newly elevated monarch until he had succeeded in strengthening his party, and securing the prospect of a tolerably undisturbed reign. Such, however, was the decision of the government of Calcutta; Sir John Keane was ordered to return with a large portion of the troops.

The author of *The Three Presidencies*, a good writer, but a warm partizan, and who assails all the measures of Lord Auckland, because he owed his appointment to a whig government, thus remarks upon the return of Sir John Keane:—"The commander-in-chief hastened from the scene of his hollow exploits; and scarcely resting at the seat of government, took his way home, to show himself to the British public as the conqueror of Affghanistan, receiving, as the fruit of his splendid achievement, a title and a pension; the greatest exploit of the entire campaign having been the blowing open of a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder." This was the tone of that portion of the press in India and in England which discussed public affairs and the conduct of public men in the spirit of party. "Blowing open a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder" was not a faithful description of a work of great military skill, which Captain Thomson devised, and other engineer officers executed. The conquest of Ghizni by Keane, and that of Khelat by General Willshire, were achievements of skill and valour, and entitled the officers and men who effected them to honourable distinction. These distinctions were ultimately conferred. "In addition to the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company, the governor-general, Lord Auckland, received an advanced step in the peerage, being created Earl of Auckland. Sir John Keane was created a peer, and parliament added a grant of a pension of two thousand pounds a year to the general and his two next heirs male. Mr. Mac Naghten and Colonel Henry Pottinger were created baronets; Colonel Wade obtained the honour of knighthood; Sir Willoughby Cotton received the Grand Cross of the Bath; General Willshire, Colonel Thackwell, and Colonel Sale were made knight-commanders; and Colonels J. Scott, Persse, Croker, and R. Macdonald companions of that order. There was also an extensive grant of brevet rank." One officer, who had served not many years short of half a century, Colonel Dennie, was passed over unrewarded, while his inferiors in service and seniority received high honours. It is to be deeply regretted that just com-

plaints are so often heard in connection with the unrequited services of distinguished military men, and that promotion is so frequently distributed with a partial hand. Few cases have been more flagrant than that of the heroic Colonel Dennie, even although such abuses are numerous, disheartening to the service, and dishonouring to the country.

On the 2nd of January, 1840, "a general order" announced the dissolution of the army of the Indus. Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir W. Mac Naghten were left in Cabul as political agents. Major-general Elphinstone was placed in command of the troops in garrison, and as commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. The state of the commissariat was desperate: it was only by paying an extraordinary price that any provisions could be obtained. Seldom has a garrison been left in such a condition as that at Cabul under General Elphinstone. The worst part of the army was the general himself. He was utterly incompetent to command it, and that incompetency brought ruin upon the army and to the cause for which the occupation was intended. The following description of General Elphinstone, and of the circumstances of his nomination to command, is as just as it is moderate in its tone:—"The officers who served under General Elphinstone throughout this unhappy crisis have invariably spoken of him with tenderness and respect. He was an honourable gentleman, a kind-hearted man, and he had once been a good soldier. His personal courage has never been questioned. Regardless of danger, and patient under trial, he exposed himself without reserve, and bore his sufferings without complaining. But disease had broken down his physical strength, and enfeebled his understanding. He had almost lost the use of his limbs. He could not walk; he could hardly ride. The gout had crippled him in a manner that it was painful to contemplate. You could not see him engaged in the most ordinary concerns of peaceful life without an emotion of lively compassion. He was fit only for the invalid establishment on the day of his arrival in India. It was a mockery to talk of his commanding a division of the army in the quietest district of Hindostan. But he was selected by Lord Auckland, against the advice of the commander-in-chief, and the remonstrances of the Agra governor, to assume the command of that division of the army which of all others was most likely to be actively employed, and which demanded, therefore, the greatest amount of energy and activity in its commander. Among the general officers of the Indian army were many able and energetic men, with active limbs and clear understanding. There was one—a cripple,

whose mental vigour much suffering had enfeebled; and he was selected by the governor-general to command the army in Affghanistan.\* The secret of this disgraceful conduct on the part of Lord Auckland is the spirit of policy which pervades all our public offices, and from which few of our public functionaries keep clear. Lord Auckland was made governor-general of India because it was "a good thing," and the party he supported desired to find a good thing for him. He in turn gave the command of the army in Affghanistan to a friend and supporter, because such ought to be provided for, and the command itself was one of honour and emolument. If the public welfare was left out of sight by the government which appointed Lord Auckland, it cannot be matter of surprise if he in his turn thought nothing of the commonwealth when nominating others to office.

Scarcely was General Elphinstone left in command when indications were given that Shah Sujah would have a hard struggle to maintain his crown. Still, the first winter was got over without revolt; but the spring and hostilities opened together. Dost Mohammed was riding about among the tribes, swearing them on the Koran to do battle with the Feringhies. Akbar Khan, the Dost's most warlike son, raised large forces, and displayed great activity, as well as some military enterprise and capacity. The English authorities, both civil and military, at Cabul, were utterly incapable of discharging the duties which devolved upon them. Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir W. Mac Naghten, however high their reputation for diplomatic talent and knowledge of Indian affairs, were unequal to the position they then occupied. Their incredulity and credulity were alike astonishing. They refused to believe the most credible testimony as to the state of Affghanistan generally, and believed the professions of the chiefs in and around Cabul, in spite of ocular demonstration of their rebellion.

During the summer of 1841 there were contests everywhere, the wild chieftains cutting off the supplies of the British, and harassing the garrisons with fatiguing vigilance. The turning point in the fortunes of Shah Sujah was the attempt to cut down the expenses of his government. An author† of distinguished merit has thus depicted the event:—"In October, 1841, Kohistan became the seat of an extensive conspiracy against British authority, and the Eastern Ghiljies, one of the largest of the clans into which the Affghans are divided, were trying to break a yoke they never wished to wear. At the same time it

was found that the million and a quarter, the cost of maintaining the authority of Shah Sujah, was more than the dignity was worth to us, certainly more than it was proper to expropriate from the revenues of India, especially as a loan had to be raised, and money came in very slowly. It was then found necessary to cut down the expenses occasioned by this sacrifice in favour of legitimacy, and the retrenchment began with the stipends and the subsidies furnished to the wild Ghiljie chieftains."

The effect of this has been thus described by Mr. Kaye:—"The blow fell upon all the chiefs about the capital—upon the Ghiljies, upon the Kohistanees, upon the Canhulees, upon the Momunds, even upon the Kuzzilbashs. Peaceful remonstrance was in vain. So they held secret meetings, and entered into a confederacy to overawe the existing government, and to recover what they had lost. Foremost in this movement were the eastern Ghiljies. Affected by the general retrenchments, they had also particular grievances of their own. They were the first, therefore, to throw off the mask. So they quitted Cabul—occupied the passes on the road to Jellalabad—plundered a valuable *cafila* (caravan)—and entirely cut off our communications with the provinces of Hindostan."

In the month of October, 1841, Sir Robert Sale's brigade was ordered from Cabul. The infatuation of the British agents still continued; the incapacity of the Hon. Major-general Elphinstone left the commander-in-chief of the forces in India ignorant of the true state of the case. Besides that exalted person had remonstrated against General Elphinstone's appointment, and the general had no desire to communicate with him more frequently than he deemed absolutely necessary. Of what really was absolutely necessary he was quite incapable of judging. Sir Robert Sale marched with his brigade, and had not gone far beyond Cabul when he was attacked by hordes of Affghans, who hung upon his flanks. They had to do with a brave man and skilful soldier, and paid dearly for their temerity. In penetrating the Khyber Pass, the attacks of the enemy were more frequent and dangerous. They made every crag a breast-work, and being good marksmen, picked off many of the brigade. The way in which Sir Robert met these assaults is thus described by Mr. Gleig, in his memoir of *Sale's Brigade*; it is a thrillingly interesting story:—"The bugles sounded for the leading companies to extend, and away among the precipices ran the skirmishers; scaling corries with a steady foot, and returning the fire of the Affghans with great alacrity. Meanwhile the column slackened not its pace for a moment. Onward

\* Kaye's *Affghanistan*.

† Rev. W. Owen.

it pressed, detaching two or three companies as flankers, which mounted the hills on the right and left, and soon became warmly engaged, till by-and-by the stockade or breast-work of huge stones, wherewith the enemy had endeavoured to block up the pass, became conspicuous. A gallant rush was made at this work, which, however, the Affghans did not venture to defend, and then Lieutenant Davis, hastening his horses, went on with his guns at a gallop, and at a gallop passed through. From that time the fire of the enemy began to slacken. Their skirmishers, indeed, had already yielded to the impetuous attack of the leading companies, and the whole now fleeing to the crests of the mountains, whither our men could not follow, gradually melted away, and at last disappeared. The loss sustained in the course of this affair was less severe than might have been expected. Sir Robert Sale himself received a musket ball in the ankle just as he entered the pass; and almost at the same moment his aide-de-camp, who rode by his side, had his horse shot under him. Captain Younghusband, of the 35th native infantry, likewise, and Lieutenant Miers, of the 13th, were wounded seriously; and among the rank and file in all the corps engaged casualties occurred. But the total amount of men put *hors de combat* was wonderfully small, considering the great advantage of position which the enemy possessed; and of horses four were struck. Of those attached to the guns, happily not one received damage. The result of this successful encounter was to carry the 35th native infantry, with all their baggage and followers, over one important stage on their homeward journey. The narrowest and most intricate portion of the pass was threaded; and in a sort of punch-bowl, or circular valley, offering a position comparatively secure from night attacks, they made preparations for encamping. Not so the 13th. To have left the Bootkak gorge in the hands of the enemy would have been not only to isolate the 35th, but to give up the communication between Cabul and the frontiers altogether; and hence the gallant 13th had received instructions, so soon as the barricade should be forced, to return to the camp whence they had set out in the morning. They now proceeded to obey these instructions; and, carrying the wounded with them, marched back into the defile. Again they were assailed, both from the right hand and the left, with a desultory, but warm skirmishing fire; and again they ran the gauntlet through it, fighting for every inch of ground, and winning it too, though not without some loss and considerable inconvenience. They then returned to the tents

and to the force, mounted and dismounted, which they had left to protect them; and slept that night as soundly as soldiers are accustomed to do who have gone through a sharp day's work, with honour to themselves."\*

Our space allows not to give the detail of this terrible march. General Sale had to contest every step of the road, and every step was contested with heroic fortitude and surpassing judgment. Colonel Dennie was the right hand of Sale, displaying a like intrepidity and judgment. The enemy succeeded, however, in bearing away tents and ammunition in great abundance.

Sale led on his brave men, inspired by his genius and fortitude. There was much suffering, and some loss of life, but the punishment inflicted upon the Affghans was severe. At last the gallant brigade reached Jellalabad, on the 13th of November, 1841. Sale immediately occupied this place, from which the people fled. He gave some little strength to its miserable defences. Colonels Dennie and Monteith, and Major Broadfoot, who commanded the sappers, were as towers of strength to the general. He had also the good fortune to have Captain Havelock upon his staff. That officer had been on the staff of General Elphinstone, but was appointed to serve in a similar capacity with General Sale, on his departure from Cabul. It was a letter of Havelock's, sent in a quill, which was the means of making known to the English agent in Peshawur the condition of the garrison.

It became necessary for Sale to fight a battle in order to impose respect upon the hordes by which he was surrounded. Accordingly, on the 16th of November, Colonel Monteith, at the head of eleven hundred men, sallied out against five thousand of the enemy, who suffered a signal defeat, which secured the garrison from further molestation for some time. Meanwhile, the indefatigable Broadfoot toiled with unflagging ardour in building up the defences, and devising expedients for rendering the attack of such enemies abortive. Food became scarce; the men were put on half rations, and thus a new cause of anxiety arose among the heroic band of officers who commanded. Abbot and M'Gregor, two very gallant and skilful officers, made successful efforts to keep up some supplies. It became, however, necessary to make another attack on the enemy. This was also successful, the Affghan hosts, however superior in numbers and sturdy in resistance, fading away before the superior skill and discipline of the British.

The brave garrison continued to skirmish

\* Gleig's *Sale's Brigade*, pp. 80, 81.

with the enemy until the 13th of January, 1842, when a sentry on duty perceived a traveller advancing on a miserable pony, faint and apparently wounded. The traveller approached, and proved to be Dr. Brydon of General Elphinstone's corps. The doctor then supposed himself to be the only survivor of that army. Sale had previously heard of the discomfiture of Elphinstone, and therefore resolved to hold Jellalabad in case the general made good his retreat so far. The story which Dr. Brydon related disclosed the fact of the destruction of the troops with which he had left Cabul. This showed the garrison of Jellalabad that nothing under Providence could save them but their own gallantry and wisdom. The narrative of Dr. Brydon, and the events which occurred at Cabul after Sale's departure from that garrison, must be deferred until the story of the "illustrious garrison of Jellalabad" is told. The position was maintained with fluctuating hopes until the 7th of April, 1842, when it became necessary to fight a battle beyond the defences to clear the neighbourhood of the enemy.

Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, and the hope of the Affghan chiefs, occupied an intrenched camp, with the intention of blockading the little garrison and of making a dash upon it, when, as Akbar hoped, want and disease should have exhausted it before help was at hand. Between the intrenched camp and the town there were several forts, all of which Akbar had garrisoned. It was resolved by Sir Robert Sale to attack both the camp and the forts. His plan was to move out in three columns, one commanded by Colonel Monteith, another by Colonel Dennie, and the third by Captain Havelock. The forts were to be passed by and the camp attacked, Sir Robert concluding that if the main body of the enemy was defeated the forts would be surrendered. If not, they could be more advantageously attacked after the conquest of the intrenched camp. In the execution of the plan Sir Robert Sale's column was exposed to a flanking fire from one of the forts, when he ordered the 13th light infantry to bring left shoulder forward and storm a small breach, which the quick eye of the general saw to be practicable. Colonel Dennie led the assault, and received a mortal wound before the breach was entered. The soldiers on penetrating it found a second line of defence which could not be scaled, nor breached without cannon. Here they were exposed to a murderous fire from matchlocks and wall pieces. As this "keep" could not be escalated or forced, the 13th were ordered to leave the place and pursue the original plan. At double quick pace they rushed forward,

driving in the skirmishers, and dashed through the intrenchment. The victory of this column was complete. The progress of the other portions of the attack has been thus described by the Rev. Mr. Gleig:—"Meanwhile, both Colonel Monteith's and Captain Havelock's columns had trodden down all opposition. The former maintained, without a check, the pace at which their advance began. The latter, sweeping round by the river, in order to turn the flank of the position, became exposed to the attack of the enemy's cavalry, and were more than once obliged to form a square, which they did with the precision of an ordinary field day. But they, too, gained their point, and now the three divisions uniting, poured such a fire upon the enemy's masses as dissolved them quite. Their guns, which had been served with much boldness, were in consequence deserted. One they endeavoured to carry away with them, but a well directed round shot from Abbot's battery killed both the horses which had just been harnessed to the limber, after which the rout became universal. Had the force of British cavalry been such as could have been launched, without support, in pursuit, few would have escaped to tell of that day's overthrow. As it was, the fugitives being chased towards the river, rushed madly in, and perished, almost as many amid the deep water as by the bayonets and shot of the pursuers. Never was victory more complete. Camp, baggage, artillery, ammunition, standards, horses, arms of every kind fell into the hands of the conquerors. The camp they committed to the flames; of the baggage, as well as of animals to transport it, they conveyed back to Jellalabad as much as they cared to preserve; and they were specially gratified by discovering in one of the forts that flanked the line an important magazine of powder, shells, and shot."

The effect of this battle was disheartening to the confederated chiefs. Provisions were brought into the town, and many persons of note made submission. Akbar Khan continued his flight to Cabul, justifying his fugitive movements by the wildest stories of the numbers, bravery, and physical force of the English, and the powers of magic and enchantment possessed by their general. The moral effect of that day's triumph for the English spread over all Afghanistan, and showed how little English interests had to apprehend when confided to officers of capacity and spirit such as Sale, Dennie, Monteith, Broadfoot, and Havelock. The Rev. W. Owen, in his interesting memoirs of Havelock, makes the following remarkable statement:—"In the midst of all these harassing scenes there were faithful

servants of Christ who were not forgetful of his claims, and were endeavouring to promote his cause. During the whole siege of Jellalabad a Jew from Bokhara was engaged in writing a transcript in Hebrew of Martin's Persian Testament, under the superintendence of a pious officer, a work that proved instrumental to his own conversion to Christianity."

The despatch of Sir Robert Sale, recounting the history of the defence of Jellalabad, and the battle of the 7th of April, is a most interesting and remarkable document. The Rev. W. Owen states, upon authority that is beyond question, that this despatch was not written by Sir Robert, but by Captain Havelock, who was then upon his personal staff.\* It is one of those remarkable productions for which this scholarly soldier was distinguished, and was spoken of by the late Sir George Murray in advantageous comparison with Cæsar's *Commentaries*. It will, perhaps, satisfy the wish of the intelligent reader, and do some justice to the memory of Havelock, to give this remarkable document *in extenso* :—

*From Major-general Sir Robert Sale to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842.*

SIR,—The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the passes of the Khyber of the army under Major-general Pollock, C.B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here, to address to you a report which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has before been made known to government that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October, 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabul, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrible insurrection at the Affghan capital, on the 2nd of November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of three hundred sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in dépôt with the treasonable irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position which I occupied I could not absolutely command a day's provisions, or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to thirty or forty thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and, by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point upon which the force at Cabul might retire if hardly pressed. Two marches brought me, after a successful contest at Futehabad, to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them; the *enceinte* was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of two thousand three hundred yards. Its tracing was

\* Owen's *Havelock*.

vicious in the extreme: it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of four hundred yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole *enceinte* was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders, at twenty or thirty yards.

The garrison took full possession of the town, in such a state, on the morning of the 12th of November, and, in the course of the day, the place and detached hills, by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than five thousand insurgents. A general attack, on the 14th of November, ridded us of these enemies, and a similar array, brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means, in the way of treasure, to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, of Shah Sujah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbot, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain M'Gregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and, through his influence and measures, our Dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected; whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbot made the artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to, and economise, our resources in the way of gun and musket ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to two hundred rounds per man. It is to be remarked that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Juzailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabul, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

On the 9th of January I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the political and military authorities at Cabul; but as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this; and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital and their annihilation in the Ghiljie defiles by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments, marched to my succour from Hindostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur: my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabul, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Affghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe,

their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Juzailchees, and a few of the Afghan Sappers, and a body of Hindostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mohammed Khan. Works had in the meantime been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, round the whole of the walls: the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege artillery.

But it pleased Providence on the 19th February to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawar face, and reduced the Cabul gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mohammed Akbar Khan, Barukzye, the assassin of the late envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabul force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Mnrkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22nd of February, and soon after—establishing his head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant—invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Sujah's 2nd cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Sing, 5th cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Denuie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot, who was severely wounded, and Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne, on the 30th and 31st of January; and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mohammed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattison, her majesty's 13th light infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar on the 7th instant.

I have to notice as a measure of defence my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our

camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Sujah's force the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars, to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period, having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown among them; but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee, and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read of them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers, and men, British and Hindostanee, of every arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarm posts every night, from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabul and Jellalabad, were heavy; and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-general Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty to bring the series of labours, privations, and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the supreme government of India, and through his lordship to that of the court of directors and of our sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of garrison engineer, will meet with attentive perusal: I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution, during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Afghan Huzarce and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two infantry regiments under the lamented Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant-colonel Monteith have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron 5th light cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissalla 2nd Shah Sujah's cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne: Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbot and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves excellent officers of ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain M'Gregor, political agent, has cheerfully rendered very valuable assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing

danger. Of his labours in his own department I ought not, perhaps, to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know they have been unremitting; and their result, in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabul, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Sujah's force, and Assistant-surgeons Robertson and Barnes, her majesty's 13th light infantry, Hare, 35th regiment, and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, commissariat officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th regiment, native infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter-master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th light infantry, of which corps I am proud of being a member: I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinctions which he recommends for the officers of his own corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and handbarrow, was as surprising as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, Brevet-captain Gerard, of the corps of Juzailchees, Captain Burn, and Lieutenant Hillersdon, of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Jambazes, when their services could no longer be available with their corps, volunteered to do duty with any regiment in which they could be useful.

I must finally express my gratitude to Providence for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to solicit the interposition of Major-general Pollock, C.B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favour of the Right

Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and through him of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

I ask permission especially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinction, or brevet rank, or both, viz., Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., commanding 35th regiment native infantry, now second in command; Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, who acted as my aide-de-camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbot, Commandant of Artillery, and Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train, and senior officer of the shah's troops with my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers, and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th light cavalry, senior officer of that arm; Captain Seaton, 35th regiment native infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant, by Lieutenant-colonel Monteith; Captain Younghusband of the same regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabul Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late commandant of the Khyber Rangers, and doing duty with the 35th regiment, N. I.; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th light infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C.B.; Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jngdulluck was noticed then in my despatch; Captain Havelock, her majesty's 13th light infantry, Persian interpreter to Major-generals Elphinstone and Pollock, and attached to me as staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mohammed Akbar's camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, her majesty's 13th light infantry, my Brigade-major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all arms, European and native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that Government will sanction my calling upon commandants of corps and detachments to send in rolls of such native officers as they may deem worthy of the insignia of the order of "Merit" and of "British India."

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. SALE,

*Major-General Commanding, Jellalabad.*

## CHAPTER CXII.

### TRANSACTIONS AND BATTLES OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT CABUL, FROM THE DEPARTURE OF SIR ROBERT SALE TO THE RETREAT OF THE HON. GENERAL ELPHINSTONE.

LEAVING Sir Robert Sale and his gallant brigade at Jellalabad, it is necessary to recall the reader's attention to Cabul. The withdrawal of Sale's force left the garrison of Cabul so much weakened, that the disaffected chiefs became sanguine that they should be able to effect its destruction. After the brigade of Sale left, the forces remaining consisted of the 44th British regiment of the line, the 5th and 54th Bengal native infantry, the 5th Bengal light cavalry, with the exception of a squadron, which left with Sir Robert, a company of foot artillery, and a troop of horse artillery. The shah's own force was

two regiments of infantry, a mountain train of artillery, and several squadrons of Hindostanee and Affghan cavalry. The 37th Bengal native infantry accompanied Sale part of his way.

The arrangement of the forces at Cabul were such as it might be supposed no officer of tolerable information would adopt. Part of it was quartered at the Balla-Hissar, the royal residence which overlooked the town, and the remainder was established in cantonments three miles distant. The force was divided when the most ordinary prudence would have united it, after the disasters which

had been experienced, and while the Affghan chiefs were already in arms. The indiscretion of the general-in-chief did not stop there; for part of the commissariat was within the walls of Cabul itself, and a number of the officers were permitted to reside there.

On the 2nd of November, 1841, the populace of Cabul rose in insurrection. The houses of the British officers were first attacked, and among them, with especial malignity, those of Sir Alexander Burnes and of the paymaster of the shah's forces, a British officer, Captain Johnson. Had Sir Alexander Burnes, even then, showed firmness and a quick insight of events, the insurgents might have been intimidated. Sir Alexander, however, forbid his guard to fire on the people, and tried the British plan of quieting a mob by making a speech. Neither Clive, Hastings, nor Wellesley would have wasted time at a period of such urgency in a way so unsuitable to orientals. The result was, that when the sepoy guard was permitted to defend the minister, the moment had passed for effectual action. The sepoys were overpowered; Sir Alexander, his brother, Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, an officer of distinguished talents and bravery, perished. Broadfoot slew six of his assailants before he fell. The residency was plundered; every one in it, even women and children, was, with the bloody ferocity of Mohammedans, murdered. The house was plundered, and then burned. The shah's treasury was also plundered, and after the massacre of those in charge of it, and their families, committed to the flames. Several British officers were wounded, and the escape of any was miraculous, for the whole population, well armed, was excited to the highest pitch of fanaticism,\* and crying out madly for the blood of the infidels. An attempt was made to assassinate Captain Sturt, of the engineers (son-in-law of General Sale), in the precincts of the palace. He was stabbed three times by an Affghan of rank, who escaped into an adjacent building. Captain Lawrence, a distinguished political servant of the company, afterwards still more known and honoured, had a narrow escape from sword and matchlock while bearing a despatch.

The shah was more vigilant, active, and skilful than the English generals. He sent Campbell's Hindostanee regiment in his own service, and three guns, to suppress the insurrection. The populace were prepared for such an event, and gallantly resisted. The Hindostanee soldiers did not display much courage or loyalty, and gave way without making any impression upon the enemy. A

son of the shah, and a number of Affghans—a sort of body-guard—supported the Hindostanee infantry, but the horsemen showed even less loyalty and spirit than the Hindostanees. Brigadier Shelton, with a portion of the troops, was just then encamped at some distance from both the Balla-Hissar and the cantonments. He was ordered, or, as it would appear, requested to send a portion of his troops to the former place, with which he complied, and the rest he marched to the cantonments. Neither he nor General Elphinstone took any measure to put down the insurrection in the city, which might have been done that day by officers of intelligence and promptitude.

Orders were given that the 37th Bengal native infantry, which had gone part of the way with General Sale, and remained posted at the Khoord-Cabul, should return. Major Griffiths conducted his regiment safely, but had to fight his way against very superior numbers during the whole march. Lady Sale, who witnessed their arrival, and who had a more masculine intellect and military mind than the chief officers of the British force, described the progress of the gallant Griffiths and his men as if it had been a mere parade movement. The arrival of this battalion on the 3rd did not lead to any increased activity or more decided policy on the part of the English general. Some of the officers made desultory efforts on their own account to dislodge the rebels from various posts which it was dangerous to allow them to occupy, but the general seemed as incapable of laying down any plan for the action of others as he was of going about or doing anything himself; the rebels, therefore, continued the offensive, and strengthened themselves in every way, and in all directions. Several important positions were lost by English officers for want of ammunition, for which their applications to their superiors were made in vain.\* Various chiefs, faithful to the cause of Shah Sujah, offered assistance to the British officers, but were so discouraged by the haughty contumely with which they were treated, that they shrunk back into neutrality, or were compelled for their own safety to join the enemy. A small fort used by Brigadier Auquetil, a French officer in the shah's service, and where also some of his majesty's commissariat stores were placed, was defended by some Affghans in the shah's service, who were commanded by Captain M'Kenzie, an officer of courage and great presence of mind. That gallant man defended the post until he had not a single cartridge left. His solicitations for ammu-

\* *Military Operations at Cabul.* Lieutenant Eyre.

\* *Lady Sale's Journal.*

dition to British cantonments and to the Balla-Hissar were in vain; he therefore evacuated the place in the night, and endeavoured to join head-quarters. His adventures were romantic, and his escape from the dangers by which he was surrounded wonderful. His own account of that terrible march is graphic and exceedingly interesting:—"Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enemy had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ahead with the Juzailhees, and I found myself alone with a chuprasse and two sowars, in the midst of a helpless and wailing crowd of women and children. Riding on by myself, along a narrow lane, to try and pick out the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be our Juzailhees, and spoke to them as such. They quickly undeceived me, however, by crying out, 'Feringhee hust,' 'here is a European;' and attacking us with swords and knives. Spurring my horse violently, I wheeled round, cutting from right to left, for I fortunately had my own sword drawn previous to the surprise. My blows, by God's mercy, parried the greater part of theirs, and I was lucky enough to cut off the hand of my most outrageous assailant. In short, after a desperate struggle, during which I received two slight sabre cuts, and a blow on the back of my head, from a fellow whose sword turned in his hand, which knocked me half off my horse, I escaped out of the crush, passing unhurt through two volleys of musketry from the whole picket, which by that time had become alarmed, and had turned out. They pursued me, but I soon distanced them, crossing several fields at speed, and gaining a road which I perceived led round the western end of the shah's garden. Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense body of Affghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting my trust in God, I charged into the midst of them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear my way for me, and reserving my sword cuts for my last struggle. It was well that I did so; for, by the time that I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found that they were my own Juzailhees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, you may imagine my feelings for the moment. With these worthies, after wandering about for some time, and passing unharmed by a sleepy post of the enemy, I reached the cantonments."

The next day apathy and neglect pervaded the English head-quarters, as on the preceding days. The British commissary held his stores in a small fort, which, if taken, the

stores from which the troops were fed would fall into the hands of the enemy, and the English must either surrender or starve. This important position, upon the occupation of which so much depended, was guarded by one officer, an ensign, and a few sepoy of the 5th Bengal native infantry. During the 4th of November, Mr. Warren, upon whom the maintenance of the post devolved, sent word that he was pressed by a very superior Affghan force, and unless he obtained speedy assistance he must abandon the defence. Instead of sending a body of troops to assist him in retaining a place of such vital importance, a very small detachment was sent to aid him in evacuating it. The detachment sent for this purpose was too small to fight its way to Ensign Warren, and had to retreat with the loss of a considerable portion of the men; yet, notwithstanding this failure, another small force was dispatched on the same errand, and, of course, with the same result.

Captain Boyd, the English commissary-general, and Captain Johnson, commissary-general to the shah, made representations to General Elphinstone of the folly and ruin of surrendering such an important place to the rebels, containing as it did stores of rice, rum, medicine, under-clothing, &c., amounting in value to four lacs of rupees; whereas the cantonments did not contain food for three days, and none could be procured elsewhere. Ensign Warren was then ordered to hold the post. The officer replied in sensible and earnest language to the effect that the insurgents were mining the walls, and that his men had become disheartened, and some had deserted. He was again ordered to hold the post, and informed that at two o'clock in the morning he would be reinforced. The commander-in-chief occupied his time in prolix councils of war, and no relief was sent to Ensign Warren. While General Elphinstone and his chief officers were debating, Ensign Warren and the remains of his detachment entered the cantonments. The enemy had set fire to the gate of the fort, as well as shattered a portion of the wall with gunpowder. Warren, no longer able to defend the place, and his soldiers no longer willing to do so, escaped with difficulty. Lieutenant Eyre in his work on *Military Operations in Cabul*, describes the effect which the capture of the commissariat fort produced upon the troops: "It no sooner became generally known that the commissariat fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned, than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison; nor can I describe the impatience of the troops, but especially the native portion, to be led out for its recapture

—a feeling that was by no means diminished by their seeing the Affghans crossing and recrossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of the Shah Bagh, laden with the provisions on which had depended our ability to make a protracted defence.”

General Elphinstone was so goaded by the loudly expressed indignation of the officers of inferior rank and the common soldiers, that he was obliged to venture upon some act of apparent decision. He ordered an attempt to be made to capture the fort of Mohammed Shureef, by which the commissariat fort was commanded. Two guns under Lieutenant Eyre were ordered to open a fire upon the forts, to cover an assault by Major Swayne, who was to blow open the gate with powder. The guns maintained their cannonade until their ammunition was nearly gone, but Swayne made no attempt to lead his infantry to the attack. Whether he would have ventured to do his duty ultimately it is difficult to say, for General Elphinstone recalled the party. This was attended by another burst of indignation on the part of the troops; even the sepoys could not restrain the expression of their scorn, and demanded to be allowed to storm the fort. The 37th Bengal regiment—which had behaved so well as a battalion under Major Griffiths, and when brigaded under General Sale—called out loudly for permission to take the place. The cause of this shameful failure it is difficult to determine, as testimonies disagree. Lieutenant Eyre attributes it to Major Swayne; Lady Sale throws all the blame on General Elphinstone. The following passages convey the language expressed by both authorities. Lieut. Eyre thus wrote:—“Major Swayne, instead of rushing forward with his men, as had been agreed, had in the meantime remained stationary, under cover of the wall by the road side. The general, who was watching our proceedings from the gateway, observing that the gun-ammunition was running short, and that the troops had failed to take advantage of the best opportunity for advancing, recalled us into cantonments.” Lady Sale says:—“The troops retired by order of General Elphinstone, to my no small surprise, for the enemy had begun to run out from a broken bastion; but when they found our people retreating, they took courage, and no more left the fort.”

General Elphinstone, who seemed to have no mind of his own, was again moved by the murmurs of the troops, and ordered a renewed attempt to take the fort, to be made on the next day. Edward Thornton thus describes it:—“At an early hour three iron 9-pounders were brought to bear upon the north-east

bastion, and two howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. The firing was maintained for about two hours, during which the artillerymen were exposed to the fire of the enemy’s sharp-shooters stationed on a couple of high towers which completely commanded the battery. A practicable breach being effected, a storming party, consisting of three companies, one of her majesty’s 44th, one of the 5th native infantry, and one of the 37th native infantry, marched forward and speedily carried the place. The death-throe of this redoubtable fort was far less violent than might have been expected from the degree of tenacity attributed to it. About one hundred and fifty men succeeded in planting the British flag upon it; but it is to be lamented that the gallant officer, Ensign Raban, of the queen’s 44th, who first waved it on the summit of the breach, was shot through the heart while in the act of thus displaying the signal of his country’s triumph.” The British cavalry pursued the fugitives, and would probably have cut off the whole had not the enemy’s horse made a demonstration in such numbers as compelled the British to draw off.

The *commissary fort* was still in the hands of the enemy, and so considerable a portion of the stores remained in it that its recapture might have saved the army. But the general would neither order this to be done nor allow others to do it. Lady Sale thus narrates one instance of the general’s delinquency in this respect:—“Paton [assistant quartermaster-general] and Bellew [deputy assistant quartermaster-general] meet in council with Sturt [her son-in-law, and chief officer of engineers], at nine, most evenings, at our house. To-day [6th November] arrangements were made for carrying the shah’s garden and the commissariat fort by daybreak, everything being so clearly explained, that even I understood it as well as hemming the handkerchief I was making. . . . Plans were sketched, and all the minutiae written out, so that the general might have no questions to ask. It is now midnight, and no reply has been sent from him, though an answer was to have come to say whether the work should be done or not.” From subsequent passages in the *Journal*, it seems that the general hesitated—then approved the plan—then abandoned it.

It is probable that but for the interference of the chief civil officer, Sir W. Mac Naghten, General Elphinstone’s army would have been destroyed without the general permitting any proper disposition of defence to be made. At Sir William’s suggestion, Brigadier Shelton, a very brave but dull officer, who had lost an arm at Waterloo, where he had distinguished himself by courage, was ordered

to remove from Balla-Hissar to the cantonments to assist the general-in-chief, whose incapacity, physical and mental, had now arrived at such a pitch as to require some more vigorous soldier in immediate consultation with him to save the army from speedy ruin. Shelton was vigorous and gallant enough for this task, but had not the mind of a general any more than his chief. Even when Shelton took a prominent share of responsibility, Sir W. MacNaghten, only by undertaking to be held responsible, could induce an attack upon a fort so near to the Balla-Hissar as to enable its garrison to fire musketry among the British troops. This fort, which was called the Rika Bashee, was in consequence ordered to be stormed. The assailants consisted of the 44th royal regiment, the 37th native regiment of Bengal, and about an equal number of Affghans in the shah's service. A troop of horse artillery, and a gun of "the mountain train," were attached to this force. Captain Bellew, who behaved with great gallantry, laid powder to the gate. The explosion missed the main gate, and blew open a wicket, through which only two or three soldiers could pass at a time, by stooping, or almost creeping. A few men instantly rushed in, chiefly officers, very few of the soldiery showing any disposition to enter. Colonel Mackerall and Lieutenant Cadett of the 44th, Lieutenant Hawtrey of the 37th Bengal regiment, and Lieutenant Burd of the shah's force, with dauntless intrepidity entered together, sword in hand, clearing the enemy from the way. The garrison, supposing that the large gate was blown in, and that the whole British force were entering, fled in dismay through a gate at the opposite side. At that instant, however, the enemy's cavalry, always more gallant than the infantry, charged round the angle of the fort, and began to sabre the shah's infantry, who fled without resistance. The British infantry behaved with nearly as little spirit, English and sepoy fleeing together. Indeed, the sepoy of the 37th showed a disposition to form and resist, but the panic of the 44th was unmitigated. Major Scott made efforts to rally them, but in vain. He then called upon volunteers to follow him; one man only had the courage or confidence, whichever was the virtue required. His name was Steward. He would have been unnoticed and unrewarded by his stoical superiors had not Sir W. MacNaghten interested himself in him, and procured his promotion to the rank of sergeant.

The heroic courage of Brigadier Shelton alone retrieved the disgrace, and saved the brave men who had entered the fort. The brigadier rallied some of the troops, who, after

renewed displays of cowardice, or want of confidence in their officers (it is difficult to which influence to attribute their hesitation), at last entered the fort, and secured its conquest. In the meantime, the officers and their few followers who had entered the wicket gate when it was blown open, had been exposed to a fearful conflict. They shut the gate out of which the garrison had fled, drew a chain across it, and fastened it with a bayonet. Two of their number, Lieutenants Cadett and Hawtrey, returned to bring up assistance. Before the runaway soldiers were rallied by Shelton, the Affghans returned (having heard of the flight of the English), and forced away the chain and the bayonet. Mackerall fell, bravely fighting to the last. Lieutenant Burd and two sepoy found shelter in a stable, barred the gate, and fired from the apertures which admitted air. Against this frail post the Affghans directed their whole fury: young Burd and his two followers flinched not, and kept the enemy at bay until assistance arrived. When that at last came, one of the faithful sepoy was slain, and thirty dead Affghans lay around and in the entrance of the shattered door of the stable. Edward Thornton says, "when the fort was gained, the gallant pair were found by their companions unharmed. The rescue, indeed, was at the last moment, for the ammunition of the besieged combatants was reduced to a stock of five cartridges."

The English had two hundred killed and wounded during these conflicts. Captain M'Crae was cut down in the first charge upon the gateway. Captain Westmeath was shot in one of the skirmishes without. The effect of the success was that the enemy abandoned the minor adjacent forts. Grain, to a considerable extent, was found in one, which circumstance cheered the army not a little. During the day much of it was removed to a safer place. A guard was applied for by the commissary to protect the remainder through the night, but with the infatuation by which all the imbecile control of this army was characterised, this important request was refused. Before morning it was removed by the enemy, and another serious deprivation was inflicted upon the army.

On the 13th of November the enemy appeared in great force upon the heights, and fired into the cantonments. Sir W. MacNaghten by taking upon himself\* the responsibility, succeeded in inducing the general to send out a force to disperse them. The British soldiery, both European and native, showed a want of courage so unusual with British troops as to excite the astonishment

\* Thornton, vol. vi. p. 26.

of their officers. The fact was, the men did not doubt the courage of their officers, which far surpassed their own, but they had lost all reliance upon the military capacity of the commander-in-chief, and of his principal officers; they were therefore unwilling to incur peril when life might be thrown away in a useless enterprise. The British, however, gained their object, and captured one of the enemy's guns. Another was protected by a heavy fire from the Affghan matchlocks, and the men of the 44th regiment could not be stimulated by the words or example of their officers to charge and capture it. This was the second time that regiment, which had so highly distinguished itself at Waterloo, had shown a want of British spirit at Cabul, independently of some minor instances in which it was deficient in alacrity and military ardour. As the soldiers of the 44th could not be prevailed upon to incur the danger of the enemy's fire to carry the gun away, Lieutenant Eyre and a horse artillery gunner descended into the ravine where the gun lay abandoned, and spiked it. The bad example set by the 44th infected the whole of the native infantry. The attack made at the instigation of Sir W. Mac Naghten had a salutary effect upon the Affghans, who for nearly a week offered the British little molestation. The English general being quite content to be let alone, left his enemies to adopt their own course.

On the 22nd November a contest occurred in the village of Belmauroo. That place had afforded the English some supplies, who, utterly thriftless and incapable, left it unprotected. The Affghans, to cut off the resources derived thence, occupied the village without hindrance. When the mischief was effected, the English general began to think of the inconvenience attending it, and ordered Major Swayne, of the 5th native infantry, with a small force of cavalry and infantry, and a *single gun*, to dispossess them. *Another gun was sent afterwards.* The orders were to storm the village. Major Swayne, however, behaved on this occasion precisely as he had done when ordered to storm the commissariat fort. He stood for hours firing at too great a distance to do any harm, the infantry being under cover with the major, the cavalry and artillery being exposed to the long-range matchlocks of the enemy. The artillery, of course, replied as efficiently as their position allowed; the cavalry were useless. In the evening Brigadier Shelton joined the assailants, if such they might be called, and looked on while, as Lady Sale described, they did nothing. As the party retired at the close of this ignominious day, Brigadier Shelton had the folly to inquire of Lady Sale if she

did not approve of the way in which the troops conducted themselves. This brave woman, accustomed to witness the heroic deeds of her illustrious husband, and the military genius which distinguished him, answered with indignant censure, pointing out the absurdities, in a military point of view, of the way in which the undertaking had been conducted and had failed. But not even the rebukes, remonstrances, or scorn of a sensible and resolute lady could inspire the English generals with wisdom, or goad them into a spirited conduct of the war. Shelton had as gallant a heart as ever beat in British bosom, but he had not mind. He was a good, kind, just, honest man, true to his country and his duty, but he had no capacity for the responsibility devolved upon him; and the system of the British army did not provide that men should be at hand, as they always might be with any considerable body of British troops, equal to emergencies such as are common to armies.

The next day Brigadier Shelton went out with about one thousand infantry of the 44th regiment and the two native regiments, a company of sappers, a squadron of regular light cavalry, another of irregular, and one hundred men of Anderson's horse. With this force also there was a single gun. This error Lady Sale commented upon severely and justly at the time. A second gun might easily have been sent, so that a regular and unintermittent fire could have been preserved. The gun was brought to a knoll, which was supposed to command the enemy's principal bivouac. The enemy became confused, seeking places of shelter, and giving a desultory fire from their "juzails." Shelton was urged by the more intelligent of his officers to storm the place while the enemy was in confusion, as the night was dark. This he neglected to do; for, although personally fearless of danger, he was too kind willingly to expose his soldiers, of whom he was fond, to any perils that did not promise to bear important fruit; and, unfortunately, his judgment was seldom clear in that respect. When morning dawned and gave the enemy light to penetrate the objects and plans of the assailants, and fight or fly as their interests might point out, Shelton resolved upon a storm; selecting an officer who had already repeatedly proved himself incompetent, the general filled up the measure of his infatuation. Major Swayne was ordered to storm the principal gate. He could not find it—*it was wide open.* He instead came upon a small wicket, which was barricaded; he did not try to force it, but placed his men under cover, where they quietly remained out of harm's way, and doing no

harm to their enemies, until they were called off. Lieutenant Eyre believes that Major Swayne was obliged to put his men under cover, being unable to force the gate. It was forced, however, but not by him. Lady Sale says a way was made through the space it closed "by a few men pulling it down with their hands, and kicking at it." The place was taken, not because British skill or valour accomplished it, but because the garrison, overrating the energy and ability of their foes, chose to evacuate it and take ground on an opposite hill to that occupied by the British, and separated from it only by a gorge. Perceiving the vacillation of the English, the Affghans returned to the village and re-occupied it with much judgment, and in considerable force. The brigadier proceeded to dislodge the enemy, who remained in position on the opposite height. Whatever may be conceived as improbable for a general to do under such circumstances, Brigadier Shelton performed. He brought forward skirmishers to the brow of the hill, two squares were formed by his infantry, supported by his cavalry, the whole force being obnoxious to the fire of the Affghans, who were covered by crags and mounds of stones artificially raised. The conduct of the British troops was dastardly in the extreme. The men had not the smallest confidence in General Shelton's dispositions, and could not be brought to hope for any success under either his command, or that of General Elphinstone. The British skirmishers could only be kept to their duty by the dauntless exposure of the officers, and their encouragements, remonstrances, and even taunts. They could no more be induced to advance against the enemy than in the Crimean war the soldiers of General Windham could be brought to follow him in the Redan, and for the same reason, want of confidence in their leaders. In the case taken for illustration, however, the men fought heroically, so far as depended upon their individual action, but Brigadier Shelton's troops showed a craven spirit in every form. The skirmishers fell back upon the main body, and the Affghan skirmishers advanced; as soon as they approached the squares, the latter gave way. The officers did everything that men could do to rally them, offering immense pecuniary rewards to capture the enemy's flag, which met with no response. The despicable cowardice of the 44th regiment was the main cause of all this disgrace; for the sepoy regiments had repeatedly proved themselves brave and well disciplined, but sepoys seldom fight well if they see want of courage in the European soldiers, to whom they look for courage in the

field. Many of the British officers advanced and threw stones at the Affghans, the base men of the 44th looking on without being moved by the heroic example. Captains Mackintosh and Mackenzie, Lieutenants Troup, Leighton, and Laing, were among the foremost in thus acting. Mackintosh and Laing fell. The enemy rushed to seize the only gun which the English had with them. The cavalry were ordered to charge to prevent such a result: they refused to obey. Captains Bolt and Collier, and Lieutenant Wallace, charged the enemy, followed by a number of native officers; the remaining officers, European and native, made every possible exertion to induce the men to charge, but they would not. The cavalry were all natives. Had there been another infantry regiment of Europeans, and a single squadron of European cavalry, the disgrace and ruin entailed by the cowardice of the 44th regiment might have been retrieved. The cavalry looked on, while the artillerymen, fighting with dauntless courage—alone brave amidst a demoralized army—struggled to retain the gun: all were cut down, two killed. The first square of the British infantry was running away, the second preserved its formation, and the fugitives were rallied in its rear, but only after incredible labour on the part of their gallant officers. This display of order and animation awed the enemy, who abandoned the gun. The English opened fire, which was maintained at some distance, but on the enemy again advancing, the infantry ran away. The officers once more displayed boundless heroism, but in vain; not even self-preservation could rally these cowards, who were cut down by the Affghans with great slaughter. The pursuers gave no quarter, and mercilessly hacked the wounded. Some of the shah's own infantry, Affghans, rallied and fired; at the same moment Lieutenant Hardyman arrived with a fresh troop of horse, who, not partaking of the general demoralization, charged with effect. One of the Affghan chiefs, whether from this display of spirit, or from a treacherous loyalty to the shah, halted his men. Colonel Oliver, Captain Mackintosh, and Lieutenants Laing and Walker were left dead upon the field.

When Shelton advanced against the height occupied by the Affghans, he left on the range of knolls which his own troops had occupied, three companies of the 37th Bengal native infantry, under Major Kershaw. This small force covered the retreat with distinguished courage, such as had always characterised that corps. They fought with such courage, and preserved such order, that to them must be attributed the safety of those who escaped. One of these companies was entirely destroyed,

except a corporal and two men. These representatives of their company retired, preserving their coolness and discipline to the last. This was not the first time in the history of Indian wars that the sepoy soldiers showed a fortitude superior to the European. Shelton had proved himself utterly incapable of any command whatever. He had the folly and stupidity afterwards to boast of the conduct of his regiment, the 44th, and blame the sepoys for the loss of the battle, although the Europeans set an example of cowardice, and would, probably, have been all cut off had not their flight been covered by the reserve companies of the 37th Bengal native infantry.

The military leaders urged Sir W. Mac Naghten to negotiate for a retreat, the safety of which might be guaranteed. It was obvious that the soldiers would not fight under the leadership of such men, and so Mac Naghten, sorely against his own disposition, yielded to their importunities. It was, after much diplomatic trick, arranged that Shah Sujah should descend from his throne, and the English abandon Affghanistan. The shah, after much prevarication, refused to abandon the musnid, gathered his partizans around him, defended his position, and showed far more spirit than his protectors. The English, no longer able to dictate terms to the shah, were compelled to make terms for themselves. The soldiers were starving, and were very anxious to see the war concluded in any way. It was finally agreed that the English should give up Affghanistan, and retire under the protection of the chiefs, who were to provide them with beasts of burden and food. The animals were never provided, and what little food the English did procure was purchased at a most extravagant price. It was at last demanded that the English should surrender their guns and artillery ammunition. Some demur was made to this, but it was substantially conceded. Meanwhile the attacks of the Affghans upon the garrison of Cabul continued. Mohammed Shureef's fort was the chief point of contest. The Affghans tried to blow open the gate with powder, as the English had done, but not understanding the process, the explosion only did harm to themselves. They then laid a mine, but Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, the heroic son-in-law of Sir Robert Sale, entered the mine in the night, and destroyed it. The cowardice of the 44th regiment, however, betrayed the fort to the enemy. The garrison consisted of one company of that regiment, and one company of the gallant 37th. Lieutenant Gray, who commanded the company of the 44th, was wounded, and while getting his wound dressed, the whole of his men ran away, climbing

the walls of the fort to escape, not having had a man killed in the defence. The company of the 37th, which had behaved well, and lost two men, was anxious to defend the place, but being abandoned by their European fellow soldiers, they also fled, and the Affghans, unopposed, walked into the fort. Sturt had been carried about in a litter, suffering from his wounds; yet he was the life and soul of the garrison, directing everything and animating all. Sir Robert Sale and his noble-hearted wife might well be proud of such a son-in-law. A company of the 44th had garrisoned the bazaar, who endeavoured to run away, after the example of their comrades in the fort, but their officers by desperate exertions prevented them. A guard of sepoys had to be placed at the entrance to *prevent the Europeans from deserting*. Lieutenant Eyre says that this regiment "had been for a long time previous to these occurrences in a state of woeful deterioration." The fact is, the regiment was composed of men who had no sympathy with British chivalry, and cared nothing for defeat to England, or dishonour to the British name. At last discipline began to fail in cantonments as in the field, and here also the 44th set the example.

The winter began now to set in severely, and the English became urgent for the performance of those stipulations which the Affghan chiefs had made with Sir W. Mac Naghten. The troops quartered in the Balla-Hissar left it for the cantonments, preparatory to the retirement of the whole body from Cabul. Akbar Khan, at this juncture, made a proposal that the English should occupy the cantonments and the Balla-Hissar a few months longer, that Shah Sujah should be confirmed on the throne, that Akbar Khan should be his vizier, and that the English should pay a large sum of money for the arrangement. Akbar also offered to decapitate Ameen Oolah Khan, the most sturdy opponent of the English, if they would pay for it. Sir William replied that England paid no blood money. Whether this offended Akbar, or that the whole scheme was a pretence to detain the English until the passes were so obstructed by the winter that the troops might be more easily sacrificed, it is difficult to determine.

Sir William accepted all the other propositions: an interview was proposed by Akbar and acceded to by Sir William. At the appointed time Sir William proceeded to the rendezvous accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie. He requested General Elphinstone to have two guns ready for secret service, to keep the garrison on the alert, and have the walls strongly manned. He suspected treachery. His wishes were so

imperfectly attended to as to draw from him severest reproaches upon the military authorities; whom, indeed, no disasters could warn and no experience teach. The general had even the incredible folly to write a letter to the envoy, remonstrating against this demand for employing his troops in such a manner. Neither Elphinstone nor Shelton was capable of transacting any business of importance, or of comprehending military measures which required thought, foresight, or combination. The spot selected for the interview was nearly screened from view from the cantonments by a range of knolls. Sir William left the small escort allowed him by the military chiefs at some distance; he, and the three officers who had accompanied him, advanced to the appointed place. Akbar Khan arrived soon after, attended by several other chiefs, among them the brother of the man whom he had proposed to decapitate. A carpet was spread and the conference was opened. Soon after, a number of armed men drew near, and formed a circle at some distance. Captain Lawrence remarked, that as the conference was secret, these men should be ordered away. Akbar replied that it was of no consequence, as all were in the secret. He then cried aloud, "Seize!" and the envoy and his three companions were disarmed and pinioned, and borne away prisoners. Sir William had just before presented Akbar with a pair of pistols; with one of these he shot the envoy, with the other Captain Trevor. The other two were spared, and the mangled remains of their companions and seniors were paraded before them. The hands of Sir William Mac Naghten were cut off, carried about, and thrown in at the window where the surviving officers were imprisoned. As soon as the officers were seized, the escort ran away, excepting one man, who was almost cut to pieces by Akbar's adherents. Sir William had ordered the body-guard to follow him; they did so for some distance, but fled at the commencement of danger. Sir William has been blamed for trusting to Akbar, but he had no other course open to him. He had no confidence in the generals, who were little better than fools. He had no confidence in the soldiers, for, although the sepoys were disposed to stand firm, the 44th, the only European regiment, were cowards, or at all events indisposed to fight when only British honour was concerned, without any prospective advantage to themselves.

When tidings of this terrible treachery arrived at the cantonments, no call of honour was made upon the army, no generous effort of devotion made to rescue the living, or save the slain from insult; nothing chivalrous,

brave, wise, or noble was attempted; the stolid generals listened and wondered. While they were pondering over the events of disaster and humiliation of which they were themselves the occasion, Akbar Khan sent in a new treaty or, rather that which had already been agreed to, with three new articles:—1st. That the British officers should leave all their guns behind, except six.\* 2nd. That they should give up all their treasure. 3rd. That the hostages already held by the Affghans should be exchanged for married men with their wives and children. The council met to consider these propositions. Major Eldred Pottinger (who, as Lieutenant E. Pottinger, had so gallantly defended Herat) acted as political agent. He urged the council to refuse such disgraceful terms, to hold their ground, and act with spirit, or to attempt a retreat to Jellalabad. The council determined to accept Akbar's terms, in spite of Major Pottinger's warnings that he only intended to betray them. Bribes were offered by the council to married officers to entrust themselves and their wives and their families in the hands of the Affghans. Some were found to acquiesce, but only some. This part, therefore, of Akbar's demand could not be complied with! The council consisted of General Elphinstone, Brigadier-general Shelton, Brigadier Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, Captain Bellev, and Captain Grant. General Elphinstone wrote to Akbar that it was contrary to the honour of his country to surrender ladies as hostages. Akbar obtaining the bills for fourteen lacs, and the concession of all his other demands, accepted married hostages, without their families. Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Skinner, were therefore sent into the cantonments. Captains Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, Webb, Connolly, and Airey, were to remain as married hostages. Akbar undertook to take charge of the sick and wounded that might be left in Cabul after the English troops should depart. On the 6th of January the British set out upon their march.

Before giving an account of this march, it is necessary to refer to the events which were taking place in other parts of Affghanistan, while humiliation exhausted itself upon the army at Cabul.

The revolt against Shah Sujah appeared simultaneously in every part of his unexpectedly acquired dominions. In the middle of November, 1841, Major Pottinger, political agent in Kohistan, accompanied by Lieutenant Houghton, adjutant of the Goorkha

\* A previous proposal to abandon all their cannon and artillery ammunition had at first been conceded, but ultimately was not agreed upon.

regiment in the shah's service, attended by a single soldier of his corps, entered Cabul, having been obliged to abandon his post, and make his way through incredible difficulties, hardships, and dangers to head-quarters. Lieutenant Rattray, Major Pottinger's assistant, had been murdered. In defending Charcker the major was wounded, and the chief military officer, Captain Codrington, killed. During the defence, so scarce was water that for a considerable time only half a wine glass was allowed to each man, and at last even that could not be dispensed. The native troops began to desert from the garrison, and finally mutinied. The Affghans, assisted by the Mohammedans in the pay of the British, attempted to murder Lieutenant Houghton. Finally, Pottinger and Houghton retreated, leading out the dispirited garrison, who one by one dropped away by desertion or death, until only the soldier who entered Cabul with them remained.

There was a remarkable sameness exhibited in the retreats accomplished or attempted by the English in remote garrisons or outposts. Nearly all those places were imperfectly garrisoned, a fault common to the English in India. Captain White, in his political paper on the cause of another war—that with Birmah—made this pertinent remark:—"A very injudicious practice prevailed in India of posting small detachments to impede the movements of formidable armies, so far in advance from the head-quarters of the division as to preclude the possibility of their receiving timely reinforcement if attacked; a practice that from the train of evil consequences it has produced, loudly calls for the intervention of authority, as heedlessly and unnecessarily exposing the lives of the troops, and injurious to the interest of the service, by cutting up their forces in detail, damping the spirit of their men, and encouraging an enemy to advance from the prospect of an easy triumph." The habit of establishing weak, unconnected, and

unsupported outposts and garrisons was exemplified by many instances from the war with Nepaul, by the same officer.

Dr. Grant fell a victim on the retreat of Major Pottinger from Kohistan. Lieutenants Maule and Whelan tried to maintain themselves in a fort, but were deserted by the sepoys and Affghans in the shah's service, and then barbarously murdered. Captain Woodburn proceeded with a detachment from Ghizni, hoping to reach Cabul. He was surprised, and the whole detachment cut off. It appears as if the very imminency of the danger, instead of inciting to vigilance, prevented it. When Sir Robert Sale made good his march from Cabul to Jellalabad, he left a considerable force at Gundamuck. The majority of the men deserted to the enemy, the remainder refused to hold the place, but consented to retire upon Jellalabad, whither their commander, Captain Burnes, succeeded in conducting them. He lost all his baggage and two guns, which the sepoys refused to defend. Another detachment of Sale's brigade was left at Pesh Boolak, to hold that post as long as possible, and when no longer able to do so, they were to retreat upon Jellalabad. This party consisted of Affghans and Hindoos in the shah's service, who refused to hold the position. The Hindoos began to desert, but the enemy put them to death, which circumstance prevented the desertion of the remainder. Captain Ferris cut his way through the enemy and arrived at Jellalabad, having lost all his stores and treasure, to the value of thirty-eight thousand rupees. His loss in personal property was also heavy. These instances of the dangers and heroism of the officers, and the dastardly conduct of the shah's forces, and of the natives in the British service, are specimens of the general aspect of affairs, while yet the Hon. General Elphinstone and his *alter ego*, Colonel Shelton, were conducting affairs at Cabul from one degree of shame and disaster to another.

## CHAPTER CXIII.

### RETREAT OF THE BRITISH FROM CABUL.—DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMY.

ON the 6th of January the army of General Elphinstone departed from Cabul. The plains were deep in snow, and the magnificent mountain range presented to the eye vast piles of dazzling white, a scene the most singular and striking to Europeans. So penetrating was the cold that no clothing could

resist it. The Asiatics in the British army of course suffered most, more even than the women, wives and daughters of officers and soldiers, by whom the dispirited troops were accompanied. "The crowd," as Lieutenant Eyre calls this army, amounted to 4500 fighting men, 12,000 camp followers, and

many women and children. The author just quoted enumerates the strictly military portion of the retreating body as follows:—"One troop of horse artillery, 90; her majesty's 44th foot, 600; = 690 Europeans. 5th regiment of light cavalry, two squadrons, 260; 5th shah's irregular ditto (Anderson's), 500; Skinner's horse, one *ressala*, 70; 4th irregular ditto, one ditto, 70; mission escort, or body-guard, 70; = 970 cavalry. 5th native infantry, 700; 37th ditto, 600; 54th ditto, 650; 6th shah's infantry, 600; sappers and miners, 20; shah's ditto, 240; half the mountain-train, 30; = 2840. Total, 4500. Six horse-artillery guns; three mountain-train ditto."

At nine o'clock in the morning the advance left the cantonments, and until evening the throng continued to issue from their gates. The Affghans, like all Mohammedan peoples, faithless, fired upon the retiring force, killing Lieutenant Hardyman of the 5th light cavalry, and about fifty troopers, who endeavoured to cover the march. As soon as the British cleared the cantonments all order was lost; the incapacity of the commanders became more conspicuous than ever. The body they commanded ceased at once to be an army, and the whole became one confused mass of fugitives. The confusion could hardly be increased when night closed around the weary way of the dispirited host. The darkness was lessened by the glare from the cantonments and the British residency, whence arose a sheet of flame; the fanatics having set fire to the buildings. Many of the sepoys and camp followers dropped down dead before the generals ordered a halt; many more perished before the morning's dawn.

The Affghan chiefs had calculated upon such results, and therefore delayed the execution of the convention which was supposed to ensure the British a safe retreat, until winter, so stern in those elevated regions, had thoroughly set in. When General Elphinstone halted his miserable followers, he had no plan for their encampment, and disorder intensified misery. The second day's march was more confused than the first, although even Generals Elphinstone and Shelton must have felt that upon the preservation of order rested safety. Sir Charles Napier's well known words of severe and just censure upon the management of British Indian armies on the march were fatally exemplified in the manner in which the British general conducted his troops. One of the shah's regiments disappeared in the night, having either gone over to the enemy, or returned to Cabul in the hope of aiding Shah Sujah. Numerous small detachments of Affghans hung upon the flanks of the dejected corps. These were supposed to be the escort promised by the

chiefs who had obtained the bills for fourteen lacs of rupees. This delusion was soon dispelled, for before the second day's disastrous march terminated, the rear-guard, almost the only semblance of order maintained by the generals, was attacked. The British force, upon which the duty of guarding the rear devolved, was composed of the 44th regiment, the mountain-guns, and a squadron of irregular horse. The guns were captured in the sudden and unexpected onset. The 44th regiment was ordered to retake them, but showing their usual cowardice, of which they betrayed no shame, they refused to advance. Lieutenant White, at the head of his brave artillerymen, advanced and spiked the guns in defiance of the efforts of the Affghans to prevent them. Lady Sale, in her *Journal*, describes this achievement as most heroically performed. Lieutenant Eyre has been accused of partiality in describing the bravery of the European artillerymen in contrast to the despicable conduct of the 44th; but Lady Sale, the wife of an infantry officer, could have no such motive, and her language is still stronger than that of the indignant artillery officer. The snow now became so heavy that the horses could not drag the guns through it, so that it was necessary to spike ten more.

It was discovered that Akbar Khan was with the enemy. Communications were opened with him, and an appeal made to the honour of that traitor and murderer to fulfil his engagement to escort the British safely. He replied that he had been sent from Cabul for that purpose; that the English, having marched before permission had been given, had occasioned the attack; that Sir Robert Sale had refused to deliver up Jellalabad according to the treaty between General Elphinstone and the chiefs of Cabul; that hostilities must be renewed unless that treaty were fulfilled, and six hostages surrendered to him to ensure the abandonment of Jellalabad by Sir Robert; and finally, that the British must not march beyond Tezeen until Sir Robert Sale marched out of Jellalabad. It was agreed that the British should halt at Boothank until the following morning. Day had scarcely dawned when, without any attempt to continue the negotiation begun the previous evening, a fierce onslaught was made upon the rear-guard. Whether animated by despair, or that some unaccountable fit of bravery came upon them, the 44th, led by Major Thain, gallantly repulsed the attack.

The British entered the Pass of Boothank on the third day. This pass is five miles long, narrow, and the sides precipitous and very elevated. A stream poured through it, which fell from its lofty source with such extraor-

dinary rapidity that it was not frozen except at the edges, and where it had overflowed its banks sheets of smooth, clear ice rendered the passage of man and beast most difficult. So winding was this river, that travellers must cross it twenty-eight times in going through the pass. At the entrance from Cabul the defile was much wider than at any place between it and the opposite entrance, where the width of the ravine was narrowest. The heights were covered with fanatics. It is scarcely possible to conceive perils more imminent and a situation more afflicting than that which fell to the lot of those who had had so many opportunities of gaining victory and renown at Cabul; and when it was too late to obtain those advantages, had opportunities of dying nobly the soldier's death upon fields of not altogether hopeless combat. Onward marched the forlorn multitude. For a time the 44th royal regiment and the 54th native infantry maintained the duties of rear-guard, but when they began to suffer severely, they abandoned military order and ran towards the front, forcing their way forward as they could. How it was that the enemy did not fall sword in hand upon the whole host is scarcely conceivable; probably the fitful displays of animation on the part of the 44th may have deterred such a result. Three thousand of the fugitives were slain in the dreadful passage, and the survivors emerged from it wounded and woe struck.

Horrible as were these disasters, worse awaited the forlorn host. When they reached Khoord-Cabul the cold became more intense, the country being more elevated; to this misery was added a fall of snow, rendering progress slower. There were no tents; no wood could be gathered to light fires, and the supply of food was already nearly exhausted. The camp remained that night unassailed. In the morning no efforts were made by the generals to restore order. Two hours before the time fixed for marching, the greater portion of the troops and nearly all the camp followers went on, setting the general orders at defiance. They were induced to halt by information that Akbar Khan had promised provisions, and requested General Elphinstone to halt, that arrangements might be made by the chief to draw off the Affghans from the line of march, except a force of his own to form an escort. The real object was to bring up his men, as they could not march so quickly through the hills as the fugitive British through the defiles. The whole of the British were against delay; they did not trust Akbar's promises; they had preferred flight to battle, and knew that the only remaining chance of safety was in making

that flight rapid. One more march would have brought them to a lower level of country, and freed them from the snow. Yet the generals did halt. To adopt any course requiring promptitude or energy, even when it afforded the only hope of safety, was impossible to them. While the English halted, Akbar proposed that the ladies, children, and married officers should be surrendered to his protection, he promising faithfully that they should be escorted a day's march behind the retreating army. The generals complied with this demand, notwithstanding the astonishment expressed by the inferior officers. The surrender was made, and two wounded officers were added to the number of hostages, for such they really became. The provisions which he promised to send never came. Famishing with cold and hunger, the British again began their perilous march, until another night, with all its horrors, fell upon the footsore, bleeding, and beaten crowd. It was a terrible night, numbers dying from exhaustion, cold, hunger, and wounds. There had been experience, such as might have profited all, of the necessity of discipline, and the danger of disorder; but the soldiery and camp followers were not taught the lesson. The next morning saw the tumult and disorganization of former days, if possible, increased. All were terror struck; nearly all the Hindostanee soldiers and camp followers were frost-bitten. Akbar Khan's success in causing General Elphinstone to halt was fatal. This day's march brought the crisis. In a narrow gorge, between two precipitous hills, the enfeebled fugitives were attacked from the heights above with a destructive fire, until the gorge was nearly choked with the dying and the dead. The native infantry were here either slain, left wounded in the pass to be afterwards murdered or perish of cold, or throwing away their arms and accoutrements they fled, willing to serve the enemy, or hoping to find a hiding-place. When resistance seemed no longer possible, the enemy, bounding down the declivities, attacked the British, sword in hand; the whole of the baggage was captured, and with it the public treasure. Part of the advanced guard, or what might more appropriately be called the advanced portion of the crowd, emerged from the pass, and the officers with it succeeded in inducing a halt to cover the progress of the remainder. Stragglers reached them, some frightfully wounded, the remainder of the main body of the force had been cut to pieces. The force now mustered seventy men and officers of the 44th, a hundred and fifty native cavalry, fifty horse artillerymen, with one 12-pound howitzer: the camp followers still amounted to several hun-

dreds, exclusive of the wounded, and disabled by frost-bite. Akbar Khan proposed that the whole force should be disarmed and placed under his protection. For once General Elphinstone refused the insidious overtures of the murderer of Sir W. Mac Naghten. The progress of the force was resumed with somewhat more of order. Again a narrow pass lay in its line of march, and again the heights were covered with the marksmen of the enemy. Brigadier Shelton displayed some of his old brave spirit; he threw out skirmishers, made dispositions which were sensible, and such a demonstration of decision as deterred the Affghans from falling upon the British with the sword, and the force arrived, after some further casualties, in the Tezeen valley. Lieutenant Eyre describes these Affghan rifles as "the best marksmen in the world:" one can hardly credit such an opinion, when such a force as that commanded by General Elphinstone could march through a series of passes, of such a nature that a single British regiment, unless formed of men like the 44th, might have defended any of them against the march of fifty thousand men. In some places those passes were a mere gorge, in others the turns were sharp and sudden, so angular that before they were attained the towering rock appeared right before the advancing army, and on these crags the Affghans were perched or crouching with more or less cover, their long-range firearms pointed to the passage below. Were they marksmen of the ability for which Lieutenant Eyre gives them credit, not a man of General Elphinstone's army would have emerged from the first pass. The opinion here given of Lieutenant Eyre's estimate of the Affghan sharp-shooters is not unsupported. One who had abundant opportunity of observing them says of similar attempts against the passage of General England's forces between Candahar and Ghizni, that the failure of the assailants arose from deficient aim as well as deficient courage:—"The enemy made no stand, rapidly retreating from hill to hill, and keeping so far out of range that with all their fire they but slightly wounded two of our people."\* The same observer thus expresses himself on another occasion:—"It is difficult to credit all that one hears of the superior marksmanship of these people. I can imagine that well screened behind a rock with a rest for their piece and a fixed mark, they may hit at considerable distances; but when compelled to move as in following an enemy, or retreating from height to height, they appear to do very little execution, with a great expenditure of ammunition."

\* Rev. J. N. Allen.

Had the British maintained order and military discipline on the march from Cabul to Tezeen, and had General Elphinstone trusted Akbar Khan and shown any tolerable skill and spirit, the loss would not have been one-third what it was.

In the valley of Tezeen, Akbar again sought to induce the British to delay, or to surrender their arms and trust to his protection. The general this time refused all parley, and ordered the troops to move upon Jugdulluck, twenty-two miles distant. It was thought just possible that Sale might send or bring some succour thither. The wounded, those unable to walk, and the remaining gun were abandoned in the valley, and the men went on more hopefully than hitherto on their desperate march. At seven o'clock in the evening they began to move, hoping to reach the proposed destination before day. It was morning when the advance reached Kutterung, little more than half the distance. The camp followers, who formed a column between the advance and rear-guard, hesitated to go on when the fire of the Affghans was at all active, who were guided in the discharge of their pieces by the noise made by the retreat, as the darkness was too dense to admit of deliberate aim. Shelton, who brought up the rear-guard, was unable to get his men forward from the obstruction presented by the swaying to and fro of the centre column. The brigadier displayed great activity during this night, but all his exertions were fruitless as to quickening the march of the native "followers." Jugdulluck was reached in the evening, and Akbar Khan opened his usual negotiations, inducing a halt, and at the same time encircling the British by the fire of his infantry. Cowardice only prevented the Affghans from closing in upon their victims. Captain Bygrove, at the head of fifteen Europeans, crept up the acclivity of a hill which was crowned with ten times the number of enemies, who fled with craven speed. The issue of the conference was that Akbar Khan protested that the hostile attacks of the Affghans arose from the violation of the convention of Cabul by the British. Sir Robert Sale felt it to be his duty to disregard that treaty, especially as one of its articles was the surrender of Jellalabad. Akbar Khan considered that hostilities were justifiable so long as the stipulation that the British would evacuate Affghanistan remained unfulfilled. He now demanded that Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson should be surrendered as hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty of Cabul, so far as Jellalabad was concerned. *General Elphinstone accepted these terms!* The general was also invited to a conference to

settle the matter finally. The commander-in-chief gave the command *pro tem.* to Brigadier Auquetil, and attended the proposed interview with the officers designated by Akbar for hostages. They were received with courtesy and hospitality, and were accommodated with tents for the night. The next morning conferences began between the British officers and a number of Affghan chiefs; Akbar Khan playing the part of mediator. Nothing decided was accomplished, and as the day advanced General Elphinstone prepared to return. He, however, soon found that his own despicable folly had made him, his second in command, and an intelligent and gallant officer, Captain Johnson, prisoners. The mode in which he placed himself in the power of an enemy whom he knew was likely just to act as he did might give rise to the suspicion that he desired such a result to secure his own safety. Such an imputation has never been cast upon him, and it is fair to presume was never deserved, but the absolute absurdity of his conduct on any other supposition might well lead to such a surmise.

The British looked anxiously for the return of their generals and the tidings of their negotiations. Major Thain and Captain Skinner rode some distance in the direction of Akbar's camp, in their anxiety to observe if any messenger were on the way; they were attacked, and Captain Skinner wounded mortally. It would surprise the reader that these officers should expose themselves to be waylaid and cut off, when they saw that the Affghans observed no truce,—if any occurrence, however irrational, in connection with that army could create surprise, after its conduct on the morning of the first revolt at Cabul. Akbar gained fresh delay by these proceedings. Hunger, thirst, and cold, and the assassin fire of the foe, made an additional number of victims. Another day and night were wasted, and at last the little force moved on, in the hope that it might reach Jellalabad. After a short march, which the enemy had not anticipated, it was pursued by overwhelming numbers, every part of the country sending its tribe to participate in the slaughter of the infidels. The enemy still kept up a murderous fire, fearing, with all their numbers, a close combat with the British, or supposing that with less loss to themselves they might pick off the whole by a distant fire. A night made mournful by the expectation that it would prove their last, gave place to a day destined to prove the gloomy anticipation well founded. Twelve officers, with what was left of the cavalry, rode on, as their delay could have afforded no protection to the infantry. There were a few other small parties

of mounted men. The infantry followed, but as they approached Gundamuck the smallness of their numbers was exposed by daylight. The enemy refused to negotiate; an appetite for the blood of the infidels raged in the bigoted Mussulmans. About twenty men and a few officers took up a position on a height. The Affghans ranged themselves on an opposite height, pouring matchlock volleys upon the crags where the few English were posted. These men, determined to sell their lives dearly, maintained a steady fire, beneath which most of the foremost Affghans fell. Several times the enemy charged these few British soldiers sword in hand, but were repulsed with signal slaughter. At last, one charge in overwhelming numbers completed the destruction of the British infantry. Some few, desperately wounded, escaped. Captain Souter was one of these. He tied the colours of his regiment round his waist, and thus preserved them. The enemy, however, preferred blood to banners—they were Mohammedans. The cavalry was on ahead, but the Affghans lined the way, and six fell dead under "the slugs" of the Affghan pieces on the way to Futtehabad, where the survivors arrived. The inhabitants received them with warm expressions of sympathy, and hospitably entertained them. Had these officers among the poor fugitives been taught in their youth the genius and spirit of the Mohammedan religion, they would have distrusted such manifestations of kindness. While the wanderers were partaking of the refreshments they so much required, their hosts armed themselves, rushed upon them, killed two of their number; the rest, with difficulty, and by dint of hard fighting, were enabled to remount and ride away. Their entertainers also took horse and pursued and cut down the whole party, except Dr. Brydon, who alone reached Jellalabad, like the last of Job's servants, escaping to tell the story of destruction.

While the events which have been described occurred at Cabul, at Jellalabad, and in the passes between those two places, very similar transactions were occurring in other parts of Shah Sujah's dominions. At Ghizni, Colonel Palmer, the British officer in command there, found himself in a situation quite desperate, from the pressure of the enemy on every side. Colonel Palmer wrote to General Elphinstone at Cabul, and to Sir William Mac Naghten, for orders and counsel, but could obtain neither. Time was in this way consumed which could not be afterwards redeemed. Colonel Palmer relied upon the fidelity of the inhabitants, who, with Mohammedan falsehood and hypocrisy, pretended loyalty to Shah Sujah, and friendship to the

English. All the while they were in correspondence with their eo-religionists outside, and suggesting a plan for gaining the latter admission to the city. This plot was successful; the British, taken by surprise, fought desperately, and after twenty-four hours of sanguinary struggle were obliged to give up the city and retire to the citadel, where they continued to bid defiance to the foe until the 1st of March, 1842, ten weeks after the town was lost. During that period the British endured, with uncommon hardihood, cold, hunger, and privations of every kind. Water at last failed. This decided the necessity of surrender. A command had also arrived from General Elphinstone to give up the place, in virtue of the treaty of Herat. It was arranged that the garrison should march out of the citadel in six days, that a certain portion of the city should be set apart for their residence until they were prepared to march, when they were to leave for India, with all their baggage, colours flying, and an escort of Affghan cavalry. The Affghan chiefs bound themselves, by an oath upon the Koran, to abide by these stipulations. The oath was of course violated the moment an opportunity presented itself; the blood of the infidel, more than possession of city or citadel, was desired by these fanatics. On the 6th of March the British left the citadel, and took up the quarters in the city assigned to them; on the 7th, when off their guard, they were attacked, not only by the multitude but by the guns of the citadel, under the direction of the chiefs. The commander of the citadel, Shumsoodeen, a nephew of Dost Mohammed, offered to spare the officers on condition of their surrender to him, and giving up the sepoy to massacre. This was indignantly refused, and the attack continued till many officers and men fell. The sepoy, perceiving that all must eventually perish, resolved to steal away, and attempt to march upon Peshawur. They informed their officers of their intention, and wished them to accompany them, but expressed their resolution, with or without their officers, to attempt an escape. The officers in vain dissuaded the men, and as they knew the attempt must end in the destruction of all, they surrendered themselves to Shumsoodeen Khan. The sepoy cleverly made their way through a hole in the outer wall of the town. They had not gone far when a heavy fall of snow puzzled them as to their route. The Affghans were soon in pursuit, and the unfortunate fugitives were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. It is not likely that had their officers accompanied them, better fortune would have attended the retreat. Whether their officers were bound in honour to have

gone with them is a point in military casuistry not so easily decided. If the officers believed, as appears to have been the case, that whatever hope existed was in connection with a defence of the quarter of the town they occupied, and that to retire from it was to incur certain destruction, which the sepoy were resolved to risk, then it is evident that the gentlemen in command of the force adopted the only course open to them. The captive officers were treated with barbarity, and barely escaped being murdered.

The fall of Ghizni produced a moral effect to the disadvantage of the British which was felt all over Affghanistan. Colonel Palmer behaved with skill and spirit when obliged to stand on his defence, but he did not possess the general intellectual qualities necessary for the post he occupied: however, as a military man, he was worthy of confidence, and in the hour of emergency acquitted himself with honour and discretion. He was outwitted as easily as Elphinstone and his coadjutors, and reposed trust in the Mohammedan chiefs and people, which an acquaintance with the history of the Mohammedan imposture, and its effects upon the minds of men, would have forbidden.

Candahar, like Jellalabad, held out. General Nott commanded the garrison, and he was a man of the Sir Robert Sale type. There were some follies perpetrated at Candahar, but they were political, not military. When the insurrection broke out, an attempt was made to bribe the chiefs. They took a lac of rupees among them, and continued quiet as long as they received money. As soon as the instalments of the stipulated amount were exhausted they commenced hostilities. Among the men who so acted was a nephew of the reigning monarch, for whom the English had expended and suffered so much. Part of the troops ordered to return to India by Lord Auckland belonged to the garrison of Candahar, and consisted of Colonel Maclaren's brigade. This body was proceeding on its homeward route, when it heard of the destruction of Captain Woodburn and his troops on their way from Ghizni to Cabul. This led them to halt; and they were soon after ordered to return to Candahar. Had they proceeded, they must in great part have perished, and the residuary garrison of Candahar could not have been saved by even the genius of Nott. General Elphinstone ordered Nott to send him assistance. This order came too late; the way was covered with snow. Nott, however, ordered Maclaren to conduct his brigade thither if possible. Fortunately for the garrison of Candahar, and, perhaps, unfortunately for that of Cabul, he did not succeed. The physical

obstacles were insurmountable. When Akbar Khan had destroyed the garrison of Cabul on their dreary and bloody march, he collected an immense force, with the object of accomplishing the same success at Candahar. As has been already shown, he received from the indomitable Sir Robert Sale signal defeat at Jellalabad. Akbar, with indefatigable activity and diligence, appeared with his forces before Candahar, and selected a position near to the town, protected by a morass along his front. Nott determined to lose no time in giving him battle, and, on the 12th of January, marched out with all his army, except the troops left to guard the cantonments. The enemy delivered a rapid and heavy matchlock fire, and fled as the British prepared to charge, without encountering a single bayonet. The flight was so eager that pursuit was ineffectual. The moral effect of that battle, like that of the battles fought by Sale, was to deter the Affghans from a near approach to the place, and to awe the inhabitants of the whole district.

In the midst of these triumphs and reverses of the British arms, the man whose unfaithful selection of a general led to the disasters endured left India for England, where he incurred the censures of the British public, and severe attacks from the parliamentary party opposed to his own; but partizan support brought him through, and he was loaded with panegyric by the Whigs, as if he had proved himself a public benefactor, and a dispenser of patronage on principles of the sternest justice.

The successor of Lord Auckland was Lord

Ellenborough, who arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February, 1842, when the government there was in consternation, and the British throughout all India filled with shame and grief for the ruin which the Auckland policy had inflicted. Whatever the merits of Lord Ellenborough, as ultimately proved, he was not selected to his high post on account of them, but just as his predecessor was selected, to answer a party object at home. Lord Auckland was a mere aristocratic whig nominee; Lord Ellenborough a mere tory nominee. Lord Ellenborough arrived, however, in the midst of appalling difficulties, and set about the discharge of his onerous and trying duties with zeal, courage, activity, and great energy. His appointment excited intense popular dissatisfaction in England, but he displayed qualities for which the English public had given him no credit; although mingled with a certain rashness his supposed possession of which had caused anxiety on his account amongst his friends and his party, and anxiety for the welfare of India and the empire among the English public.

Lord Auckland remained until the 12th of March, to offer (it was said) his counsel in the great emergency, and to assist in completing those arrangements which he and his friends hoped would redeem the faults and misfortunes of the Affghan war. Lord Ellenborough pressed forward, with characteristic vigour, the means taken to restore British authority, and wipe away the stain from the escutcheon of England which Lord Auckland's policy caused it to receive.

## CHAPTER CXIV.

### SECOND INVASION OF AFFGHANISTAN BY THE BRITISH—GENERAL POLLOCK ADVANCES FROM JELLALABAD TO CABUL—GENERAL ENGLAND MARCHES FROM QUETTAH TO CANDAHAR.

As soon as the real situation of affairs in Affghanistan was known in India, efforts were made to bring back safely the troops that yet remained. Two separate armies were organized. One of these was placed under General Lumley, of which General Pollock afterwards took the command. This was destined to march from Peshawur to Jellalabad, and thence, having formed a junction with the brigade of Sir Robert Sale, to return to Peshawur, possibly to march upon Cabul. The other force was collected in Scinde under General England, and ordered to advance as far beyond Quettah as would ensure to General Nott a safe retreat from Candahar. These arrangements were

made by Lord Auckland. His appointments were severely criticised. Major-general Lumley was known to be in ill health. It was reported that Major-general Pollock was far from well. Murmurs were heard that men of merit, and entitled by their military position to confidence and a command, were overlooked, and that favouritism ruled as certainly if not as disastrously as when General Elphinstone was sent on his abortive errand to Cabul.

The season was severe, and the difficulty of marching a large force through the passes and to the relief of isolated posts was immense. The enemy had command of all the communications, and it was likely that what-

ever the troops consumed would have to be brought with them from India. As soon as General Elphinstone's distress at Cabul was known, a brigade consisting of four regiments of native infantry was collected at Peshawur, and placed under the command of Colonel Wylde. A Sikh infantry brigade was attached to this, with a considerable force of Sikh artillery. Colonel Wylde, placing himself at the head of this division, marched from Peshawur, and attempted to force the celebrated Khyber Pass. The Sikhs refused to go forward as soon as any obstacle arose; the sepoys only required an example to fail in their duty. The camp followers and camel drivers deserted or were cut down by the enemy. Neither Sikhs nor sepoys would defend the baggage, which was to a great extent plundered by the enemy, and finally Colonel Wylde was obliged to make an inglorious retreat. It was the fashion at that time in India to laud the sepoys to the skies; hence a proper proportion of European troops was not attached to divisions and separate commands. The good conduct of the sepoys on some occasions, and, as in the case of the 44th, the indifferent conduct occasionally of European troops, conduced to hold up the delusion. Such a force as Colonel Wylde commanded was utterly unfit to cope with the real dangers and superstitious fears connected with the Khyber Pass. An attempt was made to relieve the isolated fort of Ali Musjid, but it failed, and the place was abandoned.

Soon after these occurrences fresh troops were sent forward. Colonel Wylde's failure occurred at the beginning of January, 1842. "Early in that month a reinforcement, consisting of her majesty's 9th foot and 10th light cavalry, a regiment of native infantry, and a detachment from another, together with details of artillery and irregular cavalry, crossed the Sutlej on its way to Peshawur. Subsequently the force assembled there was strengthened by the dispatch of her majesty's 3rd dragoons and 31st foot, the 1st regiment of light cavalry, two regiments of native infantry, some recruits for her majesty's 13th, and some details of irregular cavalry artillery." General Pollock, on his arrival at Peshawur, found the whole of Wylde's division utterly demoralised. Many of the men were in hospital from an epidemic contracted during their late campaign. Neither sepoy nor Sikh concealed his unwillingness to advance into the Khyber Pass. The general, under these circumstances, resolved to wait for reinforcements, and succeeded in opening communications with Sale. The plan which had failed everywhere else was tried at Peshawur, that of buying over the chiefs. They accepted

the money, swore upon the Koran eternal fidelity, and immediately broke their oaths. They kept no faith with "Feringhies." General Pollock does not appear to have had much confidence in the native portion of his troops, nor did he show himself eager to risk his force in order to ensure the relief of Sale, who, although he had beaten off his enemies, was suffering from want of food. It was not until the 5th of April that Pollock moved, and then it was at the head of a force so large that no doubt as to the issue could exist, and no peril was incurred. On approaching the Khyber Pass, the general found that a far larger force of Affghans had been collected than had before disputed the passage. The painfully protracted delay had also emboldened them. They had raised some rude works in situations advantageously selected, and breastworks, roughly but not unskilfully formed, had been constructed in commanding positions. Pollock's dispositions were such as might be expected under the circumstances. He sent out two flanking columns to scale the heights and dispossess them of the enemy, while his main column advanced to the mouth of the pass. Each of the flanking columns was separated into two detachments. The right, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Taylor, 9th foot, and Major Anderson, 64th native infantry; the left, under Lieutenant-colonel Moseley of the 64th native infantry, and Major Heriot of the 26th native infantry. As soon as these operations had begun, a large body of the enemy moved to the rear of the British, supposing that the baggage would be left imperfectly protected, and intending to make a swoop upon it, and possibly succeed in also carrying off treasure. Brigadier M'Caskill, who commanded the rear-guard, had, however, made such dispositions of his force that not a package was lost nor a pack animal wounded.

The flanking columns cleared the heights gallantly, the enemy maintaining a desultory and distant fire. Many men and officers suffered from fatigue, few from the fire of the Affghans; our sepoys delivered theirs with better effect when in motion, or when halting only while firing, than the Affghans, who, notwithstanding their celerity of movement among rocks, were not quick enough to escape the bullets of their pursuers. General Pollock received little opposition after so decisively forcing the entrance to the pass, and in ten days he arrived at Jellalabad.\* Parties of Affghans kept hovering in observation along the route, and, trusting to their swiftness of foot, often approached and delivered a fire from their matchlocks, or waited behind rocks

\* Blue books.

until a detachment passed, and then fired and fled. Great numbers paid for their temerity in thus acting; the European skirmishers brought them down as they fled, and the light pieces of the horse artillery showered grape amongst the rocks. It was not until long afterwards that the English learned how sure and deadly their fire thus proved; they supposed that as that of the enemy proved so innoxious, the inequalities of the ground, and the novel description of practice, caused their own to be nearly as harmless.

When General Pollock arrived at Jellalabad great was the joy of the garrison, and of the illustrious officers who had achieved such heroic exploits. The question then arose what course General Pollock should take; whether he should return with Sale's brigade to Peshawur and remain there, his troops acting as an army of observation, as Lord Auckland had in the first instance directed, or adopt the bolder policy of Lord Ellenborough, with which the general's own views agreed. Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief, had concurred in the views of Lord Auckland; he now supported the more vigorous ideas of Lord Ellenborough.

On the 15th of March the governor-general, in council, thus addressed Sir Jasper Nicolls:—"The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the government of India. They will in the first instance endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief in any case without reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the relief of the prisoners taken at Cabul is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can probably only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in or may come into our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghizni,\* it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-general Pollock effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul. We are fully sensible of

\* The fall of this place was not then known.

the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabul, the scene of our great disaster, and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds on which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance, and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-general Pollock, unless that general should be satisfied that he can—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed—feel assured that he can by his own strength overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus."

The opinion of General Pollock as to the policy of his advance from Peshawur was thus expressed:—"If I were to advance with the intention of merely withdrawing the garrison of Jellalabad, my success in advancing must chiefly depend on concealing my intentions; for, although (if I succeed in any negotiation to open the pass) every precaution will be taken by me to secure a retreat, I must expect that every man will rise to molest our return, as they would be left to the mercy of the Affghan rulers; and I must confess I sincerely believe that our return here, unless I have first an opportunity of inflicting some signal punishment on the enemy, would have a very bad effect both far and near." \*

On the 29th of April, Sir Jasper Nicolls, by the direction of the governor-general, forwarded instructions to General Pollock to withdraw from his advanced position to Peshawur. The views of the government of India were materially modified as to the necessity and importance of this second expedition to Affghanistan by the death of the sovereign, Shah Sujah, who was murdered at Cabul by fanatics. Matters now assumed this aspect in the councils of the English. Lord Ellenborough, at first vigorous and lofty in his ideas of the necessity of redeeming British honour, gradually lowered his tone until it sunk to the level of that of Lord Auckland.

\* Letter to Lieutenant-colonel Luard, February 27th, 1842.

He and the council of India were for the rapid withdrawal of Nott and Pollock, the former to Scinde, the latter to Peshawur. Some misgiving as to the propriety of a retrograde movement while so many English officers, and especially so many English ladies, were captives in the hands of Akbar Khan, pervades the correspondence of the governor-general with the commander-in-chief in India, and the secret committee in London; yet the case with which the safety of these individuals seems to be given up in view of the general interest is not encouraging to the spirit of self-sacrifice on the part of individual Englishmen for their country. Sir Jasper Nicolls, Generals Pollock, Nott, and England, all showed a more manly and generous feeling, as well as a nobler jealousy for their country's honour. Both General Pollock and General Nott urged remonstrance after remonstrance, and, for a time, in vain. "A craven spirit," as General Nott called it, seemed to take possession of the civil authorities. In a letter to Mr. Maddock at the end of March, 1842, General Nott urged upon that official that the government would review its whole position in Affghanistan before a retrograde movement should be irrecoverably made, and "the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have upon the whole of Beloochistan, and even in the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to ensure; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?" In a subsequent letter General Nott says, "Perhaps it is not within my province to observe that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed which war between a small body of disciplined soldiers and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Cabul; and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened,

however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of military events which led to the sad catastrophe." \*

On the 14th of May, Lord Ellenborough, in a despatch to Sir Jasper Nicolls, yielded to the wish of the generals so far as to direct that the posts of Jellalabad and Candahar should be held by Pollock and Nott for some time. This temporising on the part of the Indian government caused much precious time to be squandered which the generals were eager profitably to employ. In India Lord Ellenborough received the credit of leaning to the decisive policy of the generals, and the more timid policy was attributed to the civilians of the supreme council. Sir Jasper Nicolls, at last, in a more decisive tone, declared that neither Pollock nor Nott could with propriety or convenience withdraw until the autumn was very far advanced. The reasons given by Sir Jasper for this opinion were not so solid as the opinion itself. At all events, the governor-general allowed the decision of the officer who held the chief military responsibility to stand, and he immediately proceeded to collect an army of reserve in such a position that it could either reinforce Pollock or Nott, as might be required, and at the same time by its movements deceive the Affghans as to the general intentions of the government. The Affghan chiefs, although not very well served by their spies, were not altogether ignorant of the counsels which prevailed at Calcutta. His excellency knew this, and was less in expectation of misleading the Affghans than of "overawing the states of India." This was necessary, as the military prestige of England was lowered over all Asia. The Sikhs openly expressed their contempt, and hinted that a Sikh and Affghan alliance could expel the English from India. The plans of General Pollock and General Nott were clear, precise, bold, and consistent: Lord Ellenborough wavered as a tree shaken by the wind. At the end of May he was once more in favour of General Pollock retiring from Jellalabad, fixing his head-quarters at Peshawur, and keeping open the Khyber Pass. Nott was also to give up Candahar. On the first of June his excellency sent a despatch to General Pollock, which recommended both retirement and action. His lordship's mind was tossed to and fro like a ship upon an agitated sea. He wrote so many despatches so little consistent with others of nearly the same date, or reiterating almost in the same terms directions previously given, that he seemed to be moved by an intense propensity for rash and inconsiderate letter-writing. His

\* Letter to Mr. Maddock, April 18, 1842.

despatches were those of a restless mind, anxious to direct and govern, but with little judgment.\* Had his political opponents in England made themselves familiar with his excellency's epistolary efforts at that period, they would have had abundant material for attack, both upon him and those who nominated him to the high and onerous office he held.

General Pollock continued to entreat permission to advance upon Cabul, declaring that he did not believe there was a single soul to obstruct his march between that place and his camp. The governor-general's letters continued embarrassing, and fruitless delay was created. The British nation suffered bitterly from the incapacity of those to whom affairs were entrusted by her governments. Men arose who had the capacity to redeem her honour, but they arose unexpectedly, by the force of circumstances, and, in a great measure, in spite of a system which repressed genius and fostered patronage, connection, and routine. General Pollock had upon his staff one officer who even then had the attainments and capacity of a great general. It has been related how Captain Havelock was transferred from the staff of the Hon. General Elphinstone to that of Sir Robert Sale. The latter general strongly recommended General Pollock to accept the services of that officer, bearing a strong testimony to his invaluable aid during the march to Jellalabad, the defence of that place, and in the pitched battles with Akbar Khan. General Pollock yielded to this suggestion. Havelock, breveted to a majority, and made a Companion of the Bath, was transferred to the personal staff of General Pollock. The opinions of the general were much influenced by the decision and experience of Havelock, who considered the advance upon Cabul as the only true line of policy. "General Pollock† marched from Jellalabad on the 20th of August, 1842. Lord Ellenborough,‡ on the 4th of July, 1842, wrote to Major-general Nott, as well as to General Pollock, granting permission to the advance upon Cabul; General Pollock from Jellalabad, by the passes, up to the capital; and General Nott, proceeding from Candahar, *via* Ghizni, to Cabul. General Pollock reached Gundamuck§ on the 23rd of August, and hearing of the enemy being at Mam-mookhail, two miles distant, attacked them next morning."

Brigadiers M'Caskill and Tulloch, Lieutenant-colonel Taylor of the 9th foot, and

Captain Broadfoot here distinguished themselves. The enemy gave way as fast as attacked, but their strong position enabled them to inflict some loss. Four officers were wounded, and fifty men put *hors de combat*. General Pollock marched from Gundamuck on the 7th of September,\* after a halt of a fortnight, during which arrangements were made to keep open his communications and establish depots of supplies. Next day† the general moved through the Pass of Jugdul-luck. Here opposition was offered from good positions on the heights. The enemy were quickly dislodged, and with loss; the British had only one man slain, an officer, and sixty-five wounded, among whom was an officer. The British officers on this occasion, as during the whole route of the advance, showed a too forward valour. Indeed, throughout the whole Affghan war, the regimental officers covered themselves with unfading glory; more than Roman virtue shone in their daring and devotion.

On the 11th of September General Pollock reached Tezeen valley, memorable in the retreat of Elphinstone's army from Cabul. While resting his army on the 12th, his pickets were attacked with boldness in the evening; Lieutenant-colonel Taylor showed personal valour and good officership in repulsing the enemy. Nevertheless such was their audacity, that through the night successive although unsuccessful attacks were kept up against the whole line of pickets, especially those on the extreme left. It was evident from these bold measures that the Tezeen Pass would be disputed. On entering it next day its heights were observed to be crowned by sixteen thousand men, under the command of Akbar Khan. His force, however, did not offer a resistance in proportion to its numbers; the English marched through the pass and encamped at Khoord-Cabul, having incurred a loss of 162 men killed and wounded, exclusive of four wounded officers. The enemy disheartened did not fire another shot, and on the 16th of September General Pollock arrived in triumph at Cabul. Great was the consternation of the people of the city and province as the fine army, under the command of General Pollock, advanced upon the capital, and the general expectation was that all Affghans caught by the troops would be put to death. On the morning of the 16th Pollock entered the Balla-Hissar, and planted there the English standard, the bands playing the British national anthem, the guns firing a salute, and the cheers of the soldiery rising

\* See Blue-book.

† Blue-book, p. 372.

‡ Ibid., pp. 327, 329. Letters, 404, 405.

§ Blue-book, p. 374.

\* Blue-book, p. 383.

† Ibid., p. 385.

‡ Ibid., p. 395.

with triumphant vehemence, as if they would rend the heavens.

Having thus traced the progress of the army from Peshawur, it is necessary to turn to that at Candahar, and to the army of General England, which was ordered to march to its relief; but the further relation of events connected with Upper Affghanistan, where General Nott and his officers continued to maintain their ground, must form a separate chapter.

General England was ordered to proceed from Scinde to cover Nott's retreat, at the head of a body of troops far too small for the performance of such a duty. When the General reached Quettah, and was reinforced, his whole division did not reach three thousand men, and with these his task was to proceed through the most formidable passes, crowned with numerous enemies acquainted with every rock and ravine. General England has always been acknowledged, by those competent to judge, as one of the most skilful officers in the service. He was not a flashy and showy general, but active, energetic, brave, and vigilant; he possessed the qualities which fit a man to have the charge of soldiers. Reckless of his own safety, this general carried to the verge of excess his care and concern for the safety of his men. During the Crimean war he rendered very important services. At the battle of the Alma he not only sent up the guns of his division to assist the 2nd division, under the intrepid Sir De Lacy Evans, but he accompanied them, exposing himself in the thickest of the fire when his own division, which was in support, was not then brought into action. At Inkerman he contributed much to the success of the day by the prudent movement of a portion of his division from their own post to that against which the enemy was directing his attack. He personally joined that part of his division, having made skilful provision for the defence of his own particular post.

The situation in which General England was placed at Quettah was one of intense difficulty and deep anxiety; reinforcements were promised, but they arrived too slowly to enable the general to accomplish his purpose as opportunely as he desired. While awaiting his reinforcements at the place last named, finding forage scarce, he determined to proceed to Killa-ab-Doolah, in the valley of Peshawur, where it was plentiful. He set out on the 24th of March, 1842, and soon found that he was watched by the enemy's horse. The 3rd light cavalry cleared the country of these scouts, killing, wounding, and capturing some. On entering the defile leading to the village of Hykulzie, a powerful Affghan force,

under Mohammed Sadiz, was strongly posted. General England had obtained no information of the strength of the enemy. The officer whose duty it was to afford it, as a political agent, could obtain none, the people on the line of march concealing all knowledge of that kind, although making every demonstration of friendship. The general naturally believed that the force opposed to him was small; it was however very numerous, but hidden by a series of breastworks, a ditch, and abatis. General England ordered the advance, consisting of four light companies under Major Apthorp, to clear the lower hill. This party was opposed by overwhelming numbers; Captain May, who commanded the light company of the 41st regiment of the royal line, was shot through the heart while gallantly leading on his men. Major Apthorp was mortally wounded. While the advanced companies were maintaining an unequal contest it was impossible to support them, as the main column was charged by crowds of cavalry, who were bravely repulsed, leaving numerous men and horses dead. General England with great skill brought off the whole of his baggage without losing any portion. On the return to Quettah, Major Apthorp died. Besides the two officers who fell, there were twenty-six men killed; the wounded were sixty-nine. General England, perceiving that the enemy was in such strength in his neighbourhood, concentrated the small body of men at his command in Quettah and its cantonments; defences were thrown up, and the place was judiciously strengthened. The general in this position awaited the promised reinforcements. The narrow space which the division occupied tended to create sickness, but the arrangements of the general showed much sanitary skill, and preserved the health of the troops. Instances, however, occurred with increasing rapidity and virulence of fever and dysentery; erysipelas set in where wounds had been received in a considerable proportion of cases.

On the 23rd of April an order was received by General England to join General Nott at Candahar. The proceedings of the former officer since the commencement of the troubles may be thus briefly summed up:—The news of the Cabul tragedy reached General England, then in command of the Scinde field force, at Dadur (the lower end of the Kojuck), about the end of November or beginning of December, 1841. Towards the middle of January the news of the murder of Mac Naghten by Akbar Khan, and other distressing intelligence, arrived. It was reported that the insurrection had spread towards Candahar, and that some local levies had deserted from

the service, killing their English officers, and that Affghan chiefs were gathering round the city, and placing it in a state of blockade. In March, General England, anxiously pressing on in the direction of General Nott (who was beleaguered at Candahar), reached Quettah at the upper extremity of the Bolan. On the 25th of March he marched forward from thence, and on the 28th unsuccessfully attacked the strong position at Hykulzie, and, retreating from thence, re-entered Quettah. General Nott had been previous to this, very importunate for assistance, and made various requisitions to General England, with which the latter had no means of complying. Thus on the 14th of February he sent for cavalry, but at that time there were only half a regiment of Bombay horse and some irregulars in all Scinde, hardly sufficient to keep open communications. The government contemplated merely the falling back of Nott from Candahar, and the advance of General England to the Quettah side of the Kojuck Pass, to create a diversion in his favour, and form a point of support upon which General Nott might retire. On the 11th of March Major Rawlinson, who was then with Nott at Candahar, wrote, "I rather think he will recommend that Brigadier England should come on *with his half force* to Killabola *at once*, and wait there until the whole force has concentrated, when he can push over the Kojuck, and advance to Candahar." If such were the expectations of General Nott, they were at least as rash as they were bold, and much more rash than reasonable. The condition of General Nott naturally induced expectations that he would not have cherished had he known the means at General England's disposal, and the opinions of the government. On April 2nd General Nott wrote to General England:—"I know not what the intentions of government are, but this I know and feel, that it is now four or five months since the outbreak of Cabul, and in all that time no aid whatever has been given to me." "I have continually called for cavalry, for ammunition, treasure, stores, and medicine for the sick. I have called loudly, but I have called in vain."\*

It has been shown on preceding pages that neither Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, nor the council at Calcutta were favourable to any advance from Jellalabad or Candahar to Cabul, and that at last Lord Ellenborough tolerated it, moved by the advice of Sir Jasper Nicolls and the remonstrances of Nott and Pollock. Nott, however, had not the same opportunities as Pollock had of knowing the tone of feeling at Calcutta. General England

was well aware that the government was adverse to any attempt at a march from Candahar to Cabul, although the political agents at Candahar and in Scinde showed the desire felt by Nott for advancing.

The passage of General England on the 28th triumphantly through the scene of his former reverse was a great gratification to the army. On both occasions he was encumbered with an enormous mass of baggage, containing every requisite for Nott's army. The advance of General England was not, as it has generally been regarded, the march of an army, but of a vast convoy, which the whole of his force was not more than sufficient to protect, for the Affghans were determined if possible to capture his baggage. On approaching the place of his former unsuccessful contest, General England found the enemy occupying similar positions, which he gallantly stormed. Sir Charles Napier, commenting upon both attempts on this pass, says: "England beat the same enemy with the same troops."\* He also records in his journal this censure: "General England has again fought on the same ground. Taking due precautions, he won the heights—a clear proof of former negligence."† It was not correct of the eccentric and dashing Sir Charles Napier thus to write. England *did not* "beat the same enemy with the same troops." He was reinforced. Sir Charles was a thousand miles off, and, as he admits himself, recorded his opinions on hearsay evidence. A comparison of the force of General England on each occasion reproves the rash assertions of Sir Charles. On the 25th of March England moved forward from Quettah, having 2,500 animals, &c., and a guard consisting of about thirty Bombay cavalry, five weak companies of her majesty's 41st regiment, four six-pounders of Bombay horse-artillery, and six small companies of sepoy, with perhaps fifty Poonah horse, in all about a thousand men. Sir Charles represented General England as having attacked the enemy in March with half his force, leaving the other half with the baggage. This also was an error. The troops which England did not bring up in support and into action consisted of about four hundred sepoy, who protected the rich and vast convoy which it was now evident the Affghans watched and reckoned on with avidity; and when Sir Charles Napier disapprovingly says, "he did not bring the whole into action, and that if he had done so he would have won," Sir Charles was not aware how slender Sir Richard England's resources

\* *Memoir of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Napier.* By Lieutenant-general Sir William Napier, vol. ii. p. 222

† *Memoir*, vol. ii. p. 172.

\* Stoeckeler's *Life of General Nott*, vol. ii. p. 14.

were, for it is perfectly evident that Napier thought that England had with him *the very same troops on this first and unsuccessful occasion* which were triumphant upon the *second* occasion at Hykulzie. The reinforcements received by England enabled him to make the following arrangement for the attack (a disposition impossible on the former occasion, owing to his then slender resources): viz., three columns were formed, each having Europeans at their head, and a reserve under the command of Major Brown, of her majesty's 41st regiment; the troops that were to threaten the right of the enemy marched first, having the greater space of ground to traverse; the rest were kept back till this flank attack had actually begun under Major Simmons, his musketry being the signal for the two other columns to branch off towards the enemy. The casual practice of Leslie's light guns covered these movements. A position was taken up by two small squadrons of the 3rd Bombay cavalry, ready to take the earliest account of the enemy, if he should condescend to fly. The enemy held his ground for awhile, but, finding his rear in danger by the attack on his right flank, he gave way. Bold and vigorous in a direct resistance, he now quailed and became instantly alarmed by this sidelong movement, and saved himself, with the loss of sixty or seventy men, by a precipitate flight to the inaccessible recesses of the mountains. This is one of the operations which, in the December following, Sir Charles Napier declares "place the major-general in a high position." To pass the Kojuck with troops and a baggage-train was not an easy operation under any circumstances. General Lord Keane thus writes to General England relative to this passage:—"Buslan Lodge, Hants. July 17th, 1842. Most heartily do I congratulate you on walking over the heights of Hykulzie and through the Kojuck Pass. I know the ground well, and found it a difficult job to pass the army of the Indus, even without an enemy to defend it." On the 2nd of December following Sir Charles Napier emphatically endorses the opinions of the highest authorities in India, *that this identical affair at Hykulzie*, as well as various other military operations, "place the major-general (England) in a position in which he may treat with just disregard and contempt all reflections thrown upon his military character." Concerning the ability of General England on this occasion, and generally, Sir Charles happily did justice in his private letters and official communications, but the publication by Sir William Napier of the notes in the journal of Sir Charles, just as they were entered, causes that eminent man to appear

harsh in his judgments of General England. The latest opinions of Sir Charles furnish the best evidence of his matured judgment; and on the 6th of October, 1842, he wrote to General England thus:—"You have your troops well in hand, and the interference of a superior officer (alluding to himself) would be injurious to the public service," &c. In another letter of Sir Charles to General England he says, "I am so pressed for time that I must delay writing on one or two points upon which *I wanted your advice*."

General England's passage through Kojuck Pass was with little loss. At Hykulzie, Lieutenant Ashbourne, of the 3rd light cavalry, was severely wounded; six natives also received wounds, some of which were dangerous. General Nott, in order to facilitate the advance of England, sent Brigadier-general Wymer to the entrance of the Kojuck Pass on the Candahar side. Of this General England received intelligence on the 1st of May, while the army was encamped in attendance upon divine worship. This intelligence inspired a sense of security among the troops, for it was generally apprehended that the pass would be disputed before the army emerged from it. These apprehensions had received confirmation from the appearance of cavalry on some points where that description of force could be collected, and from the dropping shots taken by the Affghans from their long-range rifles, to which our muskets could not reply, not carrying so far. Flanking parties had to be thrown out during the march, which inflicted little mischief upon the enemy, who fled from hill to hill as the flashes approached. The British suffered from a few shots only, but many fell from fatigue each day, and could only be brought on afterwards in the "dhoolies."

A clergyman, who accompanied General England's army, gives the following picture of the pass, and relation of the meeting of England and Wymer:—"The pass was exceedingly pretty, having a great deal more verdure on the hills than I had seen anywhere in Scinde. There were many fine trees, and their fresh green foliage, with the bold forms of the rocky heights beyond, and the green turf in the foreground, strongly reminded me of some parts of the north of England, though on a much larger scale. As we proceeded, the hills approached each other, and the path narrowed, until the camels began to get jammed into a dense mass, and seeing little prospect of a passage for some time, I sat down under the cool shade of a high rock, and made a very comfortable breakfast on cold beef and hard-boiled eggs. I then contrived to wind my way through strings and strings

of camels, till I came in sight of the steep ascent of the pass. Here I saw the heights in front crowned by troops, which, from the distance, could not be ours. I soon ascertained that they were a part of Brigadier Wymer's force, which had been sent to meet us from Candahar, and in securing those heights in the morning, their work had been much sharper than ours. They had two men killed and some wounded, and had killed about twenty-five of the enemy."

General England from thence advanced, and, on the 10th of May, encamped under the walls of Candahar, and delivered within its gate money, horses, equipments, &c., of which that garrison had long stood in need. The train of baggage included upwards of 3,000 camels, besides pack bullocks, donkeys, ponies, horses, &c. On arriving at Candahar, General England's army found quarters prepared for them, General Nott having prudently expelled all the armed inhabitants. The following description of the scenes which followed the junction of the two armies is interesting:—"Our arrival was hailed with great delight, as we brought with us several camel loads of letters and newspapers, the garrison having been entirely cut off from communication during the whole winter up to the period of our arrival, an accumulation of all their letters during that period having taken place at Quettah, between which and Candahar only the smallest notes could pass, conveyed by Cossids at the hazard of their lives, many of whom were sacrificed. The garrison had been subjected to great privations; the expense of feeding their cattle was enormous; and the price of every article that could be procured

for money extravagant. They had been again and again employed in the field, and that without tents, in the depth of winter. I am persuaded that their privations and exploits were by no means fully appreciated, for owing to the exceeding brevity of General Nott's despatches, they had not the advantage of having them made known to the world." General Nott, although a good officer and a good general, was stern, not affluent in bestowing generous praise on others, not sparing in censure upon those who differed from him in opinion, or thwarted his views. Stocqueler, who in his life of this eminent soldier, disparages those who in any way came into comparison with him, so passes over his faults as to appear guilty of the *suppressio veri*, and is so eager to arrogate all merit to his hero as scarcely to escape the *suggestio falsi*. Between Nott and England there sprang up a coolness. Nott had, in his bold soldierhood and jealousy for the military honour of his country, resolved from the beginning not to retreat from Candahar, and he blamed England for not sooner bringing him succour, whereas the orders of the latter general were to strengthen Quettah, and so to dispose himself as to cover Nott's retreat from Candahar, which the government of Calcutta expected, and taught England to believe that General Nott would execute.

Both armies were now placed under the command of General Nott, and thus strengthened by men, munitions, and provisions, he determined upon advancing to Cabul. Before he could effect that purpose other tasks remained to be performed, and other scenes of interest to occur.

## CHAPTER CXV.

EVENTS IN UPPER AFFGHANISTAN—GENERAL NOTT MARCHES TO SCINDE—CAPTURE OF GHIZNI—GENERALS NOTT AND POLLOCK ADVANCE TO CABUL—RESCUE OF THE ENGLISH PRISONERS—DESTRUCTION AND EVACUATION OF CABUL.

ON the 19th of May Brigadier Wymer was ordered to release the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje. He departed from Candahar for this purpose with her majesty's 40th, Captain Leslie's troop of horse-artillery, Captain Blood's battery, 3rd Bombay light cavalry, the shah's irregular horse, and the 16th and 38th Bengal native infantry, constituting a very formidable force. The Affghans, having good information, saw that their only chance of conquering the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje was while Wymer's force was *en route*

to relieve them. Accordingly an attack was made, but Captain Craigie with his small band inflicted terrible loss upon the Affghans, completely repulsing them.

The enemy believed that Candahar might also be attacked with advantage while the large force of Wymer was absent. On the 22nd the enemy appeared in force. Her majesty's 41st was ordered out to repel the threatened assault. The enemy withdrew. They were commanded by a son of Shah Sujah, for whom the English had done and

suffered so much—a fair specimen of Mohammedan gratitude. For some days the garrison of Candahar had peace, anxiously looking forward to intelligence of Wymer's brigade, and the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilje.

The chaplain of her majesty's 40th regiment records a singularly striking and picturesque incident of which he was a witness.\* His relation of it will introduce the reader to some of the personages who occupied a prominent place in the interest of Affghan and Indian politics at that time:—"On the 27th I accompanied General England and his staff on a visit to Prince Timour Shah, the eldest son of Shah Sujah-ool-Moolk, and now, by hereditary right, the king of the Dooranee empire. We were introduced by Major Rawlinson, political agent, who acted as an interpreter. The prince's apartments were in the palace, the greater part of which was built by Ahmed Shah. We were shown into a large quadrangle, more completely oriental than anything I had previously seen. One side was occupied by a building three stories high, with a flat roof and balustrade; it had embayed projecting windows, with richly carved lattices, and a style of architecture of Moorish character, something like the drawings of the Alhambra. The court was completely surrounded by a drapery, forming a cloister; a light framework ran all round, the stems of the vines were planted at regular distances, and the branches and tendrils mantled over the framework in rich festoons. At the end opposite the buildings was a thick shrubbery, with many fruit-trees and walks; the walks were broad, paved, and planted at the angles with cypresses. The centre was occupied by an oblong piece of water, with a stone edging, perfectly clear and full to the brim, in which various sorts of fowl were sporting. Nothing could exceed the coolness, tranquillity, and repose of the whole scene, softened by the mild light of sunset. At the farther end of this piece of water carpets were spread, some of which, I was told, were from Herat, and of considerable value, though their appearance was much the same as ordinary nummud, but softer. Here sat his royal highness in a chair, I suppose out of compliment to us. After our salaam, chairs were placed for us, and conversation commenced. The prince is a man of about forty, rather stout, his countenance heavy, yet not unpleasant, and improving much when animated in conversation; he had a fine black beard and

eyebrows. Those who have seen them both say that he strikingly resembles his father, the late shah. His dress was of white silk and gold interwoven, with a loose outer vest of dark blue cloth edged with gold. His manner was serious and dignified, without hauteur. I looked with melancholy interest upon this representative of the Dooranee monarchs—a king without a kingdom. He is said to have the best moral character of the family, to be a man of peace, and despised on that account by the Affghans, as is natural among a people nurtured in blood and turbulence. He inclines much to the British, and professed his intention of accompanying the force should it evacuate the country. We complimented him on the beauty of his residence, and when he spoke of Candahar as compared with Cabul, and other topics, expressed our regret that we could not converse otherwise than by an interpreter. He replied that it had always been a cause of regret to him that he had not been taught English when young, that he had made some attempts to acquire it, but it was uphill work. He was determined, however, that his sons should not labour under the same disadvantage; they were learning English, but he was sorry to say they were very idle, and loved their swords, guns, and horses better than study. We consoled him by the assurance that such failings were not confined to princes, or to his countrymen, and requested to see the culprits. They were accordingly sent for. The group, as they advanced—the rich dresses of the two boys, the black servant following in a long white dress, the buildings and scenery around—would have formed a beautiful subject for Daniel's *Oriental Annual*. Chairs were placed for them at the right of their father, but rather behind. After the customary salaams, we assailed them with a multitude of questions as to the sharpness of their swords, the swiftness of their steeds, &c. They were very fine boys—I suppose of about twelve and nine years of age; the elder rather heavy-featured, and much resembling his father; the younger a very handsome child, and full of animation. The elder had, at his own earnest request, been sent out on one occasion with one of the brigades, but to his disappointment they returned without fighting. On the 22nd, when the alarm of the enemy's approach was given, he had ordered his horse to be saddled, and told the prince he was going out with the troops, which, much to his disgust, was not permitted. The prince told us that when they were riding with him, they often wanted to discharge their fire-arms; but as he did not admire that kind of amusement, he was accustomed on such occasions to send them to

\* *Diary of a March through Scinde and Affghanistan with the Troops under the command of General Sir William Nott, K.C.B.* By the Rev. J. N. Allen, B.A., Assistant Chaplain to the Hon. East India Company's Bombay Establishment.

the rear to amuse themselves. I fear the youngsters will hardly prove such quiet people as their papa. After a time we made our salaam, and retired."

The same author gives an equally graphic account of an action fought at Candahar on Sunday, May 29th:—"In the course of the morning her majesty's 41st, two regiments of Bengal native infantry, and what cavalry we had, were ordered out on an alarm similar to that of Sunday last, but with more serious results. After they were gone, hearing rather a heavy discharge of artillery, and my people telling me that they could see the enemy from the top of the house, I ordered my horse and went to the Herat Gate. From the top of this I soon descried three dense bodies of the enemy's cavalry, on some low hills about a mile and a half to the north-west. They were keeping up a rapid and well-sustained discharge of matchlocks, which was loudly responded to by the shah's artillery. The bulk of our troops were hidden from view by a long belt of gardens between them and the town; but I saw some of the movements of the artillery as they crossed the plain. After the fire of the artillery had continued for some time, it was succeeded by a heavy discharge of musketry behind the gardens, which I immediately concluded to be from our infantry advancing on the enemy. After a time I saw a large body of horse, which had been the object of this fire, making off towards the left at great speed. On the right they collected and came down upon a village, of which they possessed themselves, but were soon driven out by a well-directed fire of shrapnel. They were now flying in all directions, and by about three P. M. all were gone. Their numbers were computed at about five thousand, principally cavalry. It was stated, upon information subsequently obtained from some among them who came in, that they had about two hundred killed, and about the same number wounded. The number of our wounded was about twenty, and two or three sepoy were killed. Lieutenant Mainwaring, of the 42nd Bengal native infantry, was wounded; and Lieutenant Chamberlayne, commanding a detachment of the shah's irregular horse, here received one of those many scars which are the honourable testimonials of his gallantry throughout this campaign. His cavalry, and the Poonah horse under Lieutenant Tait, did good service this day, as did about two hundred Persian horse, under Aga Mohammed Khan, who was in our pay. This man is of the royal family of Persia, and an exile on account of some attempt to raise rebellion in that country. He is said to be

the head of the Assassins, the lineal representative of the Old Man of the Mountains, and to derive a considerable income from the offerings of his sect. Sufter Jung and Achtur Khan were present at this action, and the mother of Akram Khan, who was blown from a gun in October, 1841, at Candahar. This lady pretended to a vision of the prophet, and was playing Joan of Arc among the Affghans. It happened unfortunately that on two successive Sundays we had been thus disturbed; but it was most providential that the loss was so small. The enemy expected to have been joined by a large number from the villages around, and were much deceived in the strength of the garrison. Their ill success completely broke their party, which dispersed with mutual recriminations. Prince Sufter Jung surrendered himself shortly after to General Nott, and was received and treated with greater leniency than he deserved; for whatever cause of offence the Affghans in general had against us, from him and his family we were certainly entitled to expect gratitude."

At the beginning of August a portion of the army was ordered to proceed down the Bolan Pass into Scinde, under the command of General England; the other part of the force was to march under General Nott for Cabul. General Nott at that time knew nothing of Pollock's success, nor indeed until he learned the fact at Ghizni.

#### MARCH OF GENERAL ENGLAND FROM CANDAHAR TO SCINDE.

The task imposed upon General England was even more hazardous than that which General Nott took upon himself. It was a brave resolution to march upon Ghizni; but the general who accomplished it reserved to himself the whole European force at Candahar, and assigned to General England to convey the sick, wounded, women, children, a vast mass of material, and the chief part of the camp followers, through the passes of Jugdulluck and the Bolan to Scinde, his only fighting men being sepoys, who, unsupported by Europeans, had a terror of the Affghans. General England effected his task, harassed the whole way by clouds of Affghan cavalry, matchlock-men, and robber hordes. Nothing achieved in the Affghan war, unless it were the march of Sir Robert Sale from Cabul to Jellalabad, and his defence of that place, displayed generalship equal to that shown by General England in his retirement from Candahar. He conducted a vast multitude of helpless human beings, with mere sepoy guards, in the face of an enemy who had no fear of sepoys unsupported by Europeans,

through passes which a handful of brave men might defend against an army.

The ability of General England in connection with this extraordinary performance has been lately called in question by Sir William Napier, in the memoir published by him of his brother, Sir Charles. It appears that at the time Sir Charles entered in his private journal some severe strictures upon this exploit. These Sir William Napier has republished in the memoir, but has not given the opinions of Sir Charles afterwards expressed in a calm review of these transactions. As Sir William is well known to be as honourable as he is brave and talented, it is to be presumed that he overlooked those latter opinions of his brother, and also of other distinguished men, as competent as either Sir Charles or Sir William Napier to form an opinion on the matter. Our readers may require at our hands some notice of this controversy, and historical truth demands that the conduct of these gifted men should be placed in its true light.

On the 6th of August General England commenced his long retreat from Candahar. His force was, in fact, an immense and ill-assorted baggage-guard, nearly ineffective for all purposes of offensive warfare, the really combatant or protecting force did not exceed 3,500 men, all sepoys, there not being a single European soldier in the whole corps. The number of human beings in some parts of the march amounted to nearly forty thousand, and there were twelve thousand animals to guard. On the 31st of October General England, with his retreating force, reached the Indus, and encamped under General Sir C. Napier, who had arrived from Bombay, and thus ended the retreat from Candahar of 450 miles, which was then—in 1842—pronounced by Sir Charles Napier himself to be a most “difficult retreat;” and in 1849 he declared “this long retreat of General England was, in every sense of the word, one of great danger.” Upon this achievement of General England, the journal of Sir Charles Napier contains the following entry in 1842:—“October 21st.—In a rage. The poor wounded soldiers coming down with England’s second column were thrown down like dogs.”\*

Again, Sir Charles has entered in his journal:—“A letter from England says the thieves were close to his rear-guard. I met his second column in March. We saw how contemptible the thieves must be. With a single troop of hussars opposed to the second column, I would have taken the whole convoy. Had England been attacked, nothing could have saved him.”

\* *Memoir, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 225.

Sir W. Napier, commenting upon entries in Sir Charles’s journal concerning this march, says:—“Subsequent information convinced Sir Charles Napier that the march was a mere procession, and conducted without order, skill, or danger, or difficulty.”\*

The answer to these items of the private journal, and the mistaken and ungenerous comments of Sir William Napier, is beyond refutation. Sir Charles entered these items in moments of irritation, with imperfect information, and without reflection. That Sir Charles was likely to act in a manner so rash is, unhappily, well known to all who have studied his character, or known anything of him as a public man. His panegyrics and his censures; written and *vivâ voce*, were so intemperate as often to deprive either of the weight the opinion of so great a man would naturally possess. This peculiarity of his temper has been noticed by nearly every independent reviewer, either in the pages of our reviews or the columns of our leading journals, both in India and the British Isles. The march of General England did not deserve the censures recorded, but really did deserve the laudations which the same pen bestowed upon it. The following letter from Sir Charles to General England himself is a striking confutation of the entries in the journal:—

*Sukkur, Upper Scinde, Oct. 6th, 1842.*

Allow me to congratulate you on your successful progress in a most difficult retreat, for your convoy is like Falstaff’s bill for sack, and your troops something like the item for bread in the same account, no proportion between them, and I really did not expect that you would have passed the Kojuck without immense loss. Your having done so, I must say, does you great honour, encumbered as you were, not only with your baggage, but with all the riddances of General Nott’s force besides. I rejoice at General Nott’s success with all my heart, but no military man can deny that, of the two operations, that allotted to you was by far the most difficult one, whether the composition of your troops or the ground to go over be considered. His a compact force of picked troops for active service, with only the baggage that was absolutely necessary, and no sick, besides cavalry and a powerful artillery, and no passes to force; yours the refuse of his force, no cavalry, few guns, the hospitals of both forces, and the baggage of both, with perhaps the greatest passes in the world to traverse, and the enemy the same in both cases! and last, assuredly not least, the one force animated by the pride of an advance, the other acting under the depressing influence of a retreat. Hoping you may receive the praise you have so well earned,

Believe me to remain, &c.,

C. NAPIER.

On the 2nd of December following, when Sir C. Napier received from the governor-general a despatch in which he commended the skill of General England in this arduous march, Sir Charles sent it to the officer in question, endorsed, “*The governor-general is quite right.*” Seven years later, in a letter to the

\* *Memoir, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 213.

board of control, Sir Charles stated—"His (General England's) march from Candahar to Sukkur was a very difficult march, in which every one who was left a few yards behind the rear-guard was murdered." The opinions of all the authorities, civil and military, were the same. Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote on the 27th of October, 1842, and expressed his concurrence in the eulogy bestowed on this great march by the civil authorities at Calcutta. On the 15th November, Sir George Arthur, governor of Bombay, a man of truth and integrity, officially communicated his approbation, in which he says, "Nothing could be more satisfactory than the retreat of your force." "I could not resist assuring you how much gratified I am at your having made so successful a march from Candahar to the Indus." The following testimony from the highest authority in India, officially given, may complete this evidence:—"The governor-general has much satisfaction in announcing the successful termination of the arduous and difficult operations confided to Major-general England; this operation, however less brilliant in its circumstances than that entrusted to Generals Nott and Pollock, yet called into exercise many of the higher qualities which most contribute to form the character of an accomplished general." . . . . He "communicates his thanks to Major Outram, and the other political officers, for the zeal and ability they have manifested!"\* &c.

The confusion which Sir Charles Napier witnessed was among the soldiers of the second column of the retiring force. When the convoy arrived at Quettah, and the danger was over, General England divided it into three columns. General England himself remained in the situation where danger would be found, if any existed—in the rear of the third column. When Sir Charles, who knew little at that time of Indian armies and Indian convoys, saw the second column, England was two hundred miles behind up the country. The division of the great convoy of forty thousand human beings and twelve thousand animals into three columns, when that could be safely done, no enemy to molest, was judicious, and even necessary for their more convenient and expeditious descent. That the convoy system of Indian armies was itself bad, there can be no doubt, but that was beyond General England's cure; he deserves the more praise for obviating, so far as that was possible, the mischiefs which that system entailed. The dangers which beset General England before reaching Scinde, and the order and spirit with which he encountered them, the reader may infer from the following

\* General Orders, dated Simla, Oct. 20th, 1842.

passages from his despatches, in which names are quoted, some of which must be an ample guarantee for their truth:—"On the morning of the 3rd I found the Kahees posted in some numbers on the steep ground which commands the upper extremity of the narrow zigzag near the Bolan. These insurgents had, however, only time to deliver a few rounds, when their attention was fully engaged by the flanking parties which covered our left, and which I now reinforced with," &c. "I have every reason to be satisfied with the handsome manner in which our troops ascended these stupendous heights, and cleared them. Major Woodhouse speaks very highly of them." "On this occasion Major Outram gave me his able assistance, as well as in flanking the lower extremity of the Bolan Pass, near Kundie, where I had good reason to expect to meet hostile tribes; but the total disappointment of the Kakurs on the 3rd, and the effectual flanking arrangement," &c. It is thus evident that General England acted with the strictest military precaution while on the enemy's territory, but arranged this vast and helpless body of men and beasts, whom he had protected, in columns of march, when on British territory the same active protection was no longer needed, and more rapid progress was important on grounds economical and sanitary.

#### MARCH OF GENERAL NOTT TO GHIZNI AND CABUL.

Having followed the march of General England, we shall now trace the progress of General Nott to Ghizni and Cabul. Timour Shah revisited India with General England, while the brother of Timour, at his own request, was permitted to remain in Candahar, to hold it if possible. This resolution on the part of the prince was against the wish of the English, who expected their departure to be the signal of an attack ending in massacre. As the British left, many "civilians" among the Affghan population watched opportunity for assassination.

General Nott's army moved off for Ghizni on the 7th of August. The number of fighting men did not exceed seven thousand. The cavalry consisted of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, Skinner's horse, the shah's horse; in all, not very much exceeding one thousand. The artillery—the 1st troop of Bombay horse artillery, the 3rd company 1st battalion Bombay foot artillery, 3rd company 2nd battalion Bengal foot artillery, 1st troop shah's horse artillery (native), with a party of Bengal, and another of Madras sappers and miners. The guns were—four 18-pounders, two 24lb. how-

itzers, four 9-pounders, twelve 6-pounders; total twenty-two. The infantry—her majesty's 40th and 41st regiments, and the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, 43rd Bengal native infantry. The army carried provisions for forty days, which, with ammunition, &c., loaded ten thousand public and private camels, besides bullocks, asses, mules, and tattuos. The followers it is impossible to estimate, but they must have been at least double the number of fighting men.\* The enumeration of the force given by Major Huish adds to the infantry the 3rd, or Captain Craigie's Bengal irregular infantry; and to the cavalry, five ressalates of Christie's irregular horse.

The march of this army lay through wild and magnificent scenery, and through vales of soft and radiant beauty. It was itself a magnificent spectacle, and gave to many a picturesque valley through which it passed an aspect of romantic effect, such as only could be produced by the winding way of an oriental host. Seen from many elevated positions, the country, the camp, the moving squadrons and battalions of war, presented a panoramic picture of the most impressive and attractive kind. The hills at certain hours seemed bathed in purple light, the plain vividly green, from the camel-thorn, and from the abounding southern-wood, which filled the air with its perfume. The red columns of the English infantry, crested with the sheen of their bayonets, the many-costumed cavalry, the dark rolling guns, and behind all, except the rear-guard, camels, camel-drivers, and camp followers, with many-hued apparels, presented an exciting and strange array. Whatever the pleasurable emotions created by such scenes to English eyes, the painful feeling could not be dismissed, that each day's march was tracked in blood. Skirmishes were not frequent, but were sometimes sharp, and fool-hardy or lazy camp followers were every day cut off by the enemy. Besides, every spot told some tale of previous conflict and slaughter, which had occurred in the desultory struggle of the previous year. On the 27th the enemy increased in the rear, infantry and cavalry, in considerable force, pressing upon the rear-guard. Skinner's and the shah's horse were ordered to fall back, and engage the enemy, which they did, cutting down some twelve troopers, and more than fifty footmen, with a loss of only five or six wounded. On the 28th, the Affghans, by showing a small force, seduced the English cavalry to follow them, when, as the latter rounded the spur of a hill, an immense force, composed of five thousand men, horse and foot, attacked them. The

British succeeded in covering the retreat of a foraging party, but with a loss in killed and wounded of one-seventh of their number. The officers having displayed much more daring than their troops, suffered severely. Captain Bury was cut down after slaying with his sabre four of his opponents; Captain Reves was shot dead; Lieutenant Mackenzie received several most desperate sword cuts. When the cavalry arrived, they were reinforced, and again sent out to recover the bodies of their slain officers. The infantry, with Captain Blood's nine-pounders and Captain Anderson's six-pounders, were directed against a fort whence it was alleged the assailants issued. As the British approached it, the villagers came out with supplicating gestures declaring that they and their people had no part in the attack. The general directed them to remain quiet, and ordered Captain F. White, with the light company of her majesty's 40th regiment, to examine the place. The general might have spared himself the trouble; falsehood and perfidy were ever upon Affghan lips—they were true disciples of Islam. As the small party approached, the people who protested such innocence opened a fire of matchlocks, from which Major Leech, political agent and interpreter, narrowly escaped.

The British then rushed forward, followed by the light company of the 41st and a battalion company of the 40th, under Captain Neil. The fort was full of armed men, who fought furiously. The British, maddened by the treachery they had experienced, put all to the bayonet. The Affghans defended every courtyard, every house, every apartment, pressed by the infuriated English. Women and children were of course spared, but some were hurt in the conflict. In one house in which there were many, those within refused to surrender; a shot from a six-pounder drove in the door, scattering ruin upon those within. The red torrent of avenging soldiers followed; every man in the place perished, and some women and children fell victims in the struggle.

The camels and fodder taken from the grass-cutters were found in the inclosures, and recaptured. The English soldiers plundered the place, and then set fire to it. The bodies of the soldiers and officers who had fallen in the attack made by the enemy were recovered, all brutally mangled. The dead bodies had been hacked with vengeful ferocity by those who so soon paid the penalty due to such deeds.

The next day, after a short march, the army halted and were attacked on their camping ground by the enemy. The troops were ordered out. A fort called Goyain gave

\* Rev. Mr. Allen,

confidence to the enemy. It was filled with matchlock-men, who, as the English approached, shouted defiance and cursed them. They considered the building impregnable; besides, there was a large force of their brethren hovering about upon the flanks of the British. The first discharge of the English nine-pounders carried away the battlements of the right bastion, killing a number of its defiant occupants, and alarming the rest. The succeeding fire of the English cannon was not so effectual, and the enemy resumed courage. Lieutenant Terry, of the Bombay artillery, proposed to blow open the gate by approaching a gun very near, under cover of a heavy fire from the English infantry. The gate, however, was built up with mud, and this material was so thick as to resist the fire of the gun, which was withdrawn. The Affghan army meantime reached a neighbouring hill, and opened a fire of artillery, to which the English promptly replied. This artillery battle was waged for an hour. While this action went on upon the British left, a strong Affghan force attempted to turn the British right. The supporting regiments prevented that by advancing against the enemy. The recklessness of the English was on this occasion remarkable. When the play of the artillery of the enemy was really severe, "there was an almost entire absence of any sense of danger. Jokes and laughter resounded on all sides, and the general feeling appeared to be more that of a set of schoolboys at a game of snowballs than of men whose lives were in instant peril." Some poor fellows perished in the midst of this jocundity. The battle was won by the superior fire of the English cannon. The enemy retired, bearing away their guns leisurely. In the despatches the force drawn up against General Nott was reported as twelve thousand men. The Rev. Mr. Allen, who was in the action and near General Nott's person, computes it at half that amount. The British pursued, but the enemy retreated in perfect order, maintaining a well directed fire of artillery and matchlocks, causing the British considerable loss. Nott pressed them closely, captured two guns, their baggage, and a large stock of ammunition which had belonged to the English garrison at Ghizni. By far the most formidable of the enemy's troops were Mohammedan deserters from the Bengal sepoys. In the night the Affghans deserted the fort, and a number of minor forts in the vicinity, leaving behind some ammunition and vast stores of grain and other food. The camp followers and a tribe of Affghans, rivals to those who had held the forts, set on fire whatever was inflammable in the forts and villages. Much dis-

content was afterwards created in the army by the omission of all mention of the 41st regiment, as if it had taken no part in the action; and by omitting to name the captors of the guns, and others who had distinguished themselves.

The British reached Ghizni on the 5th of September, and prepared to breach its walls. An Affghan army occupied the heights behind the town, but were driven off, and abandoned all further attempts to save Ghizni. The garrison evacuated the place in the night. It is remarkable how frequently in Indian warfare the British have allowed the enemy to play them this trick. On entering the place many relics of the garrison left by Lord Keane were found. On one of the windows there was scratched by an officer an account of the sufferings of himself and his brother officers. From this it was learned that the Affghan chiefs had violated two treaties, and had twice put Colonel Palmer to the torture. The names of the cruel and treacherous chiefs were also given. The work of destruction soon began; the great gun, *Zubber Jung*, which threw balls of fifty-pound weight, and a number of other pieces of cannon and gingals were burst. The fortifications were ruined, the wood-work of the citadel and town torn down for fuel, and the citadel itself shaken into ruins by mines. An ingenious inscription in English words and Greek characters was found upon one of the walls, directing attention to a particular beam where copies of the treaties made with Colonel Palmer were deposited. They were found and preserved. The army was much refreshed by the great abundance of delicious fruit and vegetables obtained in the neighbourhood of Ghizni. The weather was genial and balmy; the climate resembling that of England, but steadier and finer, the days being warmer, the nights, early mornings, and evenings about the same temperature as that of the neighbourhood of London. The celebrated sandal-wood gates, taken from Somnauth by Mohammed of Ghizni, and which adorned his tomb, were removed from that place on the 9th of September, preparatory to their being carried to Hindostan. This was a great triumph, as the Mohammedans, especially the Fakeers, esteemed them as trophies of victory over the infidel. The tomb was otherwise carefully respected.

On the 10th of September General Nott marched for Cabul. On the march, during the 12th, the army came upon the fort of Sidabad, where a sanguinary conflict had taken place November 3rd, 1841. Captain Woodburn was promised protection by certain Affghan chiefs, and was received, with one

hundred and fifty sepoy, into a small walled yard beneath the fort. As in every other case, the chiefs violated their pledges, and fired down upon the party, pent up in a narrow compass. They made their way out and defeated the enemy, but Woodburn was killed by a shot from the bastion. The fort was found empty and barricaded by General Nott, who forced it, and found there poor Woodburn's will, a letter of commendation to him from Sir W. Mac Naghten, and other relics of the party who had well, but vainly, fought. This scene of perfidy was blotted out from the face of the earth by the English engineers. During the remainder of the march there was much skirmishing, and some hard fighting, the Affghans always incurring defeat. On the 17th the army reached Cabul. On the 18th Generals Pollock and Nott met. News arrived the same evening that Sir Richmond Shakespear had found the English prisoners safe. A brigade was sent out to his support. It is here necessary to direct attention to the fortunes of those who had been so long in captivity with the enemy. During the reverses incurred by the Affghan chiefs, they had been placed under charge of Saleh Mohammed Khan, who was proceeding with them, by order of Akbar Khan, to Turkistan. One of the captives ingeniously tampered with Mohammed, offering him a large sum of money, and a pension for life, if he would allow them their liberty. Sir Richmond Shakespear volunteered, with a small party of cavalry, to go to Mohammed Khan, and undertake their escort. The perils he encountered were numerous, and it was by a strange coincidence, while Pollock and Nott were congratulating one another upon the current of events, that the communication reached the former that Sir R. Shakespear had the captives; but was in hourly danger of a force from the enemy overtaking them and effecting a recapture. Sir R. Sale, at the head of a brigade, was sent out to secure their safety; and the brigade, with their charge, entered camp on the 21st. The list of restored captives comprised, according to Major Hough:—"Ladies, seven; women, three; children, eleven; officers, thirty-one; non-commissioned officers and privates, forty-nine; clerks, two; boys, two; total, one hundred and five, including the officers from Ghizni. Captain Bygrave was given up on the 27th of September." The Rev. Mr. Allen, who witnessed their arrival, makes a different statement:—"The number of prisoners liberated, including those left in Cabul, was as follows:—ladies and European women, twelve; officers, thirty-four; children, seventeen; non-commissioned officers, privates, and

clerks, fifty-four; total, one hundred and seventeen."

The joy of the garrison of Cabul over their countrywomen and countrymen thus raised from the dead may be conceived but cannot be described. Eager groups pressed around each, greetings and thanksgivings were heard, and tears were seen on every side. The European soldiers were deeply excited, and even the sepoy caught the generous infection. Lady Sale and her daughter, Mrs. Sturt, were especially objects of interest. The latter lady had lost her gallant husband, a young engineer officer of extraordinary promise, who died of the fatigue he experienced in defending Cabul, after having been desperately wounded by assassins. Lady Sale, in her journal, describes him as carried about in a litter, animating all by his example who were not paralyzed by the stolidity and irresolution of the commander-in-chief.

While yet the British occupied Cabul, it was deemed expedient to subdue Istaliff, a town of great strength, covering ground difficult of access, and inhabited by a people accustomed to bear arms. It was twenty miles distant to the north-west of Cabul, in Koh-i-daman. The houses and fortifications occupied the slope of a mountain, behind which loftier eminences rose, shutting in a pass which formed the road leading to Turkistan. The fugitives from Cabul had taken refuge at Istaliff, and so confident were the people in its strength, that the families of all who were exposed to danger from a great distance had fled thither. The task of subduing this place was committed to Major-general M'Caskill. The force placed at his disposal was—"Two eighteen pounders, and a detail of artillery (Bombay), Captain Blood's light field-battery, Captain Backhouse's mountain train, head-quarters and two squadrons of her majesty's 3rd dragoons, one squadron of the 1st light cavalry, Christie's horse (irregular), her majesty's 9th and 41st foot, the 26th, 42nd, and 43rd native infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's sappers and miners."

The action at Istaliff is thus recorded by Mr. Kaye:—"M'Caskill was completely successful. He made a rapid march upon Istaliff, and took the enemy by surprise. The Affghan chiefs had collected in this place their treasure and their women. They had looked to it as a place of refuge, secure from the assaults of the invading Feringhees. They had relied greatly on the strength of the place, and scarcely any defensive measures had been taken to repel the assaults of the enemy. When M'Caskill entered the gardens which surround the town, a panic

\* Kaye's *Affghan War*, p. 631.

seemed to have seized the people, they thought no longer of defence. Their first thought was to save their property and their women. Ameenoolah Khan himself fled at the first onset. As our troops entered the town, the face of the mountain beyond was covered with laden baggage-cattle, whilst long lines of white-veiled women, striving to reach a place of safety, streamed along the hill side. What our troops had to do they did rapidly and well; but the fire of the enemy's jezails soon slackened when the 9th foot, with Broadfoot's sappers and the 26th native infantry, dashed into the gardens, where the Affghan marksmen had been posted. And as their gallantry, so their forbearance is to be commended. M'Caskill, respecting the honour of the women, would not suffer a pursuit; but many fell into the hands of our people in the town, and were safely delivered over to the keeping of the Kuzzilbashes. Two guns and much booty were taken; the town was fired, and then M'Caskill went on towards the hills, meeting no opposition on the way, destroyed Charekur, where the Goorkha regiment had been annihilated, and some other fortified places, which had been among the strongholds of the enemy, and then returned triumphantly to Cabul." Referring to this action, Mr. Marshman says:—"General M'Caskill, who commanded the division, left all the arrangements of the attack to Havelock's skill; and he dwells with delight in his letters to his relatives on the opportunity he now enjoyed, for the first time after twenty-seven years of soldiering, of organizing a great military movement, as he said, out of his own brain. The town was carried with little loss, through the admirable combinations of Havelock's strategy, and the affair at Istaliff was considered one of the most brilliant of the campaign; but it is only at the present time that Havelock's share in it can be prudently recorded."

If these statements of Mr. Marshman be correct, the facts they record are an invaluable contribution to the fame of Havelock. He was then only a major on the staff of General Pollock, and accompanied M'Caskill by the courtesy of the former.

After this expedition, the commander-in-chief, in pursuance of his orders, prepared to return to India. He destroyed the great bazaar, so famous in history, built in the time of Aurungzebe. In this place the body of the British envoy, when murdered by Affghan assassins at the command of Affghan chiefs, had been exposed to insult, and General Pollock resolved that the retribution should be the destruction of the place itself. A mosque at the end of the bazaar, and another

near the cantonments, ornamented with European materials during the interval between the exit of the Hon. General Elphinstone and the entrance of General Pollock, in order to commemorate the slaughter of the Feringhees, were also destroyed.

On the 12th of October General Pollock began the retirement of his army by sending forward Sir Robert Sale, with the 1st and 2nd brigades, the 1st light cavalry, 3rd irregular cavalry, and Christie's horse, over the Gaspund Darrah Pass, with the object of turning the Khoord-Cabul. The result of this movement was, that the main pass was penetrated without so much as an exchange of shots. General Nott's division followed, but was attacked in the Huft Khatul Pass, on the 14th of October. General Pollock considered that this, and some petty attacks upon his rear-guard, were made by brigands. It is surprising that the general should think so, for there was as much appearance of military order among the assailants as in any Affghan force which he had encountered.

On the 17th of December, 1842, the army crossed the Sutlej. There were great rejoicings and festivities in Ferozepore; yet there were many causes for regret. England had been placed in mourning for the loss of a multitude of her brave and noble children. British honour was, indeed, vindicated by the destruction of Cabul, Istaliff, Ghizni, Candahar, and Jellalabad. The Affghans had been everywhere defeated, the ladies and officers so treacherously made captives had been rescued, but the conquering armies had scarcely accomplished their ultimate victory, when they began to retire; and, although General Pollock declared in his despatches that no organized resistance was made to the return of his army, yet an angry enemy who had made no submission hung upon their flanks and rear, and made victims of soldiers and camp followers until the English flag was lost to view from the territory of Affghanistan. To this day the Affghans hold themselves to have been the conquerors in that war, and the same feeling, kept alive by Russia, pervades Persia and Central Asia. There is, however, an awe of English power remaining in Affghanistan as a result of the advance of England, Nott, and Pollock, which has deterred the Affghans since then from entering into any important combinations against the power of Great Britain.

Thus ended the terrible Affghan war, one of the most destructive to the life of English soldiers, and by far the most injurious to British reputation in which the empire had ever been engaged. This justifies the length at which its affecting details have been given.

## CHAPTER CXVI.

THE WAR IN SCINDE—ADVANCE TOWARDS HYDERABAD—THE AMEERS COERCED INTO A TREATY WITH THE ENGLISH—ATTACK UPON THE ENGLISH RESIDENCY AT HYDERABAD—EXPEDITION OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER IN THE DESERT—BATTLE OF MEANNEE—BATTLE OF DUBBA—VICTORIES OF COLONEL ROBERTS AND CAPTAIN JACOBS—SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S GOVERNMENT OF SCINDE.

IN a former chapter an account was given of the proceedings of the British in Scinde previously to the Affghan war, and more especially during the period when the army of General England was ordered to prepare for protecting the retreat of General Nott. On the 4th of November, 1842,\* a year and two days after the outbreak at Cabul, a draft of a treaty with the ameers of Scinde was prepared, several of the articles of which became important at the close of the Affghan war. By article 2 the company's rupee was to become the only coin legally current in the dominions of the ameers after the 1st of January, 1845.† By article 5 the ameers renounced the privilege of coining money.‡ The 6th article relates to the cutting of wood for the steamers navigating the Indus. By article 7 Kurrachee and Tatta were to be ceded to the British government, and a free passage between Kurrachee and Tatta. By article 8 Subsulkhote,§ and the territory between the present frontier of Bhawalpore and the town of Rohree, are ceded to his Highness of Bhawalpore, "the ever faithful ally and friend of the British government."

Sir W. Napier says,|| the Seindian princes "were again excited by Nott's advance upon Candahar; they judged it a forced abandonment of that important city; and though he afterwards destroyed Ghizni, and, in conjunction with Polloek, ruined Istaliff and Cabul, the apparently hurried retreat from Affghanistan which followed, bore, for the misjudging people, the character of a flight. It was viewed as a proof of weakness, and Belochis and Brahoos became more hopeful and more confident than before. The ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde consulted together how best to league against the Feringhees; Sikh vakeels were at Khyrpore, ready to start for Lahore, loaded with presents for the Maharajah; and at the same time, letters came from

\* *Affghan War.* By Major Hough.

† The date of the coinage of the company's rupee throughout our Indian possessions.

‡ The act of coining is the right of the sovereign of a country.

§ Which had been taken from the nawab by the ameers.

|| *Conquest of Scinde*, parti., p. 111.

the victorious Affghans, reminding the ameers that they were feudatories of the Doonaree empire, and exhorting them to act boldly in the common cause. These things led to the ameers' final destruction; they were the forerunners of the battle by which they fell; but their primary cause, it has been shown, was deeper seated. The Scindian war was no isolated event. 'It was the tail of the Affghan storm.' The ameers swore upon the Koran their determination to unite with Affghans, Sikhs, or whatever other allies might be procurable, to make war upon the English. Fortunately for the interests of the British empire, the late Sir Charles Napier was in command of the troops in Scinde, while General England was at Candahar, and after the celebrated retreat of that officer in charge of the great convoy. Sir Charles Napier did not regard the war which was about to be launched against Scinde as just. His opinion was well founded; the ameers had never committed any aggression upon the English. They had preserved a cold and studied distance as long as they were able, and were influenced in so doing by the conviction that any alliance with the government of Calcutta would ultimately be subversive of their own independence. Various treaties had been forced upon them which were intolerably overbearing, and the English agents domineered over the country as if it were a province won in war. When the draft treaty, already referred to, was laid before the ameers, by Lieutenant Eastwick, on behalf of the Bombay government, Noor Mohammed, one of the principal ameers, took from a box all the treaties which were in force, and sarcastically asked, "What is to become of all these?" Before receiving a reply, he calmly, but with indignant remonstrance, added, "Here is another annoyance. Since the days that Scinde has been connected with the English, there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain." The death of Noor Mohammed facilitated the designs of the English, which were carried out with as little

scruple as justice. The ameers had borne the injustice of Lord Auckland's government, but when Lord Ellenborough arrived, a puerile and hot-headed policy was pursued, calculated to drive them to madness or despair. Yet, as in the case of Afghanistan, his hot vigour was followed by reaction, and he hesitated as to the expediency of forcing certain cessions of territory which he had ordered Colonel Outram, the resident, to demand. A month afterwards one of his fits of vigour returned, and Sir Charles Napier was placed in the chief civil and military authority. On the 5th of October Sir Charles reported to the governor-general that the ameers took tolls upon the river; which was contrary to the treaty forced upon the ameers by the government of Calcutta, which it had no more right to dictate than any Scinde or Beloochee robber would have to levy blackmail within the Indian territory. Sir Charles Napier, although he admitted that the ameers had been aggrieved, and had committed no aggression, did not resign his political or military functions, but carried out the governor-general's unjust policy with an earnest will. The general instituted a series of intrigues between certain of the ameers, which were neither very clever nor very cunning, and eventually did more to embarrass affairs and drive the ameers to resistance than any of the articles of the oppressive and insolent treaty forced upon them.\* By one of the intrigues in which Sir Charles engaged himself, a certain ameer, named Meer Proostum, fled to another, his near kinsman, named Ali Moorad upon whose head he placed the turban, an act which betokened the surrender of power. Out of this transaction arose the necessity, or the supposed necessity on the part of Sir Charles Napier, of taking a fort in the desert called Emaum Ghur. This exploit was one of great peril and difficulty, and was accomplished by Sir Charles with singular vigour and audacity. The fort was so situated that to reach it at all with an armed force was all but impossible. The march to it was long, the way a perfect waste; everything to be brought by the troops must be carried, even water. The quantity of that commodity necessary for men pursuing military enterprises in such a climate, and especially while marching over a desert, would be very great. Sir Charles was deterred by no difficulties, he determined to carry his point, and soon, and effectually. He selected two hundred irregular cavalry, one hundred and fifty of whom had ultimately to be sent back from want of forage. His artillery consisted of two howitzers, 24-pounders. He

placed 350 men of her majesty's 22nd regiment on 175 camels, loaded 10 camels with provisions, and 80 with water, and marched forth against the stronghold, the number of the defenders of which he could not have known. The fort was actually defended by considerably more than 2000 men, and the skirts of the desert were crowded with fanatical Beloochee horsemen. He went forth early in January, 1843, brought his force thither in safety, captured the place, blew it up, and returned with a rapidity which dazzled and astonished friends and foes.

*This occurred when the East India company was at peace with all the known authorities of Scinde; so that it became obvious to the ameers, and their friends the Beloochees, that the English were determined upon plundering the territory of Scinde from its possessors.*

As to the exploit itself, the Duke of Wellington, in his place in the house of lords, gave the following opinion:—"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emaum Ghur is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions."

The treaty proposed to the ameers, November the 4th, 1842, was sealed by the ameers, most reluctantly, the 14th February, 1843. The expedition in the desert terrified the ameers, although it intensified their desire to drive the English from their country. The Beloochee people were not so readily alarmed. Their patriotism and fanaticism were thoroughly roused. They regarded the English as robbers, tyrants, and truce-breakers, and determined to rid their country of them or perish. Three days after the treaty was fought the ever-memorable battle of Meannee! When the treaty was signed, the ameers warned Major (holding the local rank of colonel) Outram that if Sir Charles Napier continued to advance, the result must be a revolt by the people and troops against the execution of the treaty. Sir Charles did advance, and without justification on any ground. The predicted consequence took place. On the 15th of February the people rose, and the first object of attack was the British residency. The enclosure in which the mansion was situated was swept by the river, where a British steamer was placed, armed with cannon. Numerous bodies of

\* Parliamentary Papers relating to Scinde; Supplementary Papers; Correspondence of Sir Charles Napier.

Scinde horse and foot environed the enclosure in every other direction. For four hours the enemy maintained a heavy fire, to which a small party of British replied, under Captain Conway; Lieutenant Harding and Ensign Pennesfather distinguished themselves by their activity, skill, and courage. Two gentlemen, Captain Green, of the 21st native infantry, and Captain Wells, of the 15th, volunteered, and rendered important services. Captain Brown, Bengal engineers, went on board the steamer, and acted as an artillery officer with good effect. The British were too few to continue the defence, and retired with order to the steamer, leaving behind most of their baggage, and all the property of the residency. They subsequently joined the force of Sir Charles Napier.

#### BATTLE OF MEANNEE.

The ameers now determined to resist the advance of the English troops, the commander of these troops was furnished with a conclusive reason for continuing his march by the storming of the residency. On the 17th he reached Meannee, about six miles from Hyderabad. The ameers awaited him there in a strong position, flanked with woods, and behind the dry bed of the river Fullaillee. Before the extreme right of the enemy's position lay a village, affording a good cover. Two British officers volunteered to reconnoitre, which was done with great boldness and coolness, the officers riding along the whole line exposed to a perilous fire. The result was, however, the supply of accurate information. The number of the enemy was seven times that of the British, but Sir Charles considered that any delay for reinforcements would strengthen the confidence of the ameers and produce a moral effect upon the country dangerous to the success and even the existence of his little army, not stronger than a brigade; he therefore determined to attack. It was a daring resolution; with less than three thousand men of all arms to assail a strong position defended by more than twenty thousand men of reputed courage! But Sir Charles was a man of bold conclusions.

The ameers did not wait to be assailed. As soon as the British came within range of their guns a heavy fire was opened, but happily it was not well directed. The reply of the British cannon was most effective, and undoubtedly prepared the way for closer attack. The British guns were placed on the right. Infantry skirmishers with the Scinde irregular cavalry were thrown far in front, merely to make the enemy show his strength. The British infantry then moved from the

right in *echelon* of battalions, refusing the left to save it from the fire of the village, which, as before noticed, covered the enemy's right. The major-general commanding compared the movement to a review over a plain swept by an enemy's cannon. The artillery and her majesty's 22nd regiment, in line, formed the leading *echelon*; the 25th native infantry the second; the 12th infantry the third; and the 1st grenadier native infantry the fourth. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve, in rear of the left wing. The Poonah horse with four companies of infantry guarded the baggage. The British line opened a fire of musketry within one hundred yards of the bank of the river. The Beloochees charged their advancing enemies, firing their matchlocks and discharging their pistols as they came to close quarters. From neither fire did the English receive much harm. The Beloochees, with sword and shield, then threw themselves upon the British line, the men of which advancing, shoulder to shoulder, delivered a volley so simultaneously that it was as if given from a single machine of destruction, and directed so low that every shot told. The first line of the Beloochees went down under this surely directed fire, the second line was pierced by the bayonets of the British line, which as a wall of pointed steel received the desperate charge. Nevertheless these brave adversaries came on, scimitar in hand, as if eager for death, and so severe was the onset that the fate of the battle was for some time in suspense. The peril to the British was now so great that Colonel Pattle, at the suggestion of Captain A. Tucker, moved his cavalry, with the view of turning the enemy's right flank, and charging their rear, so as to check the force of their terrible onslaught upon the line of the British infantry. While Colonel Pattle and Captain Tucker were thus initiating an important movement, the responsibility of which the colonel was reluctant to incur, orders came from the commander-in-chief to "force the right of the enemy's line." The 9th Bengal cavalry had the honour of executing this movement, supported by the Scinde horse. The former regiment took a standard and several guns, the latter captured the camp, from which the cavalry of the Beloochees retired slowly, firing as they retreated, and taking deliberate aim. Lieutenant Fitzgerald pursued them several miles with a small body of cavalry, and himself slew three of their horsemen in single combat. This charge of cavalry decided the battle. The 22nd forced the bank of the river, as the appearance of the English cavalry in the rear of the Beloochees confused their infantry. The 25th

and 12th native infantry crossed the dry bed of the river nearly as soon as the 22nd; the 12th, scrambling up the opposite bank, captured some guns in position there. The whole of the enemy's artillery was taken, with their camp equipage, stores, ammunition and treasures. Several standards were also taken. Sir Charles in his despatches stated that all were captured, which his own account of the retreat of the Beloochee cavalry shows could not be correct.

Seldom did British arms gain a harder fought battle, and seldom were the numbers engaged on each side so disproportionate. Not more than 1900 men were actually in action on the side of the British. The ameers brought their whole force into battle, except the cavalry, which came into combat when Colonel Pattle charged round their right flank and fell upon the rear of the infantry. Some accounts rate the force of the ameers at 25,000, but certainly more than 20,000 men gave battle to the little British band opposed to them. The loss of the English was 56 soldiers killed and 177 wounded, and 95 horses.\* Six officers were killed and 22 wounded.

The plan of the battle is intelligible to civilians: the mode of going into action was beautiful, but the execution was confused, and but for the cavalry charge round the right upon the rear—a movement which never occurred to the enemy as possible until it was accomplished, and therefore bewildered them,—the probabilities were great that the battle would have been lost.

The Duke of Wellington had a very high opinion of the genius of Sir Charles Napier as a soldier, and was notoriously partial to the Napier family. This latter circumstance must qualify the reception given to any opinions pronounced by his grace upon the actions of Sir Charles. The duke's opinion of the battle of Meanee, and of the conduct of the victor, consequent upon it, has been very generally received; it was in the following terms:—"He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up a reinforcement and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations in war."

Immediately after the battle, three ameers of Hyderabad, and three of Khrypore, came

\* Blue-book.

in and surrendered themselves. They were sent prisoners to Bombay. Lord Ellenborough declared Scinde "annexed" to the company's dominions.

#### BATTLE OF DUBBA.

Shere Mohammed was still in arms, at the head of twenty-five thousand men; and so confident was he of success, that he boasted he would "Cabul the English." The use of this phrase, which became current among the Scindians, showed how extensively the weakness of the Hon. General Elphinstone, and the incapacity for large operations of Brigadier Shelton, had deprived the English of military prestige among the nations contiguous to British India. Mohammed took up a position at Dubba, about eight miles north-west of Hyderabad. He had eleven guns in battery, and four field-pieces. His infantry were drawn up in two intrenched lines, and his cavalry in masses in the rear. The right flank rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which was at that spot deep, and retained a large quantity of mud and muddy water, sufficient to prevent the position from being turned. There was another nullah\* to the rear of the former, forming an obtuse angle to the front line, and there the left of the enemy's army was posted. Thus the true front of battle extended from the right for one mile perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting what may be termed the right wing and centre to an attack; but the left wing behind the second nullah was refused. All the cavalry were behind the left. In the rear of the right wing stood the village of Dubba.† Between the first line of the right and centre and the village of Dubba there was another nullah. Each had what in military technicality is called a ramp for advancing and retreating. The enemy's second line was placed near the second and larger nullah, in the rear of which he posted his cannon. His pioneers cleared away the low jungle which had occupied the land in front, so that the fire of his guns might not be impeded.

Such was the position of the Beloochee army, described with as few technicalities as possible, so that the popular reader may comprehend the vast strength of such a post. With such intrenchments and nullahs, protecting his lines in every part, a native commander would naturally consider his lines unassailable.

The army of Sir Charles Napier did not number one-fifth of that of his opponent. He had 1100 horse, and nineteen guns; five

\* The dry bed of a river, or of a canal, or other cut for containing water, is called a nullah.

† This village was also called Narajah.

of these belonged to the horse artillery. Two pieces of cannon and a few hundred troops were left to guard the camp before Hyderabad. The rest of the little army, numbering less than five thousand men and seventeen cannons, proceeded to attack the foe.\* Arriving before the intrenched position of Mohammed, the English general instantly formed; in doing which he adopted the plan taken at Meannee, advancing by *echelon* of battalions. The left of his line was too near that of the enemy, and had to be thrown back. The guns were placed in the intervals between the battalions of infantry; the cavalry covered the flanks. The right was somewhat "refused," because a wood towards that flank at once impeded the formation, and might cover the enemy's sharp-shooters. The infantry of the enemy's left extended half a mile beyond that of the extreme right of the cavalry flankers of Sir Charles. This portion of the enemy's line was exposed to the general's view; not so their centre and right, which were hidden by the nullahs. The village of Dubba appeared to be unoccupied. Three British officers—Major Waddington of the engineers, and Lieutenants Brown and Hill, rode close up to the right centre of the position, and afterwards proceeded along the centre to its junction with the right, for the purpose of causing the enemy to show his force. This object was attained. Unable to conceive what these officers were about, the enemy stood on the defensive, their first line starting up eagerly and firing. So closely did these gallant officers ride to the line, that the ramp for leaving or entering the nullah was distinctly seen, and the precise position noted by Major Waddington. Sir Charles, having thus cleverly reconnoitred, put his whole force in motion for the attack. His first object was by rapidity to gain the junction of the nullah with the Fullaillee, and, passing it, to seize the village before the enemy could penetrate his design.

The attack was led here, as at Meannee, by her majesty's 22nd regiment, and with equal, if not even surpassing, heroism. A cross fire from the British artillery so galled the enemy's centre, that his troops showed symptoms of unsteadiness, and moved towards the left as if to be out of range. On perceiving this, Major Stack, with the 3rd cavalry, under Captain Delamain, and the Scinde horse, under Captain Jacobs, charged the flank, towards which the bodies of infantry, detaching themselves from the centre, were tending. The major dashed across the nullah, cleared all obstacles, cut into the infantry, and pursued them for miles. This charge was exe-

cuted without orders, and, like most feats of the kind, however fortunate, entailed imminent peril to the army it was bravely intended to serve. Sir William Napier says:—"He thus exposed the flank of the line of battle, and exposed the whole army to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the selected division of Beloochees."

The 22nd regiment, under Captain George, was directed by Major Poole, who commanded the brigade to storm the nullah on the enemy's left, which was accomplished in the most daring manner. The enemy's right flank was turned by Captain Tait with the Poonah horse, and by Major Story with the 9th Bengal cavalry, pursuing the enemy as Major Stack did on the left, and cutting down the fugitives over several miles of their flight. Thus both flanks of the enemy were actually turned and defeated, the centre alone being able any longer to resist, which it did not do with any persistence, the remainder of the infantry and cavalry advancing with the regularity of a review, and the guns of the British from the right and left pouring in a terrible cross fire. Thus ended the battle of Dubba. The opinion of the great Duke of Wellington concerning it is on record:—"A brilliant victory, in which he (Sir Charles) showed all the qualities of a general officer, and in which the army displayed all the best qualities of the bravest troops." The British lost two hundred and seventy officers and men. More than half the number of casualties occurred in the 22nd regiment.

After this victory the spirit of the Scindians was broken, although Shere Mohammed still hoped to retrieve his disasters. From the field of battle Sir Charles marched to the south, entering Meerpore in triumph; and on the 4th of April the fortress of Omercote opened its gates. Sir Charles determined to surround, if possible, the fugitive Shere Mohammed. To accomplish this, he divided his army into three parts, holding himself the command of one, and giving the charge of the two others to Colonel Roberts and Captain Jacobs. Upon those two officers devolved the chief duties connected with the active prosecution of the plan. On the 8th of June, Colonel Roberts met the Ameer Shah Mohammed, and Captain Jacobs encountered Shere Mohammed six days after, the British in each case gaining a signal victory. Roberts, with a small force, defeated two thousand men, and captured the shah; Jacobs, with a very disproportionate force, vanquished about four thousand Beloochees, the shere flying to the desert, attended only by his personal retinue. These events gave great satisfaction in England and at Calcutta, and Lord Ellenborough

\* *Conquest of Scinde.*

nominated Sir Charles to the government of Scinde. During his government no opportunity occurred for the display of his military genius. During the Sikh campaign, more than two years afterwards, Sir Charles marched by Mooltan from Scinde with a small force; and proceeding in advance, reached the grand army shortly after the sanguinary victory of Sobraon. If, however, the government of Sir Charles was not to be distinguished by any achievements of a military nature, it was very remarkable for its civil administration. The great Napoleon and his great rival both expressed (without either borrowing from the other) the opinion that civil qualities entered into the competency of a superior commander, even more than military. This seems to have been borne out by the management of armies, and by the administration in Scinde of Sir Charles Napier. He ruled Scinde arbitrarily, but justly; sternly, yet mercifully; in the interest of his country, yet for the welfare of the people. He held down with an iron hand all disposition to insubordination or revolt, nevertheless so attached the people to him, that when he departed, they followed him with tears and lamentations. In war they gave him the formidable *sobriquet* of "Shatan;" in peace they almost adored him as a deity. Scinde was afflicted with many calamities during his reign, as one might very appropriately call his government; but his administration of its affairs created order, cherished industry, brought wide regions, previously unproductive, into cultivation, and preserved innumerable lives when famine and disease ravaged the whole realm.

The following statement of the difficulties with which Sir Charles had to contend was drawn up in an *exposé* made to government, and suppressed by the Bombay council, or some of its officials. It is headed, "Sir Charles Napier to the Governor in Council. Bombay, Oct. 21, 1846." An extract only is made from the document:—"Plundering grain was rife all over the land while war lasted. People stole grain and concealed it, especially government grain; for the conquerors were strangers in the land, and fear pervaded all hearts, none knowing what the victorious foreigners would do; quantities of grain were therefore buried, and cultivation neglected. We at first had no knowledge of the proper men to employ as *kardars* and *umbardars*, nor did we know the amount of the collections which ought to be made; consequently, the government was robbed to an immense extent; an evil which still exists, though it gradually decreases. These *kardars*, therefore, took no pains with cultivation; they

were occupied with pillage. The canals could not be properly cleaned till the country was fairly settled; and without this clearing there could be neither health nor crops in Scinde. When we conquered Scinde the canals were choked up, for the ameers having resolved on war, everything relative to agriculture appears to have been abandoned for some time before the battle of Meannee; men were preparing for war. A plague of locusts fell upon Scinde. This was a heavy and extensive affliction; it not only consumed this country, but, I am told, ravaged whole provinces in Upper India, so that very small collections could be made there. Be that as it may, these locusts nearly destroyed the Scinde crop in 1844. The locusts were preceded by a dreadful epidemic, which raged from the end of August, 1843, to January, 1844, destroying thousands, and leaving those who survived unable to work. The troops suffered less than the people of the country; yet, out of seventeen thousand fighting men, thirteen thousand were helpless in the hospitals; and of the remaining four thousand, not above two thousand could have made a day's march. Cultivation was abandoned, for no man had strength to work. To close this catalogue of ills which fell upon the cultivation and people of Scinde in 1843 and 1844, the Indus suddenly fell, while the few crops which that year had been raised were yet on the ground, and a vast portion thus perished from want of water, for the river did not again rise."

A powerful opposition was raised against Sir Charles among the Bombay officials, and a minute was recorded by the council, censuring the way in which Sir Charles supported the revenue of Scinde, which, it was alleged, was done by causing an artificially high price for grain after the revenue paid in that commodity was received by the governor. This minute was absolutely false, and gave rise to discussions in parliament when the disgraceful fact came to light, that, although the Bombay government produced a copy of the faithless minute, no minute could be found of the complete confutation of the calumny. It was a curious circumstance that Sir Charles himself predicted that such would be the case after his death. The falsehood was, as he foretold, revived; the refutation was suppressed. Those officials, in their communications with the supreme government, represented Scinde as under "a pressure of financial difficulties," in consequence of the mal-administration of the governor, and the people as groaning under the excessive weight of taxation caused by his arbitrary, incompetent, and selfish government. Sir Charles

replied to these animadversions, showing their utter falsehood, in a brief despatch to the governor-general, Dec. 15, 1845, the following extracts from which will at once vindicate the aspersed hero, and disclose to the reader the lengths to which officials can go in injuring even men of the highest name who resist their interference, or refuse them homage :—

December 15th, 1845.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,—In answer to the extract from a letter of the Secret Committee, I have to say :—

1. That transit duties were abolished in Scinde by Lord Ellenborough's orders in 1843. I am here to obey the orders which I receive. I cannot imagine why the "Secret Committee" should suppose I disobey those orders. The transit duties have not been reimposed upon the people of Scinde, nor any new tax.

2. There is no "pressure of financial difficulty" in Scinde: its revenues increase, and a surplus of about £250,000 sterling has already been placed to the credit of the Honourable Company, after defraying the cost of the civil government and 2,400 armed and disciplined police.

3. The supreme government, at my recommendation, sanctioned the adoption of the Bombay customs code, and desired me to substitute this code for the destructively severe system of the ameer in Scinde, and I have done so gradually. Like all changes having for object to diminish the receipt of taxation, it will probably reduce the revenue in a slight degree next year, but add to it afterwards. It is well understood by, and agreeable to the merchants and people, whose present burthens will be relieved. After the 1st of January, 1846, the heavy and, what is worse, the vexatious duties levied hitherto under

the old system of the ameer will cease, and be replaced by light import and export duties levied on the frontier, except on goods in transit through Scinde. In fine, the Bombay regulations are adopted.

4. I have the honour to enclose herewith a lithograph plan of the positions of the "Chokies," or custom-house ports which I am establishing at the entrances to Scinde; and I have been induced to hasten the establishment of these ports, for the purpose of preventing the entrance of opium not covered by passes.

5. Though I regret that my conduct should have failed to obtain for me what I think it deserves, the confidence of the home authorities in a sufficient degree to overturn the baseness of *secret* information, which I have reason to suppose was sent from Bombay, I have, nevertheless, the satisfaction of believing that I possess the confidence of your Excellency.

C. J. NAPIER.

Sir Charles left Scinde on the 1st of Oct., 1847. Mr. Pringle, a civilian, an officer of the company, succeeded him. That officer, in a report the last day of 1847, praises the clemency, wisdom, moderation, and firmness of his predecessor. These good opinions were repeated by Mr. Pringle's successor, Mr. Frere, occasion having occurred for notice on his part of the principles of administration adopted by Sir Charles Napier. The successors of the military chief were men very competent to the duties imposed on them. They nurtured the prosperity which Sir Charles initiated, and which he left as a happy legacy to Scinde.

## CHAPTER CXVII.

### WAR WITH CHINA—NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS—TREATY OF PEACE—OPENING OF FIVE PORTS TO EUROPEAN COMMERCE.

THE history of English interests in China, after the date with which the last chapter on this subject closed, continued for a number of years to be monotonous, disclosing no occurrences of a kind to interest the readers of a work on the general concerns of the British empire in the East. Only for short intervals did concord prevail at Canton between the Chinese authorities and the English, or indeed any foreign traders. The trade of most European nations declined, except that of the English. The American commerce fluctuated, and on the whole made no observable progress. Edicts of the viceroy were continually issuing against some practice or other of the English. At one time the presence of English ladies gave offence; at another, some assault was committed by some drunken sailor on a Chinese subject; then, questions were raised so frivolous and vexatious as greatly to

try the temper of the British merchants, who petitioned their government to insist on a redress of grievances, and the admittance of a resident at Pekin. Remonstrances were made to the Chinese officials in language respectful and proper; to which replies were given almost always to the same effect, that if the English did not like the terms upon which they were permitted to trade, there was no occasion for them to come so far, and by staying at home collisions with the subjects of his celestial majesty would be avoided. There was no answering this logic, however unsatisfactory the English might have considered it.

In the years 1830-31 the insults and aggressions offered by the Chinese authorities were intolerable, and it became necessary for the committee, to which the concerns of the East India Company were committed, to adopt measures of public remonstrance, addressed to

the Chinese people as well as to the officials. An appeal was made also to the Governor-general of India to interfere, first by negotiation, and, failing in that, by force. The English did not act with promptitude and spirit, such as alone the Chinese could understand. Forbearance and petitions only brought fresh indignities. It was only when the officers of his celestial majesty felt that the course pursued was one involving danger and inconvenience to themselves that they were open to conviction. The bad feeling which at this period arrived at such a height was aggravated by the clandestine opium traffic, and the affrays which arose out of it. As the year 1831 advanced, and at the beginning of 1832, the officers of the viceroy entered the foreign factories when they pleased, treated their inmates with violence and abuse, tortured servants and interpreters, and, finally, set about breaking up the landing-place opposite the factories. There appeared to be no motive for these outrages but the wanton exercise of power, contempt and hatred of foreigners, and a desire on occasions to extort money.

In February, 1832, Mr. Lindsay and the Rev. Mr. Gutzlaff were dispatched to the north-east coast of China: their instructions were rather indefinite, and their voyage abortive, except so far as the acquisition of useful information was concerned. Some ships had, however, disposed of valuable cargoes of opium, woollens, and calicoes on the northern coasts.

By an act of parliament, passed in the fourth year of his majesty's reign, entitled "An Act to regulate the Trade to China," it was, amongst other things, enacted that it might be lawful for his majesty, by any such order or orders as to his majesty in council might seem expedient and salutary, to give to the superintendents mentioned in the act, or any of them, power and authority over the trade and commerce of his majesty's subjects within any part of the dominions of the Emperor of China; and to impose penalties, forfeitures, or imprisonments for the breach of any regulations, to be enforced in such manner as should be specified in the orders in council. This act came into operation April 21st, 1834. At the court at Brighton, on the 9th day of December, 1833, an order in council was issued investing in the superintendents of trade appointed in virtue of that act, all the powers invested in the supercargoes of "the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies." On the same day another order in council was issued, instituting, in virtue of the said act, a court of justice, with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction, for the trial of offences committed

by British subjects in the ports and harbours of China and within a hundred miles of its coasts. One of the superintendents mentioned in the act was nominated to hold such court. The practice and proceedings of such court were to be conformable to those of the courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery in England. A third order in council was issued the same day, in virtue of the act already named, empowering the superintendents to levy and collect tolls from English ships entering any port where these superintendents might reside. It was also ordered that within forty-eight hours of the arrival in a Chinese port of any British ships, a manifesto in writing, upon oath, specifying the particulars of the cargo, should be sent by the master or supercargo to the superintendent. Lord Napier was dispatched as the chief superintendent of British trade, from Plymouth, in his majesty's ship *Andromache*. Matters had now arrived at an interesting epoch in the commercial connection between China and Great Britain. John Francis Davis, who succeeded Lord Napier as chief superintendent, observed of the juncture of affairs when Lord Napier was nominated to that office:—"On the 22nd April, 1834, the trade of the East India Company with China, after having lasted just two hundred years, terminated according to the provisions of the new act, and several private ships soon afterwards quitted Canton with cargoes of tea for the British Islands. One vessel had, previously to that date, sailed direct for England, under a special licence from the authorities of the East India Company. A most important national experiment was now to be tried; the results of which alone could set at rest the grand question of the expediency of free trade against the *Chinese monopoly*; or prove how individual traders were likely to succeed against the union of mandarins and mandarin merchants."

The number of superintendents which the new bill authorized was three, two others with Lord Napier were immediately nominated. The East India company now stood in a new relation to China. Instead of having the exclusive possession of the tea trade, and all but the exclusive trade in other commodities, the bill of 1833 deprived the company of the power of trading between China and Great Britain, and threw the whole of the Chinese commerce open to the enterprise of individual merchants. One consequence of this was, that as the operation of the act began a few months after it was passed, the company had to sell their fine ships and other trading property at heavy loss. These great changes by the British government were carried out

without any notice to the Chinese authorities, notwithstanding that the danger of such a course was pointed out by persons well acquainted with the temper of the Chinese government and people.

On the 15th of July, 1834, Lord Napier arrived at Macao. Mr. Davis and Sir George Robinson accepted the offices of superintendents with his lordship. According to the instructions given to Lord Napier by the foreign secretary, he was immediately upon his arrival to announce his mission in a communication to the viceroy. That functionary refused to receive it, on the ground that Great Britain had no right to send a resident representative to Canton, without first obtaining the permission of the court of Peking. His lordship had no means of communication with the viceroy but through the Hong merchants, which he properly refused. His hands were tied up by such minute instructions from home, that no discretion was left to him in the midst of difficulties of which the home authorities could be no judges, and which could only be met by promptitude and address, as the exigencies arose. The Chinese meanwhile beset his lordship's house with soldiers, beat his servants, and continued to evince a feeling of rancorous hostility. His lordship was placed in a false position by the ignorance and wilfulness of the government at home, in spite of the warnings and protests of the Duke of Wellington, whose sagacious mind and oriental experience enabled him to foresee the issue of the pragmatism and conceited plans of Lord Grey. At last matters assumed so formidable an aspect of hostility, that Lord Napier was obliged to send for a guard of marines, and order the *Imogene* and *Andromache* frigates to the anchorage at Whampoa. As this order was executed, the guns of the Bocca Tigris fort opened fire upon the British, cutting away some ropes and spars, and wounding a sailor. The broadsides of the English frigates soon silenced these demonstrations of anger. As Tiger Island was approached, a still heavier fire was directed against the English, and a still more formidable reply was made to it. Each British ship had a man killed; the fortifications of the Chinese were much damaged, and the destruction of life among those who manned them was considerable. The men-of-war triumphantly sailed up to the anchorage. The Chinese now stopped the trade, demanding the withdrawal of the frigates, and the retirement of Lord Napier from China. The East India company had warned the government of the consequences of its precipitate and high-handed legislation, and the fruits were now borne. As was usual, the English, after for-

midable demonstrations of resolution, gave way the moment their trade sustained injury. The Chinese by their obstinacy and persistence gained a complete victory. The selection of Lord Napier for the important office committed to him might well have been questioned, as indeed it was both in England and China. His rank and party connections, not his fitness, determined the appointment. His lordship possessed excellent qualities, intellectual and moral, and was a useful public man; but no especial fitness was possessed by him for what might be called a Chinese embassy, or for a post which was even more difficult to fill than that of an ambassador. A few weeks after arriving at Macao, having abandoned the attempt to establish a residence at Canton, his lordship died, from the effects of the climate and the mortification which he felt at the failure of his mission, and the humiliation to which his country and himself were exposed by the incapacity of his government. This incapacity was the more to be regretted as the government of the day comprised men of great reputation, and Lord Palmerston was the secretary of state upon whom the execution of the orders in council devolved. Great as his lordship's talents were for the discharge of any duties which might be imposed upon him in connection with the relations between the United Kingdom and other parts of the world, his knowledge of oriental affairs and of commerce was small, and his capacity to deal with them, in common with that of the rest of the cabinet, insufficient. It was, however, a cabinet which would not be taught, but was carried away by popular applause, and pride of newly acquired power.

On the death of Lord Napier, the second superintendent assumed the chief direction of affairs. That gentleman was of opinion that an appeal to the government of Peking should be prosecuted, but this had been *forbidden* by the instructions delivered to Lord Napier in case of any dispute, without first communicating with the British foreign secretary. At this juncture the great Congregational missionary, Dr. Morrison, the Chinese interpreter to the superintendents, died. His loss was much felt because of his superior knowledge of the Chinese language and people. His son and the Rev. Mr. Gutzlaff were nominated in his stead. The viceroy issued edicts commanding the English to elect or obtain from England a merchant, not a royal officer, to manage the trade. Of these edicts Mr. Davis took no notice, believing that the Chinese would find it necessary themselves to open communications with him. In January, 1835, Mr. Davis returned home;

Captain Elliot, who had acted as secretary to the commission, became second, and Sir George Robinson first superintendent.

The opening of the Chinese trade the previous year facilitated smuggling, and this was more especially carried on in connection with opium. The edicts of the imperial government against the admission of the drug had been as numerous as inoperative, but so prodigious was the increase of smuggling when the East India Company was deprived of the Chinese trade, that it became incumbent upon the imperial government to adopt vigorous measures to put a stop to it, or at once abandon all pretension to control contraband commerce upon its coasts. The increase of the importation of opium tended to weaken physically the Chinese population; to create poverty, idleness, and recklessness; to drain the country of silver, and to weaken the bands of authority; the imperial government was therefore roused to exertion to check or stop the injurious import.

Captain Elliot succeeded Sir George Robinson as chief superintendent. He foresaw that the open and daring conduct of the crowds of opium smugglers who mingled with those who pursued legitimate commerce would bring on a war, or the expulsion of European traders. He earnestly importuned the British government to invest him, or a successor, with power to interpose and to punish English subjects engaging in such unlawful dealings. The government refused to do this, substantially on the ground that it was not the province of foreign governments to act as revenue police or coast-guards for countries on whose shores their subjects smuggled. The government, however, declared that any smuggler resorting to force in case of attempts to arrest him by the Chinese authorities, should be considered as a pirate. This was more generous to China than just to the smugglers, whose dishonourable calling was no ground for acting towards them illegitimately. It was clearly the business of the mandarins to deal with the smugglers, Chinese or foreign, as best they could; and of the English authorities to discountenance the traffic by moral means, and to afford no protection to English subjects embarked in it.

The year 1838 opened at Canton unfavourably to commerce and to the prospects of peace. The Hong merchants had incurred enormous debts to the new traders under the free system. They refused to pay except by instalments, extending over a great number of years. The Chinese laws afforded to the barbarians no redress, there was only the old answer, "If you do not like the country, its laws, maxims, and customs, why don't you go

away? we do not wish you to stay." The Hong merchants had in this way cheated the English out of three millions of dollars. The quantity of opium seized by the Chinese authorities amounted to two millions sterling. This opium was in many cases seized by mandarins who had connived at the illicit traffic, taking bribes to admit it, and seizing the contraband as well. The conduct of the Chinese officials was immoral and corrupt in these transactions.

On the 12th of July, 1838, Sir Frederick Maitland arrived in the ship of war *Wellesley*, and in consort with the war-brig *Algerine*, and was joined by the superintendent. The ships anchored in Tong-boo Bay, seven leagues south of the Bocca Tigris. The Canton government communicated in the old way through the Hong merchants; the superintendent sent back the despatches unopened, informing the bearer that the orders of the British government were peremptory to correspond only with the officers of his imperial majesty.

Captain Elliot then proceeded to Canton, and sent an unsealed letter by a mandarin to be communicated to the government. Mr. Davis thus relates what occurred:—"The paper was left open with a view to obviate the difficulty about the use of the character *pin*—a petition. It was conveyed to the viceroy, but the merchants returned it with a remark from his excellency that he could not take it unless it bore the character *pin*. Captain Elliot then declared that he had formally offered to set forth the peaceful purposes of the admiral's visit, and if the viceroy did not think fit to accept these explanations, his business at Canton was concluded, and he should forthwith retire. A British boat, meanwhile, passing the Bocca Tigris was fired upon by the forts; and when boarded by a mandarin, was required to state whether the admiral or any person belonging to him was there, as they should not be permitted to pass up. Sir Frederick, on being informed of this insult, remarked that he had come to China with a determination to avoid the least violation of customs or prejudices; but that he was nevertheless resolved to bear no indignity to the flag. He accordingly proceeded forthwith to the Bocca Tigris with the vessels under his command, to demand a formal disavowal of these unprovoked attacks. A civil letter was soon received from the Chinese admiral Kwan (afterwards discomfited in action with the *Volage* and *Hyacinth*), asking the reason of Admiral Maitland's visit; and in reply to this, a demand was made for reparation on account of the late insult. The result was the mission of a mandarin captain of war-

junks to wait upon the British admiral, accompanied by one of less rank; and the expressions of disavowal of any intention to insult were written at the dictation of the higher officer by the hand of the other on board the *Wellesley* in the presence of the several parties. Sir Frederick Maitland signified his satisfaction with this declaration, and after the exchange of some civilities, returned to his former anchorage, and soon afterwards sailed away."

Only two months after this transaction the Chinese functionaries, irritated by the persistence of the smugglers, prepared to execute a native smuggler in the front of the factory; the remonstrances of the Europeans upon so gross an outrage being treated with disdain, they boldly armed and drove the executioners and the attendant guards away. The people approved of the dispersion of the party. Some of the Europeans, in the insolence and hardihood of their pride, contemptuously struck with sticks the lookers on; these immediately resented, and at last a mob of thousands, armed with such missiles as could be obtained, attacked the factories. The Chinese troops drove back the mob.

Captain Elliot offered to co-operate with the government in suppressing the river smuggling, and obtained a direct communication from the viceroy, thus gaining a precedent for carrying on official correspondence without the intervention of the "Hong."

For some time matters wore a more tranquil aspect, and the smuggling was much repressed. Early in 1839 a high commission of his imperial majesty arrived at Canton, and at once proceeded to adopt measures of extraordinary severity and injustice to terrify the Europeans and stop the traffic. His first act was to execute a native opium dealer in the square in front of the factories. This operation was attended by so powerful a force that the merchants could only haul down their flags and protest against the barbarous outrage. The despatches of Captain Elliot describe the demands of Commissioner Lin as extraordinary even from an oriental tyrant. He issued an edict directly to the foreigners, demanding that every particle of opium on board the ships should be delivered to the government, in order to its being burned and destroyed. At the same time a bond was required, in the foreign and Chinese languages, that "the ships should hereafter never again dare to bring opium; and that, should any be brought, the goods should be forfeited, and the parties suffer death; moreover, that such punishment would be willingly submitted to." He plainly threatened that if his requisitions were not complied with, the

foreigners would be overwhelmed by numbers and sacrificed; but at the same time made some vague promises of reward to such as obeyed.

Mr. Davis describes the events which followed with a brevity and completeness which will in a short compass place the reader in possession of the facts which led to what is popularly known in England as "the opium war."—"On first hearing of the proceedings at Canton the British superintendent, always present where danger or difficulty called him, hurried up in the gig of her majesty's ship *Larne*, and made his way to the factories on the evening of the 24th March, notwithstanding the efforts made to stop him. The state of intense distress in which he found the whole foreign community may be estimated by stating that the actual pressing difficulty was the obstinate demand that Mr. Dent, one of the most respectable English merchants, should proceed into the city and attend the commissioner's tribunal. Captain Elliot's first step was to proceed to Mr. Dent's house, and convey him in person to the hall of the superintendents. He immediately signified to the Chinese his readiness to let Mr. Dent go into the city with himself, and upon the distinct stipulation, under the commissioner's seal, that he was never to be moved out of his sight. The whole foreign community were then assembled, and exhorted to be moderate and calm. On the same night the native servants were taken away and the supplies cut off, the reason given being the opposition to the commissioner's summons. An arc of boats was formed, filled with armed men, the extremes of which touched the east and west banks of the river in front of the factories. The square between and the rear were occupied in considerable force; and before the gate of the hall the whole body of Hong merchants and a large guard were posted day and night, the latter with their swords constantly drawn. So close an imprisonment is not recorded in the history of our previous intercourse. Under these circumstances the British superintendent issued a most momentous circular to his countrymen, requiring the surrender into his hands of all the English opium actually on the coast of China at that date. In undertaking this immense responsibility, he had no doubt that the safety of a great mass of human life hung upon his determination. Had he commenced with the denial of any control on the occasion, the Chinese commissioner would have seized the pretext for reverting to his measures of intimidation against individual merchants, obviously his original purpose, but which Captain Elliot's sudden appearance had disturbed.

He would have forced the whole into submission by the protracted confinement of the persons he had determined to seize, and, judging from his proclamation and general conduct, by the sacrifice of their lives. On the 3rd of April it was agreed that the deputy superintendent should proceed down the river with the mandarins and Hong merchants, and deliver over to the commissioner 20,283 chests of opium from the ships which were assembled for that purpose below the Bocca Tigris. The imprisonment and blockade in the meanwhile remained undiminished at Canton, and attempts were made to extort from the foreigners the bond, by which their lives and property would be at the mercy of the Chinese government. This was evaded."

On the 4th of May, when all the opium was delivered, the imprisonment of the English ceased, with the exception of sixteen persons, who were retained until the 25th; they were liberated under an edict never to return to China. The commission restricted the trade of all other foreigners, when all English subjects had withdrawn. The conduct of Captain Elliot throughout these transactions was marvellously prudent and firm. The Duke of Wellington described his concluding act as one "of courage and self-devotion such as few men had an opportunity of showing, and, probably, still fewer would have shown." His grace characterized the conduct of the Chinese commissioner and government with equal terseness. He "had never known a person filling a high station in another country treated in such a manner as Captain Elliot had been treated by the authorities of Canton."

The English took refuge at Macao, but were driven thence by a military demonstration on the part of Lin. An unarmed schooner was attacked by mandarin boats, and the crew murdered. Other aggressions followed. The English remained in their ships. The commissioner demanded that all their vessels should enter the river, and that a man should be delivered up for execution to atone for the life of a Chinese lost in a drunken broil with some sailors, English and American. Provisions were not allowed to be sold to the English ships, which were supplied indirectly through Macao, and by various hazardous boat enterprises. An English ship of war, the *Volage*, arrived most opportunely for the protection and supply of the English. Soon after an action was fought between the English vessels and the war-junks of the enemy, which was conducted by the British naval officers in a manner highly to their credit. This conflict arose and was conducted in the

following manner. On the 3rd of October the Chinese admiral left his anchorage, and stood out towards the English ships, which were got under weigh and moved towards the enemy. The war-junks then anchored in order of battle, and the British ships were "hove to." The English opened negotiations; the admiral replied that an Englishman must be given up to suffer death in atonement for the life of the Chinaman (previously referred to), killed in a drunken brawl. Captain Smith, the senior officer, considered that the safety of the ships demanded that he should repel this hostile demonstration. "At noon, therefore, the signal was made to engage, and the ships, then lying hove to at the extreme end of the Chinese line, bore away ahead in close order, having the wind on the starboard beam. In this way, and under easy sail, they ran down the Chinese line, pouring in a destructive fire. The lateral direction of the wind enabled the ships to perform the same evolution from the other extreme of the line, running up again with their larboard broadsides bearing. The Chinese answered with much spirit, but the terrible effect of the English fire was soon manifest. One war-junk blew up at pistol-shot distance from the *Volage*, three were sunk, and several others water-logged. The admiral's conduct is said to have been worthy of his station. His junk was evidently better manned and armed than any of the others; and after having weighed, or perhaps cut or slipped his cable, he bore up and engaged her majesty's ships in handsome style. In less than three quarters of an hour, however, he and the remainder of his squadron were retiring in great distress to their former anchorage, and, as Captain Smith was not disposed to protract destructive hostilities, he offered no obstruction to their retreat. It is to be feared, however, that this clemency was thrown away upon the Chinese, who have no conception of the true principles of such forbearance, and subsequent facts show that they actually claimed the victory. This they perhaps founded on the circumstance of her majesty's ships making sail for Macao, for the purpose of covering the embarkation of the English who might see fit to retire from that place, and of providing for the safety of the merchant ships. On the 4th of November, the *Volage* joined the fleet at Hong-Kong, and the *Hyacinth* was left at Macao to watch events in that quarter. It was time that the Chinese should receive such a lesson as the foregoing, for not long prior to it they had robbed and burned a Spanish brig, the *Bilbaino*, utterly unconnected with opium, under the plea that she was an Eng-

lish vessel, though her proper flag was flying."\* The treatment which the unfortunate crew of this Spanish ship received was cruel, barbarous, and unrelenting, affording no pretence of justification.

There was still some trade carried on by the English through the intervention of the Americans, who were the only foreigners that submitted to the requisitions of the Chinese authorities. They carried out Chinese commodities in their boats to the English ships, and received goods in return, driving for some time a profitable trade. This, however, was not permitted to last. The Chinese on discovering what took place, effectually put a stop to all commercial intercourse with the English. Captain Elliot could now do nothing until instructions from his government arrived.

The view taken by the British government was that a declaration of war could alone adjust matters. War was accordingly declared, and a powerful force sent to compel compliance with English demands. This war was unpopular in England. The view taken of it by the mass of the people was, that it was declared for the purpose of enforcing sales of opium, and that this was done to enrich the East India Company as the growers of that commodity. The narrative already given proves that the company had nothing to do with the transactions which led to the struggle. These transactions began when the company was no longer permitted to trade with China, and were a consequence of throwing open the trade, which the Duke of Wellington, and other eminent persons well acquainted with the East, foresaw and foretold. Had the trade been continued in the hands of the company, such a war could not have broken out; although on other grounds a rupture with China might have arisen. Whatever the advantages of giving freedom to the trade with China, the disadvantage at that particular juncture of opening a door for the smuggling of opium was attendant upon that event. Her majesty's government gave no countenance to the opium smugglers, but rather passed beyond its proper province in denouncing and thwarting it. Captain Elliot was willing to co-operate with the Chinese officials to suppress it, even by giving an extreme interpretation to his powers as chief superintendent, but the Chinese authorities treated his overtures contemptuously and arrogantly, although unable to put a stop to it themselves. Yet all these facts were suppressed by the parties who carried on the agitation against

the government of Calcutta and of London, in connection with the war. Apart from those who were actuated by party opposition against the section of English politicians then in power, the denouncers of the government consisted mainly of the members of the Peace Society, and of the Society of Friends, the former being chiefly composed of the latter. Lecturers were hired, men of clever debating powers, and eloquent, who convened meetings all over England, denouncing the war as neither forced upon us by necessity nor demanded by justice. The Chinese were represented by these lecturers as an amiable and honest race, whose government was highly moral, and being virtuously intent upon protecting its people from the enervating and dissipating effect of opium, adopted police and revenue regulations full of wisdom, which the English merchants and Captain Elliot, the English superintendent of trade, infringed in violation of international law, of natural right, and of the law of God. All these statements were false, except so far as that Englishmen were among the opium smugglers, as adventurous English seafaring men will be found amongst smugglers off the coasts of every country whose revenue system allows a contraband trade to become profitable. These allegations were, however, pretexts. The real motive with the Peace Society, and the religious body called Quakers, was to make an efficient and popular protest against war, which they believed, under any circumstances, to be contrary to the law of God, inexpedient, and in the long run injurious to the cause it was employed to promote. The occurrence of every war in which their country happens to be engaged brings out this party in a similar mode of action. The same or other orators are hired to preach down the policy of the existing government which has entered upon the war, and because it has done so, and to arraign and denounce the Englishmen who may, however unjustly treated, have been the victims, and thereby the occasion of the hostilities. These agents of the Peace Society invariably represent their own countrymen as cruel and sanguinary, actuated by unjust views and selfish aims, and inflicting undeserved injury upon harmless and well-intentioned nations, who by British brutality are forced into efforts of self-defence. The policy of such representations is to rouse the English people to put a stop to the war itself, and so secure a victory to the peace principle. Probably no public body, no society, no party, ever adopted a line of procedure more dishonest than this. If all war be unjustifiable on Christian principles in the opinion of the Society of Friends, the church of the Mora-

\* *The Chinese*. By John Francis Davis, Esq., F.R.S., and Governor of Hong-Kong: London, Cox, King William Street, Strand.

vians, or any other religious association or church, it is the duty of such to put forth that opinion as a theological or social question to be discussed, and to extend it by a zealous and honourable propagandism; but to pervert facts, to extenuate, deny, or conceal the crimes and injuries of races or nations that have made war upon England, and to cover with obloquy by scandalous falsehoods the character and conduct of all English statesmen and men of the profession of arms who assert what they believe to be the rights of Englishmen by military force, is worse than war itself, less reputable than even an unjust appeal to arms, and is an exemplification of bigotry, tyranny, and aggression on the part of those who profess liberality, benevolence, and peace, demoralising to the public, and dishonouring to the cause of free discussion.

The British government was extremely unwilling to go to war with China, and even at the last hour adopted all means to avert it. This fact was kept out of sight by the agitators of the Peace Society and of the Society of Friends, when common justice required that it should have its fair representation in the estimate which they invited the English people to form of their rulers and of the causes of the war. The government of her majesty felt it to be intolerable that in order to put down smuggling and smugglers, even if Englishmen had been exclusively the offenders, which was not the case, the Chinese officials should seize unoffending merchants, and the representative of her majesty, hold them for many weeks in durance, and menace their lives, unless others of their countrymen, the real offenders, should surrender the prohibited commodity. The English representative could only by the force of his character, by promises of indemnity, and by an appeal to the patriotism of his offending countrymen, on the ground of the danger to which he and the inoffensive merchants seized by the Chinese were exposed, obtain the surrender of the opium. The English government could not with justice refuse to make good the promise of indemnity, and it was right and just that the Chinese should be compelled to refund the money, to apologise for the outrage offered to English subjects and the English representative, and to give guarantees for future rectitude towards her majesty's subjects, who might carry on legitimate trade in their country.

To the demands of the British government the Chinese especial commissioner and plenipotentiary replied by a proclamation, couched in terms of vindictive violence and supercilious scorn, offering a reward for the heads of Englishmen, and to all who might succeed in

setting fire to their ships. So bloody and truculent was this imperial manifesto, that when copies reached England, accustomed although Englishmen were to oriental blood-thirstiness in so many various Indian wars, all classes were filled with horror, except the members of the Peace Society, who rather availed themselves of such documents as proving the lengths to which the amiable, sensible, quiet, industrious, virtuous Chinese might be driven by the injustice of Englishmen and their government.

All efforts to avert war on the part of the British officials having failed, it was at length commenced with a resolution and spirit worthy of the object proposed. The British government, however, began with the errors in which English ministers usually begin hostilities. The military force was much too small. The naval department of the expedition was sufficient, but so few were the troops, that throughout the campaign they were exposed to great hardships; no reliefs could be obtained, when humanity, economy, and military science all conspired to demand such arrangements as would have ensured them. The comforts of the men were shamefully neglected. Their food was of the worst quality; many of the soldiers died from the badness of their provisions. There was an almost total neglect of sanitary arrangements for the troops both on board ships and on shore. The men were nearly as badly off for air, water, and the means of cleanliness, as those on board the plague-stricken transports which were used in the Crimean war at a later period. The provision for medical requirements was disgracefully inadequate. The soldiers, clothing was not regulated by the climate in which they were sent to make war: during the fierce summer of southern China the men wore the flaming red jacket buttoned over the chest, and the hard stock buckled tight round the throat; men fell dead both in action and on other duty from these causes, yet even the commanding officers were averse from any relaxation of "the regulation dress." The officers were well taken care of, and just as it occurred in the war around Sebastopol, the proportion of officers who fell in battle was considerable, while few died from disease; whereas of the men a large portion of the whole army perished from sickness, induced by causes over which the government and commanding officers had control. The men, nobly brave, generously devoted to their duty, loyal to their sovereign, and faithful to their officers, were treated with a contemptuous indifference by the chief authorities, civil and military, which cannot be too sternly denounced upon the page of history.

The expedition against China set out from Calcutta in April, 1840. The 17th of that month the last transport left the Hoogly.

#### CAPTURE OF CHUSAN.

The first operations of a formidable nature were directed against Chusan. It was made an easy conquest on the 5th of July, 1840. It was garrisoned by a considerable body of troops, amounting to 3650. In little more than three months only 2036 men were fit for duty; the rest were in hospital or in the grave. Men conversant with the condition of these brave fellows have written as follows:—"Between three and four hundred had been interred, and about fifteen hundred were sick. The gallant Cameronians were reduced to a perfect skeleton, and the brave 49th were scarcely in a better condition. No doubt this was mainly to be attributed to the want of fresh and wholesome provisions, predisposing the constitution of the men to the agues and fevers epidemical in this place; for we find the sickness comparatively mild amongst the officers, who had means of living on a more generous diet; and that much sickness, it was said, prevailed among the Chinese. The seamen and officers on board the ships were not sickly.\* Dr. D. McPherson says,† 'So great was the dread of exciting a bad feeling, and causing discontent among the natives, that our men were obliged to live in their tents when there were thousands of houses available for that purpose; and without regard to the health of the men, or consulting medical authorities on the subject, positions were laid out for the encampment of the troops. Parades and guard-mounting in full dress, with a thermometer ranging from ninety degrees to one hundred degrees, made the scenes resemble the route of garrison duty in India.' 'Men were placed in tents‡ pitched on low paddy-fields, surrounded by stagnant water, putrid and stinking from quantities of dead animal and vegetable matter. Under a sun hotter than that ever experienced in India, the men on duty were buckled up to the throat in their full dress coatees; and in consequence of there being so few camp followers, fatigue parties of Europeans were daily detailed to carry provisions and stores from the ships to the tents, and to perform all menial employments, which experience has long taught us they cannot stand in a tropical climate. The poor men, working like slaves, began to sink under the exposure and fatigue. Bad provisions, low spirits, and

despondency drove them to drink.\* This increased their liability to disease, and in the month of November there were barely five hundred effective men in the force.† 'Medical men, as is often the case, were put down as croakers, they were not listened to.'"

It is horrible to relate of Englishmen and of British officials, that when the men were literally rotting away, the officers scarcely suffering anything, and it was proposed by the medical men to receive them on board ship, where they might be preserved in health, the cold-blooded reply was, that "the authorities would not be justified in incurring the expense!" Such is the testimony of Dr. McPherson, who was a spectator of this hardened sacrifice of human life to save something about £100 a day.

On the 6th of November, 1840, a truce was concluded between the imperial commissioner and Rear-admiral Elliot. Subsequently orders arrived for the evacuation of the island, which took place on the 22nd of February, 1841, when the troops and ships of war proceeded to the Canton river. Before they arrived there, other events had transpired. It became plain that the Chinese made the truce available to gain time, and had no intention of negotiating for peace. It was supposed by the emperor and his mandarins that China was invincible, and that the barbarians would lose patience, hope, and courage, and leave her coasts. The time of the cessation of hostilities having transpired without the hostile officers coming to terms, the clash of arms was again renewed.

#### BATTLES OF CHEUMPEE AND TYCOCTOW.

A force was disembarked on the 7th of January, 1841, upon the island of Cheumpee. The command of this detachment was confided to Major Pratt, of the 26th, or Cameronian regiment. Major Hough gives the following brief account of the action there and at Tycoctow:—"The force under the gallant major consisted of men of the royal artillery, and marines and seamen, six hundred and seventy-four; 37th Madras native infantry, six hundred and seven: and Bengal volunteers, seventy-six. Also one hundred invalids, who had arrived from Chusan. Her majesty's ships *Calliope*, *Larne*, and *Hyacinth*, under Captain Herbert, proceeded to bombard the lower fort, while the steamers *Nemesis* and *Queen* threw shells into the hill forts and intrenchments on the inner side,—the *Wellesley* and other large ships moving up into mid-channel, in case they might be required. The

\* Statement of a Bengal assistant-surgeon, recorded by Major Hough.

† Madras army. *Two Years in China*, 1842, p. 12.

‡ *Two Years in China*, p. 21.

\* Shamsoo—no arrak to be had.

† Out of 3650 men landed in July, 1840.

Chinese kept up a fire for an hour. Had the enemy's guns been a little more depressed, much mischief would have been done. When their firing had slackened a little, the infantry advanced. All the enemy's positions were carried, and their loss was great. In the forts there were eighty-two guns, and as many in the war-junks. Their force was about two thousand men, of whom six hundred must have been killed, and as many wounded. The fort of Tycoctow was carried by the division under Captain Scott, consisting of the *Druid*, *Samarang*, *Modeste*, and *Columbine*. The next day the signal of a flag of truce was exhibited on board the *Wellesley*."

The truce lasted for three days. On the fourth day, when the troops were in expectation of renewing hostilities, a proclamation from Captain Elliot announced that preliminaries of peace between the high commissioner and himself had been agreed upon. It was in virtue of this agreement that orders had been sent for the evacuation of Chusan.

#### OPERATIONS IN THE CANTON RIVER.

These preliminary arrangements for peace were a blind for the prosecution of warlike projects and a new effort to wear out the English by procrastination. This was soon made apparent. Hong-Kong was taken possession of by the English; the Chinese began hostilities in the Canton river by firing upon the English boats; which resulted in a successful attack by the British upon the Chinese forts. In these operations her majesty's ships *Wellesley*, *Calliope*, *Samarang*, *Druid*, *Herald*, and *Modeste* were engaged with the batteries, and Major Pratt mastered the defences on the island of Wantong; taking 1,300 prisoners. The troops led by the major were detachments of his own gallant Cameronians, of her majesty's 49th regiment, the 37th Madras native infantry, volunteers from the Bengal infantry, and a few of the royal marines. The *Blenheim*, *Melville*, and *Queen* silenced, by their broadsides, the batteries of Arunghoy. Sir H. F. Senhouse, at the head of the marines, landed and drove the Chinese from the works which they had constructed at such prodigious labour and expense, and defended with so much hope. The Chinese Admiral Kwan, who had on a former occasion behaved with so much spirit, perished, his junk having been blown up. The light squadron of the navy advanced farther up the river, under Captain Herbert, of the *Calliope*, as its commodore. At "the first bar" the enemy was found strongly posted on the left bank, close to Whampoa Reach; vessels were sunk to block the passage, and a fleet of forty war-junks was drawn across in order of battle.

The *Madagascar* and *Nemesis* soon dispersed the flotilla, and after some hours' firing, silenced the batteries. The marines then, as usual, landed, driving before them, almost without opposition, ten times their number. A captured Chinese, upon being interrogated as to the little resolution displayed in defending the batteries, replied, "If you must come in, we must go out," and seemed to think this a conclusive explanation of the facility of retreat displayed by his countrymen. Sir Gordon Bremer quickly joined Captain Herbert and the advanced squadron, a portion of which soon arrived within sight of the walls of Canton. This several writers represent as the first time English ships of war were seen from Canton.\*

At the end of March Sir Gordon Bremer left for Calcutta, in order to bring up reinforcements. A convention was soon after entered into, by virtue of which the trade was partially reopened. This convention, like all other temporising expedients, only tended to prolong the war. Heavier metal than protocols and agreements was necessary to impress China with the conviction of barbarian superiority, and the imperative claims of justice.

#### ATTACK ON CANTON.

On the 2nd of May Major-general Sir Hugh Gough took the command of the forces. On the 24th operations were commenced against Canton. Its "braves" were very boastful, and its officials still wrapped up in fancied security and unyielding pride. The plan of action was as follows:—The right column, in tow of the *Atalanta*, to attack and keep the factories. This force consisted of 309 men and officers of the Cameronians, an officer of artillery and 20 men, and an officer of engineers, the whole under command of Major Pratt. The left column, towed by the *Nemesis*, in four brigades, to move left in front, under Lieutenant-colonel Morris. Her majesty's 49th (Major Stephens), 28 officers and 273 men; 37th Madras native infantry, Captain Duff, 11 officers and 219 men; one company Bengal volunteers, Captain Mee, 1 officer and 114 men; artillery (royal), under Captain Knowles, 3 officers, 33 men; Madras artillery, Captain Anstruther, 10 officers, 231 men; sappers and miners, Captain Cotton, 4 officers, 137 men. Ordnance—four 12-pounder howitzers, four 9-pounder field-pieces, two 6-pounders, three 5½ inch mortars, and one hundred and fifty-two 32-pounder

\* Continuation of Hume and Smollett's *History of England*: Virtue & Co., Limited, City Road and Ivy Lane, London. Major Hough's account of the campaign in China. *Annual Register* for 1841.

rockets. Naval brigade, under Captain Bouchier (*Blonde*)—1st naval battalion, Captain Maitland (*Wellesley*), 11 officers, 172 men; 2nd naval battalion, Commander Barlow (*Nimrod*), 16 officers, 231 men. Reserve, under Major-general Burrell—Royal marines, Captain Ellis, 9 officers, 372 men; 18th Royal Irish, Lieutenant-colonel Adams, 25 officers, 495 men. The right column took possession of the factories before five o'clock P.M. The left column reached near the village of Tsing-hae, the point of debarkation, about five miles, by the river line, above the factories.

Sir Hugh's despatch contained the following passage:—"The heights to the north of Canton, crowned by four strong forts, and the city walls, which run over the southern extremity of these heights, including one elevated point, appeared to be about three and a half miles distant; the intermediate ground undulating much, and intersected by hollows, under wet, paddy cultivation, enabled me to take up successive positions, until we approached within range of the forts on the heights, and the northern face of the city walls. I had to wait here some time, placing the men under cover, to bring up the rocket battery and artillery." A strongly intrenched camp, of considerable extent, which lay to the north-east of the city, was taken and burnt.

On the 26th Sir Hugh Gough hoisted a flag of truce, and gave the Tartar general two hours to consider the necessity of a capitulation, or for the commissioner to decide upon yielding to the demands of the plenipotentiaries. No notice was taken of Sir Hugh by either official, and he was preparing to storm the place, when Captain Elliot stayed his sword by announcing another agreement upon preliminaries.

Sir Hugh Gough attacked the vast city with less than three thousand men, and captured the factories and the forts on the heights with a loss of only fourteen killed and ninety-one wounded. The naval commander reported an additional loss of six killed and forty-two wounded. The Chinese admitted a loss of two thousand killed and wounded. A Chinese army of forty-five thousand men had been collected for the defence of the city. This army was obliged, by the convention with Captain Elliot, to evacuate the city. The military force at the disposal of the plenipotentiaries was absurdly small; it might have burned or plundered Canton, but it could not conquer and hold it. The English consented to spare the place upon the payment of a ransom. The troops were brought from Canton, upon the execution of the convention, to Hong-Kong, where they suffered decimation by sickness, arising from the unhealthi-

ness of the place and the want of sanitary care on the part of those in charge of them.

The conduct of Captain Elliot and Sir G. Bremer did not give satisfaction to the authorities at Calcutta, nor London; their measures were deemed too temporising. A more firm policy and active course of procedure were held by those in power to have more befitted the occasion. Accordingly, soon after, Sir G. Bremer returned to China from Calcutta, and he and Captain Elliot went home. Rear-admiral Sir W. Parker and Major-general Sir Henry Pottinger arrived as plenipotentiaries. It was at once determined by these high personages that the war was not likely to be brought to an issue on the Canton river, that a blow must be struck nearer to the metropolis of the empire. The time lost up to this period was most injurious to the cause for which the English fought, and to the men by whom these victories were obtained.

#### CONQUEST OF AMOY.

The first enterprise of the new plenipotentiaries was the subjugation of Amoy, off the harbour of which the fleet found a rendezvous, on the 25th of August. The defences of the harbour were very strong, consisting of a continued battery of granite a mile in extent. This granite wall was faced by mud and turf several feet thick, so as to conceal the fortification. The embrasures were roofed, and thickly covered with turf, so as to protect the gunners. This battery terminated at either end in a high wall, connected with rocks which were of great elevation and parallel to the beach. A channel six hundred yards in width between Amoy and the island of Ko-long-soo was the entrance to the harbour. The fleet opened fire upon these fortifications in all their extent, and a dreadful cannonade was sustained for four hours by these works, without sensible injury. At last the troops landed, and assailed by escalade the flanking wall. The task seemed almost impossible, but the grenadier and light companies of the Royal Irish forced their way through every difficulty, and drove the enemy back. These gallant fellows were alone within the enemy's enclosure, with the whole host opposed to them. They acted as skilfully as bravely; having driven the enemy back with the bayonet, killing more men than had fallen from the fire of the whole fleet, they opened a gate, through which the rest of the army entered and took possession of the place. Ko-long-soo was an easier conquest, and contemporaneous with that of the great battery. The British acquired much provisions and stores useful in such a campaign. The quantity of corn, powder, and Chinese weapons captured was

enormous. The engineers blew up the magazines, broke up and inundated the arsenals, set fire to the war-junks and timber collected for building more, spiked five hundred cannon, and left the dockyards and fortifications in desolation. A force of five hundred and fifty men was placed in Ko-long-soo, and the ships *Pylades*, *Druid*, and *Algerine* were left in the neighbourhood; the rest of the armament moved on.

#### RECAPTURE OF CHUSAN.

This place had been newly fortified, on the same plan as Amoy. The embrasures for guns were 270, but not half of these were supplied with cannon, nor were the remainder efficient in half their number. Other works had been raised on heights commanding the approaches. The attack was made on the 1st of October, Sir Hugh Gough in person taking a very active part in the most dangerous portion of the enterprise. Two columns were landed, of 1,500 and 1,100 men respectively. The storm lasted for two hours, and was completely successful. The enemy lost 1,500 men. Many mandarins were among the slain. The British left a garrison of four hundred men, and proceeded to Chinhae.

#### CAPTURE OF CHINHAË.

This place was strongly fortified, after the Chinese fashion, and being the key to the great and rich city of Ningpo, its defence and capture were regarded as very important by those upon whom these different duties devolved. The city is built on the left bank of the Ta-hae and was defended by a strong citadel. The ships took up their positions so as to shell the citadel and enfilade the batteries. Sir Hugh adopted the same method of attack which had been successful in the assaults elsewhere; he landed separate columns, who escalated the flanking walls, and took the batteries in reverse. Captain Sir T. Herbert, R.N., Lieutenant-colonel Craigie, and Lieutenant-colonel Morris commanded separate columns of attack. The bombardment was most destructive. The flight of shells and rockets rushed from the ships in a continual stream. The city was in some places a heap of ruins, and thousands of its defenders lay dead or dying, while only nineteen of the assailants were killed or wounded. A garrison of five hundred men was left at Chinhae. The troops left in occupation of the conquered places caused such a deduction from the numerical force of the British as to tell seriously upon it, and there yet remained much work to perform before concession was likely to be wrung from so obstinate an enemy.

#### CAPTURE OF NINGPO.

The Chinese had expended all their precaution on Chinhae, and, believing it to be unassailable, took little thought about Ningpo. The Tartar troops had been so severely handled at the former place, that they were unwilling again to be brought into collision with British troops. The English force which landed for the purpose of storming this great city did not exceed one thousand men. The gates were barricaded, but no one had the courage to defend the walls, which were escalated; the Chinese assisted the escaladers to open the gates from within. The capture was made on the 13th of October, 1841. The English held possession, but so small was their force that the Chinese army in the field gained heart, and ventured to attack both Ningpo and Chinhae on the 10th of March, 1842. The disproportion of numbers was very great, but the enemy after some fighting, and after succeeding in penetrating to the interior of the city of Ningpo, were repulsed with slaughter. They made a bold attack upon the ships with fire-rafts, which was skilfully averted.

Intelligence reached the English commander that two intrenched camps were constructed at Tsekee, near the Segoon hills.\* It was determined to disperse the army collected there. On the 15th of March the troops were embarked on board the steamers *Queen*, *Nemesis*, and *Phlegethon*, and early in the afternoon landed within four miles of the camps. The British plan of attack was the same as had been adopted at the other captured places. The enemy made a feeble resistance. The English had only three killed and twenty-two wounded; all the killed and most of the wounded belonged to the sailors and marines; her majesty's 49th regiment numbered the remaining wounded, which were four rank and file and three officers, Captain T. S. Reynolds, and Lieutenants Montgomerie and Lane.

Early in May the city of Ningpo was evacuated, and the expedition advanced up the Yang-tse-kiang; two hundred men were, however, left in garrison upon the Pagoda Hill at Chinhae.

On the 18th the expedition arrived at Chapoo, about fifty-five miles from Chinhae;† the enemy was numerous, and made formidable preparations for resistance. The assailing force was small. The British, as usual, under Sir Hugh Gough, attacked in three columns. The usual result followed—the enemy fled. In their flight a body of less than three hundred Tartars had their retreat

\* Bingham says, *on the hills*, vol. ii. p. 297.

† Ibid.

ent off by the Camcronians. They threw themselves into a joss-house, and supposing that they would receive no quarter, defended it with great resolution: it was loop-holed, situated in a defile, and altogether difficult to assail; cannon made no impression upon it, and the musketry fire upon the loop-holes did not effect much. Attempts to break open the door were futile, so strong was it, and those who made the attempt suffered from the cool fire of the Tartars; amongst these that fine officer Lieutenant-colonel Tomlinson of the Royal Irish. Major Hough gives a different version, and perhaps the correct one, of his fall. There was, according to that officer's account, a wicket into which the soldiers might enter by single file; Tomlinson bravely set the example, and as he entered was either shot or cut down.\* Several of the officers and soldiery of the Royal Irish persevered in entering one by one, and suffered a similar fate. The gate was breached by bags of gunpowder, and the place previously fired by rockets; the troops entered, putting the defenders to the bayonet or making them prisoners. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was sixty. The total loss of the Chinese was about sixteen hundred, but many wounded had been carried away while the Irish were storming the joss-house. The city was nearly destroyed by the fire of the British guns and rockets. The proportion of officers who were killed or wounded in our force, especially of superior officers, made this affair one of the most serious during the war.

The expedition still advanced, effecting minor objects in its course, until the 16th of June, when her majesty's ship *Dido*, with eight transports containing troops sent from India, joined the fleet.

At Woo-sung, where that river forms a junction with the embouchure of the Yang-tse-kiang, and at Paoushan, bodies of Chinese troops had been dispersed, and collections of war material of various sorts destroyed, while the squadron waited for the arrival of reinforcements. On the accession of force the armament proceeded to attack Shanghai.† The capture of Shanghai was effected with exceedingly little battle, although considerable trouble and fatigue to both the maritime and military forces. The Admiral Sir W. Parker, the General Sir Hugh Gough, and Lieutenant-colonel Montgomerie especially exerted themselves.

Immediately after this success still further

reinforcements arrived. The *Belleisle*, from England, and a fleet of transports from India, brought the means of a still more vigorous prosecution of the war. Company's troops from both the Bengal and Madras settlements, and her majesty's 98th regiment, with Lord Saltoun and other officers of distinction, joined the expedition.

On the 6th of July seventy-three ships of war, including small craft, and attended by transports, proceeded up the Yang-tse-kiang. On the 17th Captain Bouchier, in the *Blonde*, was ordered to blockade the entrance to the grand canal. A fine squadron was placed at his disposal, composed of the *Modeste*, *Dido*, *Calliope*, *Childers*, *Plover*, *Starling*, and *Queen* and *Nemesis* steamers. Bouchier executed the task committed to him in an admirable manner, cutting off the whole junk trade with Pekin, one of the severest blows that could be inflicted upon his celestial majesty. On the 19th the *Cornwallis* took up a position off the city of Tchang-kiang, at the entrance of the south grand canal, while her marines occupied the Island of Kinshan. On the 21st the rest of the ships destined to operate against that city were at their berths, and the troops were landed, divided in the old way and attacking upon the old plan. The 1st column was under the command of Lord Saltoun, an officer who had seen much war, and had always acquitted himself well. He served in Sicily, 1806-7; Corunna, 1808-9; Walcheren, 1809; Cadiz, 1811; Peninsula; Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Sir Hugh Gough in person superintended the operations of the 2nd column. The 3rd column was placed under Major-general Bartley. The Tartar garrison was not very large, but very superior numerically to their assailants. The troops which composed it were picked men, most of them of gigantic stature and proved strength. They fought with desperate courage, under the impression, which the mandarins had inculcated, that the English would give no quarter. The guns at the embrasures were well served, the walls were high, and the gates strong. The engineers blew open the gates with bags of powder, and on other points escalades were effected. It was not until a large portion of the city lay in ruins under shell, and shot, and rockets, or was in conflagration, and the Tartar troops were nearly all put to the bayonet, that the English were masters of the place. When all opposition ceased, the sights that were disclosed filled the British with horror. Many of the citizens, and especially persons of rank, had cut the throats of their wives and children, and hung themselves in their houses, rather than fall into the hands of an enemy whom

\* *The War with China.* By Major Hough.

† In the geographical portion of this work the reader will find a fuller account of the Chinese cities, and of China generally, than is to be found in any work not exclusively occupied by information concerning that empire.

they were taught to believe neither spared man nor woman in their fury. Heaps of corpses were found lying in some of the houses to which the spreading flames had communicated themselves, and the odours of burning flesh told too truly what was taking place in others. Sir W. Parker, at the head of his marines, was frequently engaged in hand to hand conflicts with men who resisted with the wildest desperation. Lieutenant Crouch, R.N., and the crews in the boats of the *Blonde* suffered severely while operating on the Grand Canal, and the boats were with difficulty saved. The list of casualties after this day's conflict was very heavy. Bingham relates that the "arms and arsenals were destroyed, and the walls breached in many places." He also states that "the cholera broke out among our troops, and destroyed many men." The commanders-in-chief, to avert from Nankin the calamities that had befallen Tchong-kiang, dispatched the Tartar secretary with a summons and terms of capitulation to New-kien, viceroy of the two Kiang provinces. Keeying and Elepoo again attempted to open communications, but had not full power to negotiate.

On the 11th of August the fleet and 4,500 soldiers were assembled before Nankin, the old southern capital of the empire. The regular troops of the garrison did not amount to more than three times the number of their assailants, but an immense host of irregulars were within the walls. The Tartar general sued for an armistice of two days, as mandarins of the highest rank were on their way from Peking to treat for peace. This was conceded, but with some misgivings that the only object of the enemy was to gain time.

On the 17th of August a treaty of peace was signed between the Chinese commissioners and Sir Henry Pottinger, the British plenipotentiary. The following are its terms:

1. Lasting peace and friendship between the two empires.
2. China to pay twenty-one million dollars,\* in the course of the present and three succeeding years.
3. The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foo-choo-foo, Ningpo, and Shanghai, to be thrown open to British merchants; consular officers to be appointed to reside at them; and regular and just tariff of impost and export (as well as inland transit) duties to be established and published.
4. The island of Hong-Kong to be ceded in perpetuity to her Britannic majesty, her heirs and successors.
5. All subjects of her Britannic majesty (whether natives of Europe or India), who may be confined in any part of the Chinese empire, to be unconditionally released.

\* Four million two hundred thousand pounds, at two shillings per dollar.

6. An act of full and entire amnesty to be published by the emperor, under his imperial sign manual and seal, to all Chinese subjects, on account of their having held service, or intercourse with, or resided under, the British government or its officers.

7. Correspondence to be conducted on terms of perfect equality amongst the officers of both governments.

8. On the emperor's assent being received to this treaty, and the payment of the first instalment, six million dollars, her Britannic majesty's forces to retire from Nankin and the Grand Canal, and the military posts at Chin-hae to be withdrawn; but the islands of Chusan and Koolong-soo are to be held until the money payments, and the arrangements for opening the ports, be concluded.

An imperial edict announced the ratification of the treaty on the 29th.

The loss to the Chinese in this war was very great, independently of the humiliation, and the damage done to the prestige of the Peking government in the estimation of the people. Three thousand pieces of cannon were taken, many very serviceable,—the majority only fit to sell for old metal. The Chinese war-junks were nearly all destroyed, but it is impossible to compute their number. Vast stores of arms, gingals, matchlocks, swords, spears, &c., were captured, which, although of no use to the British, were a heavy loss to the Chinese. Independently of the indemnity for the war, the ransom paid for Canton was 6,669,615 dollars, and nearly 200,000 dollars were found in the treasuries of the different places captured. Two hundred tons of copper were taken at Chin-hae. The total loss to China, in dollars, was about six millions sterling; the destruction of material for both war and peace was enormous. The lesson taught to China was severe, but it did not produce the effect which the friends of peace would wish to find among the fruits of war to the vanquished. The Chinese did not profit by the experience derived for any very long time, they relapsed again into the arrogance and oppressiveness which brought on the war.

The conduct of the navy and army of England was in every way laudable throughout the war. The rewards which they received were not very munificent, but were on a much more liberal scale than was generally the case in the British service. A batta of six, twelve, and eighteen months, according to the time served in the expedition, was dispensed to the officers. Some promotions and brevet honours were given.

Lord Saltoun remained in command of the army in China until the indemnity was secured according to the terms of the treaty. Sir Hugh Gough passed to other scenes of warfare, with which his name will be coupled in British history.

## CHAPTER CXVIII.

WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS OF GWALIOR—BATTLES OF MAHARAJPORE AND PUNNIAR—DANGERS ON THE SIKH FRONTIER—LORD ELLENBOROUGH RECALLED—MR. BIRD GOVERNOR-GENERAL, *pro. tem.*—SIR HENRY HARDINGE ARRIVES AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

AFTER his operations in China, Lieutenant-general Sir Hugh Gough was nominated to the command of the forces in India, and his services were soon demanded in a short, decisive, but sanguinary war.

The treaty of Berhampore, in 1804, bound the English to maintain a force to act upon the requisition of the Maharajah of Gwalior to protect his person, his government, and the persons and government of his heirs and their successors. The maharajah of that date was Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That chief died June 18th, 1827. When on his death bed he sent for Major Stewart, the company's political agent, and informed him that he desired him, as acting for the company, to do as he thought best for the welfare of the state. The heir was Jhunkogee Rao Scindiah, who maintained faithfully his relations to the company's government. At his decease, the heir was Tyagee Rao Scindiah, he was moreover adopted by the Maharanee Bazeé Bae, the widow of his highness. The maharajah was a minor. The regency was, at the desire of the maharaneé and the chiefs, placed in the hands of Mama Sahib, a competent person. The company's government did not interfere, but acquiesced in the arrangements peaceably made by those most interested. The maharaneé, with the fickleness of persons in her situation in India, expelled the sahib, and one Dada Khajee Walla, became her confidant, against the will of the chiefs, and without consulting the British government. The new functionary suppressed the correspondence of the English officials, which their government denounced as the assumption of an act of sovereignty, and rendering it impossible any longer for the government of Calcutta to correspond with or through the usurping regent. Efforts to adjust these disputes by quiet means having failed, the governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, issued a proclamation, December 20th, 1843, setting forth the facts, and declaring the necessity of enforcing by arms the rights of the young maharajah in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1804.

An army assembled at Hingonah, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough. The governor-general attended the army. Vakeels, from certain of the Mahratta chiefs, sought to negotiate. This, however, was a scheme of

the usurping regent to gain time, for he had resolved to appeal to force to assert the absolute character of his regency. The governor-general did not see through his wiles, and in consequence of the inactivity of the English army for five days, in the very crisis of the occasion for which it appeared in the field, much loss of life occurred that otherwise might have been spared. It at last became obvious that battle must decide the questions at issue. The combinations of the commander-in-chief were such as to gain the marked approbation of the governor-general. The army was divided into two separate corps, or as Lord Ellenborough's *post facto* proclamation calls them, two wings. Sir Hugh Gough in person took the command of one, which was directed against Maharajpore; and Major-general Grey was nominated to the command of the other, which was directed against Punniar. At each of these places a battle was fought contemporaneously, and, after victory decided both fields in favour of the British, the two corps formed a junction and united under the walls of Gwalior.\*

## BATTLE OF MAHARAJPORE.

On the 29th of December, 1843, the *corps d'armée* under the command of Sir Hugh Gough crossed the Kohurec river at dawn. The enemy had acquired great strength during the night, and was drawn up in front of the village from which the battle took its name. Their position was strongly intrenched, and with considerable ability. Eighteen thousand men, of whom one-sixth were cavalry, and one hundred cannon, defended the intrenchments. The cannon were too numerous for the number of troops they were intended to strengthen; some of them were very large; the artillerymen were well instructed, especially the one gunner to each piece. Up to this point the management of the English had been at once tardy and precipitate; there was haste without speed, there was talent without prudence and precaution; the mind of Lord Ellenborough himself impressed the whole proceedings, and Sir Hugh Gough did not display that independence of thought necessary, however difficult, when the governor-general was in camp. A reconnaissance

\* For description of this place see descriptive and geographical portion of the work.

took place, upon which the plan of action was formed to direct the chief attack upon the Chonda intrenchment, where the guns and the enemy were supposed to be, as the village of Maharajpore was not then occupied. Brigadier-general Valliant's brigade was to lead the action, and Major-general Littler was to support the movement. The delay, want of vigilance and of effective reconnaissance, rendered the plan of battle abortive, and the rear became the column of attack, when the enemy suddenly opened fire from the village of Maharajpore. The grand elements of success, by Sir Charles Napier, in the two terrible battles of the Scinde campaign, especially in that of Meannec, were the effective reconnaissance, and the previous calculation of every supposable contingency. So imperfect was the reconnaissance in the battle now related, that the British hardly knew the precise position of the enemy they were about to attack, and were themselves surprised by the unexpected opening of a deadly fire upon troops who expected to be engaged in another part of the field. The governor-general, Lady Gough, and other ladies and civilians, were, in consequence of this want of management and foresight, in the most imminent danger, and for a short time exposed to the fury of a cannonade within easy range. The attacking army was not greatly inferior in number to that of the enemy. Perhaps never had an action been fought with any native power where so large a proportion of men to those of the enemy were ranged on the side of the English. The Mahrattas were, however, much stronger in artillery, the English having only forty guns, a proportion of which were not ready for immediate use. When Sir Hugh Gough had been ordered to march from Agra, he was to have taken fifty battering guns. Only ten were taken, the governor-general and commander-in-chief having been misled by the pacific assurances of such of the Mahratta chiefs as were in the interest of the maharanees and the regent. Everything was to be carried with a high hand, and this lofty and magniloquent spirit characterised the direction of affairs throughout. Major-general Littler, instead of having to support Valliant, had to begin the action. A terrific cannonade was opened upon these soldiers, many of whom perished, who, by proper management, might have been saved. In the despatch of Sir Hugh the severity of this cannonade is referred to, as awakening the valour of the soldiers, and the usual phraseology of despatches about nothing being "able to withstand the rush of British soldiers," celebrates the success of the attack; but there is nothing said to extenuate the faults which exposed

these men unexpectedly to the havoc of a terrible artillery, which no means had been taken previously to silence or subdue. The 39th foot, bearing upon their banners, since the battle of Plassey, "*Primus in Indis*," supported by the 56th native infantry, according to Sir Hugh Gough, "drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts." How they could be driven from their guns into the village, and bayoneted at their posts at the same time, passes the comprehension of a civilian. Probably the general meant that the infantry ranged behind the guns were so "driven," while the artillerymen remained "at their posts" and died. Even this would not express the fact,—many, both infantry and artillery, perished in defence of the guns, and the mass were driven in upon the village. In the despatch the commander-in-chief wrote that the 39th and 56th "drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts," and immediately adds, "Here a most sanguinary conflict ensued," &c. It is difficult from this passage to gather where the sanguinary conflict took place,—whether at "their posts," the place immediately referred to, or at the village into which the great body of the defenders were driven. According to the facts, however, the village was hotly contested, the Mahrattas throwing away their musketry or matchlocks, and using only their more congenial weapon the sword. The conflict was not of long duration: British skill and valour decided it with deadly promptitude. Sir Hugh's favourite and feasible practice in China he found available here also: General Valliant's brigade was ordered to take *in reverse* the village so fiercely assailed in front; this confused the gallant defenders, who ran wildly about, striking loosely at everything, and then falling before musket-ball and bayonet. Most of the men who defended the village perished, and the capture of twenty-eight cannon rewarded the exploit of the victors. On the extreme left of the British, Brigadier-general Scott was engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and, with disproportionate numbers, kept them all occupied. He and Captain Grant, with his horse-artillery, even menaced the right flank of the foe. Valliant's brigade, in conformity with instructions given before the battle, had suddenly assumed a form not contemplated, and moved against the Mahratta right, already threatened by Scott. His object of attack was Chonda, but on the way he had in succession to storm three intrenchments. The Mahrattas elung to their cannon, unwilling to leave them in even the last extremity, causing heavy loss to the British, especially in officers

of forward valour. The 40th regiment lost two officers in command, Major Stopford and Captain Codrington, but happily they survived; these gallant soldiers fell wounded under the muzzles of the guns, and bearing the flags which they chivalrously captured. While Valliant was thus impeded by obstacles of so formidable a nature, Littler, dashing through the enemy's line at the right of the captured village of Maharajpore, pursued his way over broken ground upon Chonda, where the 39th British regiment, led by Major Bray, and the 56th native infantry, led by Major Diek, gained the main position at the point of the bayonet. The battle was now over. It might have been more easily won by good arrangements, but could not have been better fought by the gallant soldiers who conquered. The Mahrattas lost nearly one-fourth of their whole number. The British incurred a loss of 797 men, of whom 106 were killed, including seven officers, who were either slain on the field or died of their wounds.

#### BATTLE OF PUNNIAR.

While Gough was fighting the confused but successful battle of Maharajpore, General Grey was winning the battle of Punniar. That officer acted with promptitude and vigilance; the enemy were attacked without allowing them any time to strengthen their position, and with a small force a comparatively easy conquest was made of a very strong position occupied by twelve thousand men, more determined in war than the natives of India usually are. The British loss was 215 killed and wounded. The casualties would have been fewer had not the troops been fatigued by a long and sultry march.

The junction of the two *corps d'armée*, each having won a decisive battle, under the walls of Gwalior, awed the durbar into submission. The Mahratta troops of his highness were disbanded; a British contingent, consisting of four companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, was formed, the expense of supporting which was to be borne by the maharajah. This contingent soon became as much a native army as that which was disbanded, and figured seditiously when the mutinies of 1857 gave opportunity to the disaffected in every Indian state to betray their real feeling. The expenses of the war were paid by the state of Gwalior.

The governor-general issued a proclamation, in which he panegyricized the dauntless courage of the British officers and men. He exaggerated grossly the importance of the war, declaring what was obviously absurd,

that "it gave new security to the British empire in India."

It is difficult to imagine that by good statesmanship this war might not have been avoided, and by better generalship decided with little loss in a single action. The policy however was sound. The English fulfilled a treaty which the usurping regent compelled them to enforce; and the relations of the English to the Sikhs were at the time most critical. Lord Ellenborough, in his despatches, justified his policy on that ground. He observed that under ordinary circumstances the different parties in Gwalior might be left to fight out amongst themselves all questions of the ascendancy of ministers or ranee, who should be regent, and what chiefs ought to have most influence, but with a magnificent Sikh army menacing the British frontier, it was necessary to bring the affairs of Gwalior to a speedy termination. The policy of letting them alone would be the wisest in a time of peace, but should war break out with the Sikh army, then the Gwalior force would occupy a position of hostile watchfulness, ready to deepen defeat into ruin, or embarrass successful enterprise. Not knowing how affairs with the maharanee of Lahore might issue, Lord Ellenborough thought it high time to settle matters with the maharanee of Gwalior. Still, when the whole case is impartially and comprehensively viewed, it is reasonable to think that prudent and skilful statesmanship might have averted a conflict, and even secured the goodwill and aid of the government and army of the Gwalior Mahrattas in any collision with the Sikhs. As the policy adopted towards Gwalior confessedly turned upon the threatening aspect of the Punjaub, it is necessary to show what our relations were at that time with the strangely blended military and ecclesiastical power which occupied that country, and over which the young and amiable Maharajah Dhuleep Singh then nominally reigned. It is the more necessary to review these relations, as in a short time the most sanguinary wars India ever saw arose out of them, the account of which must be reserved for another chapter.

From the period of the campaign from Peshawur in favour of Shah Sujah, our relations with the Sikhs beyond the Sutlej became exceedingly disturbed. Notice has been incidentally given of the progress of that people, and in the descriptive and geographical portions of this work the country which they occupy has been depicted.

In 1805, when Holkar resisted English arms so stubbornly, and sought the aid of the Sikhs, we entered into treaty with them.

Runjeet Singh was the monarch of the Punjaub. That remarkable man was born in 1780, and twelve years after, upon the death of his father, was proclaimed head of the Sikh nation. Runjeet obtained Lahore from the Affghans, and had already a position of influence and power in northern India. In 1824, Cashmere, Peshawur, and Mooltan became his conquests. He then also reigned over the whole of the Punjaub proper. He always showed a decided friendship for the English, whether from partiality or policy never could be determined.\* He died on the 27th of June, 1839. At that juncture he was allied with England for the restoration to the throne of Cabul of the expatriated monarch Shah Sujah.

After the death of Runjeet the affairs of the Sikh nation became perturbed, and the old friendship to the English was displaced by feelings of suspicion and dislike. The Mohammedans of the Punjaub always hated the British, and their hatred found vent when the expedition to Cabul by way of Peshawur was undertaken. This animosity and rooted jealousy extended until the chiefs were with difficulty restrained from attacking the army of General Pollock on his return from Cabul. Various revolutions delayed any attack upon the English, but the Sikh people being ambitious of obtaining Scinde and Delhi within their empire, the English were regarded as impediments to the expansion of Sikh power. Apprehensions of encroachment were also entertained, but the common soldiery and all members of the Sikh nation who were not politicians believed that the power which suffered such reverses in Affghanistan was not invulnerable. These reverses had caused the resistance to our aggressive policy in Scinde, and had also left the legacy, as the reader will learn, of long and sanguinary conflicts with the Sikhs. The victories of Sir Charles Napier in Scinde had somewhat restored British prestige, but the same effect did not follow the conquest of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Gough. The Mahrattas were not greatly superior numerically to the British, and yet they maintained in two pitched battles a regular and arduous fight. The fame of this Mahratta resistance spread all over India, and led the Sikh soldiery to believe that as they were, at all events in their own opinion, better troops than the Mahrattas, the ascendancy of the British in India might be disputed. An aggressive war at last became supremely popular in the Punjaub.

Dhuleep Singh, a boy ten years of age,

\* *History of the Sikhs.* By Captain J. D. Cunningham, Bengal Engineers.

reputed to be the son of Runjeet Singh, ascended the throne, and Heera Singh became vizier. The minister found it impossible to control the soldiery. The army which Runjeet had so well organized for conquest, and which he had so well controlled, now ruled the state. The vizier and various other eminent courtiers were put to death by the paramount power, the army. The maharanee had a favourite named Lall Singh. Her influence was great, and she used it with skill to promote him to the viziership.

It soon became a settled policy with the more serious and reflecting chiefs to desire a war with the English, not for the sake of conquering them, which they believed to be impossible, but in the expectation of first getting the army away from the vicinity of Lahore, and then in the hope that they would be slain or dispersed by collision with the English. In such case it was supposed that the English would come to terms, and approve even of the policy. It was not calculated how the English might feel to the Sikh nation after losing thousands of brave men in a war for defence of their Indian dominions against a sort of military imperial republic, nor was it considered by these Lahore politicians how the expense of a war with the English would ultimately fall upon the Punjaub and upon the crown of Dhuleep Singh, the unoffending victim of such a conflict. Such was the state of the relations between the English and the Sikhs when war broke out. It was no doubt hastened by the knowledge on the part of the Sikh soldiery that the government of Calcutta was bound to assist the maharajah against all enemies. Should the military faction carry its spirit of revolt further, and the court of Lahore call for English aid, as was expected, it would probably be rendered. Some of the chiefs were favourable to such a course; this was known throughout the Sikh army, and caused the murder of several eminent persons. It led the majority of the troops to the decision that a sudden attack with their whole force upon the English would break their power, at least compel the cession of rich territory, perhaps issue in the establishment of a Sikh empire all over India. The wildest dreams of ambition were cherished, the fiercest religious fanaticism fostered, and exultation spread through all ranks of the army and many classes of the people at the prospect of a grand war for empire, in which the banner of the Khalsa would float from Calcutta to Kohistan.

The war which followed was not conducted under the auspices of him whose Indian administration did so much to stimulate and increase if not to create the feeling which

caused it. Lord Ellenborough was recalled. His passion for military glory offended the East India Company. Ever since the system sprung up of nominating a peer to the general government of India, huge military enterprises had been carried on at a ruinous expense to the company. The English cabinet had a strong temptation to countenance Indian wars; they entailed no expense upon the English exchequer, gave immense patronage to the crown through the board of control, and the governor-general afforded support to a large portion of the royal army, and increased the prestige of English power in Europe. Great was the indignation of the holders of Indian stock with the wars of Lord Ellenborough, all of which were rashly waged, and that in Scinde aggressively, rapaciously, and unrighteously to a degree revolting to the minds of peaceable and just English citizens. The company determined to recall Lord Ellenborough. They did so without the consent of the cabinet, and in spite of its protests. The order of recall arrived in Calcutta on the 15th of June, 1844. The government immediately devolved upon W. W. Bird, Esq., the senior member of the Bengal council. Lord Ellenborough was *fêted* in Calcutta, but the homage paid to him was chiefly by the military. On the first of August he set sail for Europe. The Duke of Wellington manifested great indignation at his recall and the mode of it, and the party leaders in both houses intimated all sorts of threats against the East India Company for

exercising its undoubted prerogative, and for doing so in the interest, as it believed, not only of the holders of East Indian stock, but of India and of England. The noble viscount was created an earl by the government as some consolation for the attacks made upon him in the press both at home and in the East, and the general indignation which his policy excited in England. His political opponents generally made a very unfair and unscrupulous use of the unpopularity excited by the conduct of his wars.

The vacant governor-generalship was given to Sir Henry Hardinge, who was an able general, and who as an administrator had given great satisfaction to Sir Robert Peel. The directors gave the new governor-general a grand entertainment, and in a long speech impressed upon him the necessity for peace, in order that economy might be possible, without which the welfare of the populations of India could not be promoted, as their condition depended upon social improvement, and the development of roads, railways, river navigation, educational institutions, &c. These things could not be afforded to them by the company, unless peace allowed of that financial prosperity always impossible where a war policy prevailed. Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in India at Calcutta on the 23rd of July, and preserved indefatigably and wisely the policy assigned to him by the directors. The Sikh war, however, interrupted these dreams of progress, and darkened for a time the financial condition of India.

## CHAPTER CXIX.

### THE SIKH WAR—BATTLES OF MOODKEE, FEROZESHAH, ALIWAL, AND SOBRAON—ADVANCE UPON LAHORE—PEACE.

ON the 17th of November, 1844, the Sikh soldiery began the war. On that day the determination to invade Hindostan was taken at Lahore, and in a few days the troops moved upon the Sutlej. On the 11th of December the invasion began. The Sutlej was crossed between Hurrakee and Russoor. On the 14th a corps of the army took up a position near Ferozepore. The new governor-general was as much taken by surprise as Lord Ellenborough and his guard were at Maharajpore. Sir H. Hardinge assured the secret committee, in his correspondence with London, that there was no probability of the Sikh troops attempting to cross the Sutlej. This opinion was excusable in Sir Henry, as being inexperienced in Indian affairs and the

habits of Indian races. He was, however, warned by persons better competent to pronounce an opinion on the subject than he could be, that the Sikhs were about to pass the river. It was the fashion, at government-house, especially in Lord Ellenborough's time, to sneer at the civil service, particularly when civilians, however experienced, offered opinions which touched at all upon military matters. Sir Henry had, however, been warned by military men, as well as civilians, whose opinions should have received attention, that the Sikhs would burst across the confines of their empire like a flooded river suddenly rising and overflowing its banks. Sir Henry and the commander-in-chief (Sir Hugh Gough) were slow in believing the

result, and as slow in preparing against a contingency which had been probable for so long a time. Captain Nicholson and Major Broadfoot, however, watched the movements of the enemy, and furnished the government with all necessary information. The garrison of Ferozepore was the first threatened by the approach of the enemy. It consisted of seven thousand men, commanded by Sir John Littler. They marched out, and boldly offered battle, which the Sikh leaders, Lall Singh, and the vizier, and Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, declined. They, in fact, gave Captain Nicholson to understand that they had no desire for success, and would not attack an isolated division of the British army, as their object was to bring their own army into collision against the grand army of the British, that the latter might be broken up by defeat resulting from its presumption. The subsequent conduct of these chiefs hardly corresponded with these professions. The advance of the main army of the British, under Sir Hugh Gough, brought on the battle of Moodkee, the first of the war.

When the troops arrived at that village, they were exhausted with fatigue and thirst. The general moved them on in quest of the enemy, whom it was known was in the neighbourhood, and likely to attack. Sir Hugh has been criticised for not drawing up his men in front of the encampment, and awaiting the arrival of the Sikhs. He advanced, however, and about two miles distant found them in order of battle. The scene of battle was a flat country, covered in part with a low shrubby jungle, and dotted with hillocks, some of which were covered with verdure, but most of them bare and sandy. The jungle and the undulated inequalities of the ground enabled the Sikhs to cover their infantry and artillery, presenting a good position, which was occupied by troops giving every indication of having confidence in themselves.

The British force consisted of the Umballah and Loodiana divisions of the British army, which had just formed a junction. The number under Lord Gough's command did not exceed eleven thousand men, while that under Lall Singh and Tej Singh amounted to thirty thousand. The enemy had forty guns, the British a small proportion of artillery. The quality of the British force was well adapted to the undertaking. It consisted of the division under Major-general Sir H. Smith, a brigade of that under Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-general Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery and two light field-batteries, under Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, of the horse

lery force), and the cavalry division, consisting of her majesty's 3rd light dragoons, the body-guard, 4th and 5th light cavalry, and 9th irregular cavalry. The artillery of the enemy opened with formidable effect upon the twelve British battalions of infantry as they formed from echelon of brigade into line. The battery of horse artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, for a time replied to so severe a fire without silencing it, but being reinforced by two light field-pieces, that object was accomplished. In order to complete the formation of his infantry without advancing his artillery too near the jungle, Sir Hugh Gough made a flank movement with his cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, upon the left of the Sikh line. This was a brilliantly executed and effective movement. The dragoons turned the enemy's left, and swept along the whole rear of their line of infantry and cannon. Perceiving the admirable execution of these orders, Sir Hugh directed Brigadier M'Tier to make a similar movement with the remainder of the cavalry upon the enemy's right. Had not the position of the Sikhs been so well chosen, these manœuvres would have probably filled their ranks with consternation. As it was, little more was effected than to surprise the enemy, distract his attention, and enable the English infantry to form and advance with less loss than otherwise would have been the case. The day was far advanced when the British line of infantry charged, and the battle was fought in the dusk of evening and by starlight. The English attacked in echelon of lines. Amidst clouds of dust and smoke, deepened by the shadows of closing day, the English rolled their heavy musketry fire into the jungles, still approaching: sometimes the enemy fell back under this fire, or the close discharges of the horse artillery, who galloped up to the jungle; in other instances the sand hills and the brushwood were contested amidst the dash of bayonets and the grapple of desperate conflict, when man meets man in a struggle of victory or death. To the bayonet of the English infantry Sir H. Gough attributed the success of his charge. The enemy was compelled to withdraw, leaving seventeen guns in the hands of the British. The army returned to camp about midnight, and rested on the 19th and 20th of December, to collect the wounded, bring in the guns, and refresh the exhausted troops. Major-general Sir R. Sale died of his wound; Sir J. M'Caskill was shot through the chest and killed. The number of killed were two hundred and fifteen, wounded six hundred and fifty-seven; total, eight hundred and seventy-two. The enemy killed and wounded many officers

by firing from trees. This was a heavy loss to the small army of Sir Hugh Gough. The death of Sale and M'Caskill, two of the best officers in India, was regretted by all the officers of the army, and by the gallant soldiers who had so often followed them to victory.

#### BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH.

On the 21st the army marched to within three or four miles of Ferozeshah. Sir John Littler had been ordered to form a junction with the grand army, with as large a portion of the garrison of Ferozepore as could safely be withdrawn from it. The governor-general afterwards wrote a narrative of the junction of these forces, and the operations they were called upon to perform. Anything from the pen of Sir Henry Hardinge (afterwards Lord Hardinge) on a military subject will be eagerly read; his account is therefore given of the complicated transactions which ensued:—

“At half-past one o'clock the Umballah force, having marched across the country disencumbered of every description of baggage, except the reserve ammunition, formed its junction with Sir John Littler's force, who had moved out of Ferozepore with five thousand men, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field-guns. This combined operation having been effected, the commander-in-chief, with my entire concurrence, made his arrangements for the attack of the enemy's position at Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united. The British force consisted of sixteen thousand seven hundred men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse artillery. The Sikh forces varied from forty-eight thousand to sixty thousand men, with one hundred and eight pieces of cannon of heavy calibre in fixed batteries. The camp of the enemy was in the form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah; the shorter sides looking towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Ferozepore and the open country. The British troops moved against the last-named place, the ground in front of which was, like the Sikh position in Moodkee, covered with low jungle. The divisions of Major-general Sir J. Littler, Brigadier Wallace (who had succeeded Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill), and Major-general Gilbert deployed into line, having in the centre our whole force of artillery, with the exception of three troops of horse artillery, one on either flank, and one in support to be moved as occasion required. Major-general Sir H. Smith's division and our small cavalry force moved in a second line, having a brigade in reserve to cover each wing. A

very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of which were of battering calibre; these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous artillery of much lighter metal checked in some degree, but could not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced and carried these formidable intrenchments; they threw themselves upon the guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy; but when the batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiery had to face such a fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that, in spite of their most heroic efforts, a portion only of the intrenchment could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging.”

Sir Hugh Gough thus narrates the events of that terrible night, and of the succeeding day:—“Although I now brought up Major-general Sir H. Smith's division, and he captured and long retained another point of the position, and her majesty's 3rd light dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouacked upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In this state of things the long night wore away. During the whole night, however, they continued to harass our troops by the fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered our position. But, with daylight of the 22nd, came retribution. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse artillery, whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played with great effect upon this point, dismounting our pieces, and blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir H. Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. Our line advanced, and, unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then, changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along its front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards

of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field.

"In the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Singh, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozepore fresh battalions and a large field of artillery, supported by thirty thousand Ghorechurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position at Ferozeshah. This attempt was defeated, but its failure had scarcely become manifest, when the sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank, and when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village as compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns during this manœuvre maintained an incessant fire, whilst our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats, we were unable to answer him with a single shot. I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire, and to abandon the field." The enemy's camp "is the scene of the most awful carnage, and they have abandoned large stores of grain, camp equipage, and ammunition."

The conduct and issue of this battle are given in the language of Sir H. Hardinge's narrative, and of Sir Hugh Gough's despatch, contrary to the plan generally observed in this work, because the mode in which this battle was fought, and the conduct of the whole campaign, especially up to this point, have been so much criticised in India and in England, and by military men in Europe and America. As to the battle itself, it has been observed that the British artillery did not display the superiority usual in Indian warfare. The Sikhs are said to have fired three times for every two shots from the British guns. The position taken up by the British has been condemned. As before the battle of Moodkee, there was inadequate information. The intelligence department of the army failed to prove itself effective. It has been even stated by military men that the British army marched along the rear of the Sikh position, on which "face" of the intrenchments there were no guns, and took post in front of the lines from which the Sikh cannon were directed, and generally so fixed, that they could not have been turned to the reverse, had the attack been directed upon it. The proportion of numbers to those of the well-equipped and well-disciplined enemy was unjust to the British soldier. No adequate conception had

been formed by the governor-general or the commander-in-chief of the task undertaken. The foe was underrated. The defective information at Calcutta, and want of judgment among those who had the chief control of the campaign, and the responsibility of providing for it, cost fearful loss of valuable soldiers. So badly was the army provided, that, although only the second conflict of the campaign, and upon the confines of British territory, the battle was all but lost for want of ammunition. As subsequently at Inkerman, and previously on so many hard-fought fields in India and elsewhere, the English soldier was left without ammunition at a most critical juncture. The commissariat and carriage were in a condition which caused the soldier much suffering. The intrenchments were undoubtedly stormed, but they were not generally formidable, not being more than eighteen inches high; but the new force brought up by Tej Singh would probably have retaken the ground, had not an accident led him to withdraw. The English cavalry left the field, and marched to Ferozepore. This order the officers declared was given by official authority. If so, either a shameful blunder was committed, or a retreat was contemplated. The fact is, however, that the cavalry, or a large portion of it, left the field, and exposed the whole army to the most imminent peril. This blundering episode was, however, mistaken by Tej Singh for a grand measure to attack him in the rear; and supposing that the English must have obtained reinforcements to attempt the like, deemed it prudent to withdraw his army. Thus an accident, such an accident as it was disgraceful should occur in any European army, actually relieved the British of the presence of the enemy at a juncture when the men and their ammunition were nearly exhausted. It was natural that the British public should be dissatisfied with a battle where so many fell before a native force, and where at last an accident, itself discreditable to an army, caused the foe to retire at a juncture when, from another circumstance also disgraceful to the management of the force, there was an inadequate supply of ammunition. Neither Sir Henry Hardinge nor Sir Hugh Gough showed the foresight, comprehensiveness, nor faculty of detail necessary to great commanders or great statesmen. Both showed great ability in handling small numbers in action, and probably never on any field, by any commanders, was more dauntless bravery shown. During the nights of suspense, when the wearied British soldiery lay down under the incessant fire of the enemy's artillery, which ploughed up the ground in various directions,

Sir Henry Hardinge went among the soldiers, lay down among the groups, chatted with them in a tone of confidence, talked of "chastising the Sikhs next morning if they were insolent," and thoroughly sounded the temper of the soldiers as to what reliance might be placed upon them in the dreadful conflict which awaited them. Sir Henry with sleepless energy was everywhere, and everywhere the soldiers received him with an heroic confidence in him and reliance on themselves, displaying a surprising heroism.

During the series of battles—for the conflict was a series of struggles, not a single action—Sir Henry Hardinge exposed his person with romantic gallantry. Several members of his family were by his side in every peril. On one occasion a cannon-ball passed between him and his aide-de-camp, to whom at a short distance he was addressing some words. How Sir Henry or any of his staff escaped is astonishing. Sir Hugh Gough was also in the front of battle on his right, by word and gesture animating his men, and first in daring wherever danger invited. Both these heroic men, whatever their errors as commanders, displayed the highest chivalry; and each also in the action, whatever their deficiency of foresight previously, displayed experience and competency to command in battle. They were first-rate generals of division—they were more; but whatever their subsequent successes or display of military skill, the conduct of the campaign, reviewed as a whole, was not marked by enlarged ability for the conduct of armies.

The Sikhs retired to the neighbourhood of Sobraon, on the right bank of the Sutlej. Thither Sir Hugh Gough and the governor-general pursued, taking up a position from which they might observe the enemy in all directions. The following were the dispositions made from this centre by both armies. The Sikhs manœuvred from Sobraon, along the right bank of the Sutlej. The British army executed an oblique movement to its right and front. Major-general Sir H. Smith, supported by a cavalry brigade, under Brigadier Cureton, was in this new allinement, still on the right, opposite to Hurreekie Puttun; Major-general Gilbert in the centre; and Major-general Sir R. Dick on the left, covered again by cavalry. Major-general Sir J. Grey, at Attaree, watched the Nuggur ford. The troops of Major-general Sir J. Littler occupied the cantonment and intrenchment of Ferozepore. There was no doubt that Sirdar Runjoor Singh Mujethea had crossed from Philour, and not only threatened the safety of the rich and populous town of Loodiana, but would have

likewise turned the right flank, intersected the line of our communication at Busseean and Raekote, and endangered the junction of our convoys from Delhi. Brigadier Godby commanded three battalions of native infantry at Loodiana. Major-General Sir H. Smith, with his brigade at Dhurmkoote, and Brigadier Cureton's cavalry, were directed to advance by Jugraon towards Loodiana; and his second brigade, under Brigadier Wheeler, moved on to support him.\* Brigadier-general Godby was ordered to reinforce Major-general Smith. The march was a disastrous one. General Smith was thrown out of communication with General Wheeler, a matter of serious strategical importance. The enemy hung upon Sir Harry's flank and rear with courage and pertinacity, executing difficult evolutions with skill and rapidity. According to Sir Harry's despatch, "a portion of the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy." The fact, however, was, a great deal was lost. It was placed, in the different manœuvres which the constancy and activity of the enemy compelled, between the two forces, and was captured.

The sirdar took post in an intrenched camp at Budhowal, fifteen miles lower down than Loodiana.

#### THE BATTLE OF ALIWAL.

On the 28th of January, 1846, the battle so designated was fought by Sir Harry Smith. The cavalry, under the command of Brigadier Cureton, and horse artillery, under Major Lawrenson, formed two brigades—one under Brigadier MacDowell, 16th lancers, and the other under Brigadier Stedman, 7th light cavalry. The first division as it stood consisted of two brigades: her majesty's 53rd and 30th native infantry, under Brigadier Wilson, of the latter corps; the 36th native infantry and Nusseree battalion, under Brigadier Godby, 36th native infantry; and the Shikawatte brigade, under Major Foster. The Sirmoor battalion was attached to Brigadier Wheeler's brigade of the first division: the 42nd native infantry had been left at head-quarters.

The regiments of cavalry headed the advance of the British. As they approached they opened and wheeled to either flank, and the infantry and artillery formed line and approached. The scene was grand and imposing. The glittering lines of the Sikhs flashed like silver in the sun, while their dark looming guns were pointed with well-judged range against the approaching ranks.

The form of battle was peculiar; the left of the British line and the right of the Sikhs were remote, while the British right was very

\* Major Hough.

near to the enemy, whose line as it approached the British stretched far beyond. The disadvantage of this outflanking extension of the enemy's left was counterbalanced by the judicious arrangements of Sir Harry Smith's cavalry on his extreme right. The grand object of the British was to secure the village of Aliwal. He directed the infantry of his right wing against that post. It was occupied by hill men, who made a feeble resistance, but the Sikh artillerymen died at their guns. The British cavalry on the right charged through the enemy's left, dividing his line, and breaking up a large portion of the army. At the same time the Sikhs opposed to the British left, consisting of their best troops, outflanked the English line. Here a charge of British cavalry also turned the fortunes of the day. The British lancers were received by well-formed Sikh squares. The British rode through them; but as they did so, the Sikhs closed behind, as some of the British squares did when partially penetrated at Waterloo. The Sikh infantry received the English lances on their shields, breaking many of those weapons. Again the British charged through, and, by a happy manœuvre, changed the lance from the lance hand. The Sikhs not being prepared for this, caught on their persons instead of on their shields the thrusts of their foes. A third time the British cavalry rode through the squares before they were effectually broken and dispersed. It was a battle in which British cavalry effected wonders against infantry.

The enemy endeavoured to rally behind Boondrec; but the hot pursuit of the British deprived them of this last resource of despair. Numbers were driven into the river, and shot down by musketry and discharges of grape as they struggled across. Fifty pieces of cannon were captured. On this occasion the superior skill of the British artillery was made apparent. Major Lawrenson, early in the action, on his own responsibility, galloped up within close range of the most destructive of the enemy's cannon and swept the gunners from their posts. In the pursuit, the play of two eight-inch howitzers made fearful havoc upon the dense and disordered masses of the fugitives.

The loss of the enemy was extremely heavy, but could not be computed. When the dead bodies floated down the Sutlej to Sobraon, both British and Sikhs then first learned that a great battle had been fought, and these silent and appalling witnesses bore evidence, striking and conclusive, on which side victory lay.

Among the officers who had distinguished themselves at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, none

was more signally useful, or dauntlessly intrepid, than Lieutenant-colonel Havelock, afterwards the saviour of British India. At Moodkee two horses were shot under him, but he escaped without a bruise. At Ferozeshah his heroic conduct attracted the admiration of all who had opportunity to observe it. The calm resoluteness of the man may be conceived from a single incident. During the bivouac on the first sad night at that place, Lord Hardinge, in his glorious efforts to encourage the men, came upon Havelock lying asleep from excessive fatigue: *he had chosen a bag of gunpowder for his pillow.* To the exclamations of Lord Hardinge's astonishment the hero quietly replied, "I was so tired."

#### BATTLE OF SOBRAON.

On the left bank of the Sutlej, at Sobraon, the Khalsa army had collected its strength, and it was resolved by the British leaders to attack that post as soon as General Smith and the victors of Aliwal should form a junction with the army, and when siege artillery and other heavy ordnance should arrive from Delhi. The strange want of proper preparation which had hitherto characterised the councils and operations of the British authorities still prevailed. The English were allowed, with a very small force of artillery, consisting of field-pieces, light guns, and howitzers, to march against intrenchments covered with guns of the heaviest calibre, worked by the most skilful artillerymen that any native power in India had ever possessed. Now, it was absolutely necessary to wait for a supply from the arsenal at Delhi, before the strong position of Sobraon could be attempted. It was well that Tej Singh, instead of recommencing the battle of Ferozeshah, did not march to Delhi and make an easy capture of the stores, upon which the British now relied to complete the war.

Sixty-seven pieces of artillery were in battery upon the trenches which the enemy had constructed, and the greater part of the infantry were within the defences. The cavalry, under Lall Singh, were dispersed along the river, observed by the British cavalry, under the gallant and skilful Generals Thackwell and Cureton. Lord Gough estimated the number of the enemy at 35,000 men. Major Hough says, that 20,000 men would exceed the actual number. The Sikhs themselves afterwards stated their number to have been 37,000. The defences were not constructed on scientific principles, yet excessive labour had made them strong. Hurbon, a Spanish officer, and Mouton, a Frenchman, aided the defence, but the haughty pride of

the Sikhs persisted in measures which these officers opposed. There were several other French and Spanish officers of professional reputation in junior positions.

Early in February, 1846, part of the siege train and stores arrived. Sir Harry Smith joined on the 8th. Some of the stores and heavy guns did not arrive until after the action was over. The battle commenced on the 10th of February. Before dawn a surprise was made on a post called Roode Wallah, or the post of observation. That post the British had allowed, from sheer negligence on the part of the superior officers, to fall into the hands of the enemy, just as they had allowed the defences of Sobraon to become formidable without any efforts to retard or molest the foe, still waiting for guns and stores which should have been with the army from the beginning, as there had been ample time to prepare against an inroad which every one seems to have foreseen but the chief civil and military authorities.

The surprise of Roode Wallah was successful, and soon after the possession of that position the battle began. It was an action exceedingly complicated, and the generalship of both sides was regarded as exceedingly defective. There was a want of scheme on the part of the Sikhs, and of concentrated authority and guidance; and similar deficiencies existed on the English side. There was also an impatience and impetuosity which sacrificed many lives, although the means of a more scientific attack were at hand. After all the delay, guns of a sufficient calibre were wanting in the hour of action, and the infantry were precipitated upon the formidable batteries without the latter having been silenced by those of the British. The English infantry were formed into line for the attack as if the whole face of the trenches had been equally assailable: the result was the whole line was exposed to the enemy's cannon, and the devouring grape swept numbers away that by a more scientific arrangement would have been saved. After all, the men were obliged to crowd together in wedges or columns, and penetrate the gaps made in the intrenchments by the English artillery. The difficulty of entering the trenches was great; the Sikhs disputed every battery and every defence with fierce courage, giving and receiving no quarter, cutting down and hacking mercilessly the wounded who fell into their hands. It is probable that the infantry might have failed to accomplish their arduous task, had not the cavalry aided them in an unusual but not altogether unprecedented way. The sappers and miners broke down portions of the intrenchment, and let in the 3rd light

dragoons, and afterwards the irregular native cavalry, in single file. There was room, when once in, for these cavalry to form to a certain extent, and charge the infantry; while others with desultory impetuosity rode at the guns, sabring the gunners and capturing the cannon. Long and furious was the conflict, and never did men fight and fall more bravely than the Khalsa soldiery. At last, after the repeated ebb and flow of battle, the Sikhs were pushed back from all their defences, rallying and fighting as they slowly retired. It became necessary to cross the river, and they had not taken proper pains to maintain the communications in their rear. An excellent bridge of boats had been constructed, but Tej Singh, who ran away at the beginning of the assault, broke the centre boat of the chain, either from treachery or from accident; accordingly, when the retreating force came to that point they were stopped, or threw themselves into the river, and endeavoured to escape by swimming. As the fugitives retired to the bridge of boats they were cut down in great numbers by the pursuing troopers, and on the bridge were exposed to volleys of musketry, flights of fiery rockets, and showers of vertical grape—it was a carnage, a carnage most horrible for human arm to inflict, or human eye to witness; multitudes perished in the river, piles lay dead upon the bridge, round-shot crashed, and bursting shells rent the bridge itself, and masses of the dead and dying sank together into the flood, which ran red with human gore. The Sutlej had risen that day seven inches, thus rendering the efforts of the fugitives to ford the river much more perilous than they could have supposed. Some fought their way along the banks and reached fordable spots well known to them, and in this way many thousands escaped to the opposite bank. They reassembled and took post on a distant elevation, but some dispersed, and others continued their flight to Lahore. The words of the poet were literally applicable when the rays of the setting sun fell upon the swollen Sutlej, the shattered batteries of Sobraon, and the exulting host of the British as they buried their dead, and tended the wounded:—

“Night closed around the conquerors' way,  
And lightning showed the distant hill,  
Where those who lost that bloody day  
Stood few and faint, but fearless still.”

It would be difficult to award the meed of praise to any particular corps of the British army in this dreadful battle. The artillerymen throughout the Sikh war displayed undaunted bravery, officers and men of the horse artillery galloping up close to heavy batteries, and, by their rapid discharges of

grape, sweeping away the Sikh gunners from their guns. The 10th regiment of infantry, newly arrived, were exceedingly forward in the conflict, and the 3rd light dragoons merited the eulogy of the commander-in-chief, when he said, "they seem capable of effecting anything possible to cavalry, and of going anywhere that cavalry can go." The Goorkha regiments were exceedingly efficient. Sir Hugh Gough, in his despatch, said of them, "I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Goorkhas, the Sirmoor and Nusseree, met the Sikhs, wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of small stature, but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation, and armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat."

The Sikhs acknowledged that their loss was nearly fourteen thousand men. The English suffered heavily; many were ill after the battle from excessive fatigue and fever, arising from their exertions. Under the cannonade and in the storm the loss was heavy. Major-general Sir R. Dick died of a wound received in the intrenchments. He was a gallant old Waterloo officer. Major-general Gilbert was slightly wounded; and of the officers, killed and wounded, most suffered through the extraordinary courage they displayed. Lieutenant-colonel Havelock (the future hero of Lucknow) had a miraculous escape,—a ball entered the saddle-cloth, killing his horse, without so much as a bruise occurring to himself.

Immediately upon the battle of Sobraon, Sir John Littler, who was posted with a very powerful division at Ferozepore, crossed the river, and the main army prepared to follow. The cavalry dispositions were excellent, under the skilful arrangements of Generals Cureton and Thackwell.

The intelligence of the battle of Sobraon did not create so much exultation as might be expected in England or British India. It was indeed a great relief, as was also that of the battle of Aliwal; but there existed much dissatisfaction with the conduct of the whole campaign, and there was a disposition to throw more than his share of the blame upon Sir Hugh Gough, while Sir Robert Peel and his government were assiduous in screening from censure Sir Henry Hardinge. Both were favourites of the Duke of Wellington, for he knew the noble gallantry of the men, and their very great efficiency in serving in the highest commands, not actually supreme. The public were not, however, satisfied by

even the military testimony of his grace, much more than by the special pleading of the plausible baronet. It was obvious that a great deal had been left unthought of by both the heroes of the war. Some of the most efficient soldiers and officers in the British service had perished, who, in all probability, would have been preserved had the campaign, in all its aspects, civil, political and military, been conducted as it ought to have been. Guns, ammunition, supplies, were all wanting; Delhi had been left exposed to a *coup*, if Tej Singh had been a skilful enemy, or loyal; egregious blunders had been committed, vast quantities of baggage were lost to an inferior enemy; infantry attacked a wide area of trenches in line, although these trenches bristled with the heaviest ordnance, and when every officer and soldier knew that attack in column would not only have spared the men, but more easily have conduced to success. The management of the campaign did not even improve as blunders and their consequences were developed. The enemy was allowed to seize an important post just before the battle of Sobraon; that place was permitted to assume strength, which had a Wellington, a Napoleon, or a Havelock commanded, would, by skilful manœuvres, have been prevented; and at last infantry were compelled to storm with the bayonet intrenchments the guns of which were far from being disabled, because there was no longer an adequate supply either of artillery or musketry ammunition. Had the fire of the cannon and musketry upon the retreating force on the bridge of boats, on the fords, and on the fordless river, been as full and continuous as it was well directed, and as it would have been had the ammunition been adequate, nearly the whole Sikh army would have been destroyed. These things were discussed not only by military men, but among the middle classes of England, who had become more capable than formerly to canvass the conduct of military affairs.

Having crossed the Sutlej, Sir John Littler pressed vigorously forward, and Kussoor fell to the British without a blow. The Sikhs re-collected at Umritsir, individually as brave as ever, but collectively enfeebled and depressed. Gholab Singh, of Jummoo, opened negotiations with Sir Henry Hardinge in the name of the infant sovereign, Dhuleep Singh. The English representative demanded a million and a half sterling as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and the cession of all the country between the Beear and the Sutlej, as security against further aggression. The Sikhs were reluctant to concede so much, but Sir Charles Napier had marched up with

reinforcements from Scinde, which decided them. The English were unwilling to accept the concessions which they ultimately obtained, but the season was, in Sir Henry Hardinge's opinion, too far advanced to justify any demands which might lead to renewed hostilities. Generally the reasoning of his excellency did not appear sound on this matter to the officers of the Indian army and the members of the civil service; but Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, the government and parliament, approved of the policy Sir Henry adopted.

The young maharajah tendered his submission in person to the representative of the Queen of England, and on the 20th of February the British army arrived at Lahore, as the allies of Dhuleep Singh. The public entry of the maharajah with his new allies was a pageant at once gorgeous and impressive, occidental and oriental pomp strangely blending in the scene. The ensigns of civil authority and military power dazzled the eyes together. The insignia of Eastern royalty, and of that anomalous power, the great Company Sahib, were, to the disciples of Govind, marvellously mixed. The population gazed at the great sight as if it were a scene of magic. Only a short time before the mighty army of the Khalsa (or Church) of the Sikh prophet marched forth from the gates of the capital: since then the Sutlej had run red with their blood, their unburied corpses lay along its banks, the prey of the Indian kite, the vulture, and the other savage creatures which infest the ground where battle has raged. The ponderous cannon—the pride of the Sikh soldiery, and which they knew so well how to direct—swelled the train of the conqueror, or lay in broken fragments upon the shattered trenches, which the valour of Sikh, sepoy, and Briton

had stained with the blood of the brave. It was more like the relation of some Indian tale of gods and spirits creating strange phantasies among the abodes of men than a reality. The Sikh could not realize it. The beaten soldier stalked forth and viewed the anomaly with scowling brow, but unarmed hand—bewildered, baffled, wonder-struck, but not cowed. The Lahore citizen sulked, and gazed with an interest and listlessness as incompatible as they were obvious. The women, not so reserved or secluded as in India proper, were pleased with the pageant; they uttered no joy nor grief, but shared with their husbands, sons, and brothers in hatred to the conquering stranger, who, carrying his machines and arts of slaughter from afar, over western and eastern seas and shores, now humbled the sacred Khalsa under the shadow of its citadel.

The pageant passed away, English regiments garrisoned the metropolis of the Sikhs, General Littler held its military resources in his grasp, and a treaty professed to secure perpetual friendship and alliance between the East India Company and the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh. Gholab Singh managed to serve his sovereign and himself. He became the chief of the beautiful region of Cashmere. This was ceded instead of money, Gholab Singh purchasing it from the British. The new Maharajah of Cashmere, by the 3rd article of a treaty signed March 10th, gave the British three quarters of a million sterling for the territory. On the 15th of March, 1846, he assumed his title and his sovereignty. Thus ended the first Sikh war, as glorious as it was fatal to the valour of the Sikhs; as unfortunate for the reputation of English prudence and military skill as it was glorious to the heroism of the English soldier.

## CHAPTER CXX.

THE SECOND SIKH WAR—REVOLT OF CHUTTUR SINGH—MURDER OF ENGLISH ENVOYS AT MOOLTAN—GALLANT CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT EDWARDES—GENERAL WHISH BOMBARDS AND CAPTURES MOOLTAN—SENTENCE ON MOOLRAJ—ADVANCE OF LORD GOUGH—BATTLE OF RUMNUGGUR.

THE second Sikh war commenced almost immediately after the first had concluded; at least the elements began to work which burst forth in an irruption of desolation and carnage once more.

As soon as the treaty referred to in the last chapter had been concluded, the British

government of India settled down into the conviction that, in the eyes of the Sikhs, the English were irresistible; and that however the Sikhs might murmur or create partial disturbances, a revolt against the last treaty, or the predominant influence of the English at Lahore, was highly improbable. Sir Henry

Hardinge's mind was filled with the delusion. He was utterly unacquainted with India, its people, its modes of thought, its political ethics. Circumstances had never directed his mind to the subject. He was not sent from England, any more than his predecessors, because he knew anything about India, or possessed any peculiar fitness. He was a political *protégé* of Sir Robert Peel; had answered the baronet's party and political purposes well in certain situations at home, and was rewarded with the honourable, lucrative, and, therefore, coveted post of governor-general of India. In Ireland he had made an expert, red tape, parliamentary partizan secretary. He held himself on polite and good terms with Irish politicians and Irish gentlemen, and was admired by that gallant people for his chivalrous soldierhood. He had no qualifications which fitted him for the governor-generalship of India. There were hundreds of the company's servants, and scores of servants of the crown, better adapted to the office. The old principle was maintained of making the office a reward for political partizanship or service in parliament, and with the old results. A second Sikh war broke out, finding the English as little prepared as for the first, simply because they had exercised no foresight to prevent it, or to provide against its occurrence.

On the 5th of April, 1847, Sir Henry, then Viscount, Hardinge, wrote to the secret committee in London that the Sikh chiefs, comprising the durbar of Lahore, were carrying on the government with a loyal desire to execute the treaty. At that time the majority of the durbar were plotting the destruction of the English. At the end of May (the 27th), he again addressed the secret committee, holding forth the same assurances that all was well. In that letter he quotes the opinions of the British resident, no less gifted a person than Lieutenant-colonel H. M. Lawrence, that as usual all sorts of reports were raised of intentions on the part of the Sikhs, and even of the chiefs, against us, which were greatly exaggerated, and many obviously false. These "reports" seem to have been utterly rejected at government-house; yet no man who had studied the religion, disposition, and antecedents of the Sikhs could doubt that those rumours had a basis in the wide-spread disaffection of chiefs and people to the alliance of Dhuleep Singh with the stranger, and the presence of the latter in any part of the Punjabee empire.

The first symptoms of opposition appeared in a resistance to the possession by Gholab Singh of the territory for which he had paid the English. It was necessary to have recourse to arms in order to put down, and keep

down, a pretender who disputed the new maharajah's claim. Soon after, Chuttur Singh, an influential chief, raised the standard of revolt.

The next indication of opposition was made by Moolraj, the khan or chief of Mooltan. That chief had in various ways given offence to the durbar of Lahore, or at all events to the English influence in that durbar. Remonstrances having proved ineffectual, Moolraj was addressed in terms which plainly intimated that unless his conduct was shaped in conformity with the behests of the durbar, force, in the name of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, would be employed. Upon this Moolraj responded by expressing his intention of resigning his government of Mooltan into the hands of any authorized person or persons sent to receive the trust. Whether this was a pre-arranged manœuvre between Moolraj and the opponents of the English in the durbar it is difficult to determine; it is probable, however, that had native officers only been sent to receive the surrender, it might have been made *bonâ fide*. The English resident ordered Mr. Agnew, of the civil service, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay army, to accompany Sirdar Khan Singh, who was nominated to the dewan of Mooltan. Five hundred and thirty irregulars were sent as an escort. Moolraj made a show of surrendering his dewanee, but made pretexts of delay.

Meantime, insurrections began in the city, and the two Englishmen were slain. Moolraj affected to be no party to this crime, but averred that he had no power to punish the perpetrators, who were popularly upheld. It was a foul and treacherous murder, in which Moolraj had complicity. If he were not the original plotter of it, he undoubtedly abetted the murderers after the deed. The mode in which the transaction took place has been recorded by the author of this history in another work, lately reissued by the same firm, *Nolan's Continuation of Hume and Smollett's History of England*. The way in which it is there related, and the consequences which followed, are placed with brevity before the reader.

On the 17th of April the authority was surrendered in due form by Moolraj, and the object of the British officers seemed to be accomplished. On the 18th they were attacked and desperately wounded; it was at first supposed from a sudden impulse on the part of the soldiery of Moolraj, but it was afterwards known to be the result of treachery. The officers, accompanied by the new governor, were carried to a small fort outside the town. A fire was opened upon the place from Mooltan, but it was ineffectual. A few days afterwards, however, the fort was attacked by

the soldiers of Moolraj; the Sikhs who garrisoned the place, and among whom were the escort, treacherously opened the gates, and the assailants entered, foaming with rage, and demanding vengeance upon the infidel officers. Lieutenant Anderson was in a dying state; but Mr. Agnew, although so badly wounded, defended himself with resolution to the last: both officers were murdered. Intelligence of these barbarities reached Lahore with the speed so peculiar to the East; and a force of three thousand cavalry and some infantry was dispatched, under Sirdar Shere Singh, against the refractory city. There happened to be upon the Indus, at the head of a small force, a young and gallant officer who had served with distinction upon the staff of Lord Gough, and who was favourably known by his clever contributions to the India press on the state of the company's territory, civil and military: this officer was Lieutenant Edwardes. He was engaged in settling a disturbed district of country, and in collecting the land-tax due to Moolraj, as Sikh governor of Mooltan. At the same time, Colonel Van Cortlandt, a native of India, and a distinguished officer in the service of the company, occupied Dhera Ismael Khan, also in the neighbourhood. Lieutenant Edwardes crossed the river into the Deerajat, whence he wrote to the Khan of Bhawulpore, requesting him to make such a movement of troops as would prevent Moolraj from falling upon either Edwardes or Cortlandt. The khan's territories were so situated as to enable him to effect a military disposition to accomplish this object. The khan made the required demonstration. When Edwardes crossed the Indus, he left a detachment of three hundred horse to protect the collection at Leiah, where, on the 18th of May, they were attacked by a body of cavalry exceeding their own in number, sent against them from Mooltan, with ten light field-guns (zumbooruks). The British force so manœuvred as to attain a good position, although under the fire of the zumbooruks, and then charged brilliantly, dispersing the Mooltanese, and capturing their guns.

Colonel Cortlandt was as prompt as Edwardes in the measures taken by him. He left the fort of Dhera Ismael Khan, and proceeded by the base of the hills southward. On his route he was joined by a Beloochee chief, with one hundred of his wild followers. Cortlandt detached these, with a portion of his own troops, against the fortress of Sunghur, westward of the Indus. The commander of the fort refused the summons of surrender, and for six hours maintained a gallant resistance; he then brought off the garrison by a skilful manœuvre, reaching Mooltan in safety.

Lieutenant Edwardes and Colonel Cortlandt effected a junction of their small forces, and on the 20th of May were attacked by a division of the Mooltan army. The united forces of Cortlandt and Edwardes were so disposed that not more than one thousand five hundred men could be brought into action, while the enemy numbered three thousand. The artillery force of each was about equal. Edwardes was, however, joined by a body of irregular cavalry and a party of Beloochees, which brought up the British force more nearly to an equality of numbers. The Sikhs in British pay happily showed no disposition to fraternise with the Mooltan army, although the calculations of Moolraj were based upon such an expectation. The enemy suffered a signal defeat and great slaughter. The Beloochees behaved remarkably well. The skill of British officers turned the balance in favour of the native army under their command.

After this engagement, Edwardes, acting upon the authority which he possessed as a civil officer of the company, demanded a reinforcement from the Khan of Bhawulpore, and in the meantime recruited his force by Sikhs, Beloochees, Affghans, and men from the hills of various tribes. The faculty of organization, the ceaseless activity, and the courage of this young officer were surprising. Colonel Cortlandt was also equal to the part assigned him; but, although senior in military rank, the civil functions of the former gave him an especial, and, in some respects, superior authority. The Khan of Bhawulpore responded to the demands of Edwardes, and a plan was laid for a junction of their troops. In pursuance of this, the British crossed the Indus on the 10th and 11th of June. Moolraj was informed by his spies of every movement, and the intelligence was conveyed to him with astonishing rapidity. He accordingly marched a large force to intercept either army, and beat both in detail. On the 14th he crossed the Chenab, leaving a considerable force on the other bank. This detachment marched to Khan Ghur, but on the following day crossed the river, being surprised at that place by the advance of Edwardes's irregulars. The Mooltanese had barely time to cross the Chenab, when the scouts of the English galloped into Khan Ghur. The Sikhs, instead of receiving Edwardes's force at that place, and practically attempting the scheme of Moolraj, encamped on the opposite side of the river, in observation of the British officer and his little army. This delay and timidity were fatal; for the lieutenant was soon joined by the infantry and a portion of the artillery of Cortlandt, whose cavalry were scouring the country. The situation of affairs became now interest-

ing and important, for the Bhawulpore forces had arrived on the enemy's side of the Chenab, within twelve miles. Edwardes made a retrograde movement, so as to place himself opposite the Bhawulpore encampment. The enemy advanced to within four miles of that position. In the course of the night, the raw levies of Edwardes contrived to cross the river in a very irregular manner, and within dangerous proximity to the enemy's patrols, but were unmolested. On the 18th, early in the morning, the lieutenant crossed with the remainder of his men, except the horses and artillery, which remained with Cortlandt on the opposite side, for a more slow and safe transport across the river. Scarcely had the lieutenant gained the opposite bank than he was attacked by the Sikh army, which had been moving up from Bugurarah while he was gaining the passage. This was a terrible engagement. The sun had hardly risen upon river, and swamp, and undulating plains, when the Mooltanese forces fell upon the motley crowd of the British levies, and in such superior numbers that victory seemed certain. For nine hours the English officer resisted the onslaught, and by his valour, activity, presence of mind, and moral influence, kept his undisciplined forces in firm front to the foe. At last Cortlandt's guns were brought over, and made the contest somewhat equal. Later in the day, two regular regiments belonging to the colonel's division arrived, with six guns, and the enemy panic-struck fled, leaving a large proportion of their troops upon the field, slain, wounded, and prisoners, with six guns, and their entire baggage and munitions of war. The conduct of Edwardes throughout the day was splendid, and laid for him a deeper foundation still than had already existed for his military reputation.

Moolraj retreated to Mooltan, followed by the British and the Khan of Bhawulpore, who had rendered hitherto but little assistance, and whose movements led to the suspicion that he had more sympathy with Moolraj than he dared to avow.

On the 28th of June a Sikh brigade under the command of Sheik Emaum-ood-deen, which had been dispatched by the government of Lahore, arrived to reinforce the English. The whole army appeared before Mooltan, consisting of eighteen thousand men.

Emaum-ood-deen retired; the bulk of his force remained, and was ultimately placed under the command of Shere Singh, who professed to be on the side of the maharajah and the English, but was in reality organizing a most perilous plot of treachery and treason. While, however, the shere maintained this profession of loyalty, he was rapidly joined

by other sirdars with troops, under the same pretence, but also with the same aim.

The Nawab of Bhawulpore, Colonel Cortlandt, and Lieutenant Edwardes remained before Mooltan, constantly skirmishing with the enemy, their force being inadequate for the reduction of the place, but too strong to be easily beaten off. Sir John Littler was of opinion that the forces under the British officers and their allies should be left as an army of observation, and no offensive operations undertaken against Mooltan until the general plans of the enemy became developed, and the English had gathered a main army sufficiently strong for the complete suppression of revolt throughout the Sikh territories. The commander-in-chief had formed the same opinion, independently of Sir John Littler's communications.

On the 13th of July, 1848, Lieutenant Edwardes warned his superiors that Shere Singh was a traitor, and was collecting forces to aid the revolt, under cover of co-operation with the English. Either the higher officials did not credit the sagacious judgment of Lieutenant Edwardes, or they neglected to act upon it. Shere Singh had ample scope for maturing his plans.

On the 22nd of July a proclamation was issued against Moolraj, charging him with rebellion and murder.

On the 18th of August, Major-general Whish, a distinguished artillery officer, arrived with a force of seven thousand men, and took command of the whole investing army. On the 12th of September the place was bombarded, and other operations undertaken, which prepared for the finale of the struggle. On the 14th Shere Singh marched from Mooltan with his division, consisting of the finest soldiers of the Sikh army. Moolraj was anxious for the withdrawal of the sirdar; had he remained, it is probable that the forces sent by the English government against Mooltan would have failed. Lieutenant Edwardes had contrived to ferment disputes between these chiefs by letters fabricated for the purpose of deceiving them. Each chief came into the possession of a supposed correspondence between the other and the English, which the spies of Edwardes placed in their hands, pretending to betray him for sake of the Khalsa cause. The departure of Shere Singh involved operations elsewhere on the part of General, then Lord Gough, himself, as commander-in-chief of the grand army of the Punjab, which had been collected for the suppression of the revolt. For nearly four months the operations before Mooltan were discontinued from want of reinforcements. The arrival in December of Brigadier-general the Hon. D. Dundas,

with a division of Bombay troops, enabled General Whish to decide the contest. The enemy's intrenchments were attacked on the 27th of December. A chance shell from one of the mortars blew up the magazine, causing extraordinary loss of life and destruction of material. The grand "musjid" and many of the principal houses were laid in ruins. The granaries also were totally destroyed.

Whish was now at the head of a very large army, amounting to fifteen thousand British, European and native, and seventeen thousand of the troops of the Rajah of Bhawalpore and other allies; he had also one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On the 2nd of January, 1849, Mooltan, after a terrible cannonade, was stormed. The resistance was desperate, the Sikhs fighting as at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon, with the tenacity of men and the ferocity of wild beasts. Old Runjeet Singh and his soldiers were well named, when called "the Lions of the Punjaub." It was not until the 21st that the citadel was surrendered. Moolraj demanded terms of capitulation. General Whish would hear of nothing but an unconditional surrender. This was at last made, and the sirdar, with firmness and dignity, delivered himself a prisoner. He made no manifestations of grief, nor allowed depression to cloud his brow. He bore himself with uncommon fortitude until he learned that banishment from his country, not death, was to be his doom; he then gave way to violent expressions of grief and despair, and begged to be executed in the country of his birth and of his love, rather than be sent away to drag out life miserably, as must be his fate when an exile. He was a murderer, and deserved a murderer's death. Such was pronounced upon him by a court-martial commissioned to try him, but he obtained the respite, which he would not accept as an act of clemency, but denounced as a refinement of cruelty.

Seldom did a conquered city display so terrible a scene as that witnessed in Mooltan. The dead and dying lay everywhere, and notwithstanding the cold season, the odour arising from putrescent corpses was intolerable. One of the first duties which the conquerors felt bound to impose upon themselves was the discovery of the bodies of their murdered countrymen, and their burial, or re-sepulture. The bodies were discovered cast into an obscure place, and covered with earth. They were exhumed and publicly interred, with military honours. Poor Anderson's own regiment was among the troops who effected the conquest, and their band played the dead march as they followed the remains of their brave and talented comrade in arms. The

coffins were deposited in a grave at the highest part of the fort, with every demonstration of respect, and much manifestation of sorrow for their loss, and the cruel end which they had experienced.

The army of General Whish, which was set at liberty by this conquest, prepared to join the grand army under General Gough. Whish was a brave, prudent, and skilful artillerist, but rapidity of action was not among his soldierly qualifications. Dundas was even more tardy than Whish, and the progress made to join the commander-in-chief was so slow as to baffle his lordship's calculations, and the operations of the campaign.

Before the junction of the two armies took place, various events befell that which Lord Gough commanded. He had been ordered to collect an army at Ferozepore. This duty was slowly and most imperfectly executed. The experience of the previous war was thrown away upon governor-general, commander-in-chief, and the executive of the army generally. All the defects of commissariat and transport remained as they were when their deficiency nearly destroyed the British army in the previous Punjaub war. This is the testimony of every writer and every officer acquainted with the affairs of British India at that time. On the 21st of November, 1848, Lord Gough joined the grand army at Saharun, a position from which he could march with nearly equal advantage upon any point of the territory where decisive events were likely to take place.

The Punjaub takes its name from the five rivers which water it.\* The Chenab is the central of these five rivers. The theatre of opening war was between the Chenab and the Indus, and bounded by the confluence of these rivers. The town of Ramnuggur lay upon the left bank of the Chenab, stretching to a distance of a mile and a half from the stream. That place was the point of support and headquarters of Shere Singh, who had, as before related, left the vicinity of Mooltan. He had now decided upon a separate line of operations. An island was situated in the middle of the Chenab, at a bend of the river opposite Ramnuggur. Shere Singh occupied the island by a brigade, and with batteries erected there commanded the ford, or nullah, as a ford at low water, or any water course, natural or artificial, is called in the vocabulary of the country. Besides the forces on the right bank of the river and on the island, the Sikhs had a strong body of troops on the left bank, which, in the first instance, it appeared to Lord Gough ought to be dislodged. The strength of the main position of Shere Singh at Ram-

\* See geographical portion of this work, p. 32

nuggur was very great, it was flanked on one side by the land in the river, on the other by a grove. Between the right bank and the island the communication was maintained by boats, with which the enemy was well supplied; they were a peculiar description of craft, suitable especially for this purpose. The ford, or nullah, between the island and the left bank was not very difficult, but the descent to it was steep.

The whole of Shere Singh's arrangements were scientific. Lord Gough commenced his operations by directing the 8th light cavalry to advance along the left bank, supported by her majesty's light dragoons and the company's light horse. The 8th skirmished, the enemy receding as the supporting cavalry came up. The horse artillery, in their ever forward valour, pushed into the deep sand on the margin of the river, and brought the enemy's position at Ramnuggur within range. The guns in position there were very heavy, and opening with precision upon the light pieces of the English soon silenced them, and forced the men to retire, leaving one or two ammunition waggons behind. The 14th light dragoons were directed to charge them, supported by a regiment of native cavalry.\* The 14th dragoons were commanded by Colonel William Havelock, brother to the hero who afterwards won in India a renown immortal. Colonel William Havelock was one of the most intrepid officers in the service. During the "Peninsular war" in Spain, when a mere boy, he had signalised himself by extraordinary feats of daring worthy the old Norse sea-kings, from whom he is said to have been descended. Such enthusiasm did he inspire among the Spaniards, that although seldom willing to stand before the French, they would follow young Havelock anywhere. Generally when he led them a cry would go forth, "Follow the fair boy!" and with a shout they would rush with him into dangers other officers could not induce them to encounter. This was the hero upon whom the task devolved of charging with the 14th light dragoons into the nullah. The author having described this action in the work referred to in the note, will here quote the description of the heroic General Thackwell, who was an eye-witness. That officer having noticed the events already recorded on this page, goes on to say:—"It was while the enemy were thus apparently setting us at defiance that Lieu-

tenant-colonel Havelock, of the 14th dragoons, requested permission to charge, and drive them from the bank. No sooner had the equivocal assent been accorded than the flaxen-haired boy of the Peninsular, on whose deed of valour the military historian has proudly dwelt, entering into a hand gallop, at the head of his men, soon threw himself on the crowd of Sikhs who lined the high bank. The 5th light cavalry, under Lieutenant-colonel Alexander, ably supported the gallant 14th. So impetuous was the onset of these determined warriors, and so energetically and effectually did Havelock and his troopers ply their swords, that the bank was swept in a few minutes of all its swarthy occupants, who, running hastily down the bank, across the sand, threw away their standards in their flight. Not contented with having driven the enemy from this position, Havelock, animated by that fiery spirit which glowed within him, instantly resolved to exceed the limits of his mission, and renew the offensive, contrary to the real wishes of the commander-in-chief, by continuing the charge on the discomfited enemy, and driving them back across the river. Yielding to his insatiable love of glory, he brandished his sword above his head, and calling on the squadron of the 14th, in reserve under Lieutenant-colonel King, to come and support him, dashed furiously down the steep declivity into the tract of sand in which, it will be remembered, the gun had been immovably fixed, and over which Captain Ouvry had charged. The British cavalry becoming now fully exposed to view, the Sikh batteries opened a rapid and destructive fire upon them. The Khalsa infantry also, summoning fresh courage, began to stand and open matchlock fire on their pursuers. The horses of the dragoons soon became exhausted in this difficult ground, their feet every moment sinking into deep sand or mud. Our cavalry were not only exposed to the fire of the batteries across the river, but some guns, which had been dragged to the left bank, had taken up a position near the green island above alluded to, and the presence of this artillery inspired the enemy with fresh courage. The deportment of Havelock was more that of a mortal confiding in the protection of the ægis of some divinity than that of an ordinary human being. In the last charge, always in advance, he suddenly disappeared, and the latest glimpse of that daring soldier disclosed him in the midst of the savage enemy, his left arm half severed from his body, and dealing frantic blows with his sword, so soon doomed to droop from his trusty right hand. His last words were—"Follow me!" Some days after the action,

\* In the author's *Continuation of Hume and Smollett's History of England* he described, upon what appeared to be adequate authority, this regiment as the 3rd; General Thackwell says it was the 5th. See *Nolan's Hume and Smollett*, chap. lv. p. 729, and Thackwell's *Sikh War*, p. 40.

a mutilated corpse was discovered, which the chaplain of the army, Mr. Whiting, recognised by the hair on the body to be that of this gallant but ill-fated sabreur. Such a death was worthy of William Havelock."

The slaughter of the brigade commanded by Havelock was not the only misfortune which befell the army in the rash attempt upon the nullah. Major-general Cureton rode up with an order of retreat from Lord Gough. The moment he delivered the order he received two balls simultaneously, and fell dead from his horse. Thus two of the finest cavalry officers in the British, or in any other army, perished in this ill-fated charge. The troops retired discomfited and dispirited.

On the 30th of November, Captain Nicholson, whose services had so often proved available in the civil department, discovered a small ford higher up the river; he had also the address to provide some boats. At this point Major-general Thackwell was ordered to cross, and take the enemy on that flank, while Lord Gough remained in front watching for any opportunity for striking a deadly blow, which the movement of Thackwell might create. It was not an easy task for the general to cross by the imperfect ford, and scanty supply of boats. His dispositions were skilful, but his difficulties were formidable. On the 3rd of December he effected the passage. Shere Singh did not, however, allow him to surprise his flank, nor to pass to his rear. He moved out an adequate force to check the movement of the English general. On the 4th of December Thackwell was himself menaced on his flank by guns and cavalry. His orders fettered him. Nothing was left to his discretion, although he was quite as competent as the commander-in-chief to conduct difficult operations in the face of an enemy. Thackwell's orders barely allowed of his replying to the enemy's cannonade, but he made such able dispositions as deceived the enemy both as to the amount of his force and his intentions, and the Sikh force retired upon its main body. The action, chiefly an artillery battle, which arose from the flank movement of General Thackwell, takes the name of the battle of Sodalapore, although it was more a series of demonstrations and a duel of artillery than a battle. General Thackwell, having been a good historian of war as well as a distinguished actor, in his own words shall relate the course of a conflict which was better known to him than to any one who has told the tale of his success:—"After a cannonade of about two hours the fire of the enemy slackened, and I sent Lieutenant Patton to desire the cavalry on the right to charge and take the enemy's guns, if possible, intending

to support them by moving the brigades in echelon, from the right at intervals, according to circumstances; but as no opportunity offered for the cavalry to charge, and so little of daylight remained, I deemed it safer to remain in my position than attempt to drive back an enemy so strongly posted on their right and centre, with prospect of having to attack their intrenched position afterwards. From this position the Sikhs began to retire at about twelve o'clock at night, as was afterwards ascertained, and as was conjectured by the barking of dogs in their rear. I have every reason to believe that Shere Singh attacked with twenty guns; and nearly the whole of the Sikh army were employed against my position, which was by no means what I could have wished it; but the fire of our artillery was so effective that he did not dare to bring his masses to the front, and my brave, steady, and ardent infantry, whom I had caused to lie down to avoid the heavy fire, had no chance of firing a shot, except a few companies on the left of the line. The enemy's loss has been severe; ours, comparatively, very small."\* The force which had passed over with General Thackwell, and which followed afterwards, was a small one:—Three troops of horse artillery, two light field-batteries,† her majesty's 3rd light dragoons, two regiments of light cavalry, one irregular cavalry, her majesty's 24th and 61st regiments of infantry, five regiments of native infantry, and two companies of pioneers. The two 18-pounders and the pontoon train were sent back.

Shere Singh was partly influenced in drawing in that body of troops by the cannonade with which Lord Gough played upon the island, and the batteries of Ramnuggur. Thackwell advanced from Wurzerabad, along the river until he arrived within a short distance of Ramnuggur, where there was another ford. This enabled him to protect the passage across of a brigade of infantry, under General Godby. These plans led the enemy to abandon his position. General Gilbert, with a brigade of cavalry, was moved across, which caused Shere Singh to quicken his retreat. The proceedings of Lord Gough were so leisurely, that the Sikh general had no difficulty in moving away with impunity, and finding a strong position suitable to his projects. It was not until the 28th of December that Lord Gough and the rest of the army crossed the river. The subsequent movements and struggles of both armies must be reserved for another chapter.

\* Seventy-three men and forty-eight horses killed and wounded.

† Thirty guns sent, two were sent away, leaving only twenty-eight guns.

## CHAPTER CXXI.

SHERE SINGH RETREATS FROM RAMNUGGUR TO RUSSOOL—BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLAH—OPERATIONS AGAINST RAM SINGH IN THE RAREE DOAB—STORMING OF THE DULLAH HEIGHTS—BATTLE OF GUJERAT—DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF THE SIKH ARMY—ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.

THE slow movements of the English enabled Shere Singh to acquire new strength. His troops accumulated to the number of forty thousand men, all, or nearly all, in a high state of discipline, into which French and British officers had brought them during the latter years of Runjeet Singh's life, and for some time after his death. A powerful artillery of the heaviest calibre, perhaps, hitherto exercised in field operations swelled the magnitude and strength of that army. This force of guns has been variously estimated from sixty-two to ninety.\* Shere Singh marched to the Jhelum, where he took post near the village of Russool. The position which he had abandoned was very strong, but the movement of Thackwell led him to despair of holding it, and in choosing Russool he perhaps made a selection still more eligible for a grand contest. It also more easily led him to combine with Chuttur Singh and other chiefs, and concentrate the whole. Chuttur had reduced the fort of Attock, after it had been well defended by Major Herbert. That officer contrived to send intelligence of its fall to the commander-in-chief, and to warn him that Chuttur Singh intended to form a junction with Shere Singh. The slow movements of Lord Gough were quickened by this information, and he resolved, if possible, to bring the Sikhs to battle before the grand junction of their forces had taken place. This was a resolution which his lordship should have taken sooner, and the officials at Calcutta should have better provided him with means for the onerous task which thus devolved upon him in the re-subjugation of the Punjaub. Lord Gough formed an erroneous opinion as to the strength of the ground taken up by Shere Singh, and as to its peculiarities, circumstances which considerably influenced the remainder of the campaign. When the commander-in-chief arrived before the village of Russool, he reconnoitred the enemy's lines, the right of which rested on the villages of Luckneewallah and Futteh-Shah-le-Chuck, the left on the village of Russool by the Jhelum, and the centre, where the main strength of the enemy was gathered,

lay around the village of Chillianwallah. The position chosen was upon the southern extremity of a low line of hills. That part of the range was more especially cut up by nullahs, intersected by ravines, and obstructed by craggy eminences, obstacles to the approach of an assailing force which had been keenly observed, and skilfully discriminated by the artful and vigilant officer by whom the Sikhs were commanded. Lord Gough determined to bring the enemy to a general action, and prepared his measures accordingly. The author of this history may venture to say that no description which has appeared of the battle that ensued has so particularized its changing fortunes, without encumbering the narrative by tedious or technical details, as the account which he published in his *Continuation of Hume and Smollett's England*,\* which he therefore here transcribes.

The advance to the ground chosen by the sirdar was impeded by a jungle, to avoid which, and to distract the enemy's attention, Lord Gough took a considerable *détour* to the right. He succeeded in avoiding the intricacies of the jungle, but not in distracting the attention of Shere Singh. That general moved from his encampment, and took ground in advance, a manœuvre calculated to hide the strength of his position, and to disconcert any previous arrangements of the British commander.

About noon on the 13th Lord Gough was before the village of Russool, and finding a very strong picket of the enemy on a mound close to that place, his lordship, after some fighting, dislodged it. Ascending the mound, the general and his staff beheld the Khalsa army arranged along the furrowed hills in all the majestic array of war. The British officers gazed with admiration and professional ardour upon the long lines of compact infantry, and the well-marshalled cavalry, mustered in their relative proportions and positions with scientific exactness. The sirdar's batteries were chiefly masked by jungle. The scene was striking in its aspect, the magnitude of the events associated with it, and the excitement it stirred up within the hearts of the brave. Alas, how many noble hearts were necessarily

\* Nolan's *Continuation of Hume and Smollett*; Hugh Murray; Major Hough; Thorntou, *The Three Presidencies*.

\* This work is published by Virtue & Co., Limited, City Road and Ivy Lane.

to bleed before victory crowned the arms of England, and that fine Khalsa army followed the destinies of England's Asiatic foes! Lord Gough found that he could not turn the flanks of the sirdar's army, they were so protected by jungle, unless he detached a portion of his army to a considerable distance, which he deemed unsafe. The day was too far advanced to begin any operations. The engineer officers were ordered to examine the country in front, and the quarter-master-general was about to take up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse artillery, and opened a fire upon the skirmishers in front of Russool. Lord Gough ordered his heavy guns to open upon the enemy's artillery, and for this purpose they were advanced to an open space in front of the village. Shere Singh did not act with his usual good strategy in exposing the positions of so many of his cannon which the jungle had concealed, and which might have remained hidden until an attack upon his line would have afforded him opportunity to use them with sudden and terrible advantage, as he afterwards was enabled to do with those on his right. As it was, he replied to the British cannonade with such a force of his field-artillery as constrained Lord Gough to draw up in order of battle, lest in the night the sirdar's guns should be moved still more forward, and open on his camp. His lordship, keeping his heavy guns on the centre, placed Sir Walter Gilbert's division on his right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, strengthened by her majesty's 14th light dragoons, and three troops of horse artillery under Colonel Grant. This arrangement was necessitated by the large force of cavalry observed upon the enemy's left. On the left of the British line Brigadier-general Campbell's division was formed, flanked by Brigadier White's cavalry, and three troops of horse artillery under Colonel Brind. The demonstrations of the enemy were such that, late as was the hour, and weary as the troops were with marching, Lord Gough determined to attack at once. His lordship's errors, influenced by the events which followed, have severely censured him for attacking under such circumstances, more especially as the ground was unknown to his lordship. It was true that sufficient time had not been obtained to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, but it was not correct to allege that Lord Gough was entirely unacquainted with the ground, as he had previously known it, especially the country to the left of the enemy. It was generally supposed by his lordship's censors that the attack was a wanton waste of life, and arose from the brave, rash, and unreflect-

ing temperament of the general, and the irritation caused by the sudden and severe artillery fire opened upon him. On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington declared that he would, in Lord Gough's place, have acted as he had done; and so full of confidence were the Sikhs in their numbers and resolution, that had not the general given battle, he would have been obliged to defend himself from a desperate night attack under circumstances far less favourable. There can be no doubt, on the part of any who know the noble old soldier, that he acted from his sense of duty to his army and his country, and not from personal irritation.

The battle began, or, it may be said, was resumed, by a heavy cannonade, which lasted for more than an hour, when Lord Gough ordered his left to advance, making a flank movement. In executing this manoeuvre the troops exposed their own flank to a galling fire from heavy guns, the positions of which had remained covered by jungle, and the Sikh batteries were so placed as to pour a cross-fire, the most destructive, upon the British. When the 3rd and 4th brigades reached the enemy's guns, they were received by a cannonade so awful that they were obliged to retire. As soon as it was known that these two brigades were engaged, the 5th, under Brigadier Mountain, was ordered to storm the centre. They were received with round-shot the moment they moved, with grape and canister as they advanced through the jungle, and, finally, with musketry within close and deadly range. Many of the Sikh soldiers, at the cost of their own life, advanced and shot down the British officers. Brigadier Mountain had distinguished himself in China, and had the entire confidence of Lord Gough, under whom he had served there. Under his able guidance, the British stormed the batteries and spiked the guns, under a flank fire from other guns, which they also spiked; while the enemy, without giving way, poured upon them musket-balls thick as hail. Detachments of musketeers took them on each flank; and some getting to their rear among the jungle, fired upon them with deadly aim. The British were thus compelled to cut their way back to their own lines through hosts of encircling foes. While this was going on upon the centre, Sir Walter Gilbert advanced against the enemy's left. That general occupied the extreme right of his division, and Brigadier Godby the extreme left. They marched through a dense jungle almost unmolested, and then were confronted by infantry. Had the British at once charged with the bayonet, the result might for them have been less sanguinary; they, however, opened

fire, and the Sikhs, more numerous, returned the fire, and outflanked them. Two companies of the 2nd (or Queen's) British regiment charged with the bayonet, but were surrounded. These gallant and skilful soldiers immediately faced about, and after some file-firing, charged, rear-rank in front. At this critical moment a field battery arrived, and drove back the enemy by the precision of their fire. Several guns were here captured by the British. The heroism and losses of the 2nd regiment were very great. While the infantry had thus been engaged in close and deadly battle, the cavalry also were occupied both on the left and right. On the former flank of the British, Brigadier White's brigade charged the enemy, covering the retreat of the infantry. On the extreme right, Brigadier Pope's brigade, strengthened, as has been already shown, by the temporary attachment of the 14th light dragoons of the queen's army, were ordered to charge a body of the enemy's cavalry, the number of which was much superior. Instead of obeying the orders given, they wheeled right about, and galloped off the field, breaking through the artillery, upsetting artillerymen, drivers, and waggons in their course, until they reached the field-hospital. According to some narrations of this transaction, the men galloped away under a mistake of orders; other accounts represent this to have been impossible, because their own officers, and officers of the artillery, endeavoured to stop and rally them without success, except so far as a portion of the 9th lancers were concerned. The enemy was not slow to take advantage of this extraordinary flight; they pursued—dashed in among the horse artillery—cut down seventy-five gunners, and took six guns. The arrival of artillery reserves, the rallying of a portion of the 9th lancers, the steadiness of the infantry, prevented the destruction of the whole right wing. The fresh artillery which came up opened upon the Sikh cavalry with grape and canister with such precision and fury that they retreated. Two of the captured guns were recovered in the retreat. The Sikhs gradually withdrew, leaving the field of battle in possession of the British, who, on this account, claimed the victory. The enemy, in the night, carried away all the guns which the British had spiked during the action, the four pieces of horse artillery which they took on the British right, and five stand of colours, and on these grounds also claimed the victory; and a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the triumph was, as the English thought, most impudently fired. This was also done at Attock, in the capital of Chuttur Singh, and wherever the Sikh troops held a

position. The Sikhs also claimed the victory for the same reason as the English did, being left in possession of the field. It was, in truth, a drawn battle. The Sikhs having begun the engagement, and the English having retained the ground on which they fought, while the former withdrew their line, the battle may more correctly be said to have been won by the British; but the advantages gained were altogether on the part of the Sikhs, who continued to occupy for a month positions from which the British did not attempt to dislodge them. During that time Lord Gough waited for reinforcements, and felt the tardy arrival of some of the troops whose presence had been detained before Mooltan, as has already been shown.

The loss sustained by the Sikhs it is impossible to calculate; according to themselves it was much less than that of the English; and this is credible, when the strength of their position is considered, and the losses to which the unaccountable flight of Pope's brigade exposed the British right. The English loss, according to the official returns, was three thousand men killed and wounded, nearly one-third of whom belonged to the former class; this, however, did not comprehend all the slain, for many were so horribly wounded by the close discharge of artillery that they died in a few days. The proportion of the wounded who were hit mortally was beyond that which usually occurs in battle. There were also many desertions of sepoy soldiers to Shere Singh, but more especially of Sikh soldiery under Lord Gough's command.

The flight of the large body of cavalry under Brigadier Pope was the subject of much investigation and criticism. The brigadier was too old for the duties imposed upon him; he had no experience in war, and was placed in the command from seniority. This gave occasion in England to denounce the substitution of seniority for fitness, so common in the British army. Unhappily, the officer himself, who was so much concerned in the responsibility of the event, and who had been much respected by his brother officers and his commander, was placed beyond all human accountability, for he fell in front of his fugitive soldiers. Colonel King, of the 14th light dragoons, who succeeded Colonel Havelock, who fell at Ramnuggur, was also much censured. His defence was, that he did his utmost to rally his men in vain; that they were generally light small men, mounted upon light small horses; whereas the cavalry immediately opposed to them were not only much more numerous, but cuirassiers, powerful heavy men, with

long and superior swords, and admirably mounted. The colonel complained of the bad manufacture of the English weapons, which bent against the swords or cuirasses of the Sikh cavalry. When Sir Charles Napier arrived to command the forces in India late in the spring, he inspected the 14th, and addressed them, referring to the allegations of their colonel, and telling them that they were fine, stalwart, broad-chested fellows, that would follow anywhere that they were led. Colonel King took this so much to heart that he retired from the field of inspection and shot himself. Sir William Napier (brother to Sir Charles) afterwards denied in the London newspapers that his brother intended to cast any reflection upon Colonel King. It was, however, generally believed in the army that Sir Charles levelled a censure at the unfortunate officer, whose sensitive honour could not endure such a reflection from so high an authority. His fate excited deep commiseration, and the address of Sir Charles was disapproved of indignantly by the whole army.

The generalship of Lord Gough became the subject of anonymous criticism in India, and open attack in England; but the brave and skilful general proved, at the subsequent battle of Gujerat, that he knew how to gain victory at as little cost of blood as it was possible for military knowledge to ensure. The late drawn battle—if such it may be called—was designated the battle of Chillianwallah, after a village in the immediate neighbourhood of which the British had encamped. The Sikhs know it as the battle of Russool, the more appropriate name to give it, as it was in its vicinity the chief strength of the Sikh position was found.

The results of this battle were important; the Sikhs became encouraged, and the Sikh generals felt that the superiority of the English in natural talent or military science, was not such as to destroy the hopes of the sirdars to shake off the English yoke, and perhaps assert an ascendancy of the Khalsa over India. In England the shame and the alarm were great. Lord John Russell announced in parliament that Sir Charles Napier should be appointed to the command of the forces, and this was received with loud cheers. His lordship knew very well that the war would be over before Sir Charles could arrive to conduct it, but the announcement answered the end for which it was intended—it was mere parliamentary “clap-trap.” His lordship did *not* announce a reform in the military administration, by means of which campaigns would be conducted by competent generals, whether successful or unsuccessful, with honour to themselves and their country. It is scarcely

necessary to say that before Sir Charles Napier arrived, Lord Gough had retrieved his own renown and the credit of English arms. That Lord John Russell only made one of his customary plausible pretexts in this matter became pretty evident, from the fact that no dispatch was shown in sending out Sir Charles. That gallant man had no wish to go. Lord Dalhousie had now assumed the government of India, and with him it was not likely that the mercurial and open-mouthed Sir Charles would ever agree. Before that could be brought to the test, the second Sikh war was over.

The battle of Chillianwallah almost paralysed Lord Gough. He ordered General Wheeler with a force to join him, and a reserve under Sir Dudley Hill. Gholab Singh, the Maharajah of Cashmere, had sent ten thousand men to the sphere of action, but they behaved pretty much as the Spaniards did in the “Peninsular war,”—they left the English and their opponents to fight, reserving to themselves the opportunity to take such advantage as an armed neutrality might offer.

Dost Mohammed of Cabul, our professed ally, caused considerable apprehension after the battle of Chillianwallah. He assisted the Sikhs with an army of twelve thousand men, and it was feared that a large army of Affghans would pour upon India, with the energy and force of the Dooranee empire. The Affghan auxiliaries were chiefly cavalry, undisciplined, tardy in their movements, and not zealous in the war. The Affghans were Mohammedans, and regarded the true Sikhs as heretics or infidels, and therefore did not deem it desirable to risk much to serve one class of infidels against another, although on the whole they preferred the Sikhs.

When the government published, which they did ostentatiously, the list of guns, &c., captured at Chillianwallah, confidence was in a great measure restored to the army throughout India, for it was supposed that after all the rumours of failure there must have been a victory if cannon were left in the hands of the British; for it was well known that the Sikh soldier patted his gun as he did his horse, and regarded it with similar affection.

Lord Gough was obliged to remain inactive, expecting reinforcements, which were under the command of Wheeler in one direction, and Whish in another. The progress of the latter was discreditably slow, especially of the Bombay column, under the command of the Hon. General Dundas. Wheeler's force had hard and useful work to do before they could join the grand army. This was the conquest of Ram Singh, chief of the Raree Doab. This

leader occupied a formidable post in his territory, called the Dullah heights.

In the middle of January Wheeler attacked this position, but so inaccessible was the fastness that the most he could do, and that with considerable loss, was to drive out Ram Singh and his followers, whereas the gallant general hoped to accomplish either his capture or destruction. On the 11th Wheeler ordered the 4th native infantry to take up a position to the northward of the enemy's post, so as to intercept him in case he should be obliged to evacuate the fort, and retreat in that direction; the main force tarried at Shorpore, where they had been in quarters, until the 13th, the sappers, pioneers, and labourers being engaged in making a practicable road through an exceedingly difficult country, consisting of defiles and "ghauts." This road was laid for about seven miles, as far as the village of Cote on the course of the Ravee, about three miles distant from Ram Singh's position. On the 14th the little army of General Wheeler took up ground under the Dullah heights. That day and the next were occupied in cutting roads, transporting guns and mortars upon elephants, and making arrangements for storming the fort. On the morning of the latter day, Captain Hicks, of the 3rd native infantry, was dispatched with four companies of that regiment, and Mr. Hodgson with two companies of the Guide corps, to take post west of the Dullah heights, on the opposite bank of the Ravee. The precautions taken by detaching these bodies of men were necessary from the topographical character of the neighbourhood. The Ravee, debouching from the mountainous region in which it has its birth, flows through a beautiful valley, where a series of hills lying from east to west presented an unequal ridge; on this ridge, overlooking the river, the little village of Dullah was situated, in which Ram Singh had so cleverly fortified himself. In every direction from the village the rock dipped almost perpendicularly, beside being protected by the river, which wound partly around it. Access was by paths partly lying in hollows formed by former streams, and partly cut through the rock. These paths were circuitous, and nearly covered with brushwood, admitting only by single file of an approach to the platform on which the village rested. On either side of the path were precipices from twenty to eighty feet deep, and huge boulders lay profusely across the way. Very few men might defend this position against very many. The 4th native regiment was to advance against the face of this defence, from the direction where it had taken post some days, and the signal was to

be the firing of a gun from the British camp. The 3rd and the Guides were at the same moment ordered, by the same signal, to advance against the west of the ridge, and crown a height visible from head-quarters. As soon as the success of this detachment was ascertained, the remainder of the 3rd regiment, and two hundred men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, who, with Lieutenant Swinton, had volunteered to serve on foot, were to advance upon another face of the ridge, from the little village of Chulbarah, where they had been posted; this party, ascending a spur of the hill on its left, was to co-operate opportunely with the advance of the other detachments. Major Fisher, at the head of a body of regular native infantry and irregular cavalry, with guns mounted upon elephants, was in support, and to ascend (the cavalry, of course, dismounting) when the various detachments had come well into action. There was yet another point upon which an ascent was to be attempted—that which was in front of the camp of the British. Major Davidson, with a few hundred Sikh auxiliaries, regular and irregular, supported by two companies of the 1st Sikh light infantry under Lieutenant Peel, was ordered to make this attempt. At the moment for action, the signal gun was fired, but no one appeared to take any notice of it—no men were seen to make their way along the ridge. There was a long pause on the side of the British, the guns of the enemy at the same time firing. None of the detachments appearing on the ridge, Major Butler was ordered to attempt to storm it, in conjunction with the other party already appointed to ascend in front: this was happily accomplished, after a very sharp conflict. Major Davidson was shot through the hand, Lieutenant Peel was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Christie killed. The detached parties, trusting to native guides, were purposely misled, and thus could not come into action. Ram Singh had by this means the way kept open for his retreat when resistance was no longer possible, and all the skilful arrangements that had been made to catch the eagle in his eyrie were disappointed by the treachery of the natives, who had been, unfortunately, too implicitly trusted in an important service.

#### BATTLE OF GUJERAT.

Shere Singh maintained his post in the neighbourhood of Russool until the 12th of February, when he retired with coolness and deliberation. Lord Gough instituted a pursuit, but the Sikh cavalry covered the retreat of the army effectually. The approach, at last, of General Whish greatly embarrassed the move-

ments of the Sikh chief. He was obliged, by the combinations which General Whish and Lord Gough were able to effect, to take post at Gujerat, where he requested Chuttur Singh to join him with his whole force, for he was too sagacious not to perceive that the war was approaching its crisis. Chuttur accomplished the junction, and then the most formidable army the English had ever encountered in the East was drawn up in the lines of Gujerat. The number of men was scarcely less than eighty thousand;\* the pieces of ordnance were fifty-nine. The whole force of Lord Gough, after the junction of Whish, did not much exceed twenty-five thousand men, but his artillery was superior to that of the enemy; for, although Shere Singh's pieces were heavy metal, and his artillerymen practised in battle, as well as thoroughly drilled on the French system, Whish had brought with him heavy guns, and the artillerymen, officers, and privates of Lord Gough's army were excellent. The calibre of the British guns was, for the first time during the two campaigns, superior to that of the Sikhs; Major-general Whish was especially competent to direct that arm of the service.

The troops under the command of Lord Gough were: Cavalry—Her majesty's 3rd, 9th, and 14th light dragoons; Bengal 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th light cavalry; 3rd and 9th irregular cavalry; detachments of 11th and 14th irregular cavalry, Scinde horse. Artillery—Nine troops horse artillery, and four light field-batteries (one each of the Bombay army). Infantry—Her majesty's 10th, 29th, and 32nd foot; Bengal 2nd European regiment; 8th, 13th, 15th, 25th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 36th, 45th, 46th, 51st, 52nd, 56th, 69th, 70th, and 72nd. In addition to these was a strong brigade, under the Hon. Major-general Dundas, of Bombay infantry, consisting of the 1st Bombay European Fusiliers and several native regiments. Shere Singh made the village of Gujerat his head-quarters. It was curiously, and for military purposes strongly situated between the Jhelum and the Chenab, but nearer to the Jhelum. It was nearly surrounded by a brook, which ran rather among than over the pebbles which lay in its bed, although in a few places pools of water were collected to some considerable depth. Between that brook and the town the main position of Shere Singh lay. Lord Gough resolved not to despise his enemy on this occasion, or by any act of precipitancy give him advantage. He also resolved to contest this battle upon the strictest principles of military science, so that no unfavourable critiques should be made upon his generalship at home. He began the

action by employing his superior force of artillery, and contrived to use it to the utmost, causing great havoc in the ranks of the enemy, and smashing guns and tumbrels along his lines.

Shere Singh strove to bring into efficient play that arm of war in which he was more particularly superior to his enemy—the cavalry. With his numerous horse he endeavoured to outflank Lord Gough. Vast bodies of cavalry were thrown on either flank, and the skill, energy, and courage of the British horsemen were taxed to the uttermost to prevent this design. Shere Singh did not, however, display his usual generalship on this occasion; all his movements showed a mind perturbed and anxious. He did not conceal the position of his batteries as he had so cleverly done at Chillianwallah, but opening fire at long range betrayed the arrangement of his cannon before he could make the weapons seriously injurious to his foe. This fault, considering the superiority of artillery power on the part of the English, was irredeemable. Lord Gough, having nearly silenced the Sikh guns, and out-manceuvred their cavalry upon his flanks, attacked with his infantry, throwing his right against the left centre, and the right of the enemy's left. The difficulty was in passing the deep empty brook, or nullah, in doing which the guns of the enemy could be brought to bear, as the English cannon would necessarily cease their fire. This impediment was found formidable; some valuable lives were lost in passing that "Rubicon;" but success attended the attempt, in spite of the grape and canister of the field-pieces, and the rolling volleys of musketry. The English ascended the banks of the nullah, brought the bayonet to the charge, dashed forward, penetrated the line, and separated the enemy's left and centre. Although that successful attack did not end the struggle, it virtually decided the battle. Shere Singh indeed must have seen, after his flank operations had failed, that if the British infantry passed the nullah his guns would be lost, as well as the battle. Scarcely had the British right accomplished the purpose for which they were directed against the enemy's line, than the left also cleared the nullah, and turned his right wing, huddling together his flanks in a confused mass upon his centre. Even then the gallant Sikhs hoped for victory. Their cavalry charged the flanks of the victorious infantry, but were in their turn brought down by successive close rounds from the horse artillery, and then their broken squadrons were charged by the English cavalry. Thus left free to follow their course of conquest, the English infantry of both flanks wheeled round

\* Lord Gough's estimate was 61,500.

the village of Gujerat, pouring continuous volleys of musketry into the packed masses of the divided Sikh infantry, and inflicting horrible slaughter. The battle was won. Campbell and Dundas with their infantry, Gilbert with cavalry and artillery, relentlessly pursued, exacting a fearful vengeance for the losses at the nullah of Ramnuggur, and the hill-sides of Russool. The Sikh army was broken. Lord Gough rested the main body of his army, entrusting to General Gilbert, with the cavalry, horse artillery, and light infantry, the further prosecution of pursuit. Thus, so far as active fighting was concerned, ended the second Sikh war.

Sir Walter Gilbert pursued the enemy unremittingly, until at last a surrender was compelled. The Affghans deserted the fallen fortunes of their confederates, and fled through the Khoree Pass. The Affghans lost half their number in the field, and a large portion of the remainder in retreat. Dost Mohammed Khan submitted to entreaties for peace, and as the English had no desire for another Affghan war, they accepted his offers, and extended forgiveness. The Sikh army surrendered, forty-one guns were captured, and the whole Khalsa force remaining after so many fields of slaughter gave up their arms, and, obtaining a gratuity of a rupee each, dispersed to their homes. During the war the Sikhs lost one hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, and twenty thousand stand of infantry arms. The British guns taken at Chillianwallah were all restored. The consequences of the Sikh war were the annexation of the Punjaub, and the entire destruction of the Khalsa army. The expense of treasure by which the result was purchased was very great. The cost of human life was also great. The policy of the British government, and the grounds of it, were made public in the following proclamation, issued on the 29th of March, by the governor-general:—

For many years, in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation and the Sikhs. When Runjeet Singh was dead, and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the state, the sirdars and the Khalsa army, without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated. They were driven, with slaughter and in shame, from the country they had invaded, and at the gates of Lahore the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh tendered to the governor-general the submission of himself and his chiefs, and solicited the clemency of the British government. The governor-general extended his clemency to the state of Lahore; he generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the maharajah having been replaced on the throne, treaties of friendship were formed between the states.

The British have faithfully kept their word, and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them. But the Sikh people and their chiefs

have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound. Of their annual tribute, no portion whatever has at any time been paid, and large sums advanced by the government of India have never been repaid. The control of the British government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, has been resisted by arms. Peace has been cast aside. British officers have been murdered when acting for the state; others engaged in the like employment have been treacherously thrown into prison. Finally, the army of the state and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the sirdars of the Punjaub who signed the treaties, and led by a member of the regency itself, have risen in arms against us, and have waged a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.

The government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now—but it is bound, in its duty, to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge. To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the state from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasteful wars, the governor-general is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore, the governor-general of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the kingdom of the Punjaub is at an end; and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India.

His Highness the Maharajah shall be treated with consideration and with honour. The few chiefs who have not engaged in hostilities against the British shall retain their property and their rank. The British government will leave to all the people, whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religions; but it will not permit any man to interfere with others in the observance of such forms as their respective religions may either enjoin or permit. The jagheers, and all the property of sirdars and others who have been in arms against the British, shall be confiscated to the state. The defences of every fortified place in the Punjaub, which is not occupied by British troops, shall be totally destroyed, and effectual measures shall be taken to deprive the people of the means of renewing either tumult or war.

The governor-general calls upon all the inhabitants of the Punjaub, sirdars and people, to submit themselves peaceably to the authority of the British government, which has hereby been proclaimed. Over those who shall live as obedient and peaceful subjects of the state, the British government will rule with mildness and beneficence. But if resistance to constituted authority shall again be attempted—if violence and turbulence be renewed, the governor-general warns the people of the Punjaub that the time for leniency with them has passed away, and that their offence will be punished with prompt and most rigorous severity.

The decisive measures which this proclamation indicated had the desired effect. The Punjaub gradually settled down, its administration was committed to able men, and the people were taught to rely on their own peaceable industry and a just government for prosperity. A new era dawned upon that rich but distracted realm, which became the glory of English government in India, so that when some years later the native army of Bengal, by which its subjugation was chiefly

effected, mutinied, the Sikhs remained loyal. Among the officers who so nobly fought and conquered in that formidable war, none held a more useful and honourable position than Major-general Thackwell. It was the last campaign in which the gifted veteran ever fought. He returned to his country, and enjoyed the respect of all classes. Some notice of his career as a whole is desirable, as he has long since paid "the debt of nature," and been numbered among the host of departed heroes who have made the name of Great Britain illustrious. He entered the army in April, 1800, and during his career of nearly sixty years had gained the highest distinction in the service, particularly in the East Indies. Sir Joseph's services in the Peninsula are thus recorded by Hart:—"Served the campaign in Galicia and Leon under Sir John Moore, and was engaged in several skirmishes, and present at the battle of Corunna; served the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in the Peninsula, including the battle of Vittoria, the Pyrenees in front of Pampeluna, the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th July; blockade of Pampeluna from the 18th to the 31st of October, when it surrendered; battle of Orthes, affair of Tarbes, and battle of Toulouse, besides many affairs of advanced guards, outposts, &c. Served also the campaign of 1815, including the action at Quatre Bras, the retreat on the following day, and battle of Waterloo. Commanded the cavalry division of the army of the Indus during the Affghanistan campaign; was present at the storm and capture of Ghizni, and commanded the 2nd column of the army on its march from Cabul to Bengal." He commanded the cavalry division of the army of Gwalior throughout the Mahratta war in 1843, and likewise the cavalry division at the action of Maharajpore on the 29th December of that year. Sir Joseph greatly distinguished himself in the operations against the Sikhs in the campaigns of 1846 and 1849, for which eminent services he received the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company, and was rewarded in the last mentioned year by her majesty nominating him a Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, the gallant general having formerly for his military services been made a Companion and Knight of that Order. During his honourable career in the service he had been several times wounded. At Vittoria he was severely contused on the right shoulder, and at Waterloo he was so badly wounded that he had to have his left arm amputated, and had two horses shot under him. On his return to England from the East Indies he was appointed Inspector-General of Cavalry in succession to his Royal Highness the Duke

of Cambridge. In 1834 he was made a knight of the Hanoverian Order, and received the silver war medal and three clasps for his services in the Peninsula, a medal for Sobraon, where he commanded the cavalry, and a medal and clasps for the last Punjaub campaign, also the empty honour of the Doorance Order for services in Affghanistan. In November, 1849, he was appointed colonel of the 16th (the Queen's) regiment of light dragoons (Lancers). He was an intimate friend of the late General Havelock, and of Lord Clyde, Sir Harry Smith, Lord Gough, and other noble and gallant veterans of the army. His commissions bore date as follows:—Cornet, 22nd of April, 1800; lieutenant, 13th of June, 1801; captain, 9th of April, 1807; major, 18th of June, 1815; lieutenant-colonel, 21st of June, 1817; colonel, 10th of January, 1837; major-general, 9th of November, 1846; and lieutenant-general, 20th of June, 1854.

The *United Service Gazette* for May, 1859 gives the following interesting account of the last act of homage which his country paid to his gallantry and long and efficient services:—"Lieutenant-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., was buried in Corkbeg churchyard, which is distant about a mile from Aghada House, and twenty miles from Cork, on the 15th instant. The coffin was borne to the grave on the shoulders of his sorrow-stricken tenantry. The peasantry, who had swarmed to the spot from the neighbouring districts, lined the road from Aghada House to the church, as a last tribute of respect to one whose noble deeds of daring occupy an important place in history's pages. The Irish naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Talbot, with many other naval and military officers in full uniform, formed part of the funeral procession. The coast-guard from all the stations in the vicinity preserved order along the line of route. The badge and collar of a Grand Cross of the Bath, the insignia of a Knight of Hanover, and of the Dooranee Order, and the medals for the Peninsular, Waterloo, Affghan, Mahratta, and Sikh campaigns, so well earned by the lamented deceased, were tastefully arranged on a cushion, which was carried before the coffin by four officers. Notwithstanding all this glittering display, it was not a military funeral, there not being sufficient artillery, cavalry, and infantry at Cork to pay the honours due to a lieutenant-general. The gallant *sabreur's* remains lie near the mausoleum of the Roche family, with which he was connected by marriage, a family of which Lord Fermoy, the [then] lord-lieutenant of Cork, is the present head. No cavalry officer ever saw more service."

## CHAPTER CXXII.

GENERAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF SIR HENRY (LORD) HARDINGE—  
HIS DEPARTURE—ARRIVAL OF LORD DALHOUSIE—HIS GENERAL POLICY.

IT was necessary in previous chapters, in order to maintain consecutive relation, to narrate the progress of hostilities in the Punjab to their termination, passing over all notice of civil affairs and changes of government. This chapter will supply the omission. Very few governor-generals so much disappointed previous expectations as Sir Henry Hardinge. His nomination to the post commanded the general suffrage of his countrymen. Belonging to the Peel party, it was supposed that he would be the advocate of peace, yet immediately upon his arrival he had to wage a most dangerous war. He began that war most reluctantly, as he knew that the peace policy of Sir Robert Peel was popular in England. It is probable that had he made a warlike demonstration, such as became the empire he governed and the real exigencies of the case, war might have been averted.

His appointment to the high office was regarded in England with great favour, from the supposition that he would, by his military prestige, probably prevent war. This was an absurd expectation, for the Sikhs or the sepoys knew nothing of his European renown. It was also believed in England that his military skill would enable him to take such measures as would deter any Asiatic people from aggression or disturbance, and that if war broke out his capacity for military arrangement would bring it to a speedy termination, by the use of those means which modern military science supplied, and the grand organization to which he was supposed equal. All these expectations were falsified. Very few civilians in the government of India allowed the country to "drift into war" so easily as did Sir Henry Hardinge. He acted in all respects similar to the Peelite cabinet of Lord Aberdeen subsequently, when its weakness, temporising, and vacillation not only allowed but invited Russian aggression. Lord Aberdeen's demonstration of ten thousand men, unprovided with any of the means necessary for a campaign, in order to deter the Czar Nicholas from launching his hosts against Turkey, was a policy anticipated by Sir Henry Hardinge, when he allowed the Sikhs, whom he knew, or ought to have known, to constitute the most formidable native army which had ever appeared in India, to cross the frontiers and invade India. So far from fulfilling the hopes of his countrymen, when war did break

out, by the efficiency of his military administration, want and confusion harassed the army at every step, and in consequence our ascendancy in India was placed in the greatest jeopardy. Sir Henry was regarded as a man of a frank and direct mind, but his policy in India was indirect, and his relation of public transactions uncandid. While, for instance, he was praising the native army for its heroism and loyalty in his orders of the day, proclamations, and despatches, he believed that army to be dangerously disloyal, and was by no means satisfied with either its zeal or courage in action. It has been alleged in extenuation of this, that he praised the native troops from policy. If so, he might have consulted truth as well as policy, in some degree, by moderating the praise his conscience permitted him to bestow, and not mislead his own countrymen, who trusted that his panegyrics of native loyalty and valour issued from his convictions. It was supposed that Sir Henry was capable of ruling India with a comprehensive policy, and that he would treat liberally, and with enlarged thought, all great public questions connected with our Asiatic empire. He did not display these qualities, but he put forth surprising vigour and activity in detail. He performed all routine duties with alacrity and dispatch, and transacted public business with readiness, clearness, and perfect order. He neglected no duty which he imposed upon himself, or thought was incumbent upon him officially; but he interfered as little as possible with the routine of the offices even in military matters, and when he must have clearly seen that it was injurious to the public interests. His views were narrow, and he not only tolerated but fostered the spirit of clique and partizan patronage, and this at a time when his government should from necessity have rested on the broad basis of justice and principle.

Immediately upon his assumption of office, Sir Henry had to settle various disputes, in different directions, while the Sikh war was pending. In all these he showed an intense anxiety to conciliate and secure peace at all costs. There were disagreements between the Bombay government and the Rajah of Kalapore. The late prince had been a great robber and a great devotee; he died while making preparations for plunder and a pilgrimage. His death relieved the Bombay

presidential government of some trouble for a time; but out of his decease differences among his ministers and tributaries arose, which remained as a legacy for Sir Henry Hardinge's administration. A rebellion broke out. British troops were sent to uphold a cruel and unjust government against a people driven to revolt. The troops sent were inefficient. They were, as was customary when British troops took the field, unprovided with proper commissariat or material of war, and commanded by men in virtue of their seniority or connexions, not because they were possessed of the talent for command. Shame and defeat were the consequences. It was necessary to attack the fort of Samnughur, which rested on the summit of a scarp'd rock. There were only three hundred men in its garrison, wretchedly equipped, yet they kept a large British force at bay for several weeks. Heavy guns were ordered up from Belgaum, thirty miles off, which were moved at less than a mile and a half per day. Colonel Outram and Mr. Reeves, arriving as civil commissioners, offered an amnesty, which the brave garrison refused, in consequence of their determination never again to submit to the oppressions which the rajah had inflicted upon them. After gross mismanagement in almost every form, and the commission of military errors utterly discreditable to the English arms, and the loss of many good soldiers, the Kalaporean and Sawunt Warrec rebels were subdued. With that extraordinary good fortune which the English almost always have in some form, a man was found equal to the emergency. Colonel Ovens, who knew well the Indian character, a brave soldier, a good officer, and adroit politician, brought order out of the chaos. The miserable failures, civil and military, where Colonel Ovens was not present, strikingly illustrated the system. The governor-general and the commander-in-chief were too far away to be responsible for the disgraces inflicted upon the British name in Kalapore and Sawunt Warrec, but they repeated the errors on their own ground; they were, in fact, themselves part of "the system," and among its most prominent abettors.

During Sir Henry's government there were active operations on the Scinde frontier, in one of the most difficult countries in the world. These were conducted as fortunately and gloriously as military operations in other directions were the reverse. The mountain robber tribes of Scinde were put down by that great military heretic, Sir Charles Napier. He did not belong to "the system," and incurred the anger of all its orthodox upholders, who load his memory with opprobrium to this day, and hate it, because he put an end to cliquism, row-

dyism, gambling, military routine, and jobbery, in the army he commanded. Sir Charles, who bore the euphonious but not very complimentary sobriquet of Shitanka Chai, or the Devil's Brother, politely imparted, for his activity and daring, by the Beloochees, swept the mountains of the robber hordes, making good soldiers of some, good agriculturists of others, and killing or compelling into exile all who persisted in resistance. Fortunately the responsibility of the Scinde exploits did not rest in Calcutta, or there would, in all likelihood, have been disasters such as occurred wherever "the system" had its full scope. When in 1847 there appeared, at all events in the eyes of the governor-general, tokens of settled quietude in the Punjaub, and Sir Henry became Viscount Hardinge, he carried out the policy in favour at home, by reducing the army to a peace establishment. This he did so cagerly, and with so little discrimination, that it would have required the ingenuity of Lord Aberdeen, or Mr. Gladstone, or the conscientious peace principles of Mr. Cobden or Mr. Bright to have rivalled him in the rapidity and success with which he disarmed, while a treacherous and powerful enemy, whose habits and purposes it was his business to study, was preparing for another and more formidable struggle. The state of the revenue afforded some justification to Lord Hardinge. The treasury was empty, war had swallowed up its resources. Unnecessary and unjust war left no funds for just and necessary war, such as that with the Sikhs was. The English government had pursued the same policy in India which it protested against in Europe, when carried out by Austria. As that power guaranteed the thrones of all the despots in Italy, and was ever ready to interpose to uphold absolute monarchy against the people, no matter how aggrieved the latter, and thus created, encouraged, and perpetuated tyranny and cruelty, so the English guaranteed the despots of India against their subjects, however cruel and horrid the oppressions which the people endured. Rajahs and maharajahs, nizams, subahdars, and kings robbed and murdered with the prospect of keeping down all revolt in their dominions by the aid of the British sepoys. This policy exhausted the treasury of India, and compelled the reduction of armaments when they ought to have been increased and strengthened. These reductions of Lord Hardinge were not skilfully effected. He left this too much to the civilians, and hence when the drum again beat to arms, it was difficult to find the material of war. The more skilled part of the army, such as cannot be easily recruited, was disbanded in a manner dispro-

portionate, rash, and dangerous. From the cool retreats of Simla, to which he retired like a philosopher, he reduced the expenses of the army one million sterling per annum; while the ranee at Lahore was disconsolate for the loss of her favourite Lall Singh, whom Lord Hardinge had banished, and while she and he were gaining the whole Sikh army to their cause, Lord Hardinge, with that business capacity with which he was endowed, set about many useful but costly works, all desirable and honourable, had the army been cared for first, and the Punjaub watched or garrisoned by a perfect force, provided with munitions, and all the appliances of an army even if small numerically. His lordship completed the grand trunk road from Calcutta to Benares, over which fifty-four bridges were erected. The Ganges canal, the formation of which had been begun under Lord Auckland's government, but stopped by Lord Ellenborough, was recommenced by Lord Hardinge. His lordship's good works were not confined to British India. He induced twenty-three of the petty princes to abolish infanticide, sutteeism, and slavery in their dominions. This course he adopted as the result of directions from home, but he entered into the spirit of his instructions, and pursued these objects *con amore*. He also raised Bengal to a separate government.

His lordship pared down the military expenditure on the eve of war, and increased the civil expenditure in the midst of commercial panic, and with a revenue deficit of two millions. His arrangements for improvement of the revenue were, however, admitted to be judicious, and had he remained and no war ensued, it was confidently affirmed by his friends that he would have seen a surplus in the treasury. He left India January 18th, 1848, six days after the arrival of his successor, the Earl (afterwards Marquis) of Dalhousie.

The Whigs were in office when Lord Dalhousie was nominated to the grandest viceroyship in the wide realms of the queen. He was not of their number, but of the influential followers of Sir Robert Peel, who bore a relation to the party like that which the bat bears to the bird and the mouse. His lordship had obtained among the *juste milieu* politicians, who claimed him as one of their circle, a reputation for extraordinary administrative ability. It does not appear, however meritorious his past services in that respect, that he deserved the laudations bestowed upon his genius for government which his friends and party asserted he possessed. He was, however, young and vigorous, and very ambitious to distinguish himself. His confidence in his

own powers at least equalled that reposed in them by his friends. Immediately upon his arrival, commercial bankruptcy spread disaster over Calcutta and over India. Under the name of commerce and banking, vast swindling speculations were carried on by persons holding the highest places in society. It is not related that his lordship showed any remarkable tact or ability in dealing with such a condition of affairs. Perhaps it was too widespread, too pervading, too terrible in the ruin scattered, too complicated in the fraud and villany developed, for the powers entrusted to him to mitigate or control, whatever his capacity to employ them.

The policy pursued by Lord Dalhousie in the settlement of the Punjaub in 1849-50 was to endow the Maharajah Dhulceep Singh, who would not come of age until 1854,\* with a munificent pension, and to treat the Sikhs, not as conquered enemies, but as free English subjects, enjoying the protection of the government in the same way as her majesty's European subjects. This policy was crowned with success. He also acquired for her majesty the Koh-i-noor, or Mountain of Light, which is represented as the most precious diamond in the world. At the Great Exhibition in London, in 1851, this gem was exhibited, and is therefore well known to multitudes of Englishmen. It was presented to the queen, at a levee, on the 3rd of July, 1850, by the chairman and deputy-chairman of the East India Company.

On May 6, 1849, Sir Charles Napier landed in Calcutta as commander-in-chief. He immediately set about a reform of the army, in which he of course encountered the most decided opposition from all the patrons of routine. In the first six months of his command he had to decide forty-six cases of courts-martial; the crimes imputed to officers being drunkenness, gambling, and dishonourable actions arising out of these causes. While at Lahore the eccentric but wise commander issued the following general order, certainly the most remarkable ever issued in the British army, but one much required. Men like Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough

\* This prince is now resident in England, where, having been under the guidance of Sir W. Logan, he conducts himself with a dignity and prudence which have gained the esteem of statesmen and citizens. He is a frequent visitor of the court, is often invited by her majesty to select dinner parties, and is regarded by her with sympathy and respect. He is a pious Christian, fond of retirement, and benevolent. When he appears on public occasions he is invested with elegant oriental costume, and wears the richest gems. The author, who has had opportunity of observing the manners of his highness, has been struck with his intimate acquaintance with the language, customs, and observances of the country in which he has made his honourable exile.

winked at these things, rather than disturb "the system," or make themselves unpopular; Sir Charles only regarded his country, his duty, and the honour of his profession:—"At a late review of the troops on the plain of Meean Meer the following egregious deficiencies were evident to all: 1st. That some commanders of regiments were unable to bring their regiments properly into general line. 2ndly. One commanding officer of a regiment attempted to wheel his whole regiment as he would a company. 3rdly. Several officers commanding companies were seen disordering their companies by attempting to dress them from the wrong flanks. 4thly. When the line was ordered to be formed on the left column, some commanders deployed too soon, and ordered their lines thus improperly formed to 'double quick' in order to regain their position. This was all bad; but it was worse to see the regiments on receiving the word to 'double quick' at once charge, with loud shouts, no such order to charge having been given by any one, nor the words 'prepare to charge:' nor did anything occur to give a pretext for such a disgraceful scene, exhibiting both want of drill and want of discipline. 5thly. Bad as this was, it was not the worst. When these regiments chose to 'charge,' the commander-in-chief, to his astonishment, beheld the men discharging their firelocks straight up into the air; and he saw some men of the rear rank actually firing off their muskets to the rear over their shoulders as their bearers (he will not call them soldiers) were running to the front. He feels assured that no such scene could have occurred in any other regiments in the army. If ever such again happen, he will expose the commanding officer of any regiment that so disgraces itself, in public orders, to the whole Indian army. In the course of his service he never before witnessed such a scene. No commander could go into action with a regiment capable of such conduct without feeling certain that it would behave ill. The commander-in-chief will, therefore, hold commanding officers responsible (for they alone are to blame), that any soldier, who shouts or charges, or fires without orders, be instantly seized, tried at once by a drumhead court-martial, and the sentence executed on the spot."

This order was but a foretaste of the discipline enforced by Sir Charles. Yet he was no martinet. All his regulations were based upon sound military principles. The general custom of patching up and expediency he loathed, and, whenever opportunity afforded, exposed. Sir Charles held the command of the army for a very short time. The opposition he encountered in every attempt to

establish reform led him to the conclusion that he could effect nothing serviceable to his country in his command. It was a high and honourable post, and most lucrative, such as Sir Charles would find not only suitable to his talents, but valuable, for he was comparatively poor; but as he took upon him the office with an honourable desire to do something useful in the public service, so he resigned it when he found there was no longer any hope of accomplishing his object. He gave his motives in brief in a speech delivered at Kurrachee, where he was presented with a costly sword by the native chiefs:—"Lord Ellenborough treated me as a general officer, and the brave Bombay army seconded me nobly; not, as is the custom now-a-days, for a general officer entrusted with the command to be told by a colonel and a captain that this thing is right and that thing is wrong. If general officers are unfit for command, in God's name do not appoint them to command—and I must say, there are nine out of ten who ought not to be appointed; but I hold that when once a general officer is appointed to command, he ought to be treated as such; he ought to know what is best for the army under his command, and should not be dictated to by boy-politicals, who do not belong to the army, and who know nothing whatever of military science. It is this that has caused me to resign the command."

Dr. Taylor says: "During the eighteen months that Sir C. Napier held that office, forty-five officers of the Bengal army were tried by courts-martial, of whom fourteen were cashiered, six dismissed, seven lost rank, five were suspended, ten reprimanded, and but two honourably acquitted, one simply found not guilty, and four had their sentences commuted, or were pardoned."

On the 6th of December, 1850, Sir W. Gomm arrived to succeed Sir Charles. Things soon went on in the old way; "the system" was too sacred to be disturbed by heterodox reformers like Sir Charles. The Marquis Dalhousie displayed great activity. He had the vigour and ardour of youth, and really possessed administrative tastes, with a fair show of capacity for government. He determined to see for himself the condition of the provinces. He passed into the upper provinces, travelled all through the Punjaub, Peshawur, and Cashmere. He adopted measures both civil and military, calculated to secure these provinces. He then came by the rivers, examining their courses, and the countries on their banks to the capital of Scinde. From Hyderabad he passed to Bombay. He there embarked in a steamer for Goa, Colombo, Galle, in the island of Ceylon, Singapore, on

the Malacca Peninsula, Malabar, and then steaming through the bay of Bengal arrived at Calcutta.

During Lord Dalhousie's early administration the spirit of revolt among the Bengal sepoys displayed itself. It began in the Punjab. The 66th regiment at Umritsir revolted; the plea was, the denial of batta (extra allowance). The ringleaders were arrested and punished, and the regiment disbanded. Lord Dalhousie favoured railways, and had the honour of initiating railway enterprise in India. Whatever the administrative care of Lord Dalhousie, there was a dash of the despotic in his measures, and this the English, in some cases, bitterly felt. The introduction of measures to deprive Europeans of their right of trial by jury excited much antipathy personally to his lordship, and a violent opposition. The Europeans in the Mofussil were to be placed at the mercy of the magistrates. The measures intended to effect these objects were nicknamed by the English residents "the black acts." Lieutenant Waghorn died during this year; a poor pension only was awarded to his widow, although he had rendered, by his postal enterprises, great service to the company and to India, to the crown and to England.

In the year 1851 symptoms of disturbance manifested themselves in various directions. The mountain tribes on the Affghan borders showed a determination to plunder, as they had from time immemorial been accustomed to do. A force was collected at Peshawur, under the eyes of the ubiquitous governor-general, before whose energy time and space seemed to vanish. The Lawrences, and their political disciple, Major Edwardes, the hero of Mooltan, suppressed these disturbances, and like Sir Charles Napier on the Scinde frontier, turned robbers and marauders into loyal soldiers or peaceful agriculturists. These men, rude as they were, were amenable to a policy of consistent firmness and manly generosity, justifying the saying of Horace, *Argilla quidvis imitaberis uda*. These wild mountaineers had been previously deemed incorrigible plunderers, like those described by Virgil, *Convectare juvat prædas et vivere rapto*. In the seaports a system of incendiarism sprung up, by which ships were set on fire, often when laden with a rich cargo for Europe.

In January, 1851, the ex-peishwa, Bajee Rao, died at Benares; his pension of £90,000 per annum fell to the company. Meetings of Hindoos were held in Calcutta to protest against the government patronage of the Christian religion, and the proselyting character of the government schools. It was sufficiently evident that the government was

using the public wealth of India to propagate religious opinions opposed to those held by the masses from whom that wealth was extracted. It was also obvious that heathen and Mohammedan religious institutions were supported from the public treasury. The feeling which pervaded the native gathering at Calcutta was intensely, almost savagely bigoted. It had been well that no occasion had been given for such a spirit. Means were adopted to disconnect the government with the support of Mohammedanism and idolatry, but a large number of the civil and of the military were in favour of the state endowment of idolatry, as "expedient" and good in "policy." The minds of the natives throughout Bengal were much unsettled by an infamous transaction, on the part of the government, calculated to destroy all faith in public men in India, and to uproot all confidence in the English from the native mind. Deficiencies in various public accounts had been discovered, and the governor-general ordered a strict investigation. In order to divert public attention from delinquencies by Europeans, a plan seems to have been formed among the officials to incriminate wealthy natives transacting business with the government. As a class, these natives are dishonest, but the disclosures of 1848-49 enabled the worst of the native usurers to address a European accuser with the *tu quoque*. The progress of these proceedings has been related by McKenna,\* who presents the whole narrative of this great scandal with a brevity which cannot be improved, and the clearness and point of the relation be maintained. It is as follows:—

Jotee Persaud, a wealthy native and banker, being accustomed to engage in extensive transactions, and with great means and perfect organization at his disposal, undertook to assist the Anglo-Indian armies during the wars in Affghanistan and Gwalior, by native agency, and at a distance from any effective system of check and supervision. Irregularities in detail occurred, and at the close of the war, all his accounts were not clear, distinct, or well vouched for. When the war was over, Jotee Persaud claimed a balance of half a million sterling from the Indian government. It was disputed, and of course not paid. Years of discussion and debate followed, the Indian authorities wearying out the pertinacious Hindoo. When hostilities in the Punjab broke out, the military authorities applied to him to maintain the armies. Persaud at once declined to do so; he refused to be again connected with their commissariat. Every effort was made to induce him to yield, and at last he did give way, but upon two

\* Continuation of Dr. Taylor's *History of India*.

conditions, that his past arrears should be adjusted as soon as the new war was over, and that a title of honour should be conferred on him. He accepted the new contract, and maintained the armies in the Punjab campaign.

Having fulfilled his part of the undertaking, he asked the Indian government to fulfil the stipulations, but was again disappointed. Instead of the old balances being discharged, the new accounts were subjected to criticism, and to a more severe examination. One of the natives employed in the commissariat came forward on the 30th of March, 1849, and made a deposition against Jotee Persaud, accusing him of corruption, embezzlement, and forgery. The government ordered an investigation, which was referred to Major Ramsay. He declared the accused to be blameless, and sent in his report to the military board. Two of the members agreed with him, and were about to quash the case, when a third recommended it for the consideration of the governor-general and his council. Jotee Persaud had threatened an action for his demand, but while at Agra he was required to give bail to abide a trial for the charges brought against him by the government. Mr. Lang, of Meerut, became responsible. Jotee Persaud was allowed his liberty, and went to Loodiana, from whence he fled to Calcutta, thinking that within the jurisdiction of the supreme court he would be safe from the Agra judge. But the warrant was executed in Calcutta, and Jotee Persaud was taken to be tried at Agra. In the meantime his bail was estreated, and treated roughly. Mr. Lang, a barrister of courage and talents, defended Jotee Persaud with spirit. Although the court was composed of a judge, a jury, and a prosecutor nominated by the government, the defendant was acquitted.

The trial lasted twelve days, in March, 1851, and excited an interest unparalleled in the district. India was searched for witnesses wherewith to procure a conviction; but not even then could a case be made out. In his defence, Mr. Lang called forward many high government *employés* to speak of Jotee Persaud's services and character. After the trial the enthusiasm of the natives broke forth, and the people offered to carry Jotee Persaud in triumph from the court-house. The Indian authorities sought to clear themselves from the blame which these proceedings afforded for imputing to them—1st, injustice in not settling their creditor's just claims; 2nd, ingratitude for not dealing liberally with one whose services were confessedly great; 3rd, breach of faith for not fulfilling the engagements they had entered into with Jotee Persaud as an inducement to undertake the supply of the

army; and 4th, above all, a vindictive interference with his proceedings against them in the Queen's Court, by concocting unsustainable criminal charges against him in their own courts, by showing, 1st, that they could not be expected to pay a debt which was not admitted or proved to be justly due; 2nd, that there was no ingratitude in their acts, which were founded on justice; 3rd, that the delays in payment arose from the difficulties of having satisfactory proofs; and 4th, by stating that the investigation had been ordered, and bail had been required from Jotee Persaud months before he had commenced any action, and previous to his flight to Calcutta. It is impossible to come to any conclusion favourable to the authorities in this affair. It is more than probable that Jotee was not more honest than European commissaries are reputed to be. That he had his own way of making a profit, both by the government and the unfortunate soldiers, and that way not commendable, is also very likely; but he was acquitted of fraud by the very persons whom the government appointed to investigate the charges which they brought against him. Before the matter came before a court of law his accusers appointed his judges on the tribunal of investigation, and they declared him innocent. A large debt was due to the man, and the officials who had the honour of their country in keeping endeavoured to confiscate his claim. They, resolutely bent on this course, nevertheless made fresh bargains with him when their own official helplessness made him indispensable. They then openly violated their new compact, and to uphold the iniquity of their proceedings, endeavoured to ruin the man by resorting to subornation of perjury. There is nothing in the worst annals of the days of Clive, Vansittart, and Hastings—when these governors endeavoured to control the cupidity and tyranny of their countrymen—which surpasses the infamy thus openly incurred in 1851. Lord Dalhousie won no renown by his own conduct. Accustomed as he was to look personally into everything, why did he not investigate this affair, and stop the abomination before the judges of the land acquitted the man whom his officials, by such desperate and flagrant violation of honour and honesty, sought to ruin? When faith is so often violated in contracts by the government at home, in sight of the English public, and under the lash of parliament and the press, we cannot wonder that the like should occur in India, were it not for the destruction to the interests of the nation which is created there by destroying confidence in English honour in the native mind.

In 1850 and 1851 Lord Dalhousie did

what he could to forward public works. The Ganges canal was in the former year continued on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. The proceedings of the governor-general during these years in the Punjaub have been already referred to elsewhere. The year 1850 was signalised by another great improvement in India, that of abolishing all punishment inflicted by Hindoos or Mohammedans, under the sanction of the law, upon persons changing their religion. This measure was violently opposed by all ranks and conditions of the natives, who hold the principle of coercion in religion. One of the provocations to the sepoy revolt a few years after was this great and salutary reform: would that other provocations to that crime had been as much to our honour! During these two years police and educational improvements were carried on under the auspices of Lord Dalhousie, the Lawrences, Montgomerie, and Edwardes with some success in Bengal, the upper provinces, and the Punjaub.

In the civil administration of Madras during the general government of Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie there was much to trouble the presidency. Attempts to restrict the liberties of the English residents, on the part of the government, caused opposition from them during the governor-generalship of Lord Hardinge, and the presidential government of the Marquis of Tweeddale. The noble marquis personally favoured liberty and religious freedom, and in his general administration deserved well of his country. Still, another measure of that nobleman produced much discussion in India, and much discontent among the natives. In 1847 a minute of council, introduced by him, made the Bible a class-book in the government schools. The disturbance of feeling on the part of the natives was, in the same year, increased by a decision made by the law courts on a question of religious liberty. A young girl educated by the missionaries became a Christian. Her mother demanded that she should be delivered up to her, with the avowed object of coercing, in matters of conscience, her Christian daughter. The woman's co-religionists made a fierce hubbub, and treating the matter as a question of creed and right, brought it into the supreme court. The girl being of sufficient age, was by the decree of the court allowed to do as she pleased. This gave great offence to the natives, who insisted that she should be compelled to resume her former religion. They hated liberty, civil and religious, as the genius of Brahminism and Mohammedanism alike taught them to do. The minds of the people throughout the Madras presidency became more and more agitated by religious intoler-

ance and fanaticism. There was an arrogant tone in the mind of the natives on all religious questions; they spoke, wrote, and acted as if they had the right and the power to compel the government to set at nought the scruples and rights of Christians, and to concede everything to their prejudices. The Mohammedan and the Brahmin were as intolerably fierce to one another as each was to Christians. At Gumsoor human sacrifices were attempted, and the whole district became disturbed, so that military interposition became necessary. An extension of greater religious liberty to the army further marked the era of progress in Madras. The baptism of five native girls at Madras increased the ferment which previous events produced. The Marquis of Tweeddale left in 1847, having completed many reforms, removed vexatious taxation, improved Madras, put down cruel native practices, and opened the gate wider for the free labours of the missionaries. On the question of religious liberty, however, in Madras, as elsewhere in India, *adhuc sub judice lis est*.

Henry Dickenson, Esq., the senior councillor, took the government, *ad interim*, until the arrival of Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart. He landed April 7th, 1848. That year was remarkable for an insurrection of the Moplahs at Calicut, who were only put down after terrific slaughter. These men were Mohammedan fanatics—

"Men of the murderous saintly brood,  
To carnage and the Koran given."

Their custom was to commit some furious and sanguinary outrage upon Christians and Brahmins, more especially the latter, then, exulting in having gained "the surest way to heaven" by a passage of blood, shut themselves up in some mosque or temple, and defend it with a determination to sell life as dearly as possible, and pass to paradise and the prophet from the sword or shot of their adversaries. Many conversions were made to Christianity among the natives after the arrival of that functionary, who regarded them with no favourable feeling. In 1850 a young native embraced Christianity; his friends and his wife's friends forcibly withheld her from joining him. He appealed to the supreme court on a writ of *habeas corpus*. She was by the interposition of the judges restored to him. The natives treated this act of justice and righteous law—which was as much in their favour as in that of the Christian—as an invasion of their rights, their right to persecute. It is curious that in the vocabulary of Anglo-Indians Madras is called "the benighted presidency," whereas there are more native Christians and more schools in it, in proportion to population, than in either of the other

presidencies. In the early part of Lord Hardinge's government Bombay was under the presidential sway of the amiable and enlightened Sir George Arthur, a good man, a good soldier, and a good governor. After his retirement in 1846, Sestock Robert Reed, Esq., senior councillor, assumed, *pro tempore*, the reins of power. In 1847 Sir George Russell Clerk arrived as governor of that presidency. Sir Jámsetjee Jeejeebhoy, the celebrated Parsee merchant, much honoured by the previous governor, received additional honour from Sir George. Scinde was that year placed on the same footing with other British provinces, thus completing the act of unprincipled invasion and spoliation with which, in the history of that interesting region, the English name has been dishonoured.

In 1849 Lord Falkland arrived as governor, in the room of Sir George Clerk. Then arose the discussion about the rajalik of Sattara, of which so much was heard in England. The rajah died without heirs. The government refused to recognise the principle of adoption sacred to native law all over Asia. The rajah's territories were annexed. His legal successor (legal in view of native law) claimed the throne, and hired advocates of eloquence and popular acceptance in England to urge his claims upon the justice of the English people, parliament, and court. Those claims were urged in vain; a spoil was to be gathered by the Indian government, and when that was the case, the voice of Asiatic custom or Mohammedan law, however formally recognised, was unheard. During Lord Falkland's government of Bombay, education, especially in English, made rapid progress. In 1850 many discoveries were made of the corruption and cruelty of the native officials; many of

them were dismissed from their offices. In 1851 disputes arose between the British government and the Nizam of the Deccan, which were not creditable to the governor-general or to England. An account of these must be reserved for another chapter.

It became obvious that the leading feature of the policy of Lord Dalhousie was "annexation." He had annexed the Punjaub, confiscated the dominion of the Rajah of Sattara, minor states had been quietly disposed of, and now demands were made upon the Nizam of the Deccan incompatible with his rights and dignity to grant, and to British honour to demand. The policy of his excellency appeared to be an exemplification of

"The good old rule, the simple plan,  
That they should take who have the power;  
That they should keep who can."

The temper of India at the time was not favourable to such a policy. His excellency was warned of this: the certainty that as state after state was "brought within the company's red line" (as old Runjeet Singh would say), native gentlemen of ability, civil and military, would be debarred of all hope of rising to eminence; and as no scope would be left for ambition, their disloyalty would increase, and sedition and revolt employ their energies. Events would of themselves, in their own time, have brought these countries under British sway, but Lord Dalhousie, like men who make haste to be rich, and pierce themselves through with many sorrows, provided a heritage of grief, and blood, and shame for his country, by the haste of his ambition. It may be, it probably was, an ambition for her glory and aggrandizement, not his own; but the principle, and its operations, worked all the same against her.

## CHAPTER CXXIII.

GOVERNMENT OF THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE FROM 1851 (*continued*)—CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE NIZAM, AND ITS RESULTS—AFFAIRS OF OUDE—THE SECOND BURMESE WAR—TREATY WITH DOST MOHAMMED.

GIBBON, the celebrated historian, remarks, "Darkness is favourable to cruelty, but it is also favourable to calumny and fiction." This remark applies to the negotiations and diplomacy of our Indian empire. Deeds of annexation like that of Scinde and the rajalik of Sattara were contrived and executed, after a tortuous diplomacy of pretences, before the English public could hear anything about it. Even the court of directors, almost always unfavourable to annexation, were helpless in

the hands of the board of control and governor-generals, who did for a long series of years pretty much as they pleased, in spite of the protests of the company. It is true that the directors, in a fit of unwonted spirit, might recall a governor-general, as they did Lord Ellenborough, but this exercise of their acknowledged right would be talked down in the clubs, wrote down in the organs of government, disapproved of in parliament by the members of the ministry, and denounced

by the ministerial hacks in both houses. The real power of the company had been gone from the days of Pitt—their virtual power from 1833.

In 1851 Lord Dalhousie demanded from the Nizam of the Deccan that he should give up to the British resident at Hyderabad\* a portion of his territories of the annual value of £370,000, until his debt due to the company was fully liquidated. The resident was empowered to occupy with troops the country demanded, in case his highness refused compliance.

The relations of the nizam at that time to the British government of India were extremely delicate, and much dissatisfaction, real or feigned, was expressed at Calcutta with the way in which his highness governed his dominions. His state was, in fact, tributary, and he was held responsible for its good government according to an English standard, to which neither he nor his subjects had any desire to conform themselves. He was unable to cultivate any independent external relations. He dare not make treaties or alliances, except under the direction or control of the governor-general of British India. He was indebted heavily to the English government for the pay of troops ostensibly used in his service, really employed to overawe him and his subjects. He was, by treaty, to maintain an army in alliance with the British, to be placed at their disposal whenever they might require such assistance. This treaty he probably never intended to observe; at all events he acted without seeming to feel its obligation, as was customary with all the native princes. One of the advocates of annexation† wrote at the period to which reference is here made, in terms which so accorded with the policy of Lord Dalhousie, that it would seem as if the policy of annexation had been deliberately adopted, and its application determined upon in reference to all the native states, and that the word had gone out to all concerned in the East India interest to hold it up. At all events the number of books and pamphlets insisting upon the annexation policy which were published in 1850-52 was very remarkable. The work referred to contains the following bold assertion of the policy in reference to the Deccan, Oude, the states of Central India, and all the territories governed by princes born there. Concerning the nizam, the writer observes:—

\* The reader will remember that this is the name of the metropolitan city of Scinde, as well as of the Deccan. See the geographical and descriptive portion of this work.

† Horace St. John; *History of the British Conquests in India*. Colburn, London, 1852.

“A population of nearly eleven millions is ground under his sway; his finances are in irretrievable confusion; his ministers prey on him, he preys on the people, and daily the process of disorganization and decay is going on, while the prince sits on a throne which would not last one year without the assistance of the East India Company. Anarchy and oppression consume the resources and desolate the face of a beautiful province, with an area of nearly a hundred thousand square miles.

“This is an organized crime against humanity. It is for the British government to redeem the state of Hyderabad from the demoralization and poverty with which it is afflicted, and to spare its reputation the reproach of conserving an authority exercised only for the vilest of purposes. Corruption, profligacy, oppression, practised in all the departments of the nizam’s administration, enfeeble and impoverish the country, and it is a shame that the English nation should lend itself to the support of a government so irretrievably weak and immoral, or to the further injury of a people already debased, degraded, and undone. Charity may ascribe to the nizam the virtue of good intentions, but it is scarcely wise to adopt the Jesuit principle of dividing his motives from his acts, and judging him by the philosophy of Escobar. When a sovereign is set up by British authority, one question alone is to be answered—Is he fit or able to reign? If he is, then there is no need of a contingent force to uphold him on his throne. If he is not, every aid extended to him is an offence against the people he oppresses. The nizam’s dominions, however, will inevitably sooner or later be absorbed in our own, and humanity will bless the occasion which rescues a fine country and a large population from the double curse of a tyranny at once feeble and destructive.”

Concerning the other states Mr. St. John says:—

“With still more justice may these criticisms be applied to the principle of upholding the King of Oude. He is, as his predecessors have ever been, a feeble, cruel, faithless despot, and we are the janissaries of his sanguinary power. We have lately been assured by an Indian official, high in the estimation of the company, that he has seen the tax-gatherers in the territories of Lucknow lighting their way through the country with the flames of forty villages at one time, set on fire because the wretched inhabitants were unable to satisfy those vampires—the agents of an oriental exchequer. It would be difficult, with the utmost license of style,

to draw an exaggerated picture of the anarchy and impoverishment which prevail in Oude, under a prince whose imbecility renders his subjects equally contemptible with himself—*fraco Re fa forte gente fraca*. Whenever the British government determines, therefore, to be consistent in its justice, it will do what the king's want of faith gives it authority at any moment to resolve. It will withdraw its support from him; he will assuredly fall; and it will remain for the company, instead of keeping up a standing army to defend a people which has been robbed of all that was worth protecting, to undertake the duty which attaches to an imperial power, and make late atonement to Oude for all the misery with which it has been afflicted under its native governors.

"In Nepaul there does not appear any present necessity for interference, or in Nagpore. But in the Gwalior state the politics of Hyderabad seem to be continually repeated. A score of small states are dependent on this—the hereditary domain of Scindiah's family. The Guicowar's dominions, under the Baroda residency, present a picture of similar demoralization, which it is vain to cry out against, unless the whole territory is to be immediately annexed; for the subsidiary and the protective system is inseparably bound up with those evils. While the British states occupy an area of 677,000 square miles, with a population of ninety-nine millions, the subordinate native states occupy an area of 690,000 square miles, with a population of only fifty-three millions; and thus one-half of India, with a third of its inhabitants, is under an inefficient, if not a destructive government, upheld and protected by the British arms.

"The whole of these ought gradually to be annexed, and the fiction of native sovereignty abolished. Were it a harmless fiction, it might be allowed to continue; but it is essentially injurious to India; and if in characterising the company's administration of its own provinces, I employ terms of elevated panegyric, in dwelling on the system which upholds the coarse and savage tyranny of Oude, and the feeble and pernicious government of Hyderabad, I have no language to express conscientiously my views except that of unqualified reprobation. The English people have to be instructed that their representatives in India support, at Lucknow, a king whose atrocities are ferocious, even in comparison with the usual acts of oriental tyrants; that it protects in Cashmere a ruler who flays a man alive because he fails to pay his tax; and that in Hyderabad a miserable creature; the victim of his ministers, as well as of his own imbecility and vice, is maintained in power because the

British government, averse from conquest, desires to preserve its character for moderation.

"Every year, however, that these evils are permitted to exist will increase the difficulty of removing them, as well as the necessity we shun. Infallibly the rotten state of Hyderabad will, sooner or later, be incorporated as an integral province of our empire, and the longer this annexation is delayed; the more heavy and slow must be the labour of reclaiming it from barbarism to civilization. The ordinary question of history is thus reversed. It is not whether we have a right to conquer (for the conquest is already made), but whether, having conquered, we have a right to impose on the provinces we have subdued cruel and feeble princes, whose only ambition is to gratify their degrading lusts, and whose sole power is one of destruction. Guilt, under these despots, is insolent, and innocence only is not secure. There is no law imposed to curb their licentious will, which is enforced under a prerogative derived from us. Every principle of morals, and every political maxim is thus violated and defied. When an imperial government assumes the privilege to appoint viceroys, they should be charged to distribute justice and preserve peace, not to riot in the excesses of despotism, or give authority to pillage and assassination. The unhappiness of those populations is enhanced by contrast with the felicity of their neighbours. It is futile to muse over the pleasant vision of creating new Indian states, under kings of Indian blood, who may receive the lessons of civilization from us. We cannot proselytise these princes to humanity. They will not embrace our ethics; we must recognise their crimes. We may be gentle and caressing to them, but they will be *carnifices* to their people. We have dreamed too long over this idea. We have no moral authority to uphold them, and they have no claim to be upheld, for the prescriptive right to plunder and oppress any community is a vile and bloody fiction. The regeneration of such powers is impossible. It is time to relinquish the fancy. The more we delay, confiding in a better future, the further will the chance be driven. 'The hope is on our horizon, and it flies as we proceed.'"

These words are exponent of the Dalhousie policy, as thoroughly as if written by his lordship himself.

It is needless to trouble the reader with a long account of events which in their detail offer no interest. It would be a recital of much the same story were we to show how one little state after another was swallowed up by great imperial England. The Deccan was a grand prize, and it was seized without

compunction. The English resident made his demands; the nizam was in no hurry to concede them. Troops were ordered into his territory.

Throughout the year 1849-50 much dissatisfaction existed at Calcutta with the government of Oude. It is believed that even so early as the close of the war in the Punjab, Lord Dalhousie had contemplated the annexation of that kingdom, the independence of which was held to be a sacred thing by both Mohammedan and heathen all over India. Lord Hardinge had visited that province, and remonstrated with the king upon the misgovernment of his dominions, in violation of his especial treaties with the English. One of the earliest acts of Lord Dalhousie was to send Colonel Sleeman thither to investigate the state of the country. That officer traversed the whole of the Oude dominions, and his report was most unfavourable. The country must have sadly deteriorated since the days of Bishop Heber, for no two accounts of any place could be more in contrast than that given by the divine and that by the colonel. Heber, however, took but a cursory view of the country; Sleeman investigated its actual condition. The enemies of Lord Dalhousie, and of the East India Company, affirmed that these accounts were got up by the colonel with a view to sustain Lord Dalhousie in following out his policy of annexation. When, at a later date, General Outram was sent with the ostensible object of reconciling matters, and of recalling the king to a sense of duty in reference to his people, and his treaty obligations with the English, similar allegations were made, and General Outram was criminated in a way such as his rectitude of character forbids those who know it to believe. The differences with Oude became more complicated and serious, until the final act of annexation by Lord Dalhousie set at work the elements of rebellion and mutiny, which lived, but slumbered, in the heart of India.

The year 1850 began in the serenest tranquillity. India was in perfect repose. The wars of Lords Auckland, Ellenborough, Hardinge, and Dalhousie had added fourteen millions sterling to the public debt of India, and swallowed up besides six millions sterling of the current revenue. It was expected that Lord Dalhousie would prosecute peace by all means, and above all things avoid any attempts to enlarge the British territory, as it had been found by experience that the extension of British dominion lessened its security, and increased the debt, without any commensurate advantage. During 1850 and 1851 these pleasing expectations were realized, notwithstanding that in Oude, that realm of political

storms, Lord Dalhousie and his agents were playing with the lightning. On the north-west frontier the Afreedees gave some trouble, and Peshawur, the old cause of contention between Affghan and Sikh, was the cause of disputation and negotiation between Affghan and Englishmen. Sir Colin Campbell found occupation for the freebooters of the frontier, although his operations were not very successful, and his co-operation with Calcutta not very harmonious. Railways and electric telegraphs engaged the attention of the directors at home, and the councils in India. Laws favourable to religious liberty and education were also enacted, and improvements of various kinds devised and partly applied.

For many years the government of Ava had been on unfriendly terms with that of Calcutta, and early in the year 1852 the arrogance, ignorance, and folly of that state led once more to an appeal to arms to settle permanently the differences which could not be otherwise adjusted.

#### SECOND BIRMESE WAR.

A new viceroy of the Emperor of Birmah took up his residence in Rangoon. He seemed animated by a keen hatred to the English, and a resolution to avenge the disasters of the former war. His conduct was at first insulting only, which was borne tamely by the English, who dreaded the expense of another Birmese war. This endurance of affront provoked its renewal and aggravation, until it became intolerable. The property of English subjects was injured or invaded in various ways, and it became necessary at last to demand redress. Peaceful means were tried in vain; Commodore Lambert was sent with a ship of the line and some war-steamers. The commodore was received with much haughtiness, and acts of violence still continuing, he was compelled to exceed his instructions, and make some active demonstrations of force. All Europeans whom the viceroy could seize were cast into prison, the rest found shelter on board the British ships. The dilatory policy of Lord Dalhousie throughout the contest enabled the Birmese to gain confidence, and organize resistance; prompt and decisive action, when an appeal to arms became inevitable, would have saved many valuable lives, and have prevented much expense and trouble.

On the 24th of February six steamers were dispatched from Bombay to Madras to embark troops for a Birmese campaign, under the command of General Godwin, who, as colonel of a regiment, had served in the previous war with Birmah. The troops consisted of two European and four native regiments, with four corps of artillery, chiefly Europeans. It was

the 29th of March before the armament left the roads of Madras. A few days previous (the 25th) a force similar in all respects to that which left the roads of Madras was dispatched from Calcutta. The total number of men, exclusive of the naval service, did not much exceed eight thousand. An ultimatum had been sent by the governor-general, which ran out on the 1st of April. An officer was sent to Rangoon to obtain a reply—he was fired upon. This act the Birmese knew well was contrary to European custom in war, was regarded as dishonourable and barbarous, and would excite strong resentment. Admiral Austin took command of the naval portion of the expedition. Both the naval and military commanders were advanced far in life, were inactive in their habits, and feeble from years. This circumstance excited much painful comment, to the effect that notwithstanding all the nation had suffered from partizanship and routine in the selection of commanders, the system remained the same, as if incurable by any amount of calamity or experience.

On the 5th of April Martaban was attacked by the Bengal force, and easily carried. The Madras troops arriving on the 7th were in time to participate in an attack upon Rangoon. The place was stockaded, and garrisoned by twenty-five thousand Birmese troops. The pagodas on the heights were fortified, and contributed much strength to the defence. The enemy fought in the way they had done in the previous war, and their defences were not much improved, but strong; their cannon were of heavier metal than in the former war. The stockades were cannonaded and bombarded, and some of them stormed; a marine force, consisting of eighteen hundred men, contributing prominently to the victory. The British lost seventeen men killed, one hundred and thirty-two wounded, and two officers from sun-stroke. The capture of Rangoon led to the immediate return of the inhabitants of Pegu, who hated the Birman yoke, and placed themselves willingly under the protection of the English. The British commander was one of those dilatory old generals in which the civil authorities so frequently delight. He was desirous of doing nothing during the rainy season, from May to October, but the Birmese collected in such force at Bassein, a place of importance up the lesser Irrawaddy, a branch of the greater stream bearing that name, that it became necessary to dislodge them; at all events, so the general thought. He accordingly ordered four hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, with a corresponding complement of artillery, sappers, and miners, to accomplish that object. This force descended the Irrawaddy, and ascended the

minor branch to Bassein. The importance of steamers in expeditions of this nature was demonstrated. This was an arm of war of the power of which the enemy had formed no idea, and their surprise, confusion, and dismay at its development were very great. About seven thousand men sheltered in stockades defended the approaches to Bassein. The English, joined by a detachment of marines, mustered about one thousand. They found behind the range of stockades a mud fort, mounted with heavy guns. After an ineffectual fire on the part of the Birmese, and an impatient and gallant attack by the British, stockades and fort were stormed, and the enemy fled, leaving nearly one thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of the conquerors. The Birmese infantry fought badly, except while under cover, but the artillerymen stood by their guns until they fell, pierced by the bayonets of their assailants. Major Errington and a detachment of the 51st light infantry behaved with distinguished gallantry. The British left about half their number as a garrison.

On the 3rd of June a small force was sent in a steamer to attack the city of Pegu, the old capital of the province called by that name. One hundred Europeans, as many sepoys, and a few sappers and miners composed the detachment. As the English approached, the enemy ran away. The English retired from the place without leaving a garrison, when the Birmese came back, and perpetrated great cruelties upon the Peguans for their hospitable reception of the English. During the remainder of June the weather was inauspicious for active enterprises, and very trying to the health of the troops. General Godwin's previous experience of the climate was not thrown away, his sanitary arrangements were skilful and successful. He sent to Calcutta earnestly desiring reinforcements, which ought not to have been needed; a sufficient force for the objects of the expedition should have been sent in the first instance. The reinforcements he required were sent, consisting of a few squadrons of light cavalry, a few troops of horse artillery, a field battery, some sappers and miners, and a few battalions of infantry. The governor-general also visited the seat of war, and conferred with the commander-in-chief as to a plan of future operations.

In July an expedition was undertaken against Prome, which was opposed in its progress up river, but dispersing the enemy's parties, it arrived, without loss, upon the rear of the Birmese general's army. The reinforcements had not yet arrived, and some apprehensions were entertained that the enemy might be found in such overwhelming numbers

as to defy attack. A couple of volleys were exchanged, and then the Birmese took to flight, leaving behind them twenty-eight guns, their standards, camp equipage, and the general's barge. It was September before Prome was captured, which was accomplished without incurring any resistance that deserved the name. The British did not garrison it, and when reinforcements arrived the enemy were again in possession, and determined, if possible, to hold it. An obstinate conflict ensued, but the dispositions of General Godwin and Brigadier McNeil rendered the enemy's resistance productive only of destruction to his own troops. General Godwin's capturing and recapturing of places caused much fatigue to the troops, and the loss, especially by *coup de soleil*, of several officers. There was a want of consistent and comprehensive plan on the part of the general's expeditions which made them exhausting to his army and expensive to his country. When Prome was the second time captured, there lay a force of six thousand Birmese near the place, who held the town in observation. Nothing could have been more easy than the dispersion of these men, which the general refused to attempt until more troops were placed at his disposal. It was rumoured in the army that his excellency had an objection to terminate the war too soon. Small detachments were ordered up by him from Rangoon with so little judgment that they were beaten in detail. It then became necessary to send from Rangoon a force of fourteen hundred men, including a newly arrived detachment of Sikh irregular horse. This brigade swept the country of the enemy. At Pegu eight thousand men drew up in line and awaited a charge, by which they were broken and dispersed. The Sikh cavalry proved themselves most efficient, pursuing and cutting down the enemy's cavalry with zeal and courage.

On December 28th, 1852, the governor-general, by proclamation, declared Pegu annexed to the British dominions. He also declared that he contemplated no further conquests, but should the King of Ava refuse to hold friendly intercourse with the British government, he would conquer the whole Birmese empire. This proclamation produced an

important result—a revolution at Ava on the part of those who were opposed to the continuance of the war; the king was deposed, and his brother reigned in his stead. While these things were going on, hostilities were, as in the previous war, waged from Arracan. The British marched through the Aen Pass, taking the stockades in flank by which it was blocked up, and slaying or dispersing their defenders. This circumstance also contributed to the revolution. Negotiations were opened with the new emperor, and by July, 1853, the Birmese troops had retired from the vicinity of Pegu, upon the dominions of Ava Proper. The feeling, however, was not amicable, and reason existed to doubt the sincerity of the new Birman court. The demonstrations made by the governor of Calcutta of a firm intention to hold Pegu had at last their due effect, and towards the close of 1854 relations were established as amicable as the Birmese will allow themselves to maintain with any foreign government. The year 1854 was not remarkable for any operations of a hostile kind in India, but affairs in Oude waxed worse and worse, and the policy of annexation by Lord Dalhousie, in reference to that country, was plainly developed, although not actually accomplished.

In 1855 amicable relations were established with Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Affghanistan, who had proved himself an acute politician. Hyder Khan (his son Akbar, the enemy of the English, had fallen a victim to the political jealousy of the other chiefs, and was poisoned) came down to Peshawur, and negotiated a treaty, by which Dost Mohammed, against whom we had made war in Affghanistan, was recognised by the British government. This chief had been governor of Ghizni when the British stormed that place. The treaty was negotiated with Mr. John Lawrence, brother to the Captain George Lawrence who accompanied Sir W. MacNaghten to the quasi-friendly meeting with Akbar Khan, and who saw the brother of Hyder Khan murder the English minister. "*O tempora mutantur, et mutamur cum illos!*"

Both the years 1854 and 1855 were in India years of administrative improvement and material progress.

## CHAPTER CXXIV.

HOME EVENTS—DISPUTES BETWEEN THE BOARD OF CONTROL AND THE COURT OF DIRECTORS DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE CHARTER OF 1833-4—VICIOUS PRINCIPLE OF APPOINTING GOVERNOR-GENERALS—RECALL OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—DISCUSSIONS UPON THE APPOINTMENT OF LORD DALHOUSIE—HIS POLICY OF ANNEXATION CAUSES UNEASINESS IN ENGLAND—NEW CHARTER 1853-4.

THE charter of 1833-4 placed the East India Company in a position to the board of control, to the cabinet, and to the country, so essentially different from its previous relations to any of these sources of power and authority, that its history up to 1854 merges in the general political history of the English government. A relation of what transpired in the board of directors would prove uninteresting, unless to readers connected with either the company or with India. During all that time the directors were engaged in struggles with the board of control to retain some fragment of the power which was all but entirely wrested from their hands. The board made use of the name of the company and of the directors to screen itself from responsibility. If the policy pursued by the English cabinet was unpopular, the orators and organs of the press, who served the former, placed all evils at the door of the latter; if occurrences in India pleased the English people, the cabinet took all the credit. In the one case the directors of the East India Company were represented as mischievous and incompetent, in the other they were treated as ciphers; it was the president of the board of control, or the governor-general, or both, by whom all the good was accomplished. The directors held their tongues,—some from timidity, some from party sympathy with the cabinet of the day, others to please the court; men of quiet and reserved dispositions among them said nothing, it was their habit to be silent; if they did make a demonstration, they were threatened with the abolition of their power, and some of the government faction would be instructed to ask some pointed and insulting question, or make a motion, which would at least afford an opportunity for conveying the impression that the company was no longer of any use to India or to England, that it was an obsolete existence, and the sooner it became defunct the better. The most shameless falsehood and effrontery were resorted to, by successive governments, to brow-beat the directors, undermine the influence of the company, and clutch the patronage which, by law and justice, belonged to the directors. The

directors were almost invariably for a policy of peace; the board of control and its nominees, the governor-generals, were generally the abettors of aggrandizement and war.

Scarcely were the arrangements of 1833 made between the board of control and the directors than the former resumed its officious, insolent, and domineering policy. Early in 1834 an application, on the part of the crown, was made to the King's Bench for a mandamus to compel the court of directors, "under the act of 1793," to transmit certain despatches to the East Indies, they having been directed to do so by the board of commissioners for the affairs of India. These despatches related to claims made upon the King of Oude by certain unprincipled adventurers and money-lenders. The directors were unwilling to interfere, to embroil either the company or the government of India in a matter where they were not called upon by right or duty to take any part. The government might have waited a short time, as the act of 1833 would have come into operation on the 22nd of April, 1834. The board, however, would show its authority and dominate, and, therefore, insisted upon immediate compliance. Such was the general spirit in which business between the two boards was conducted. The cry raised against a double government was factitious, it meant simply, a demand upon the company to give up what *patronage* and authority remained with them to the minister for India. Double government, properly speaking, there was none; for the board of commissioners or board of control, whichever way it might be called, generally enforced its views, and nearly always with a high hand, and in a spirit and mode unconstitutional and improper. The firmness of the directors in the case of the mandamus prevented its execution. They protested against the folly and wickedness of the whole affair, and the deputy chairman preferred any consequence rather than inflict upon his conscience the stain of signing such a despatch. The matter became known to the public, the newspapers took it up, public opinion was for once with the directors, the board of control became afraid of that public opinion it

had so often, by scandalously faithless means, misled and prejudiced against the directors and the company. Lord Ellenborough gave notice of a motion in the lords, and this caused Earl Grey and his ministry to make a precipitate retreat. Throughout the whole of his political career, Earl Grey was a haughty and factious enemy of the company, and when in power betrayed a jealousy of the court of directors, and an eagerness to grasp their patronage, which probably no other minister had shown. Lord Ellenborough demanded the reasons why the board of control refused to proceed with the mandamus, Earl Grey replied that he *did not know*. On the 5th of May Lord Ellenborough brought forward his motion, and uttered a withering denunciation of the conduct of the ministry. The Duke of Wellington, in one of the most sensible and earnest speeches he ever delivered in parliament, followed in the same strain. The lord-chancellors of England and Ireland delivered eloquent harangues for the purpose of making the motion a party question, in which they did not succeed. Finally the house of lords voted against the government, who winced more under the exposure than the vote. It was a vote of censure by the house of lords of the immorality and injustice of Lord Grey's government in its Indian policy, and of its tyranny and unconstitutional treatment of the court of directors. On the 8th of May Mr. Herries moved in the commons for the same papers refused, but extorted, in the house of lords. The government, intimidated by their defeat in the upper house, made no resistance. Sir Robert Peel and several of the most eloquent members denounced the conduct of the cabinet, the board of control, and of its chief, Mr. Grant. None of the members, on either side, espoused the cause of the ministry, except Mr. Joseph Hume. That gentleman, always so liberal in home affairs, so watchful of the public expenditure, and so useful generally, sympathised in colonial matters, especially in East and West Indian affairs, with selfish and class interests. His mind was habituated to partial and unjust views of colonial affairs by siding with West Indian slavery, of which he was the industrious and but little scrupulous champion. The defeat of the board of control, in the attempt to coerce the court of directors into an inequitable and impolitic line of action, rankled in the hearts of the ministry. The nature of the defeat, its *modus operandi*, the public exposure attending it, mortified, but did not do more than partially check Lord Grey's enmity to the company, which he communicated to the heads of his party. A short time, therefore, was only permitted to elapse before the

board of control renewed its aggressive policy towards the directors. Changes of ministry occurred at brief intervals, which established the Whigs in office for a time more firmly, although with much diminished prestige. Sir John Cam Hobhouse became president of the board of commissioners for the affairs of India. He was a more courteous, but more insidious and less candid enemy of the company than Mr. Grant had been. Indeed, presidents of the board seemed to think that the real object for which they were appointed was not to co-operate with the directors for the better government of India, but to study and apply such tactics of opposition to the East India company as would soonest destroy it, and turn over to the coteries who constituted ministries that valuable patronage which the directors possessed, and for which the parliamentary and party politicians hungered. The chief offices in India were not conferred on the company's best servants, or on persons selected from any class of Englishmen peculiarly fitted for them, but upon political partizans. In proportion as India was ruled by the board of control it ceased to be governed for the people of India, or of England, and was governed for party purposes and party patronage. During the twenty years which elapsed between the act of 1833 and the act of 1853, for the regulation of the company's affairs, the directors showed an improvement in the spirit of their administration which no impartial person, acquainted with the history of the company, can deny.

In August, 1834, a new feud, as fiercely maintained as the last named, broke out between the two divisions of the "double government." On the resignation of Lord W. Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe, *ex officio*, assumed the vacated post *pro tempore*. The directors, in view of the high talents of Sir Charles, his great experience of India, and his moral influence, deemed it inexpedient to disturb his possession of office, and confirmed him in his charge. This, as a matter of course, enraged the board of control, and a long and painful controversy arose. That Sir Charles possessed all the qualifications for the high office to which he was designated was not denied by the board; the president placed his objections upon the narrow ground of patronage. Sir Charles was a servant of the company; the office, in the opinion of the cabinet, ought to be held by a servant of the crown. The grand question for the public, as to the fittest man, was left out of view by the ministry. A place was wanted for a ministerial party-man, and therefore the excellent and enlightened appointment made by the directors should be overturned. India and

Indian appointments had been, at last, thoroughly brought within the range of the disputes of home party factions,—an evil against which all statesmen, conversant with India and its peoples, had warned successive governments. This contest continued until January, 1835, when Sir Robert Peel came into power. That minister was as much bent as his predecessors upon despoiling the company of their patronage, but he did not proceed to do so in the high-handed, haughty, insolent manner displayed by Lord Grey, Lord J. Russell, and Mr. Grant. He thought it possible by sly and slow methods not less surely to accomplish the same end. He began his ministerial career by conciliating the directors, in which he completely succeeded; and, acting in harmony, Lord Heytesbury was nominated to the office, Sir Charles Metcalfe being provisionally named as his successor. Sir Robert Peel failed to secure the support of the commons. The Whigs again came into power, and they resumed authority in the same arrogant spirit towards the company. They refused to recognise Lord Heytesbury, *although he had been sworn into office*. It was one of the most discreditable party moves of the age. The public disapprobation was strong, but the Whigs braved it. Discussions fierce and protracted were maintained in parliament, which seriously damaged the government, and displayed the party animosities which it cherished in a most unfavourable light.

On the 6th of May, 1836, the chairman and deputy chairman of the company addressed a letter to the president of the board of control, an extract from which will show the just sentiments by which the court of directors was at that time animated:—"The court do not forget that the nomination of Lord Heytesbury was made, and his appointment completed, during the late administration. But this fact, connected with his removal by the present ministers, fills the court with apprehension and alarm as respects both India and themselves. It has always been the court's endcavour in their public acts, and especially in their nominations to office, to divest themselves of political bias; and in the same spirit they now consider it to be their duty frankly and firmly to express their decided conviction that the vital interests of India will be sacrificed if the appointments of governors are made subservient to political objects in this country; and if the local authorities, and through them all public servants, are led to feel that tenure of office abroad is dependent upon the duration of an administration at home; and, further, that the revocation of an appointment, such as that of Lord Heytesbury, for no other reason, so far as the

court can judge, than that the ministry has changed, must have the effect of lessening the authority of the court, and consequently impairing its usefulness and efficiency as a body entrusted with the government of India."

Whatever effect this letter may have had upon the convictions of the cabinet, it had none upon their policy. The general public had little opportunity of judging of the arguments and motives of the directors, for, unfortunately, they had such a repugnance to publicity, and so habitually neglected to throw themselves, however strongly in the right, upon the judgment of the country, that their battles with the board of control were fought in the dark. The board, however, through its agents in parliament, and by the press, stirred up the country by the reiteration of misrepresentations. From these causes the public had seldom an opportunity of judging except from *ex parte* statements. Fierce debates ensued in parliament; the ministry refused all papers and correspondence which might throw a light upon their motives and conduct. A motion was made to compel their production; Sir Robert Peel spoke with peculiar eloquence and effect in condemnation of the conduct of the ministry, but the vote was made a party one by the government, and the motion for the production of papers was successfully resisted. Sir Cam Hobhouse and Mr. Vernon Smith were especially remarkable in the debate for their party feeling and disingenuous arguments. The appointment of Lord Heytesbury was triumphantly resisted by his whig antagonists. Mr. Edward Thornton has justly observed upon the transaction—"It was one of the strongest instances on record, in which a power was exercised within the strict limits of the law, but in a manner altogether at variance with its spirit. It was one of those acts by which a political party loses far more in character than it can possibly gain in any other way." The nomination of a governor-general by the cabinet was an appropriate sequel to the previous conduct. After waiting until Lord William Bentinck arrived in England, during which time Sir C. Metcalfe conducted the government in a manner not at all in accordance with the policy of his successor, Lord Auckland was nominated. In a previous chapter this profligate and calamitous appointment has been made the subject of comment. It is only necessary to say here, that it was profligate, because it was a mere party nomination to the government of a great empire, and that it was made purely to confer a good office upon a confederate, irrespective of his merits. That it was a disastrous appointment, the history of Lord Auckland's incompetency as governor-

general of India, already given, has abundantly shown. In the years immediately following these transactions, the company and the board of commissioners were much occupied by the relations of England to Persia, and the gravest discussions took place as to the designs of Russia upon Hindostan by way of Persia. A sufficient account of the policy and proceedings of the company and the English government was given when relating the transactions preliminary to the Affghan war, so as to render unnecessary a further detail of them in connection with the discussions in the court of directors and the action taken by that body and the board of control.

For some years but few disputes occurred between the two boards. The disaster attendant on Lord Auckland's policy led to hot discussions in parliament. The Whigs defended their measure with very little regard to the justice of the defence. The press, however, teemed with severe articles, some of a sarcastic nature, turning into ridicule the claims of men to govern an empire whose judgment was so much at fault in nominating the lieutenant of a province; others of the "leaders" were severe, stern, written with dignity and political knowledge. The wars in Affghanistan, Scinde, and in China led to many discussions in parliament, and the thanks of both houses were voted to the officers by whom victories were achieved.

The appointment of Lord Ellenborough to the government of India was another instance in which the board of control exercised its authority to the disadvantage of India and of England, in spite of the company. In the nomination of Lord Ellenborough it is true no active opposition was offered by the court of directors, for it was well known how useless such opposition would have been. His appointment was, however, against the general opinion of that body, and of parliament, and of the country. His nomination was regarded as a fault on the part of the Tories, as culpable as the appointment of Lord Auckland by the Whigs. He was a man of more ability than Lord Auckland, capable of perceiving talent in others more readily, of appreciating and honouring it more; but he was as much of a partizan, and his attainment of so high an office was regarded as the result of mere party services. His career in India was so injudicious, involving so much danger and expense—so fitful, capricious, eccentric, and uncertain—that the directors were obliged at last to recall him, without the consent of the board of control. This decisive act caused long and angry discussions between the board and the court. Parliament took up the dispute. The Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel de-

fended Lord Ellenborough, justified his follies, and extenuated his errors with exceeding acrimony towards the company, and in a spirit as thoroughly the expression of mere party as the Whigs displayed in their dishonest apologies for Lord Auckland. The country had come very generally to the conclusion that appointments to office, in the public interest, were not to be expected from either of the great sections of the higher classes, who divided the influence of parliament, and alternately shared the favours of the court. The estimate formed of Lord Ellenborough, and of his career, by the English public, was that expressed in one of the most discriminating and eloquent passages in the *History of the British Empire in India*, by Edward Thornton:—"It is certain, however, that his Indian administration disappointed his friends; and if a judgment may be formed from his own declarations previously to his departure from Europe, it must have disappointed himself. He went to India the avowed champion of peace, and he was incessantly engaged in war. For the Affghan war he was not, indeed, accountable—he found it on his hands; and in the mode in which he proposed to conclude it, and in which he would have concluded it, but for the remonstrances of his military advisers, he certainly displayed no departure from the ultra-pacific policy which he had professed in England. The triumphs with which the perseverance of the generals commanding in Affghanistan graced his administration seem completely to have altered his views; and the desire of military glory thenceforward supplanted every other feeling in his breast. He would have shunned war in Affghanistan by a course which the majority of his countrymen would pronounce dishonourable. He might without dishonour have avoided war in Scinde, and possibly have averted hostilities at Gwalior, but he did not. For the internal improvement of India he did nothing. He had, indeed, little time to do anything. War, and preparation for war, absorbed most of his hours, and in a theatrical display of childish pomp many more were consumed. With an extravagant confidence in his own judgment, even on points which he had never studied, he united no portion of steadiness or constancy. His purposes were formed and abandoned with a levity which accorded little with the offensive tone which he manifested in their defence, so long as they were entertained. His administration was not an illustration of any marked and consistent course of policy; it was an aggregation of isolated facts. It resembled an ill-constructed drama, in which no one incident is the result of that by which it was preceded, nor a just and natural prepa-

ration for that which is to follow. Everything in it stands alone and unconnected. His influence shot across the Asiatic world like a meteor, and but for the indelible brand of shame indented in Scinde, like a meteor its memory would pass from the mind with its disappearance.\* It is astonishingly strange that fourteen years after his recall, under circumstances so discreditable to himself, he should have been made minister for India, with a seat in the cabinet of the government of the Earl of Derby, again to be driven from office by the voice of public opinion, in consequence of his party spirit, and incompetency to deal with Indian affairs. It is if possible still more strange that his renewed errors found abettors among those to whom the responsibility of the government of this great empire was committed, his conduct being discussed in the spirit of faction, not of patriotism. His party had learned nothing during all these years, as his appointment to such an office proved, and the faithless defence of his conduct also proved, when public indignation left it impossible for the government to retain his services.

The decisive act of the directors in recalling Lord Ellenborough gave a fresh stimulus to the board of control to watch every opportunity for invading their independence. The double government worked badly, not because of its constitution, but because the higher classes represented by the government of the day were anxious to gain the entire patronage. It was impossible to govern India with a steady and consistent policy while this was the case. Professor Wilson was right when he wrote that some influential and independent body must always be maintained between the English cabinet and the people of India, if that country be governed with impartiality and a constant intelligible policy. The more power the board of control assumed, the less attention parliament paid to Indian affairs. If India, or an Indian governor, were to be the subject of a *party* debate, the parliamentary benches were well filled; if the interests of India, of England in India, of the relations of our oriental possessions to the empire, were to be discussed, the benches were empty of all or nearly all but those by whom the ministerial whip, or the member whose motion was to be debated, "made a house." Mr. Horace St. John, in his work entitled *British Conquests in India*, has truly observed:—"Whether the popular legislature is now so far educated, to an acquaintance with the history, the religion and laws, manners, resources, industry, trade, arts, castes, classes, opinions, prejudices, traditions, local feelings,

\* Vol. vi., close of the history.

actual condition, or wants of India, seems to admit of little doubt. Such knowledge is still peculiar to a few. The technicalities of the most abstruse sciences are not more unintelligible to the general body of persons in this country than the very names of Zillah and Sudder courts. Some who possess this information in a greater or less degree, desire parliament to adopt the whole legislative control of India, because they imagine every member is equally well instructed with themselves; but from 1834 to 1852 small change in this respect is observable. Whenever Asiatic topics were then introduced, they were listened to impatiently, treated with indifference, and eagerly dismissed.\* Such subjects are not only uninteresting, but obnoxious, to the general body of the house. This feeling is no more than natural in that senate. It is the prevailing tone of the country, which is undoubtedly very ill-acquainted with the social and political state of the East.

"Consequently, nothing can be more dangerous than to trust to parliament alone for a watchful and wise administration of the details of Indian affairs. It may, and generally does, decide justly in great controversies on imperial policy; but if ever the minute and subordinate points are forced on the daily and continual attention of parliament, it will assuredly resign their settlement into the hands of the ascendant statesman of the day.† It would give him what a prime-minister has himself described as a dangerous and unconstitutional amount of power, a power which should excite the jealousy of all in this nation who are attached to our institutions.‡ That minister without a corrupt sentiment in his breast, or a corrupt practice in his own scheme of action, will assuredly, under the conditions of his political existence, employ the power and patronage thus confided to his will in obtaining the command of parliamentary supremacy."

From the recall of Lord Ellenborough to the appointment of Lord Dalhousie, various useful laws were passed for India by the imperial parliament—these could not be enumerated and described except in a history of the statutes regulating Indian affairs. Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough, it has been already observed in passing, were raised to the rank of peers, the former to that of a viscount, the latter to that of a baron; and subsequently Lord Gough was promoted a step in the peerage. Pensions were also conferred upon these noblemen, and their heirs male

\* In an important debate in the commons (May, 1852) scarcely forty members would remain to hear the subject discussed.

† Wilson, ix., 563.

‡ Earl of Derby: Speech, April 2, 1852.

within two generations ; various rewards were distributed to the naval and military officers who distinguished themselves in the Chinese war, and to the military officers who served in Gwalior and the two Punjaub wars. Promotion was not bestowed on a liberal scale to officers of inferior rank, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. Thanks were given in parliament to the great actors, civil and military, who took the leading parts in the great transactions which passed in India up to the time when Lord Dalhousie resigned his government. He was himself promoted a step in the peerage. The appointment of that nobleman to the momentous responsibilities of governor-general of India was due to the influence of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. The latter regarded him as "a promising young man," a description scarcely appropriate to the office of governor-general of India. Sir Robert considered him a disciple of his own ; and was proud of that tact for administrative routine which Sir Robert succeeded in imparting to Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, his own son Frederick, and others of his pupils in parliamentary and official service. There was no difficulty, therefore, in gaining the assent of Sir Robert to the nomination, but Lord Dalhousie, like Lord Ellenborough, was essentially the Duke of Wellington's nominee. However just his grace in the administration of armies or peoples, he was never a warm advocate for promotion for merit. He held the principle of aristocratic patronage to be perfect. Those who were his own warm admirers had always good chance of high office, provided they possessed tact for business (*a sine quâ non* with the duke), were well born (another indispensable requisite), and were endowed with bold and active habits, or were presumed to be so. Hence Sir Henry Hardinge, the Napiers, the Somersets, Lord Raglan (as he afterwards became) especially, and Lord Dalhousie. All these men were *smart* in business, or exact and regular in routine, or bold and energetic. None of these men possessed genius, or even large capacity, except the Napiers. The duke himself had no confidence in the prudence of Sir Charles or Lord Ellenborough, but all these men were upheld and abetted by him, as were others, from the action of the causes just alleged. All were clever men, fit for high and important, but subordinate offices. Perhaps Sir Charles Napier, in spite of his overbearing temper and rashness, had ability for the office of governor-general of India ; none of the rest had the qualities necessary for a post requiring such various and nicely balanced qualifications. Rumour ascribed motives for the appointment of Lord Dalhousie which did not increase

either the political or personal reputation of the duke. No doubt his grace believed that Hardinge, Ellenborough, and Dalhousie were all competent for the office. He was conscientious in the support he gave them, but had they not been connected with himself, and had they not been idolaters of his genius and his glory, he would have judged them with a stern impartiality, which he did not exercise in reference to them. No governor-general that ever served England in that office had the ability for it that the duke himself possessed, who seemed to have an intuitive perception of the character of the peoples of India, and the way to deal with them. It is, however, indisputable that those whom he patronised in the office of governor-general, while they made a career brilliant and eventful, involved the empire in much alarm, occasioned vast bloodshed, perpetrated gross injustice, ruled the people arrogantly and tyrannically, although with administrative energy and ability.

In the year 1853 it became necessary to determine the new constitution of the East India Company, as the charter of 1833, which came into effect in 1834, was only to last twenty years. It would be tedious and uninteresting to place before our readers the discussions which occupied the attention of parliament on this subject. It is, however, necessary to give a succinct account of the important changes which then took place.

On June 3rd, 1853, Sir C. Wood introduced in the house of commons a bill for the government of India, which, with some slight modifications, became law. The principal features of this measure may be thus epitomized :—The relations of the board of control and the court of directors to remain as before. The thirty members of the court to be reduced to eighteen ; twelve elected in the usual way, and six nominated by the crown from persons who have resided in India for ten years, either as servants of the company, or as merchants or barristers. One-third of the whole number to go out every second year, but to be again eligible. The directors to receive salaries of £500 a year, and the chairman and deputy-chairman £1000 a year. No change was made in the general control which the governor-general exercised over the Indian government ; but a lieutenant-governor of Bengal was to be appointed ; the lieutenant-governor of Agra to be continued ; and a new presidency on the Indus to be created. A commission to be appointed in England to digest and put into shape the drafts and reports of the Indian law-commission appointed in 1833. It was also proposed to enlarge the legislative council ; giving the governor-general power to select two councillors, the heads

of the presidencies one councillor each, and making the chief-justice of the Queen's Court and one other judge members, in all twelve; the governor-general to have a veto on their legislation. The privilege hitherto exercised by the court of directors of nominating all students to Haileybury and Addiscombe to cease, except in respect to the appointments to the military service, which were still to remain in their hands. The admission to the colleges, and consequently to the service, to be thrown open to public competition; properly qualified examiners being appointed by the board of control. The act to continue in force until parliament should otherwise determine.

On the 20th of August the act was passed. On the second Wednesday in April, 1854, it provided that the eighteen directors under the new constitution should be appointed. This provision was carried out according to law, and the authority of the old court ceased on that day. A more enlarged description of the act of 1853, which came into operation in 1854, would be unnecessary, as in a few years, in consequence of the mutiny and rebellion of 1857, the East India Company's control over the political affairs of India was abolished. The new act, together with the circumstances which led to it, will be noticed in future pages of this work.

## CHAPTER CXXV.

### ANNEXATION OF OUDE—LAWS AFFECTING THE TENURE OF LAND IN BENGAL.

It has been shown in previous chapters that in no part of India did the agents of the company hold terms less amicable with a native state than in Oude. Both the government of that country and the government of England violated their agreements. The King of Oude consented to govern his subjects in a certain way which accorded with the views of the company, who declared themselves unable in conscience or equity to hold up the king's government unless his people were ruled in a just way, and so as not to endanger the peace of the contiguous British territory. His majesty never so governed his people. His court was infamous, and the country impoverished and distracted; nevertheless, the people were loyal from traditionary and fanatical feeling, and the independence of Oude was held to be a sacred thing all over India. The English government failed in its pecuniary stipulations. Sums were borrowed which were never repaid, and borrowed in such a manner, and the lender so treated, as would naturally leave the impression that the borrower never intended to pay. Whatever may have been the conduct of the kings of Oude to their own subjects during the nineteenth century, their assistance in money, more especially to the English government on occasions of emergency, was most valuable, and was not acknowledged with gratitude or generosity. The following is the language of the author of *How to Make and how to Break a Treaty*:—"It was during the residency of Mr. I. R. Davidson that the first Punjaub campaign was raging. All India was looking in terror at the fierce

and uncertain contest. The enemies of the East India government did not hesitate to scheme and make proposals for the overthrow of their government. Dinapore and Benares were rife with intrigue. Whispered messages to Nepaul were daily increasing the uncertain position of the East India Company. The government paper, that certain criterion of the state of public feeling, was at the lowest point ever known. There was then everything to induce the Oude government to assert their independence, or at any rate give themselves airs. One move in that direction, and the East India rule would have been thrown back one hundred years; and who shall say to what extent the loss might not have extended? But no; Oude was firm. In the East India government's peril was clearly seen Oude's constancy. Her men cheerfully given from her own army for the company. Her horses at the service of the irregular corps, then being raised in hot haste, and her minister directed to tender every and any aid that the East India company might require.\* These are not wild, enthusiastic flatteries. These are the accounts of well-known realities. If Lord Hardinge has but an iota of the magnanimity for which we give him credit, he will not fail to bear witness to the gallant conduct of Oude on this occasion, and we look to him for it."

Lord Dalhousie, in his annexation policy, having fixed upon Oude as a rich province, determined to take it, after the fashion in which Lord Ellenborough took Scinde. The

\* The minister Newab Ameenood Dowlah received a letter of thanks on this occasion.

agents of the noble marquis, well aware of his policy, made representations in harmony with it. During the whole period of Lord Dalhousie's government until the annexation took place, the British residents at the court of Oude interfered in every matter of government, and with an impertinence utterly humiliating to the king. In 1854 the king banished one Kurrum Ulimud, a Moonshee, for perjury and sedition. This man had been the spy of the British resident, who interfered on his behalf in terms of menace and insolence utterly subversive of the royal authority. The courts of law were interfered with, British troops were ordered out upon the sole authority of the resident to execute his decisions in cases where he had been imposed upon, and in which in no case should he have interfered. The result of such conduct was to create or increase the confusion and disorder in the king's dominions, on account of which the annexation was afterwards ostensibly effected. Whatever the weakness or wickedness of the court of Oude, the faults of its government have this extenuation, that it was impossible to preserve order while Lord Dalhousie's agents and the resident were dictating in every department. Colonel Sleeman, the English representative, ruled as a despot, and dictated as a conqueror.

On the 5th of December, 1854, General Outram arrived at Lucknow. His commission was to inquire if the reports of Colonel Sleeman concerning the condition of Oude were correct. The general confirmed the representations of the colonel, after a brief inquiry, over so extensive a field, of less than fifteen weeks. On the 18th of March, 1855, his report was made. The general, however, took care to guard himself from responsibility in thus bolstering up the annexation project, by declaring that he had no knowledge or experience of Oude, and only reported upon the basis of what he found in the records of the residency, and what he was told by the agents whom Colonel Sleeman employed. During the time the general was preparing his report, disturbances occurred between the Mohammedans and Hindoos, such as are common all over India. This was made a pretext by Lord Dalhousie for the use of armed force in the interest of the British government.

On the 18th of June, 1855, Lord Dalhousie made what is called in Indian state vocabulary "a minute," based upon the report of Outram, itself resting upon the general report of Colonel Sleeman, who had been sent to Oude to get up such a report. In this minute his excellency placed before the court of direc-

tors a review of the condition of Oude, and suggested "the measures which appeared incumbent to take regarding it." These amounted to the seizure of the revenues of Oude, and appropriating the surplus to the advantage of the company. The disposal of the king was a matter of difficulty; but, on the whole, Lord Dalhousie and the council of Calcutta were favourable to leaving him a nominal sovereignty. The directors and the board of control approved of the proposals in the main, and left the carrying out of the measure entirely to the governor-general's discretion. This was intimated in a despatch, dated the 21st of November, 1855. By the end of 1855, therefore, his excellency was invested with full power to do as he pleased; and he pleased to do that which no doubt every member of the council of India which now meets in Westminster will admit, set India in a flame, and was impolitic beyond any measure, however foolish or extravagant, perpetrated by any governor-general, from the day the board of control made the office a party one, and a reward for the members of a class. Military preparations were promptly made to carry out the plan purposed.

On the 30th of January, 1856, General Outram informed the prime-minister of Oude of the intention to take possession of the kingdom. To the remonstrances and arguments of his majesty there was but one answer, *sic volo, sic jubeo*. It was insisted that his majesty should accept and sign a treaty voluntarily surrendering his kingdom. This he refused to do. Three days of grace were allowed him for the acceptance of this bill. He still treated the proposal with indignation. "Accordingly, on the 7th of February, 1856, Major-general Outram issued a proclamation, previously prepared at Calcutta, wherein it was declared that 'the British government assumed to itself the exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude,' and that 'the government of the territories of Oude is hereafter vested exclusively and for ever in the honourable East India Company.' Having thus assumed the government of Oude, he proceeded to constitute its civil administration, in accordance with instructions previously addressed to him for his guidance by the supreme council at Calcutta, appointing numerous commissioners and other officers, at large, and in some cases excessive salaries, payable from the revenues of the kingdom of Oude, to administer the affairs of the country in various departments. As may fairly be presumed, to his disappointment, if not to his surprise, the officials of the Oude government all refused to enter the service of the

East India government. The disbanded Oude army declined to enter the regiments which were being raised. Every inducement by confronting them with armed regiments to prove their helpless position, by tempting them with payment of arrears, and with the offer of receiving young and old alike into the ranks, failed for a long period. They declared they had no arrears to claim from his majesty; and one gallant subhadar of one of the regiments stepped in front of his comrades, and stated, he had served his majesty and his forefathers for forty years, and would enter no other service. That active officer, Brigadier Gray, who was present on this occasion, is challenged, if he can, to deny the truth of these assertions. In virtue of the proclamation, these gallant men, by their conduct on this occasion, might be accounted rebels; but in spite of the risks they encountered, they thus manifested their devotion to the *régime* of their slandered rulers and princes.

"His Majesty the King of Oude having determined to repair to England to lay his case before the throne and parliament, applied to the resident for his sanction; but that functionary, not respecting the misfortunes even of a king, treated his majesty's application in an imperious manner, and endeavoured to deter and prevent him from accomplishing his wishes. In order still more pointedly to mark his discourtesy, the resident, on frivolous pretexts, held to bail his majesty's prime-minister, Syed Allie Nuque Khan, a nobleman of royal descent from the family of Delhi, and of distinguished rank, who, from the commencement to the end of his political career has uniformly proved himself a sincere and steadfast adherent of the British government, and who has received the commendation of the British authorities. At the same time, other high and distinguished officials were held to bail, and placed under surveillance at Lucknow by the British authorities. The records, public acts, official documents, and other papers of importance to his majesty to enable him to establish his claim for the restoration of his kingdom, were seized by the resident and his officials. The prime-minister, as we stated, was obliged to give security, and to the effect that he would not depart from Lucknow. The same plan was followed with the minister of finance, Rajah Balkishen, and also with the keeper of the government records, Baboo Poorun Chum; and the king was thus deprived of the services of these officers, and of their testimony, so indispensable to the maintenance of his rights in this country. An attempt was even made to prevent the king's own departure by the arrest of twenty-two of his personal attendants,

and by the seizure of his carriage horses; but he came away with others, and his family have now preceded him to England, to seek redress for this spoliation, at the hands of the English parliament.

"That no claim might be wanting in this behalf, since the confiscation of the Oude territory, the royal palaces, parks, gardens, menageries, plate, jewellery, household furniture, stores, wardrobes, carriages, rarities, and articles of *virtu*, together with the royal museum and library, containing two hundred thousand volumes of rare books and manuscripts of immense value, have been sequestered. The king's most valuable stud of Arabian, Persian, and English horses, his fighting, hunting, riding, and baggage elephants, his camels, dogs, and cattle, have all been sold by public auction, at nominal prices. His majesty's armoury, including the most rare and beautiful worked arms of every description, has also been seized, and its contents disposed of by sale and otherwise. The queen mother, to whom General Outram descended *to offer money\** to induce her to persuade the king to sign the treaty, has also reason to declare that the ladies of the royal household have been treated in a harsh and unfeeling manner; that, despite their protest, and a most humble petition which they sent to the political commissioner, they were, on the 23rd of August, 1856, forcibly ejected from the royal palace of Chuttar Munzul by officers who neither respected their persons nor their property, and who threw their effects into the street; and that a sum of money which had been specially left by the king to be appropriated for their maintenance, was prevented by the British authorities from being so applied."†

The annexation of Oude was effected without a war. The king believed that an appeal to the Queen of the United Kingdom and her parliament would reinstate him in his honours, and he discouraged all attempts on the part of his troops or people to defend his throne. General Outram was appointed the governor-general's agent for the government of the province, and the plan of government was as nearly as possible identical with that established in the Punjab. The system of police was that established in Scinde by Sir Charles Napier, when governor of that province. Thus the year 1856 witnessed one

\* "His lordship in council will have gathered from the translation of the conference which I held with the queen mother, that I promised that lady an annual stipend of one lakh of rupees, provided that the king would accept the treaty."—*Oude Blue-book*, p. 291; and see pp. 285-6.

† "*Dacoitee in excelsis.*"

of the most remarkable events which had occurred in the history of the British empire in India: one of the oldest states, and in alliance with the East India Company, was, by the simple will of the English government, annexed. It is scarcely necessary to say that the agitation excited by the measure in India was very great; at first, the people were appalled, after a time they prepared for mutiny and revolt.

The condemnation of Lord Dalhousie and the government was very strong in England, and the severest criticisms were made in the public press upon the whole system of our Indian government. In India the people of Oude maintained a sullen silence, but they prepared for insurrection; and, in order to make it more effectual, endeavoured too successfully to corrupt the Bengal native army, which was mainly recruited from Oude and the surrounding provinces of British India.\* Unfortunately, the disposition of the talookdars and soldiery of Oude to revolt was shared in by the whole of the inhabitants, even by those who might be supposed likely to profit by a change of masters. The conduct of Lord Dalhousie, his ministers, and officials, was not calculated to soothe the irritation and indignation which his policy had created. The state of Oude between the annexation and the great revolt has been described in a petition to the house of commons from the King of Oude; the following extract will suffice:—"Since the military occupation and annexation of the kingdom of Oude, the country has been thrown into a state of much confusion. That whereas during the reign of the sovereign of Oude,

and whilst happiness prevailed within the kingdom, no emigration took place therefrom, but, on the contrary, the subjects of Great Britain in Hindostan evinced a disposition to immigrate thereto, and settle therein; since the annexation of the territory to the British dominion, numbers of persons have fled from the kingdom of Oude, and immigration has wholly ceased. That it is computed that not less than one hundred thousand persons, including civil servants of the government, and the disbanded troops who have refused to take the company's service, have been deprived of their means of subsistence; that the business of the country having been transferred from the natives to the British officers and forces; the retainers of the zemindars have been thrown out of their situations; that the natives holding office as writers, clerks, &c., have been turned away and replaced by company's servants; that all allowances and pensions being stopped, many of the recipients, including members or near connexions of the royal family, have been reduced to extreme poverty; that the conduct of the British to the natives of the lower class is complained of as harsh in the extreme; that justice cannot now be obtained at Lucknow; and that crime is committed with so much impunity, that even the royal palace itself has been broken into and pillaged of money and jewels to a large amount." Lord Dalhousie seems to have been aware of the danger, although unwilling to acknowledge the cause or redress the grievances he had inflicted. He urged upon the company and the government the necessity of preserving a sufficient force of European regiments. He argued, requested, entreated, remonstrated in vain. While danger was threatening on every hand, the authorities in England were withdrawing the European regiments, without sending out reliefs. This policy was suicidal, and was persisted in with an infatuated conceit of judgment by the board of control and the company, notwithstanding warnings the most clear and urgent from men of the highest authority on Indian affairs, as well as from the governor-general. At last the denouement came, the blow was struck, and all Oude burned in insurrection. It is barely just to Lord Dalhousie to show that whatever his ambition, or his errors in working it out, he was prescient of the necessity for keeping up the European branch of the army in India, not only after the annexation of Oude, but throughout his government. He saw soon after his arrival the danger of placing too much confidence in the native troops, and the absolute necessity of preserving in the army of India, in all its presidencies, a larger pro-

\* As the annexation of Oude was undoubtedly the main cause of the dreadful mutiny of 1857, the reader may wish to consult the voluminous documents extant on the subject. In doing so, the following may be perused with interest, in the order which follows:—

1. The treaties concluded between the East India Company and the rulers of Oude from 1765 to 1837, published in the collection of East India Treaties, laid before the House of Lords, 24th June, 1853.

2. The correspondence and minutes of the government of India amongst the "papers relating to Oude," presented to the houses of parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1856.

3. The notification from the Right Honourable the Earl of Auckland, Governor-general of India, to His Majesty the King of Oude, 8th July, 1839, on the subject of the recent treaty under date 11th September, 1837, and His Majesty's reply thereto sent with the case.

4. The remonstrance on the part of the governor-general of India, Lord Hardinge, delivered to the King of Oude, 23rd November, 1847, sent with the case.

5. The letter of the Honourable Court of Directors to the Governor-general of India, 10th December, 1856, relative to the assumption of the government of Oude, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 5th February, 1857.

portion of the European element. Several of the leading journals of London attributed to Lord Dalhousie an opposite line of conduct, and blamed him for the small number of European troops in India when the mutiny of 1857 broke out. Nothing could be more opposed to truth than these allegations. Copies of certain despatches and minutes during the governorship of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie, received by the court of directors, or by the president of the board of control, from the government of India, for an increase of European troops subsequently to the acquisition of the Punjaub, Pegu, Nagpore, Sattara, Jhansi, Berar, and other districts, were submitted to parliament and printed, on the motion of Mr. W. Vansittart, M.P. The Marquis of Dalhousie, so far back as September, 1848, earnestly requested the addition of at least three European regiments of infantry to the army in India, from which so large a number of British troops had been withdrawn, and this request was complied with by the India-house authorities. In March, 1849, two other regiments of infantry were ordered to be added to the queen's forces in India. On the 5th of February, 1853, a secret letter was written by the Indian government, considering the regular force which would be required for the permanent occupation of the newly-acquired province of Pegu, and recommending that one regiment should be added to the number of European infantry in each presidency. This increase was ordered, the total addition including 71 officers and 2,760 rank and file.

In September, 1854, a most important minute was issued by the governor-general in council, and transmitted to the directors of the India-house, in which, with reference to the then state of India and the war in Europe, the diminution of the British force then at the disposal of the government of India was most earnestly deprecated. The minute appears to have been elicited by an order for the recall of the 25th and 98th regiments from India without being relieved until the close of 1855. It illustrates most strikingly Lord Dalhousie's sagacity, and we recommend an attentive perusal of it to all persons in possession of the parliamentary paper in which it is included. "The imprudence and impolicy of weakening our force of European infantry at the present time," writes the marquis, "will be made evident, I think, by a brief review of the amount of that force which we actually possess, of the position in which we stand, and of the contingencies and risks to which we are liable." He shows that the army had been very inconsiderably augmented during the past seven years, notwithstanding the

great changes which had occurred in the interval, and the vast mass of territory acquired by recent conquests. He warns the directors of the danger of countenancing the prevalent belief (in India) that we were (in 1854) grappling with an enemy (the Russians) whose strength would prove equal to overpower us, by withdrawing troops from India to Europe; and he reminds them that "India has to play her own part in this contest, that, unlike Canada and the colonies, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend, and that she is already indirectly affected by the feelings to which the war has given rise;" he adds, "it is at least possible that those feelings may be quickened in the hostile action which she will be called upon to meet by force of arms." This spirited remonstrance of Lord Dalhousie against the weakening of our military force was unavailing, for the authorities at home, "looking to the exigencies of the war in Europe and the general tranquillity of India," confirmed the order for the return of the two regiments. Another long "minute" was issued by the governor-general on the 5th of February, 1856. In this state paper the marquis, following the principles and guidance of Lord Wellesley, endeavours to determine what are the wants of the government of India in respect of European infantry throughout the territories for which it is responsible, and to show how those wants may best be supplied. The various considerations adduced must lead, he thinks, to the conviction that the European infantry in Bengal ought to be reinforced, and he names nineteen battalions as the *minimum* force of the European infantry which ought to be maintained upon the Bengal establishment;—twenty, he adds, would be better, and even more not superfluous. Having reviewed the wants of the several presidencies in succession and in minute detail, the governor-general concludes that the *minimum* force of European infantry which can be relied on as fully adequate for the defence of India and for the preservation of internal quiet is thirty-five battalions—nineteen for Bengal, nine for Madras, and seven for Bombay. Of these twenty-four were to be queen's and eleven company's regiments. The idea of permanency being essential to the usefulness of this force, it was proposed by the marquis that the twenty-four queen's regiments should be declared by the home government to be the establishment of royal infantry for India, and that a formal assurance should be given that no one of these regiments should at any time be withdrawn without relief, unless with full consent of the court

of directors. It was further proposed to add a fourth regiment of European infantry to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras by converting two regiments of native infantry into one of European infantry; in each, respectively, disbanding the native officers and sepoy, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

The result of these minutes does not appear from the returns, but the public know that Lord Dalhousie expostulated in vain.

While the events which issued in the annexation were passing in Oude, changes were being effected in the laws of land tenure in Bengal, which, although salutary in themselves, led to discontent, and prepared the talookdars and zemindars for rebellion. There existed great difficulties in the way of reform of any kind in India, of which persons in England could form no conception. The sympathy of the people was with despotism, and they preferred freedom to cheat, and the chances dependent upon a speculation in fraud, to law and justice. When the English put forth any enactment which protected the oppressed, but which also prevented the oppressed from defrauding or imposing upon their tyrants, they felt no gratitude for such interposition. They were of course very desirous to be released from any disability under which they lay, provided the power which rescued them left them still an opportunity of resorting to chicanery in their dealings with others; but on the whole they preferred the most grinding tyranny under which men could suffer, if it also admitted the precarious hope of winning back their own by deceit and intrigue. Just laws, dealing equally with all, were regarded with aversion, unless where some tradition of creed allied such a law to long maintained customs. Early in 1856 the legislative council took up a measure which was designated "the Sale law." It was an excellent remedy for some of the greatest impediments to the prosperity of Bengal. The measure was introduced to the council on the authority of no less important and competent a person than Mr. Grant, and was admirably devised for its purpose. It would be impossible to give the reader a correct notion of the subject without detailing the state of the land tenure at the time in Bengal, and the way in which that tenure worked against the progress of agriculture, the settlement of European planters, and the prosperity of the country. The following description of "the Sale law," and of the circumstances which called for it, was written by a gentleman then on the spot, and familiar with the project, and the discussions to which it gave rise:—"Under the perpetual settlement the whole of

Bengal has been divided into estates held by landlords on the tenure of a fixed quit rent to the company. While this rent is paid no act short of treason can deprive a proprietor of his estates. Should he not pay up to the hour, however, his estate goes to the hammer. In practice few estates are thus sold, and the tenure may be regarded as a free holding subject to a land tax. These estates, however, are often of vast size. The landlord, often an absentee, cannot manage them himself. Farming, in the English sense, he never dreams of, and the collection of rents from perhaps 100,000 cottiers—there are more than 2,000,000 on the Burdwan estate—is too heavy a task for an Asiatic. He sublets it for ever. The sub-tenant, whom we call a talookdar, holds of the zemindar, as the zemindar holds of government. In English phrase, he has a perpetual lease from the tenant of the crown. Two-thirds of the whole land of Bengal is thus held, including almost all the indigo factories, sugar plantations, and European farms. The tenure would seem to an English farmer rational enough. Unfortunately, Lord Cornwallis, when he established the perpetual settlement, in order to secure the government rental, arranged that, in the event of failure to pay the quit rent, the sale should vitiate all encumbrances whatsoever. Whenever, therefore, an estate goes to the hammer every lease upon it is *ipso facto* void. Because Stowe is sold, all the John Smiths on the property are deprived of the leases they have paid for. The zemindars, thoroughly aware of the law, use it in this fashion:—They lease the lands to wealthy tenants, suffer them to raise the value of the property, fail to pay the quit rent, and at the consequent sale buy in their own estates, under a false name, clear of all encumbrances. The threat of such a proceeding has actually been employed in one instance within my knowledge to extort money from the manager of a great indigo concern. Of course with such a tenure improvement became impossible. Men will not lay out capital in improving a property their right to which may be destroyed at any moment without any fault of their own. They considered themselves, with justice, as tenants-at-will instead of leaseholders. The evil has long been felt, but hitherto a reform has been considered impossible. It would be, it was alleged, a breach of the perpetual settlement. At last the evil became unendurable. Captain Craufurd, manager of the Indigo Company's affairs, agitated the question vigorously. He demonstrated that the present tenure prohibited advance. The press took up the subject, asserting that a radical change would involve no breach of faith. Officials seized upon the

question as soon as there appeared a gleam of hope, and at last it assumed a practical form. A proposition was brought forward, strongly supported by the government of Bengal, for keeping leases inviolate in the event of a sale. So long as the money bid for an estate would cover the government arrear, the leases were to be held intact. The new proprietor would buy land subject to the leases upon it. In the event, however, of the sum bid not being sufficient to pay that arrear the leases must be violated and the encumbrances cleared away. This proposal, it is evident, secured the leaseholder in every event but one. A reckless zemindar might grant away portions of his estate at peppercorn rents till nobody would buy the whole subject to such leases. This contingency would be of frequent occurrence, and Mr. Grant therefore has proposed a new scheme. It goes further than the former one, further than the boldest reformers have dared to hope. Mr. Grant proposes that every talookdar, or permanent leaseholder, shall have the right to call in a government surveyor. If this official on examination reports that the rent paid under the lease is sufficient to pay the government rent, he is secured for ever. Whatever becomes of the estate his lease cannot be touched or his rent raised. He is of course bound by his lease to pay the rent agreed on with his landlord to his landlord; but the zemindar can no longer by fraud annul his own agreements, nor can he by folly cause the ruin of every one under him. Two-thirds of the land *users*—not landowners—of Bengal thus exchange tenancy-at-will for a leasehold right. They have always contracted and paid for the latter form of tenure, but hitherto, from the defect of the law, have been unable to secure it. The advantage of this reform to the zemindar is scarcely less than to his tenant. It is insecurity which has kept down the price of land in Bengal. It is calculated that on the average almost all zemindaries return a clear 25 per cent. upon the purchase-money; yet thousands prefer the government 5 per cent. simply for its security. In other words, the funds are held to be more secure than landed property in the proportion of five to one. Some other changes have been introduced, all tending to increase the security of land, of which the following is, perhaps, the most im-

portant :—Hitherto it has been dangerous for a great proprietor to quit his estate. His agent may want it for himself. In that case he fails to pay the government rent. No subsequent payment is of any avail. The estate is put up to auction, and bought by a bidder employed by the knavish agent. It is now proposed to permit the proprietor to deposit in the collector's hands any amount of company's paper he pleases. Up to the value of that paper he is safe. He may go to England for two years or ten, or, if he chooses, he may deposit so much paper that the interest shall be equal to the government rent. In that case he is secure for ever, happen what may. I have described this innovation at some length, but you will readily perceive that it alters not only the tenure of land, but the whole constitution of society in Bengal. It makes the leaseholder a free man. It deprives the landowner of a terrible instrument of coercion, ejectment at will, the right to which he had formerly by his own lease abandoned. It creates a class of yeomanry of small free landholders, a class most urgently required." It could not be expected that changes so momentous would be unopposed; yet for some time the parties most interested, in a selfish sense, remained silent, and, in fact, no opposition was made such as would undoubtedly have been offered had it not been for the impression entertained throughout the Bengal provinces that "the Company's Raj" would soon come to an end. The feelings nurtured in Oude had communicated themselves all through these provinces, and there was not only a general expectation of successful disturbance, but a knowledge of the means by which success was to be secured. The native landholders were not in ignorance, as were the company's officers, civil and military, as to the military revolt then preparing. The rebellion prevented the application of "the Sale law" by the council in its original form, but, while some of the reforms then discussed in connection with it have not even yet been carried, much has been done. The agitation on "the Sale law" greatly increased the agitation of the classes venally interested, but they avoided demonstrations, hoping that the power that interfered with their customs would soon perish in a new and grand struggle.

## CHAPTER CXXVI.

## PERSIAN WAR—ITS CAUSES—INVASION OF HERAT—EXPEDITION TO THE PERSIAN GULF—CAPTURE OF BUSHIRE, MOHAMMERAH, AND AKWAZ—PEACE NEGOTIATED AT PARIS.

THE circumstances which originated the Persian war of 1856 were of the same nature as those which issued in the Affghan war. Minute details of the policy of Russia towards Persia, and, through Persia, towards British India, were given in the account of events preliminary to that war.

Although peace and, apparently, good relations were then established, a bad feeling lurked in the Persian court. The desire to invade Affghanistan was not abandoned, and the Russian government kept up the bad feeling without actually urging Persia to a war. Russia was anxious to keep open a cause of contention which she might one day turn to account, and yet afraid to provoke the power of England to any operations in the Persian Gulf which might increase her influence over the court of Teheran. When the war with Turkey, England, and France broke out, Russia was of course desirous to create a diversion by the instrumentality of Persia. Her instigations took effect only when a hostile movement of Persia could be no longer of use, peace between the European powers having been proclaimed.

The policy of Persia continued the same as when it occasioned the Affghan war. That policy was expressed with singular clearness by Hoossein Khan, a Persian ambassador, in a communication to Prince Metternich, in 1839. Prince Metternich observed upon this letter, that it was "expressed with a precision scarcely eastern," as the following extract will show:—

"The shah is sovereign of his country, and as such he desires to be independent. There are two great powers with whom Persia is in more or less direct contact—Russia and the English power in India. The first has more military means than the second. On the other hand, England has more money than Russia. The two powers can thus do Persia good and evil; and in order above all to avoid the evil, the shah is desirous of keeping himself, with respect to them, within the relations of good friendship and free from all contestation. If, on the contrary, he finds himself threatened on one side, he will betake himself to the other in search of the support which he shall stand in need of. That is not what he desires, but to what he may be driven, for he is not more the friend of one than of the other of those powers: he desires to be with them on a footing of equal friend-

ship. What he cherishes above all is his independence, and the maintenance of good relations with foreign powers."

This letter puts the shah's policy in the most favourable point of view. The idea of compensation on the side of Affghanistan, for territory lost on the frontier of Russia, pervaded the Persian court, and it was something like a point of honour to take Herat whenever opportunity might present itself. On the 21st of July, 1851, Colonel Shiel, then minister of England at the Persian court, informed his majesty that the views of England, as to the independence of Herat, remained unchanged.

During the latter part of 1851 Herat was much disturbed, and the khan asked for Persia's help to maintain his authority. The shah promised aid if required, and entered into negotiations which had for their object to extort certain oriental forms from the khan which would constitute recognition of the shah's sovereignty. On the other hand, Dost Mohammed of Cabul was jealous of Persian interference at Herat, and threatened to march an army from Candahar, to counteract the shah's policy.

In the spring of 1852 a Persian expedition advanced against Herat. The city was occupied; various oppressions were perpetrated; several Affghan khans were seized and sent to Persia. These acts followed assurances the most pacific, offered to the English minister. Falsehood the most scandalous was resorted to for the purpose of concealing intentions dishonest and aggressive. Herat was finally annexed to Persia. When the cabinet at London became aware of these transactions, Lord Malmesbury, the minister for foreign affairs, refused to hold intercourse with the Persian ambassador.

In consequence of the resistance offered by Colonel Shiel, and his menaces of the active displeasure of England, the shah at last became alarmed, and on the 25th of January, 1853, signed an engagement renouncing all sovereignty, and promising not to interfere by arms in the affairs of Herat, but reserving the right to march an army into its neighbourhood in case any other power did the like.

The Persian government, in making so satisfactory a settlement, threw the English off their guard, which was the only object the Persian court and ministers had in view.

having never intended to perform any of the stipulations. The firmness of the English minister constrained their observance.

The temper and spirit of the Persian court became intensely irritable towards the English ambassador and his suite. A circumstance arose which brought this out painfully. On the 15th of June, 1854, Mr. Thomson, the English minister, wrote to Lord Clarendon, then minister for foreign affairs, informing him that he had chosen one Meerza Hashem Khan as the Persian secretary to the British mission. This person was courtly, learned, and in every way suitable to the office assigned to him. Lord Clarendon confirmed the appointment. The Persian court immediately persecuted the favourite of the English mission. The Hon. C. A. Murray succeeded Mr. Thomson, and he also favoured Meerza Hashem. The Persian court continued its persecution, and finally seized and imprisoned the khan's wife. Mr. Murray demanded satisfaction for this outrage upon the staff of the British mission, and the release of the lady. His demands were treated with disdain, and Mr. Murray felt bound to maintain the dignity of the government he represented by striking his flag on the 20th of November, 1855.

The Persian prime-minister put a report into circulation that both Mr. Murray and his predecessor had intrigues with the khan's wife, and therefore employed him in the embassy. The Persian premier at last made the allegation to Mr. Murray himself, in a despatch. On the 5th of December, after having endured many insults, he left Teheran.

The Persian court then endeavoured to transact business with England through the English ambassador at the Porte. On the 2nd of January, 1856, the Persian *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople laid a long complaint before the English ambassador there against Mr. Murray, Mr. Thomson, Consul Stevens, and, in fact, all persons connected with the English mission at Teheran. The Persian court was as much opposed to the consul as to the ministers. The Persian ministers drew up a scandalous document for publication in Europe, incriminating the English ministers at their court of immorality. This document breathed a malignant hostility unusual between belligerent states, and utterly disgraceful in its conception and expression. Had all the English ministers been immoral, the fact would not have affected the merits of the dispute. The sacredness of the persons and property of all persons, Persians or others, engaged in the service of the English embassy, and of their families, had been violated spitefully and without provocation, and for this wrong redress was demanded.

It is probable that all these disturbances were got up by the Persian government to cover their policy towards Herat, for at the end of 1855 Prince Sultan Moorad Meerza was sent with a force of nine thousand men against that place.

The fall of Kars during the war with Russia was circulated all over Asia. The fall of Sebastopol was not known for long after. The Russians had the means of producing this double effect. The consequence was, the Persians were emboldened, as were also the Oudeans, and other enemies of England in India. The shah determined to accomplish the long-cherished purpose of his court to annex Herat.

In July, 1856, Lord Clarendon caused the ultimatum of his government to be delivered to the Persian *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople. He about the same time instructed the governor-general of India to collect forces at Bombay for operations in the Persian Gulf.

The ultimatum of the British government was in the following terms:—"The sadr azim (prime-minister) to write in the shah's name a letter to Mr. Murray, expressing his regret at having uttered and given currency to the offensive imputation upon the honour of her majesty's minister, requesting to withdraw his own letter of the 19th of November, and the two letters of the minister for foreign affairs of the 26th of November, one of which contains a rescript from the shah respecting the imputation upon Mr. Murray, and declaring, in the same letter, that no such further rescript from the shah as that inclosed herewith in copy was communicated, directly or indirectly, to any of the foreign missions at Teheran. A copy of this letter to be communicated officially by the sadr azim to each of the foreign missions at Teheran, and the substance of it to be made public in that capital. The original letter to be conveyed to Mr. Murray, at Bagdad, by the hands of some high Persian officer, and to be accompanied by an invitation to Mr. Murray, in the shah's name, to return with the mission to Teheran, on his majesty's assurance that he shall be received with all the honours and consideration due to the representative of the British government; another person of suitable rank being sent to conduct him, as mehmandar, on his journey through Persia. Mr. Murray, on approaching the capital, to be received by persons of high rank deputed to escort him to his residence in the town. Immediately on his arrival there, the sadr azim to go in state to the British mission and renew friendly relations with Mr. Murray, leaving the secretary of state for foreign affairs to accompany him to the royal palace, the sadr azim re-

ceiving Mr. Murray, and conducting him to the presence of the shah. At noon on the following day, the British flag to be hoisted under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the *sadr azim* to visit the mission immediately afterwards, which visit Mr. Murray will return, at latest, on the following day before noon. Satisfaction being thus given, and friendly relations restored, the settlement of the questions of Herat, of Meerza Hashem and of his wife, remains to be stated. Should Herat be occupied by the shah's troops, his majesty to engage to withdraw them without delay. Should that city be in any way menaced, though not occupied by the shah's troops, his majesty to engage not to allow them to occupy it on any account. In either case, the engagement being solemnly given, the British mission to defer to his majesty's wish, if renewed, respecting Meerza Hashem, by not insisting on his appointment at Shiraz; the Meerza's wife, however, to be restored to him, and himself to enjoy the security, emoluments, and position offered by the Persian government in a former stage of the question. The whole of the correspondence respecting Meerza Hashem may then be mutually withdrawn and cancelled, it being to be understood that no objections will be made by the Persian government to the appointment, as heretofore, of a British correspondent at Shiraz till that and other matters can be arranged by a suitable convention."

The ultimatum failed to secure redress. A series of fresh outrages were offered at the embassy upon such servants of the British government as remained there. Tidings of the forces clustering at Bombay reached Teheran, but the Persian, undismayed, ordered more troops to be sent to garrison his menaced provinces. Orders were sent to Consul Stevens to quit Persia, and take the means usual in such cases to secure the liberty and property of British subjects.

On the 24th of September the president of the board of control was requested to forward to India, by the next mail, orders for the expedition to move to the Persian Gulf. On the 17th of October Feruk Khan arrived at Constantinople as minister plenipotentiary of the shah. He entered into negotiation with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and consented to terms of peace, but raised so many obstructions to them in detail afterwards, that no reliance could be placed in the sincerity of his negotiations.

On the 1st of November the governor-general of India declared war against Persia. Three proclamations were issued by his excellency, which, when they arrived at Constantinople, caused the Persian plenipotentiary

to withdraw from all further negotiations, and to treat his former agreements as null and void. Major-general Outram, K.C.B., had returned to England from Oude, and while at home was in consultation with the British government concerning the Persian expedition. He was appointed to command it, and arrived in Bombay for that purpose. He took the command of "the second division of the army of Persia," and proceeded with it to the Persian Gulf. The 1st division, under Major-general Stalker, had already been dispatched. The brigadiers of this division were Wilson and Honner; Brigadier Tapp had charge of the cavalry, and Brigadier Trevelyan the artillery. When the second division arrived at the Gulf, Lieutenant-general Outram holding the command in chief, that of the second division was reserved for Brigadier Havelock, C.B., deputy adjutant-general of her majesty's forces in India, who arrived afterwards. Brigadiers Hamilton and Hale commanded the brigades of that division. The cavalry of both divisions was placed under Brigadier Farol, C.B. Colonel Stuart, of the 14th light dragoons, commanded the cavalry of the second division. Brigadier Hill commanded the whole of the artillery force.

In the geographical portions of this work descriptions are given of the Persian Gulf and its shores, and Bushire is particularly described. A reference to these descriptions will enable the reader to follow with some ease the proceedings of the troops during this expedition.

The arrival of Sir James Outram was followed by active operations. The army marched round the head of the Bushire Creek, a heavy road, for the most part of loose sand. The army was drawn up in the following order:—Two lines of contiguous quarter-distance columns. First line: first brigade, first division—her majesty's 64th regiment, and 20th regiment native infantry. First brigade, second division—78th Highlanders, and 26th regiment native infantry. Second brigade, first division—2nd European light infantry, and 4th Bombay rifle regiment, native infantry. Second line: 3rd light cavalry (two squadrons); 3rd (Blake's) troop horse artillery; Nos. 3 and 5 field-batteries; one *risalakh* of Poonah horse. An advance guard was formed seven hundred yards on the right of all under Colonel Tapp, of the Poonah irregular horse, composed of one troop 3rd light cavalry, two guns horse artillery, two companies of her majesty's 64th regiment, and two companies of 20th regiment native infantry; the rearguard, under Major Hough, consisting of his own, the 2nd Beloochee bat-

talion, and one troop of Poonah horse, was drawn up on the left. The first night's bivouac was one of terrible storm; hail and rain with bitter blasts swept over the crouching host. Early in the morning the march was directed against Brasjoon. Before one o'clock the Persian videttes were seen reconnoitring. They fell back as the British approached, and the main army was soon after seen in rapid retreat. The advance guard of the British came up with the enemy's rear, and skirmished. The Persians behaved with spirit. One officer and several men were wounded, and Brigadier Honner had a narrow escape from a bullet which pierced his saddle. The enemy's intrenched camp fell into the hands of the English, and large stores of ammunition, food, and fodder which it contained. For two days the army rested, so far as marching or fighting was concerned, but was busily occupied in searching for grain, guns, and treasure, said to have been buried by the foe. Some quantities of corn and treasure were found, and some guns discovered in the wells. The military governor of Brasjoon was taken prisoner.

On the 7th the army retraced their steps to Bushire, bringing with them much of the booty they had acquired. The march was conducted leisurely. After midnight the army was astonished to hear a volley of musketry in the rear, followed by the cannonade of two pieces of horse artillery. The shots gradually increased for half an hour, when the whole force became enveloped in a skirmishing fire. The Persian cavalry rode up, making every possible noise, shouting and blowing trumpets. The bugle-calls of the British army were familiar to the enemy, from the circumstance of British officers having been engaged in drilling his army a few years previously. This knowledge was used to create disorder in the British lines. Some of the buglers, riding close up in the dark to the 78th Highlanders, sounded the "cease fire," and afterwards, "incline to the left." The Highlanders remained steady. The yelling, shouting, and bugle-calls at last ceased, and the British lay by their arms, waiting in silence for the meeting. Before dawn five heavy guns were opened by the enemy with accurate range, wounding several officers, killing and wounding soldiers and camp-followers, and baggage animals. In the morning the enemy was seen with his force in order of battle.

There is but little information extant of the contest which ensued, and of its results, except what is contained in Sir James Outram's own account, which is as follows:—

*To his Excellency Lieutenant-general Sir H. Somerset, Commander-in-chief, Bombay.*

Camp near Bushire, Feb. 10th.

SIR,—I have the honour to report for your excellency's information that the Persian Expeditionary Force obtained a signal victory over the Persian army, commanded by Shooja-ool-Moolk in person, on the 8th inst.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great. It is impossible to compute the amount, but from the number of bodies which strewed the ground of contest, extending several miles, I should say that full 700 must have fallen. Two brass 9-pounder guns, with their carriages and horses, eight mules laden with ammunition, and several hundred stand of arms, were taken; and the Persian commander-in-chief, with the remainder of his army, only escaped annihilation owing to the numerical weakness of our cavalry.

The loss on our side is, I am happy to say, comparatively small, attributable, I am inclined to believe, to the rapid advance of our artillery and cavalry, and the well-directed fire of the former, which almost paralyzed the Persians from the commencement. I have, however, to regret the loss of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European regiment, who was acting as brigade-major of cavalry, and was killed in the first cavalry charge; Captain Forbes, also, who commanded and most gallantly led the 3rd cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, 64th foot, were severely wounded.

Returns of the killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance stores taken, are annexed.

I myself had very little to do with the action, being stunned by my horse falling with me at the commencement of the contest, and recovering only in time to resume my place at the head of the army shortly before the close of this action.

To Major-general Stalker and Colonel Lugard, chief of the staff, is the credit due for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion.

At daybreak the Persian force,\* amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men, with some guns, was discovered on our rear left (north-east of our line of march) in order of battle.

Our artillery and cavalry at once moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution; the cavalry brigade twice charged with great gallantry and success; a standard of the Kashkai regular infantry regiment was captured by the Poonah horse, and the 3rd light cavalry charged a square, and killed nearly the whole regiment; indeed, upon the cavalry and artillery fell the whole brunt of the action, as the enemy moved away too rapidly for the infantry to overtake them. By ten o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete. Two guns were captured, the gun ammunition, laden upon mules, fell into our hands, and at least 700 men lay dead upon the field. The number of wounded could not be ascertained, but it must have been very large. The remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers, and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns.

The troops bivouacked for the day close to the battle-field, and at night accomplished a march of twenty miles (by another route) over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain which fell incessantly. After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued

\* Guards, 900; two Karragoozloo regiments, 1,500; Shiraz regiment, 200; four regiments of Sabriz, 800; Arab regiment, 900; Kashkai, 800—5,100; Sufengchees, 1,000. Cavalry of Shiraz, 300; Eilkhanee, 500—800. Total, 6,900; guns (said to be), 18.

their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight, thus performing another most arduous march of forty-four miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during its progress within the short period of fifty hours. The cavalry and artillery reached camp this morning.

The result is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, have a very beneficial effect upon our future operations.

The greatest praise is due to the troops of all arms for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind; and I cannot too strongly express the obligation I feel to all under my command for the almost incredible exertions they have undergone and the gallantry they have displayed on this occasion.

To Major-general Stalker and to Colonel Lugard my especial thanks are due.

To the heads of the several departments, as well as to every officer belonging to those departments, and to my personal staff (including Lieutenant-colonel Lord Dunkerlin, who volunteered his services as aide-de-camp), I am much indebted. From all I received every possible assistance, and, although I do not now specify by name the department and personal staff, and other officers alluded to, I shall hereafter take an opportunity of bringing them individually to your excellency's notice. Indeed, when all have behaved so nobly, it is difficult to specify individuals.

The rapid retreat of the enemy afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry. I have already alluded to the successful charges made by the 3rd cavalry and Poonah horse, under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant-colonel Tapp, and to the very efficient service performed by the artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Trevelyan. The brigadiers commanding the infantry brigades—Wilson, Stisted, and Honner—with the several commanding officers of the regiments, and indeed every officer and soldier of the force, earned my warmest approbation.

To the medical officers of the force I am under great obligation for their untiring exertions throughout these arduous operations.

I cannot conclude without alluding in strong terms to the valuable assistance I have received from Major Taylor, whose services were placed at my disposal by the Hon. C. A. Murray, C.B.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. OUTRAM,

*Lieutenant-general commanding Expeditionary Force.*

Total killed.—Europeans, 3; natives, 7.

Total wounded.—Europeans, 31; natives, 31.

Grand total.—Killed, 10; wounded, 62—72.

Died of wounds since the action—3 Europeans and 3 natives.

M. STOVELL, *Superintending Surgeon.*

*1st. Division Persian Expeditionary Field Force.*

The following is the return of ordnance captured on the morning of the 8th inst. at Bivouac Khoosh-ab:—

One brass gun, Persian inscription, vent good, 9-pounder, length 6 feet, bore 4.2, of Persian manufacture.

One ditto, ditto, spiked, 9-pounder, length 6 feet, bore 4.2, of Persian manufacture.

These guns are in good travelling order, mounted on travelling field carriages, each limber fitted with a limber box to contain about thirty rounds of ammunition. One gun was taken with three horses, harness, &c., complete.

The carriages are of block trail construction; the cheeks of one require to be replaced.

Eighteen rounds of ammunition and some food were in the limber boxes.

Besides the above were 262 rounds of gun ammunition,

which I destroyed before leaving the bivouac on Sunday evening. The mules, eight in number, which carried it, I have brought into camp. I have 350 stand of arms, and I think fully treble that number must have been taken by camp followers and others.

One gun was spiked by our horse artillery, as they had to leave it when following on in pursuit. I have since removed the spike.

B. K. FINNIMORE,

*Captain, Field Commissary of Ordnance, P.E.F.F.*

The precise force under Sir James Outram's command on this occasion was as follows:—3rd cavalry, 243; Poonah horse, 176—419 sabres; 64th foot, 780; 2nd Europeans, 693; 78th Highlanders, 739—2,212 European infantry; sappers, 118; 20th native infantry, 442; 4th rifles, 523; 26th native infantry, 479; Beloochees, 460—2,022 native infantry. Total, 4,653. 3rd troop horse artillery, 6; 3rd light field battery, 6; 5th light field battery, 6—Total, 18 guns. Camp.—376 Europeans; 1,466 native infantry; 1 company of European artillery; and 14 guns.

The troops rested on the field of battle, and refreshed themselves; but in a few hours after they took up their old position; on the line of march heavy rain fell, and their sufferings were great: no army ever displayed more patience, unless indeed the men whose heroic fortitude endured, without murmuring, the horrors of the Crimean war. The cold to which the heroes of the Persian expedition were exposed was intense, the season was especially severe, although the winter of that part of Persia is generally cold and wet, with heavy hail-storms. Almost every kind of bad weather common to that climate at that season fell upon the little army of General Outram, which without a murmur encountered every task imposed upon it, and every difficulty that impeded. On the night of the battle, men and officers literally lay in mire, and when the march was resumed, it is no exaggeration to describe it as made knee-deep in mud. Rain continued to fall, accompanied by a sharp, biting wind throughout the remainder of the way to Bushire, where the force arrived without another combat, or losing a straggler. So perfect were General Outram's arrangements, that even the dead were carried with the army, that they might be buried in the English lines with military honours. This had an excellent effect upon the soldiery, for it caused them to feel that they were commanded by men who sympathised with them. There had been but one officer slain, so that the cascade of death, with that exception, was made up of private soldiers, and one or two non-commissioned officers. This concern to show respect to the men in humblest rank was attributable to General Outram, but all the officers caught the generous infection.

They participated in the toil and sufferings of their brave followers, and identified themselves with them in manly and soldierly sympathy.

On the morning of the 11th of February, Lieutenant Frankland, and the brave soldiers who died, received sepulture together, with all the honours which could be paid to their remains. On the previous morning, the 10th, the force marched into the lines of Bushire, amidst the cheers of those who had remained in camp, and of the sailors and marines from the ships. On the same morning the lieutenant-general in command issued a judicious order of the day, not resembling those frigid orders which issued from Lord Raglan, Sir James Simpson, and Sir E. Codrington, in the Crimea, but one warm with admiration of the noble qualities which the soldiers had displayed, and which indirectly appealed to their patriotism.

The rain descended in torrents for several days following that on which the force returned to Bushire. A few fine mornings enabled the troops to take exercise. During the interval Brigadier-generals Havelock and Hamilton arrived from India, and assumed the commands to which they had previously been appointed: Havelock commanding the second division, and Hamilton the first brigade of that division. From the 14th of February the weather again assumed its former character, and the lines were deluged with rain; nevertheless, so excellent were General Outram's arrangements, that the army was in vigorous health and excellent spirits. Reinforcements gradually arrived, but the heavy surf on the sea-shore prevented troops from landing; and also the dispatch of supplies for men and cattle. The good management of the commissariat—a rare piece of fortune in English armies—prevented any inconvenience. General Outram saw personally to everything; like the great Duke and Sir Charles Napier, he entered into all the detail of his army, while he never suffered a mere routine to formalise the service, and prevent the exercise of foresight, and of capacity for judging of events as they arose.

On the night of the 22nd of February the enemy's camp fires were seen upon the hills, of which there was a prospect from the lines. The enemy's patrols avoided all demonstrations by day; at night they watched opportunity to cut off camp-followers. The English fortified their lines, erecting fine strong redoubts, and mounting them with heavy 68-pounders. Thus matters proceeded until the 4th of March, when a change of weather enabled the general to embark forces for an expedition against Mohammerah.\*

\* For description see geographical portion of this work.

#### EXPEDITION TO MOHAMMERAH.

The circumstances attending the embarkation and the arrival before Mohammerah have been described by an eye-witness and participator in the events of the war, Captain G. H. Hunt, of the 78th Highlanders. The description is at once condensed and graphic, and has all the lifelike force of that which a competent witness relates:—"It was now known that General Outram's arrangements were to be as follows,—viz., General Stalker to remain in command at Bushire, with Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Tapp; the troops to remain being two field-batteries and the mountain trains, the entire cavalry of the first division, three companies each from her majesty's 64th, and the Highlanders, the 4th rifles, 20th native infantry, and the Belooch battalion; Sir James proceeding himself with the remainder, to the number, of all arms, of about four thousand men—those left for the defence of Bushire counting about three thousand. The different accounts of Mohammerah stated it to be held by from ten to thirteen thousand men, with numerous cavalry in its neighbourhood, and seven of the shah's best regular regiments among its garrison. The works of the fort or batteries were described as very formidable earthen parapets, eighteen or twenty feet thick, with heavy guns on the river face. To encounter these, until the troops should land and carry the batteries, were the broadsides of the *Clive* and *Falkland* sloops, and *Ajdaha*, *Feroze*, *Semiramis*, *Victoria*, and *Assaye* frigate steamers; which must, however, face the enemy's fire at the distance of about one hundred yards. The difficulty of the enterprise, however, seemed only the more to determine the general to accomplish it; and camp gossip affirmed that an ill-timed remonstrance from the Turkish government against our attacking a place so near their own (a neutral) territory, had materially hastened our chief's movements, and that the arrival of any portion of the expected cavalry and artillery would be the signal for an immediate advance.

"On the 6th of March, before the transport *Kingston* put to sea, the *Falkland* sloop sailed for the Euphrates; and about the same time her majesty's 64th regiment embarked in the *Bride of the Sea* transport; and, even while these events were occurring, the *Feroze*, *Pottinger*, and *Pioneer* steamers entered the roads, bringing a troop of horse artillery and some of the long-looked-for Scinde horse; so the departure of the entire expedition now became imminent. Intelligence was also brought in this day, stating so confidently that the new Persian commander-in-chief, with considerable reinforcements, had joined

the army recently beaten by us, and intended an advance, that strong hopes, if not actual expectations, were entertained that he might be induced, when the departure of so large a portion of our force became known, to attack the camp and try the strength of our new redoubts, and thus give the troops remaining behind an equal opportunity of honour and distinction with ourselves. On the afternoon of the 6th, the *Kingston*, with four other transports, got clear of the Bushire roads, and were off the island of Karrack early next morning. This formed no exception in desolate rocky appearance to its sister islands in the gulf. A detachment of the 4th rifles held it as a coaling-station for the Indian navy. The mouth of the Euphrates was made by daylight on the 8th, with the *Falkland* sloop under all sail leading into it; and after being aground on the bar for about an hour, the *Kingston* anchored by noon among the eight or ten ships that had then arrived; others continuing to reach the anchorage in the course of the day. A considerable portion of the expedition had assembled in the river, and the cavalry patrols of the enemy evinced great curiosity at our movements, coming down close to the water's edge to make their observations within easy gun-range, but no shot was fired at them. A day or so previously to our arrival, one of their superior officers held an inspection of about three thousand of their infantry abreast of the shipping, and evidently intended for observation." A considerable body of their irregulars, both horse and infantry, still occupied the village of Mahamur, opposite to the anchorage, and had pickets established in some ruined buildings within rifle-range. The Persian horsemen came within easy range, performing feats of horsemanship such as equestrian showmen might display in England. They flourished their swords, poised their lances, and seemed very desirous to impress the English with the idea that the horsemen of Persia were dangerously active and expert in encounter.

While the troops were impatiently waiting to be led against Mohammerah, General Stalker committed suicide at Bushire. That officer, finding that he was to be left in command on the departure of Sir James Outram against Mohammerah, was overwhelmed by a sense of responsibility. In important commands, under the chief direction of some other officer, he was very efficient; and in the public and private communications of the commander-in-chief was much honoured. When, however, he believed that a superior force would attack the lines which it would be his duty to defend, he shrunk from a responsibility to

which he was unequal, and deprived himself of life. In the war with Russia, two British admirals acted in the same way from a similar cause; and soon after the death of General Stalker, Captain Ettensey, the naval chief of the expedition, also perished from his own hand, from the consciousness of his incompetency for the great task devolved upon him.

The promotion of officers in the British service by routine, purchase, and favouritism, is often as irksome to the victims of such unsuitable honour as it is unjust to the country which is injured, and to meritorious officers who are neglected.

Until the 23rd of March the fleet, with troops on board, remained at anchor. The enemy, during the interval, worked hard at the defences. Captain Maisonneuve, of the *Sibylle*, a French ship of war, then observing matters in the Persian Gulf, under the pretence of a display of alliance, made energetic representations to the British of the strength of the enemy's positions and the incompetency of the English, with such means as they had at their disposal, to attack it successfully. The French captain professed a warm alliance, although not actually intending to unite his fire to that of the British fleet against the foe; but it is not at all improbable that the polite captain would have preferred that the English did not try to take Mohammerah, but, yielding to his opinion, have abandoned the enterprise, and incurred the disgrace of doing so. Active preparations continued until the dawn of the 26th, when the attack began. During these preparations the sailors of the Indian navy showed an intelligence, order, and activity which the royal navy might well admire, and could not surpass, perhaps not equal.

On the night of the 25th, and before dawn of the 26th, a most gallant as well as useful manœuvre was performed. A raft, with two eight-inch and two five-inch mortars, was moored behind a low island in the middle of the river, and fronting the most powerful battery which the enemy possessed. "The cool daring of the men who placed, and the little band of artillery who remained on this raft for several hours of darkness in the middle of a rapid river without means of retreat, and certain destruction staring them in the face, should the enemy, within but a few hundred yards, be aroused to the fact of their presence, requires no commendation. The simple narrative of the event as it occurred is sufficient." Happily, the enemy was not "aroused to the fact of their presence" until at day-dawn the first shell sent from the raft fell into the centre of the battery, slaying eleven of the enemy. The Persian soldiers

were engaged at prayer when the shell fell among them; so sudden was the explosion, and so terrible the effect, that those who were not themselves among the victims were filled with wonder and consternation. "The attacking ships got under weigh as the first shot was fired, and proceeded to engage the batteries, going into action as follows:—The *Semiramis*, with the commodore's pendant flying of Captain Young, Indian navy, and towing the *Olive* sloop, led the squadron, followed by the steam-frigates *Ajdaha*, *Feroze*, *Assaye*, *Victoria*, the latter towing the *Falkland* sloop, which she cast off when in position. The leading ships passing the lower batteries, and opening their guns as they could be brought to bear, were soon at their respective posts, followed in quick succession by the rear division; and but few minutes had elapsed after the *Semiramis* had fired her first gun before the action became general, the Persian artillery replying with spirit. The morning being very clear, with just sufficient breeze to prevent the smoke from collecting, a more beautiful scene than was then presented can scarcely be imagined. The ships, with ensigns flying from every mast-head, seemed decked for a holiday; the river glittering in the early sun-light, its dark, date-fringed banks contrasting most effectively with the white canvas of the *Falkland*, which had loosened sails to get into closer action: the sulky-looking batteries just visible through the grey fleecy cloud which enveloped them; and groups of brightly-dressed horsemen flitting at intervals between the trees where they had their encampment, formed altogether a picture from which even the excitement of the heavy cannonade around could not divert attention."\*

The *Berenice*, with General Havelock and the Highlanders on board, led the column for disembarkation. So crowded were the decks of the *Berenice*, that had a single shot plunged into the mass, the havoc must have been dreadful. Providentially, that peril was escaped. The conduct of the Indian navy in covering the landing was beyond praise. They kept up so terrible a fire of broadsides at the critical moment as to prevent the enemy from being able to give sufficient attention to the transports and their precious freights. Those vessels were all armed, some with only one gun, others with several guns or mortars, and the fire from these was directed most skilfully. The reckless exposure of the sailors of the Indian navy must have filled the enemy with surprise, as it did the British army with admiration. The enthu-

siasm of these gallant tars equalled their audacity; in the midst of the furious cannonade they cheered vociferously each detachment of the troops as they passed between the ships on their way to what appeared still greater dangers and more formidable encounters. The infantry and some field artillery were landed by two o'clock, but the creeks of the river were filled by the rising of the tide, so as to intercept the passage of the horse artillery and the 14th light dragoons. The general ordered the troops he had with him to advance; the grenadier company of the gallant 64th keeping up a fire upon the enemy's matchlock-men while the troops passed. The troops arrived at the extremity of the date-grove which covered the line of advance, and hid the enemy's position. At once the lines of the Persians broke into view as the troops emerged beyond the intercepting wood. By this time the loud duel between the ships and batteries had nearly ceased; an explosion in the chief magazine of the defences had silenced many of the guns, and created alarm among the Persian troops.

The position of the enemy as presented to General Outram from the verge of the date-grove consisted of the town and batteries, flanked by intrenched encampments, which were thrown back to the rear of the place. In front of these lines large bodies of troops were massed. Upon these lines the British marched. The formation was as follows:—a line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field-battery on the right. Next came the 78th Highlanders; next the 25th native infantry, (one wing), her majesty's 64th regiment, the light battalion, and 23rd Bengal light infantry, the whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers. The point of attack was the camp to the left rear of the town of Mohammerah, where the shah-zada had evidently pitched his cavalry and guns, and had been with them in person. His infantry had occupied the other encampment, about five hundred yards to the right of this, and had also been quartered in considerable numbers in the batteries and date-groves adjacent. Up to the moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle, outside the boundary of the shah-zada's camp, the right of their line far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd native light infantry being slightly thrown back. This great risk, however, caused no hesitation. The scene which followed was singular. The British advanced in compact order of battle, with bold bearing and confident step, when, to their astonishment, as if the hosts of the

\* *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*. By George Townsend, pp. 249, 250.

enemy were a dissolving view, they melted away. The Persian soldiery refused to fight, battalion after battalion vanished, and with such rapidity, that before the English could recover from their astonishment, the grand army of the shah had disappeared. Every tent remained standing, and the ground was covered with arms and ammunition, accoutrements and garments, shot and shell which had fallen in the camp from the British guns and mortars. No wounded men were seen, but the dead were scattered around in bloody profusion. Some of the wounded had in part been sent into the interior, others were hidden by the townspeople. The inefficiency of the British shells was proved by the numbers which lay among the enemy's tents without having burst. Before retreating the Persians had destroyed their grand magazine. As the cowardly Persian army glided away, crowds of bolder Arab robbers approached to plunder the camp. These were driven off by a few of the advance men of the 14th light dragoons and the rearguard, while Sir James Outram pursued the fugitive army. The Scinde horse made desperate exertions to overtake them, but could only come upon unfortunate stragglers who were wounded. The English were powerless to pursue from the old cause of inefficiency in this respect—an inadequate force of cavalry. Indeed, so small was the number of the English army, that it is astonishing the enemy did not try the ordeal of battle. The Arabs fell upon the wounded fugitives, murdering them partly from love of plunder and partly from animosity.

Eighteen beautiful brass guns and mortars were found in the camp, amongst them a Russian 12-pounder, cast in 1828, bearing an inscription which stated that it was a present from the Emperor Nicholas of Russia to the shah. The total loss of men slain by the enemy was probably about five hundred, they acknowledged a loss of three hundred. The wounded who died on the retreat, and those murdered by the Arabs, would increase the numbers by several hundreds. Their total loss could not be less than one thousand men. The British loss was ten men killed and thirty-one wounded, including Lieutenant Harriss of the Indian navy. The fire of the Persians was good, hulling the ships, and cutting up the rigging; several boats were much injured, and one sunk, the mortar raft was also damaged, and in great danger of being sunk. Many lives were saved on board ship through the protection afforded by trusses of hay placed round the sides of the vessels.

When the British had time to examine the position which they had conquered, they were much amazed at its strength, and the skill

shown in constructing and mounting the batteries. The scene was thus described by an officer on the staff of the army, who examined the works and witnessed the havoc made by the fire from our ships:—"The strength of the batteries was found to have been by no means exaggerated, and considerable skill was displayed both in their position and construction. Nothing but stout hearts within them was required to have made their capture matter of bloody price to the victors: happily for us these were wanting. Solid earthworks, open in rear, with parapets eighteen feet thick and twenty-five in height—the embrasures casemated, and revetted with date-stumps (which the heaviest shot will not splinter), and the whole interior thickly studded with pits full of water to catch our shells—had been the work cut out for us. The north battery had embrasures for eighteen guns, and stood on the right bank of the Karoon, at its junction with the Euphrates, and looked across and down the stream of that river. The south battery had eleven guns, and was on the opposite bank of the Karoon, commanding in the same direction. A small fort between the north battery and the town, and connected with the former by a long intrenchment, with embrasures for guns, mounted eight or ten guns. This intrenchment, crowded with infantry, had kept up a heavy musketry fire during the whole action; and from the broken pieces of arms and appointments lying about, as well as patches of blood-stains in all directions, our shot must have told fearfully among its occupants. Several minor batteries of from two to four guns each were on either bank, and just outside the west face of the town, on the right bank, was a very carefully made and strong work for ten guns. The whole of the works bore the marks of very rough treatment from our shot, though they were far from being ruined. Outside the small fort connected with the north battery was a capsized brass 12-pounder, with the carriage smashed, and three dead horses harnessed to it, all evidently killed at the same moment, if not by the same shot. A captain of their artillery and three gunners were also lying dead beside it. A letter found on the officer stated his expectation of a great battle on the morrow, and foreboded his own fate—committing his wife and children to the care of his brother at Teheran. This letter was subsequently forwarded to the address it bore by the British political agent at Bagdad.

"Two other handsome field guns and a large brass mortar were found deserted near the brass 12-pounder, the accident to which had prevented the enemy carrying them off; and they must have had some frightful casualties

in their ranks while their men were delayed in the attempt. Some few corpses remaining on the spot presented horrible spectacles: a huge African, in particular, struck on the back of the head by a round shot, which had carried away all the bones of the skull and face, lay across another dead soldier, with the hideous, eyeless black mask that had once been a countenance, still as it were mowing and grinning at the beholder. The scene of the explosion of their grand magazine also afforded some ghastly objects; and the damage it had occasioned was frightful—legs, arms, and heads—wretched mutilated remains of humanity—protruding among the blackened, blasted ruins. The effect of the 68-pounder shot upon the date-trees was most extraordinary, a single one sufficing to snap the largest. The immense size and range of these missiles had occasioned the greatest terror and astonishment among the Persian troops, and doubtless was their excuse for their subsequent dastardly misconduct. Much discouragement was also said to have been created in their ranks by the loss of Agha Jhan Khan, surteep, or general of division, and their most able chief, who fell desperately wounded very early in the day, while showing a most gallant example in the north battery.

“The 27th and 28th of March were occupied in removing the guns, collecting the stores, &c., and in landing supplies and our own tentage for the troops, who, with the exception of those to whom the Persian tents had fallen prize on occupying their camps, had up to this time been living entirely in the open air.”

#### EXPEDITION TO AKWAZ.

While the British were encamped at Mohammerah, Sir James Outram ascertained that the enemy had retreated, with the intention of reaching Akwâz, about one hundred miles distant, on the river Karoon. It was the grand depot of provisions of war of all kinds for these provinces. The British commander-in-chief conceived the idea of sending up some steamers, with a small detachment of troops, and of damaging or destroying the place before the retreating force could reach it. The steam squadron consisted of the *Comet*, *Planet*, and *Assyria*, under Commander Rennie, of the Indian navy, whose experience in river warfare in Birmah and China had been considerable.

“The troops told off for the service were, one hundred and fifty men from the flank companies of the 64th regiment, and a like number furnished by the light and Captain McAndrew’s companies of the Highlanders. Each steamer took one hundred men, the light companies of the Highlanders going on

the *Comet*; Captain Goode’s grenadiers, of the 64th, on the *Planet*; and Captain McAndrew, with part of his own Highlanders and part of the light company of the 64th, on the *Assyria*. The expedition was accompanied by the following officers, irrespective of the troops:—Captain Wray, deputy quartermaster-general of the army; Captain Green, military secretary to Sir James; Captain Kemball, political agent and consul at Bagdad; and several other officers. The steamers left Mohammerah about ten o’clock on the morning of 29th March, the *Comet* leading and lending a tow-rope to the *Assyria*, she being of lesser power; the *Planet* brought up the rear. A gunboat, carrying two 24-pounder howitzers, was also in tow of each steamer.” After sunset of the first day’s sail, a party of officers landed, and discovered the ground upon which the enemy had bivouaced in their retreat, and the wheel-marks of five guns were made out, besides those of a carriage of narrow axle. Getting under weigh again at daylight the next morning, the ruined mosque of Imaum Subbeh was reached early in the afternoon; and the steamer running alongside the bank, a few officers landed to explore, again finding the marks of the enemy’s halting-ground. The five guns had been parked near the ruin, which stood close to the waterside, and the shah-zada himself had evidently occupied the little shelter afforded by the few date-trees in its immediate neighbourhood. The wheel-marks of the small carriage were again made out, and, judging from the freshness of the impressions in the clay and other appearances, not more than twenty-four hours could have elapsed since the retreating army had passed. Several fresh-made graves also gave evidence that they had buried their dead by the way; and, from the absence of the usual scraps of food around the bivouac fires, and similar indications at the picketing-places, they were evidently pressed for both provisions and forage. Again the little squadron got under weigh, and on arriving at the Arab village of Ismaini, it was learned that the enemy had passed the previous day; the force consisting of seven regiments, two thousand horse, and four guns; and another gun, with a broken carriage, towed in a boat along the river close by their line of march. On the 31st, at dawn, the brisk little *Comet* cast off the *Assyria*, and putting on full power, made up river, expecting to capture the boat on board of which was the gun. Soon after nine in the morning, a straggler from the rearguard was captured. He was so exhausted with fatigue, hunger, and fear, that no information could be extracted from him. From the Arabs it was soon after ascertained that the enemy’s army had reached

their destination, towing their boat with the gun safely up to the city. The remainder of the little squadron joined in the evening, and a position was taken up for the night. Early on the morning of the 1st of April the squadron steamed up towards Akwâz. The Persian army was descried on the right bank of the river the town was situated on the left. "They had a most formidable cavalry force, certainly over two thousand; four large masses of infantry were partly screened by a low range of sand-hills, which ran along their front; and three guns were distinctly seen in position near a small mosque in their centre, a fourth being on a slope below and to the left of it. Their line fronted down the river, and at a slight angle to it, their left resting immediately upon its bank. Our small fleet steamed slowly up to within three thousand yards of the position, all busied either in surveying the river, reconnoitring the force in front, or observing the patrols of cavalry which were now riding within rifle-shot abreast of us, and watching our movements. A boat beneath the left bank for some minutes escaped with very casual notice; but suspicions being roused, it was determined to examine her. A cutter from the *Comet*, taking two officers of the party and a corporal's guard of the Highlanders, accordingly boarded her (the crew jumping overboard as the cutter approached), when she proved to be the much-coveted prize, a splendid 12-pounder brass gun being found in her. While hoisting this on board the *Comet*, a couple of horsemen approaching closer to see what we were doing, a shot was fired at them from one of Colonel Jacob's new rifles. The effect of this was most ridiculous: though not striking either. They both turned at once, galloping back at speed to the picket of some thirty cavalry which they had come from, and which also withdrew to a more respectful distance. Some Arabs next hailed us from the shore, one was brought on board, and it was ascertained that the garrison of Akwâz did not exceed five hundred infantry and thirty horse, left to protect the stores, which had scarcely been touched by the enemy before our approach. The information appearing reliable, it was determined at once to attempt reaching the town by landing on the left bank, and circling clear of cannon-range to its east face; when, should it be found defended in much greater force, a simple reconnaissance was to be made, and an orderly return to the boats; but if practicable, the town was to be carried, and the stores burnt. A gunboat was ordered to go up the river as far as possible without rashness, and open fire with two howitzers. There were only two

small boats on the side of the river where the Persian army lay, so that men could not be sent over in any great numbers to assist the garrison of the city. The gunboat performed its mission admirably; Mr. Hewett, mate of the Indian navy, directed the fire with great coolness and skill, although a very young man. Dispositions were made of a most ingenious nature to make the enemy believe that the British force opposed to them was only the advance guard of a great flotilla, and of the whole army of Sir James Outram. A high jungle, screening the formation of the troops, enabled this happy imposition to be practised, rendering it impossible for the enemy to form any correct estimate of the numbers. A single line of skirmishers, each man ten or twelve paces apart, first issued from the bushes on the plain, in view of the enemy; the supports followed these, at about one hundred yards' interval, also in single rank, and with files very much loosened. At another interval of about one hundred yards, the three main detachments advanced, about two hundred yards apart, each in columns of threes, and opened out to very wide intervals. The light company of the Highlanders was on the left, and on entering the town had to turn to the left, and, getting under cover at the water's edge, to endeavour to keep down the fire. Captain Goode's grenadiers of the 64th were in the centre, and were to move on the body of the town, and at once begin destroying the stores. Captain McAndrew's detachment on the right, composed partly of Highlanders and partly of men of the 64th, was to turn to the right on entering, and, watching any troops that might attempt the upper face of the town, also destroy whatever magazines or stores fell in his way."

The garrison of the town ran away, and crossing far up the river, joined the main army. The sheik, with a long retinue of religious persons, came out to solicit protection, which was afforded, on condition that he would disclose the position of the magazines, and aid in their destruction. He was assured that private property would be spared and the inhabitants treated with respect.

The Persian army remained still in position, and it was necessary for the troops to act with the greatest circumspection. A lucky cast from one of the howitzers pitched a shell into the shah-zada's quarters, nearly destroying a mosque. His excellency became so alarmed that he gave orders for the army to retreat upon Shustu, his nearest depot, but a long distance for an army without provisions, as all their stores lay in the city which they were unable to save. Ten thousand men thus fled before three hundred, surren-

dering a city and extensive magazines of food and ammunition. One who witnessed the retreat of the Persians thus describes it:—"Their infantry, keeping in four distinct masses, went off first, marching very rapidly on a course parallel to the river, taking the four guns seen in position with them; and they were also said to have had three others of lighter metal. A small green palanquin carriage, with glass windows, and a 'takh-teraidan,' or mule-litter, in which Persian women of rank usually travel, were conspicuous in the midst of a strong escort. This was the carriage, the tracks of which had been found at their several bivouacs. The cavalry brought up the rear, and a magnificent appearance this great body of horse presented. They certainly exceeded two thousand in number, appeared well mounted, and were dressed in long blue frocks, with trousers of lighter colour, a white belt, and the high black lambskin cap peculiar to the Persians. A sabre and long matchlock slung across their backs appeared to be their only arms, as (unusual with Asiatics) no lances were visible among them. The pick of the Bactdyari tribes, reputed the shah's best cavalry, were present among the number. They carried three standards with them, but in crimson cases, not flying. One of these horsemen remained concealed behind a wall until their whole army had proceeded about a mile, then suddenly starting from his hiding-place, he fired his matchlock at the town, as if in defiance, and galloped off at speed after his comrades. This was the last man seen of the Persian army.

"Before their rearguard had advanced many hundred yards out of their lines, the gunboat crossed, taking Captain Wray, Lord Schomberg Kerr, and Captain Green, with twenty of the Highlanders, and with utter impunity exploded a quantity of ammunition deserted by them; although—a few minutes after this took place, and when the party might easily have been cut off from the boat, had a few of their horsemen possessed the courage to dash back—they unlimbered a light gun and sent a shot at some Arab marauders who had swum the river and commenced plundering the lines they had abandoned. The town had been entered about half an hour before midday, and it was about two o'clock when the last of the enemy was seen. During the whole of this time the work of destroying the stores had been going on, Major Kemball first compelling the Arabs to carry down to the steamers as much of the flour and wheat as stowage could be found for them, and, as payment for their labour, threw open to them the remainder.

"Besides the immense quantity of grain thus carried off and scattered by us, fifteen cases of perfectly new firelocks and bayonets were taken, fifty-six fine mules in capital condition, a handsome horse of the shah-zada's, a number of new pack-saddles, with their appointments, and a great many new intrenching tools of different descriptions. The whole of these were brought away in the boats. The firelocks captured were of English manufacture, and had the Tower mark upon them. A large flock of sheep was also among the prizes. Of these, as many were brought off as the boats could hold, and the troops and seamen consumed many more during the stay which it was now decided to make at Akwâz, both for the moral effect and for political reasons; the remainder of the flock was presented to the sheik of the town on the departure of the expedition."

Captain Selby, noticed elsewhere in this work as so useful an officer in his marine surveys, was of great service in this expedition. He commanded the *Comet*, and his surveys of the river and of the Persian Gulf on former occasions enabled him to guide the little squadron in safety.

During the 2nd and 3rd of April the political agent who accompanied the expedition remained at Akwâz, receiving the submission of the sheiks of the surrounding districts. While these events were occurring, negotiations for peace were going on at Paris, which, on the 4th of March, was concluded. This intelligence arrived at Mohammerah on the same day that the expeditionary force arrived at that place on its return from Akwâz. Sir James Outram put himself into communication with the nearest Persian authorities in reference to the fulfilment of the treaty. He arranged that a small garrison should remain in Bushire, and the rest of the troops return to India. Great dissatisfaction was created among the army of Persia by the easy terms which the Persian ambassadors obtained at Paris. The general impressions were, that the French emperor, or his foreign minister, was more anxious, by the interposition of France, to prevent the acquisition of renown and influence by the English in Persia than to secure a tried and faithful ally such terms as honour and justice might demand. It was thought that Lord Clarendon showed too little firmness, and that he and Lord Palmerston displayed more eagerness to please the French emperor than comported with the dignity of England. These noblemen did not expect that the operations in the Persian Gulf would be so successful. They, no doubt, calculated upon the expedition being conducted with the usual blunders of an English

campaign. They did not recollect, or did not know, that Outram and Havelock were men who rose by their merit, and were not the creatures of a pragmatist governor-general, or a servile commander-in-chief. Had there been a just conception in the English cabinet of the capacity and resources of the majority of the officers who led the army of Persia, better terms would have been insisted on. The troops engaged in the Persian expedition became a useful reinforcement to the army in India struggling against the mutineers and rebels of the Bengal provinces and Central India. From that circumstance the reader will be interested in the destination of the troops which left Persia in May, 1858. In a field-force order, made at the camp, Mohammerah, 9th of May, 1857, the following dispositions were made as to the places to which the troops then departing should be sent:—

1st. "The third troop of horse-artillery to Kurrachee; first company second battalion of artillery to Kurrachee; reserve companies to Bombay; her majesty's 64th regiment to Vingorla; her majesty's 78th Highlanders to Bombay; light battalion to Bombay; Madras sappers and miners to Bombay.

2nd. "The 23rd native light infantry and the 26th native infantry are transferred to the first division, and will proceed to Bushire, with the detachment of Scinde horse and land transport corps now at Mohammerah.

3rd. "The staff of the second division will return to Bombay, with the exception of the engineers, ordnance, and commissariat departments, which will proceed to Bushire and await further instructions.

4th. "Brigadier-general Jacob, C.B., will command the troops stationed at Bushire, which will be organized as follows:—cavalry brigade: 3rd regiment light cavalry, Scinde horse, Poonah horse, Aden troop, 14th king's light dragoons—Brigadier Stewart. Artillery brigade: 4th troop horse artillery, 3rd light field-battery, 5th light field-battery, 8th light field-battery, three companies of the second battalion artillery, four companies of the fourth battalion artillery—Lieutenant-colonel Trevelyan. Infantry: 20th regiment native infantry, 26th regiment native infantry—first brigade, Colonel Macan. Fourth Bengal native infantry, 23rd regiment native light infantry, Beloochee battalion—second brigade, Colonel Henner.\*

5th. "The Lieutenant-general avails himself of this opportunity to return his warmest thanks to the whole of the troops placed under his command for service in Persia, for their very exemplary conduct since their arrival

\* This force subsequently went to India, in time to render service in the suppression of the mutiny.

in this country, evinced by the fact of scarcely one instance of misconduct on the part of any individual having been brought to his notice. This entire absence of crime amongst so large a body of troops assembled in camp redounds to the credit of both officers and men, and is the strongest possible proof of the high state of discipline of the force; whilst their conduct throughout the expedition to Brasjoon, and in the engagement at Khoosh-aub, bore ample testimony to the gallantry of all ranks before an enemy, and to their cheerful and patient endurance of fatigue and hardship under most trying circumstances."

In the remainder of "the order" his excellency thanked the officers of his force for their signal skill and gallantry, selecting Brigadier-general Havelock, C.B., and Brigadier-general Wilson, K.H., as especially worthy of honour.

On the 15th of May, Brigadier-general Havelock, with the staff of his late division, embarked on board the *Berenice*, the vessel on board of which he had been, and which so providentially escaped when under fire of the batteries of Mohammerah. The *Berenice* arrived on the 23rd of May at Bombay, where the unwelcome intelligence of the mutiny smote every ear and every heart. The Highlanders and the 64th regiment were immediately, without landing, dispatched for debarkation nearer to the scene of action. How little did the authorities of Bombay suspect that the experience and hardihood acquired in Persia had qualified those troops for sublime services in India! As little was it supposed at Bombay or anywhere else in India that Havelock was to be the saviour of our Asiatic possessions, and that in him Britain would find a genius equal to the terrible emergency Providence permitted to arise.

Havelock and most of his officers had disembarked at Bombay, although the men still "kept the ships." He did not again embark in the *Berenice*, but in the *Erin*, on the 1st of June, following the troops which had been sent forward. A storm arose, and the *Erin* struck upon a reef off the Island of Ceylon, near a small civil station called Caltura, between Galle and Colombo. The loss of all on board was imminent, and had that precious freight of genius and devoted loyalty perished, India, humanly speaking, would have been lost to England. The cowardly Lascars (native sailors) refused to go aloft and ease the ship, or make any exertion whatever below. They huddled together in craven fear and fanatical apathy, while the English officers performed their work for them. To the firmness, coolness, and genius

of Havelock it was mainly due that every soul on board did not perish.

On the 8th of June Havelock and his officers embarked on board the *Fire Queen*. On the 12th the ship entered the roads of Madras. She arrived at Calcutta the 17th of June, bringing also Sir Patrick Grant, the

new commander-in-chief of the army of the Bengal presidency. The arrival of those officers at Calcutta, especially Havelock, caused joy and hope in the midst of the depression and gloom which then predominated. The causes of this despondency will be related in another chapter.

## CHAPTER CXXVII.

DEPARTURE OF LORD DALHOUSIE—ARRIVAL OF LORD CANNING AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—BREAKING OUT OF A SEPOY MUTINY—WANT OF FORESIGHT AND DECISION ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT—DISBANDING OF REGIMENTS AND PUNISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS—PROOFS OF A MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACY.

EARLY in March, 1856, Lord Dalhousie retired from the government of India. His successor, Lord Canning, arrived previous to that event. These two men met at Government House, amidst festivities and splendour.\* The most eventful incidents of British Indian history had occurred during the government of Lord Dalhousie, but even these were destined to be surpassed in magnitude and importance by those which afterwards taxed the powers and experience of Lord Canning. Lord Canning's difficulties were in the main created by Lord Dalhousie. To deal with this legacy of difficulties Lord Canning did not possess any extraordinary abilities. He had been considered an apt man of public business, with the family talent for diplomacy; he had been as good a postmaster-general as his predecessors in that office, which is not a very high commendation. He inherited a great name, and was a favourite of Lord Palmerston, under whose auspices he went to India. Much more could not be said for him. His reception at Calcutta was described in the chapter which treated of the social condition of India. His government, previous to the breaking out of the mutiny, was not in any way remarkable. That event surpassed all others in Anglo-Indian history in its importance and its danger, and brought out a heroism and talent on the part of the British in India—of all ranks—such as excited the admiration of their countrymen and of the world. The causes of the mutiny, and even the immediate occasion of it, have been referred to so frequently in the course of this history, that it is unnecessary further to discuss them. In the chapters which treat of the social condition of India, and of the Indian army, and in the introduction, sufficient has

been written on this subject to render it only requisite to make incidental reference to it as the narrative of facts proceeds.

### MUTINY OF THE BENGAL ARMY, AND INSURRECTION IN THE BENGAL PROVINCES.

The annexation of Oude had disgusted and enraged the sepoys of the Bengal army, who were generally recruited from that country, or from the contiguous province of Upper Bengal. Independent of that circumstance, while the government pampered the Brahmins and high-caste Mussulmans, it became less careful of offending the religious prejudices of the soldiers. Instances had occurred of these prejudices having been invaded in various ways without creating revolt, but the government did not know that in every such case bad feeling was created, which was quietly but actively diffused. Cases of military revolt had, however, occurred so often in Indian history in consequence of the superstition of the sepoys taking offence, that the government and its officials had lessons of prudence so plainly given, that none but persons judicially blinded or utterly incompetent could have been heedless. All such monitions proved in vain; the government and the officials acted like men governed by some irresistible fate. *Quod Deus vult perdere prius dementat*, might be pronounced in every department of the Bengal government without impiety, so blindly did each proceed in precipitating the awful catastrophe which impended. Various indications were afforded before Lord Dalhousie left India, and immediately after the arrival of his successor, that the native army was in an unsettled state; that the troops were not respectful to their officers, not loyal; and that they brooded over some real or supposed grievances, not simply with discontent, but with vindictive feeling. These indications

\* The reader will find an account of their meeting in chapter xxvii., under the head of "The social condition of India."

of the temper of the troops were noticed all over Bengal and the annexed provinces. A sense of alarm was felt by loyal natives and independent English settlers. In Calcutta it was impossible to visit the bazaar without perceiving that the natives of all classes expected some serious and important event, and that society was perturbed. All these portents of a coming storm were pointed out to the government, but its officials, civil and military, refused to hear the rustling of the leaves, and only awoke from their stupidity when the trees themselves were snapped by the tempest. When at last the hurricane of sedition burst forth, the government was utterly unprepared for such a calamity, and were stunned by the tidings of disaster and devastation.

The first decisive indication of a state of distrust on the part of the sepoys occurred at Dum-Dum, where a school of musketry was established. The feeling was first shown there at the close of 1856. On the 22nd of January, 1857, Captain Wright, of the 70th native infantry, brought under notice of Major Bonteim, the commandant, the existence of dissatisfaction among the men. His report stated that "a very unpleasant feeling existed among the native soldiers who were at the depot for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges, some evil-disposed person having spread a report that it consisted of a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows." Captain Wright added, "The belief in this respect has been strengthened by the behaviour of a classic attached to the magazine, who, I am told, asked a sepoy of the 2nd grenadiers to supply him with water from his lotah; the sepoy refused, observing he was not aware of what caste the man was; the classic immediately rejoined, 'You will soon lose your caste, as ere long you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows,' or words to that effect. Some of the depot men, in conversing with me on the subject last night, said that the report had spread throughout India, and when they go to their homes their friends will refuse to eat with them. I assured them (believing it to be the case) that the grease used is composed of mutton fat and wax; to which they replied, 'It may be so, but our friends will not believe it: let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow soldiers that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste.'" After some delays, such as may well surprise any person acquainted with the importance of allowing the native troops to take up a religious or caste prejudice, the men were paraded, and asked if they had any grievances or complaints. About two-thirds of the men, and all

the native commissioned officers, stepped to the front and respectfully stated that a suspicion had gone abroad that the fat of kine and swine was used in the preparation of the cartridges for the Enfield rifles. It was well known that the Mohammedan regarded swine's flesh as abominable, while those of the Brahminical religion holding kine to be sacred, would have their religious prejudices shocked by the use of fat from the animal in the making up of their cartridges. The men prayed that wax and oil should be used. General Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpore, acquainted the deputy adjutant-general of the forces with the true state of affairs, of which the general formed an accurate estimate. He recommended that the men should be allowed to obtain from the bazaar whatever ingredients for preparing the cartridges would answer that end, and satisfy the religious scruples of the sepoy.

The deputy adjutant-general took three days to "con over" the affair, and then sent the correspondence to the military secretary, who answered, on the 27th January, that the governor-general in council had adopted General Hearsey's suggestion, which might be carried out as well at Umballah and Sealkote, if the men wished it. The inspector-general of ordnance was applied to for information as to what the composition used in the arsenal for greasing the cartridges of the rifle muskets consisted of, "whether mutton fat was or is used, and if there are any means adopted for ensuring the fat of sheep and goats only being used; also, whether it is possible that the fat of bullocks and pigs may have been employed in preparing the ammunition for the new rifled muskets which has been recently made up in the arsenal." The reply was, that the grease used was a mixture of tallow and beeswax, in accordance with the instructions of the court of directors; that the tallow was supplied by a contractor; but that "no extraordinary precaution appears to have been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat." The first ammunition made in the arsenal was intended for the 60th rifles, and it was probable that some of this was issued to the depot at Dum-Dum. The inspector-general regretted that "ammunition was not prepared expressly for the practice depot, without any grease at all," but the subject did not "occur to him." He recommended that the home government should be requested not to send out any more made ammunition for the Enfield rifles.\*

On the 28th of January General Hearsey again informed the government that the idea was deeply seated in the minds of the soldiers, that the government intended to deprive them

\* *The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences*, By Henry Mead.

of caste by a deceitful trick, and then by force to make them Christians. The general assured his superiors that so completely had this idea taken possession of the sepoys, that "it would be idle and unwise to attempt its removal." He also stated that incendiary fires had taken place, which were the work of the disaffected soldiers, and perpetrated with the object of disturbing the country, exasperating the natives, and thus creating a sympathy with their own sedition. It seems almost incredible that the government, in the face of this and other evidence, wrote home making light of the whole affair, and informing the court of directors that the explanations offered to the sepoys had satisfied them. The directors have been blamed for not foreseeing the magnitude and peril of the crisis when its first indications gave them warning. It is not wonderful that they should accept the assurances of Lord Canning and his council that all was well, more especially as the president of the board of control (Mr. Vernon Smith), and the premier, Lord Palmerston, were satisfied with the competency of Lord Canning to determine all matters on the spot, and with the accuracy of his advices. While the English government and the Indian government were crying "Peace, peace," here was no peace. Had all the officials at Calcutta been blind, or had the dispatches which were received from the provinces been addressed to men without reason, they could not have acted with less forethought, or shown less judgment. Viscount Canning had evidently taken up the government in the spirit in which Lord Dalhousie had laid it down—that India might be regarded as secure and prosperous. In the last "minute" of the government of the Marquis Dalhousie he thus recorded his conviction, while reviewing the history of his own eight years of office:—"I enter on the review with the single hope that the honourable court of directors may derive from the retrospect some degree of satisfaction with the past, and a still larger measure of encouragement for the future." This minute was perused by Viscount Canning with confidence in his predecessor and himself, and hence the false security in which he wrapped himself, and the dulness of all around him to the real signs of the time.

On the 11th of February General Hearsey wrote to the government declaring that they "dwelt on a mine ready for explosion." He pointed out the peculiar facts connected with several fresh instances of incendiarism, as proving that they had been perpetrated by the soldiery. The general declared that depositions had been made before him and other authorities that the soldiers had conspired throughout the Bengal army to prevent the

government from forcing them to abandon their religion by compelling them to break caste in biting cartridges greased with the fat of forbidden animals. The general showed how he had paraded the men, and dissuaded them from their dangerous proceedings, and added these ominous words:—"You will perceive in all this business the native officers were of no use; in fact, they are afraid of their men, and dare not act; all they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by so doing they will escape censure as not actively implicated. This has always occurred on such occasions, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. Well might Sir C. Metcalfe say, 'that he expected to awake some fine morning, and find that India had been lost to the English crown.'" The procedure of the government, on the receipt of new and most alarming communications from various parts, was slow, uncertain, and, at last, when action of a determined kind was taken, it was haughtily confident, severe, and impolitic.

The sepoys at Barrackpore took measures to corrupt those of the 19th regiment at Berhampore. That regiment, on the night of the 19th of February, suddenly assembled, and made demonstrations of revolt. Colonel Mitchel, who commanded the garrison, immediately ordered out other troops at the station, which were a squadron of irregular cavalry, consisting of one hundred and eighty men; there were also two pieces of cannon, manned by six native gunners each. He there addressed the 19th, demanding the reason of their parading without orders; they alleged that it arose from a report that European troops had been ordered up to the station to murder them unless they consented to violate their religion by biting the greased cartridges. Colonel Mitchel addressed them in terms which blended firmness and prudence. The cavalry and artillery remained loyal, and the infantry, at last, consented to lay down their arms and submit to their duty. They were invited to test the cartridges. This the native officers did in the presence of the men, and pronounced the greater number free from grease of any kind, but that grease had been used in preparing the more highly glazed paper of one set of the cartridges. The men were informed that a plan would be adopted of loading without biting the cartridge, but although this satisfied the majority for the time, the good faith of government, as to the maintenance of its promises not to interfere with their religion, was not trusted. The regiment, however, continued to perform its duties. It will be observed that the irregular cavalry and artillerymen remained loyal, and that their loyalty saved the station, for there was not a

European quartered there. This furnishes proof of the sincerity of the infantry in the allegations they made as to the causes of disaffection. The artillery and cavalry had nothing to do with such cartridges, and therefore not only made no complaints, but were ready to fire on their mutinous co-religionists had they continued in revolt. The artillery and cavalry, however, sympathised with the grievances of the infantry, but not being themselves involved in them, were easily satisfied as to the remedies proposed. The 19th had been seduced by the men of the 34th, stationed at Barrackpore, who promised co-operation, but failed to render it in the hour of trial.

When Lord Canning heard of the transactions at Berhampore, he determined upon making an example of the 19th regiment, although the corps had returned to its duty, and had evidently misconducted itself, not from a mutinous disposition, but from a sincere conviction that the government had violated its engagements never to enforce observances or practices upon its native soldiery at variance with their religion. Lord Canning ordered the *Oriental* steamship to Rangoon, to convey the 84th regiment of the royal line, quartered there, to Barrackpore; to which place also a wing of the 53rd regiment, stationed at Fort William, was ordered; and some artillery was to accompany these detachments. The mutinous native regiment was, at the same time, ordered to march from Berhampore to Barrackpore. This last order was that the regiment might be disbanded in the presence of the garrison, and of various detachments called in from a certain distance. It might be supposed that a measure of such importance would be kept secret by the select few whom it was necessary should co-operate in carrying it out—this, however, was not the case; scarcely had the resolve been taken when it was known and discussed among the sepoys at Barrackpore. The 34th regiment of Bengal native infantry quartered there was one of the most fanatical and disloyal of the service. This corps, which, as already shown, had caused the uneasy feeling in the 19th at Berhampore, immediately laid a plan for frustrating the intentions of the government. The authorities had no information of the exact state of feeling in the 34th. They were dull of understanding to observe the indications of things at Barrackpore, as well as everywhere else. The order to march to Barrackpore was given to the 19th, and the 34th was commanded to relieve that corps. The latter advised the former to mutiny on the road, assuring it that European troops had been sent for to massacre it; a particular part of the road was specified for the revolt; the officers were, according to the

plan of the 34th, to be at once murdered, a signal was to be given, and the 34th would march out and join the mutineers. This correspondence fell into the hands of Colonel Mitchel, who acted with undaunted courage and perfect skill. When he reached a particular part of the road he suddenly halted the regiment, so that at the appointed time for the revolt the corps was not at the appointed place. Before the hour arrived he held a durbar of the native officers, whom he engaged in acts of courtesy and well-assumed confidence. The men *could* not act according to the concocted plan, the expected signal, of course, never reached the 34th at Barrackpore; and thus, by the presence of mind, good sense, and cool resolution of Colonel Mitchel, the scheme of the mutineers was frustrated, and scenes of blood and horror averted, similar to those which soon afterwards took place in so many parts of India. The 19th was marched to its destination, and the arrangements of the government were completed for breaking up the corps. It is but justice to say that at the core the battalion was loyal, that the men had no disposition to mutinous acts; it was as brave and well-disciplined a body of native infantry as any in the service, as might be expected from its having so efficient a commander. It was only under the suspicion, not at all unreasonable, that the government, either from design or carelessness, had endangered its caste, that it was disposed to any hostile action. The men had been informed by natives actually engaged in the manufacture of the obnoxious cartridges that their caste was gone; this information had been accompanied with sneers and insults which goaded the men almost to madness, loyal although they were. The reports which reached them from the 34th, about disbanding and massacre, left them, in their own opinion, no alternative but revolt.

While these transactions were taking place, others of a still more formidable nature occurred in the 34th regiment. That corps was cowardly, but still more truculent. One of its number, a desperate fanatic, in a state of intoxication, rushed on the parade-ground on Sunday, the 29th of March, shouting "deen, deen," ("religion, religion,") and taunted his comrades to come forth and fight for their faith against the Ferringhees. The serjeant-major arrived at the moment, the fanatic fired at him, but was too drunk with bhang to hit the mark. This was immediately in front of the quarter-guard, numbering nineteen men, who turned out and enjoyed the sight, crowding around the serjeant-major, and preventing him from taking any decided action against the mutineer, who reloaded his piece, and shot

the horse of the adjutant, who just then rode up to see what was the matter. As the adjutant fell, the mutineer attacked him with his side arms, and the quarter-guard struck the serjeant-major and the fallen officer with the butt-ends of their muskets. Both men would have been murdered in a few moments if General Hearsey had not galloped up, fearing that a revolt was beginning: he ordered the guard to rescue the adjutant and serjeant-major; they refused—their pieces were not loaded. He presented a revolver, declaring that he would shoot the first man who refused to move forward; they obeyed, and rescued the intended victims of assassination. The jemadar gave orders in opposition to those of the general; but the resolution and authority of the latter prevailed. The jemadar and guard were subsequently arrested. The name of the fanatical sepoy was Mungul Pandey, and he has received an unenviable notoriety in India, not only by being the first man who struck a blow for the cause of the mutineers, but from the fact of his name having, from that circumstance, been given to the mutineers and to all sepoys who excite the hostility or contempt of the English.

The evening after this affair with the 34th, the 19th entered from Barrackpore, and the next day they were drawn up on parade to hear the decision of the governor-general and commander-in-chief. It was an imposing sight when the four thousand sepoys of the garrison, the offending regiment, the European artillery and infantry which had arrived for the occasion, and various detachments from other stations, assembled to hear the order of the day. The first part of the document recapitulated the events which led to the situation, the order then declared:—

The regiment has been guilty of open and defiant mutiny.

It is no excuse for this offence to say, as had been said in the before-mentioned petition of the native officers and men of the regiment, that they were afraid for their religion, and that they apprehended violence to themselves.

It is no atonement of it to declare, as they have therein declared, that they are ready to fight for their government in the field, when they have disobeyed and insulted that government in the persons of its officers, and have expressed no contrition for their heavy offences.

Neither the 19th regiment, nor any regiment in the service of the government of India, nor any sepoy, Hindoo, or Mussulman, has reason to pretend that the government has shown, directly or indirectly, a desire to interfere with the religion of its troops.

It has been the unvarying rule of the government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful respect; and to representations or complaints put forward in a dutiful and becoming spirit, whether upon this or upon any other subject, it has never turned a deaf ear.

But the government of India expects to receive, in

return for this treatment, the confidence of those who serve it.

From its soldiers of every rank and race it will, at all times and in all circumstances, enforce unhesitating obedience. They have sworn to give it, and the governor-general in council will never cease to exact it. To no men who prefer complaints with arms in their hands will he ever listen.

Had the sepoys of the 19th regiment confided in their government, and believed their commanding officer, instead of crediting the idle stories with which false and evil-minded men have deceived them, their religious scruples would still have remained inviolate, and themselves would still be, as they have hitherto been, faithful soldiers, trusted by the state, and laying up for future years all the rewards of a long and honourable service.

But the governor-general in council can no longer have any confidence in this regiment, which has disgraced its name, and has lost all claim to consideration and indulgence.

It is therefore the order of the governor-general in council, that the 19th regiment N. I. be now disbanded; that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates be discharged from the army of Bengal; that this be done at the head-quarters of the presidency division in the presence of every available corps within two days' march of the station; that the regiment be paraded for the purpose; and that each man, after being deprived of his arms, shall receive his arrears of pay and be required to withdraw from the cantonment.

The European officers of the regiment will remain at Barrackpore until orders for their disposal shall be received from his excellency the commander-in-chief.

This order is to be read at the head of every regiment, troop, and company in the service.

The arms were piled, the colours deposited, and the 19th native infantry was erased from the army list.

The men of the 19th received the sentence with regret. They begged to be enlisted in other corps, offered their services anywhere to be led against the enemies of the company, and, finally, besought that if they must be dismissed the service, they would be allowed to attack the 34th regiment, the cause of their disgrace, and punish it at once for its treachery to them, and disloyalty to the government. Some of these requests could not be granted, and all were refused. They dispersed in various directions, some perished of cholera on the road, some were employed as gate-keepers and retainers of rich natives; none were at any time afterwards found in arms against the government, and several fought bravely, and as volunteers, against the mutineers. The wisdom of disbanding this regiment is open to question. The motives for doing so were, however, stated at length in the sentence already quoted, and which assumes importance as a public document, because it declares the policy of Viscount Canning's government towards the refractory sepoys at the beginning of the revolt. That policy was not, however, consistently carried out, for the conduct of the government towards the 34th regiment was slow and vacillating,

although to it the mischief connected with the 19th was attributable, and the men had attacked and nearly murdered several of their officers. The commander-in-chief remained in the cool sanatorium of the Himalayas; the government at Calcutta had time for all the usual frivolities of a court, but for five weeks it remained undecided what was to be done with the 34th regiment. These rebels and murderers remained all that time unpunished, Lord Canning advocating palliatives, his council urging decision. Meanwhile, Mungul Pandey and the jemadar, who was a high caste Brahmin, were hanged. These men feared the loss of caste more than death. They died in the spirit of martyrs, Pandey exulting in the opportunity afforded him of suffering for his faith, shouting "religion, religion," and urging his brethren to revolt, to the last. The conduct of these men evinced that there was a sincere belief among the sepoys that the government intended to persecute their creed.

Two sepoys of the 70th regiment were transported for conspiring to attack the fort, and one of their officers was dismissed the service for treason. It is obvious that however allowable it might be, taking a merciful view of the subject, to dismiss an officer for neglect of duty or incapacity, such leniency was inapplicable to high treason. It encouraged the revolted when they saw that, after all, in case of failure, it might be no worse than dismissal. Lord Canning had imbibed the idea that the honour and advantage of serving the English were so great, that for a sepoy to be deprived of the opportunity was the heaviest punishment that could be inflicted upon him short of death. There were other penalties which the sepoy dreaded much more than either.

With great difficulty, and not until numerous reports of fresh proofs of extensive disaffection had reached them, the government at Calcutta was brought to believe that something decisive must be done. Had not events thwarted the purposes of Lord Canning, the 84th British regiment would have been sent back to Birmah, and the capital of India been left for protection to a wing of the 53rd royal regiment and the doubtful body-guards. All the while the rebellious sepoys were in receipt of their pay, an expense to the empire as well as a danger. The system of disbanding without any punishment was better than supporting disaffected regiments and paying royal troops to watch them.

On the 6th of May, nearly six weeks after the attempt of the 34th to murder some of their officers, the troops in and around Calcutta were concentrated at Barrackpore, to witness the disbanding of the guilty portion

of the 34th. The crime committed was concerted mutiny and attempted murder, the punishment inflicted was as follows: in the presence of the assembled troops seven companies of the 34th were paraded and ordered to pile their arms, and to strip off their uniforms; having no means of resistance, they obeyed. Means were taken to prevent any outrage or disorder by the disarmed sepoys. An order of the day, or proclamation (it is difficult to give a precise designation to so anomalous a document), was issued by the government, explaining the necessity the government was under to inflict punishment, and threatening certain and speedy penalties upon all military insubordination. The public felt that it was an absurdity to give the name of punishment to the disbanding of a regiment that wished to serve no longer, and the soldiers of which were deserting. A painful impression was left on the minds of all loyal natives as well as Europeans, that the document was rather an excuse for leniency and weakness than a proclamation intended to vindicate justice. Confidence in the vigour of the governor-general was impaired. The continued absence of the commander-in-chief from the head-quarters of the army was the subject of universal animadversion. Time was consumed in consulting him at so vast a distance; and his counsels were neither very enlightened nor decisive. With the disbanding of the seven companies of the 34th, the government was satisfied that the mutiny was at an end. There had been abundant evidence to the contrary, but the government thought proper to ignore it. The authorities might have known that altogether, irrespective of the discontent of the sepoys, means had been taken to sow disaffection throughout India, more especially throughout Bengal and its non-regulation provinces. These efforts originated in Oude, but a bad state of feeling existed in Mohammedan India for some years preparatory to such an attempt. When the war with Russia broke out, much excitement was created in the minds of the Mohammedan populations of all India, from Cabul to Calcutta and Cape Comorin. When the western allies insisted on reforms in Turkey, an opinion gained ground in India that the allies merely aided Turkey to betray her, and that by a treacherous alliance, the ascendancy of the religion of Mohammed, and of the grand Padisha, was destroyed. Thus the war in Turkey prepared the way for a Mahomedan struggle in India, in Persia, —everywhere. The peoples of these nations were excited by the events in Constantinople, which were told in innumerable tales of exaggeration all over Asia. And when to this excitement was added the persuasion that the time had arrived for a Mohammedan holy

war, the followers of the prophet became frantic with fanaticism. There was also a general feeling that the English sway would only last one hundred years in Bengal. In 1757 Clive completed its conquest; in 1857 it was believed that it would be restored to the followers of the true faith. The Mohammedans found no difficulty in inducing the Brahmins to join them against English power. It had for many years interfered with Brahminical rites and customs, such as suttee, thugism, infanticide, &c., as well as with the operation of Mohammedan law in some respects. A prophecy was circulated, which was to the effect that in 1857 the English would be destroyed. The government seems to have had no intelligence of this state of feeling, although evidence of it was abundant. Tokens of conspiracy and combination, for some purpose or purposes, were visible, but no steps were taken to unravel their meaning. Soon after the annexation of Oude, chappictees were sent all over eastern and north-eastern India, in a manner which excited great surprise, but no adequate means to penetrate the mystery were adopted. From some place, probably in Oude, six cakes of unleavened bread were sent to some other place, and were delivered to the head man of the village, or the chief religious authority of the place, with the intention to distribute them, and to invite each recipient of a cake to repeat the process, and so on. This proceeded until the chappictees were conveyed everywhere, with significant but enigmatical expressions, only to be comprehended by the faithful of either of the creeds allied for the destruction of the foreigner. The agents of this conspiracy corrupted the sepoys, whose minds were prepared by the causes already detailed. It was evident that some communications, secret from the government, were passing among the natives of India, which an active and intelligent government would have risked much to discover. Had the like occurred in the dominions of the Russian czar, the French emperor, or the Austrian kaiser, means would soon have been adopted to check the progress of the mysterious cakes, and find some clue to their meaning. The English government in India is as absolute as that of any of the despotisms named, but was not so vigilant or systematic, and its chief officers were not so responsible. The following very remarkable words were used by Mr. Disraeli, in a speech in the house of commons, made with the design of showing that the government of India had not proved itself vigilant or competent:—"Suppose the Emperor of Russia, whose territory, in extent and character, has more resemblance to our Eastern possessions than the territory of any other

power—suppose the Emperor of Russia were told—"Sire, there is a very remarkable circumstance going on in your territory; from village to village, men are passing who leave the tail of an ermine or a pot of caviare, with a message to some one to perform the same ceremony. Strange to say, this has been going on in some ten thousand villages, and we cannot make head or tail of it." I think the Emperor of Russia would say: "I do not know whether you can make head or tail of it, but I am quite certain there is something wrong, and that we must take some precautions; because, where the people are not usually indiscreet and troublesome, they do not make a secret communication unless it is opposed to the government. This is a secret communication, and, therefore, a communication dangerous to the government."

Many Irish and Scottish officers interpreted the cakes as a token to prepare for war, but they were bantered or laughed at. In olden Celtic times the clans of Scotland sent round signals of war in a similar way, and with the words often repeated in India when the cakes were left, "To be kept until called for." The very same language and the very same plan of procedure have been adopted in Ireland in the case of insurrection or agrarian disturbance in the memory of living men: "the holy straws" and "the holy turf," sent round during agitations of comparatively recent occurrence, exemplify this. Many in India who expressed a sense of insecurity were censured by their superiors, civil and religious, until men were too much discouraged to express their minds; a false security, having its birth in pride and arrogance of race, stultified the chief officials, and led them to "pooh-pooh" all efforts to call attention to the real condition of India. In England, among the chief persons in the houses of legislature, in the cabinet, and in a lesser degree among the directors of the East India Company, a similar state of mind existed. India was supposed to be completely at the feet of England, incapable of making a hostile effort. When tidings of the mutiny reached England, even at a later period than that of the disbanding of the 34th native infantry, and when at Meerut a far more serious revolt occurred, and even when Delhi was in arms, and the effete king used his property and influence against the company, the government, parliament, and to some extent the press, of England, refused to believe that the people of India had any sympathy with the revolt. It was supposed that they were too contented and happy under English rule to desire to escape from it. The rebellion in India was called "a mutiny," a "sepoy re-

volt," a "disturbance created by pampered sepoys, and some of the vagabond population of the cities;" but a great rebellion of native princes and peoples, over a large portion of India, as well as a revolt of the Bengal native army, few would allow it to be considered. Even when the native contingents in the service of certain allied or tributary princes deserted, and made war against the company, and when the whole people of the kingdom of Oude were in arms, officials and newspapers, and the people of England generally, persisted in regarding it as a sepoy revolt. There was an extraordinary disposition among men, both in India and in Great Britain, to shut their eyes to the real facts of the case.

Such was the state of affairs in the military condition of Bengal, and as to the state of mind in reference to it among the English in India and at home, when the next episode in the sad history of the revolt occurred. Before relating it, some account of the forces in India at that moment will be acceptable to the reader. In the chapter on the military affairs of the East India Company very full information is given concerning the numbers, equipments, and character of its army. Captain Rafter furnishes the following statement of the force when the revolt broke out:—

*Bengal presidency.*—Queen's troops: Two regiments of light cavalry, fifteen regiments of infantry, one battalion of 60th rifles. Company's regular troops: Three brigades of horse artillery, European and native, six battalions of European foot artillery, three battalions of native foot artillery, corps of royal engineers, ten regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European fusiliers, seventy-four regiments of native infantry, one regiment of sappers and miners. Irregular and contingent troops: Twenty-three regiments of irregular native cavalry, twelve regiments of irregular native infantry, one corps of guides, one regiment of camel corps, sixteen regiments of local militia, Shekhawuttie brigade, contingents of Gwalior, Joudpore, Malwa, Bhopal, and Kotah.

The European troops here mentioned in the company's regular army were those who were enlisted in England or elsewhere by the company's agents, quite irrespective of the royal or queen's army. The above forces, altogether, amounted to somewhat over 150,000.

*Madras presidency.*—Queen's troops: One regiment of light cavalry, five regiments of infantry. Company's regular troops: One brigade of horse artillery, European and native, four battalions of European foot artillery, one battalion of native foot artillery, corps of

royal engineers, eight regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European infantry, fifty-two regiments of native infantry.

No irregular or contingent troops appear in this entry.

*Bombay presidency.*—Queen's troops: One regiment of light cavalry, five regiments of infantry. Company's regular troops: One brigade of horse artillery, European and native, two battalions of European foot artillery, two battalions of native foot artillery, corps of royal engineers, three regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European infantry, twenty-nine regiments of native infantry. Irregular and contingent troops: Fifteen regiments of irregular native troops.

The European and native troops in the service of the company are not marked with sufficient distinctness by Captain Rafter.

"The European element in the armies has been regularly augmenting. In 1837 there were 28,000 European troops in India; in 1850 the number was 44,000, comprising 28,000 queen's troops, and 16,000 belonging to the company; while the new charter of 1854 allowed the company to raise 24,000, of whom 4000 were to be in training in England, and the rest on service in India. What was the number in 1857 becomes part of the history of the mutiny. In the whole Indian army, a year or two before this catastrophe, there were about 5000 European officers, governing the native as well as the European regiments; but of this number so many were absent on furlough or leave, so many more on staff appointments, and so many of the remainder in local corps and on civil duties, that there was an insufficiency of regimental control—leading, as some authorities think, in great part to the scenes of insubordination; for the native officers were regarded in a very subordinate light."

Such was the condition of the Anglo-Indian army when the suppression of revolt at Dum-Dum, Berhampore, and Barrackpore led the government to believe that India was safe from her own sepoys. It is the more surprising that the suppression of open revolt near Calcutta should have inspired such security, because all the while the government was receiving intelligence, and even official reports, of evidences of sedition among the troops of the distant garrisons. During the whole period from the revolt of the 19th to the disbanding of the 34th, incendiary fires occurred in the military cantonments of the Punjab occupied by Bengal troops; and in the Cis-Sutlej territories they were as open and daring as the conduct of the government was unaccountably inert and time-serving. It is impossible to acquit the government of

the charge of not having taken proper precautions on the ground of being unable to obtain information as to the state of feeling of the troops, or the cause of that state of feeling, after the perusal of the following report made by Captain Howard, magistrate of the Umballah cantonment, when, at the close of April, an appalling list of incendiary acts alarmed that officer, and caused him to address the government with marked earnestness on the subject:—"The emanating cause of the arson at this cantonment I conceive originated with regard to the newly introduced cartridges, to which the native sepoy shows his decided objection; it being obnoxious to him from a false idea—which, now that it has entered the mind of the sepoy, is difficult to eradicate—that the innovation of this cartridge is derogatory both to his caste and his religion. . . . That this has led to the fires at this cantonment, in my own private mind I am perfectly convinced. Were it the act of only one or two, or even a few persons, the well-disposed sepoys would at once have come forward and forthwith informed, but that there is an organised, leagued conspiracy existing, I feel confident. Though all and every individual composing a regiment may not form part of the combination, still I am of opinion that such a league in each corps is known to exist; and such being upheld by the majority, or rather connived at, therefore it is that no single man dared to come forward and expose it."

An investigation was instituted early in May as to whether any efforts were making to create sedition among the soldiery or people by native princes or ecclesiastics, or by foreign influence. The last source of evil influence was suspected, but could not be proved. The native press had been extremely anti-British and bigoted. Many of its conductors were notorious atheists, and these were amongst the most violent in calling upon the people to defend their religion. It was discovered that the largest influence in unsettling the minds of the people was that of wandering Brahmins and fakeers, both having united to stir up the people against English power. That most of the native princes and rich native landholders knew this, and sympathised with it, could not then be discovered, but was soon made plain by their appearing with arms in their hands wherever there was a chance of success. At all times the English had to contend in India with the use of the wandering and mendicant religious classes by disaffected or deposed princes, to stir up fanaticism against British authority. More than fifty years since, Sir John Malcolm described a state of things in his day identical

with that which, with larger influence and more decided energy, operated in 1857. Sir John then wrote:—"My attention has been during the last twenty-five years particularly directed to this dangerous species of secret war against our authority, which is always carrying on by numerous though unseen hands. The spirit is kept up by letters, by exaggerated reports, and by pretended prophecies. When the time appears favourable, from the occurrence of misfortune to our arms, from rebellion in our provinces, or from mutiny in our troops, circular-letters and proclamations are dispersed over the country with a celerity almost incredible. Such documents are read with avidity. The contents in most cases are the same. The English are depicted as usurpers of low caste, and as tyrants who have sought India with no other view but that of degrading the inhabitants and of robbing them of their wealth, while they seek to subvert their usages and their religion. The native soldiery are always appealed to, and the advice to them is, in all instances I have met with, the same—'Your European tyrants are few in number—kill them!'"

That the native princes and landholders throughout the Bengal provinces and Central India were in concert with the religious incendiaries of 1857, many documents showed, when, during the conflict, such papers fell into the hands of the conquerors; among these, none was so remarkable as that which was addressed to the Rajah of Nepaul by the King of Oude while the insurrection was raging. Jung Bahadoor showed the letter to the British resident, to whom also he furnished a copy of his reply. Lord Canning expressed to the maharajah his cordial thanks for the proof of his loyalty and good faith thus evinced.

*Abstract translation of a letter from Ramzan Alee Khan Mirza Birjees Kudder Bahadoor to his highness the Maharajah of Nepaul, dated 7th of Jeth Sumvat, 1915, corresponding with 19th May, 1858.*

After compliments—It is known to every one that my ancestors brought the British into Hindostan, but Bulvunt Sing, the Rajah of Benares, was a cause of much annoyance to them, and therefore the province of Benares was given to them. A treaty was then signed by the British, in which they wrote that they would never act treacherously as long as the sun and moon should exist. But they have broken that treaty; and, dethroning my father, Wajid Alee Shah, have sequestered his state palaces, and everything he had. Every one is acquainted with this event as it took place only in Sumvat, 1912.

After taking Lucknow they intended to make war with you, for which purpose they collected a large force and magazine at Colonelgunj, which is situated below the Hills; perhaps you are aware of this event.

In former years great intimacy existed between our houses, inasmuch that your forefathers built a bungalow

for my ancestors, for shooting and hunting purposes, in Bootwal.

The British some time ago attempted to interfere with the faith of both the Hindoos and Mohammedans, by preparing cartridges with cows' grease for the Hindoo, and that of pigs for the Mohammedans, and ordering them to bite them with their teeth. The sepoy refused, and were ordered by the British to be blown away from guns on the parade ground. This is the cause of the war breaking out, and probably you are acquainted with it.

But I am ignorant as to how they managed to get your troops, which they brought here, and began to commit every sort of violence, and to pull down temples, mosques, imambaras, and the sacred places.

You are well aware of the treachery of the British, and it is proper you should preserve the standard of religion, and make the tree of friendship between you and me fresh.

*Translation of a letter from his excellency the maharajah Jung Bahadoor to Birjees Kudder Bahadoor, of Lucknow.*

Your letter of the 7th, Jeth Soode, Wednesday, corresponding to the 19th of May, 1858, to the address of his highness the maharajah of Nepaul, and that of 13th Jeth Vudee of the present year, Tuesday, corresponding to the 11th May, 1858, to my address, have reached their respective destinations, and their contents are fully understood. In it is written that the British are bent on the destruction of the society, religion, and faith of both Hindoos and Mohammedans.

Be it known that for upwards of a century the British have reigned in Hindostan, but up to the present moment neither the Hindoos nor the Mohammedans have ever complained that their religion has been interfered with.

As the Hindoos and Mohammedans have been guilty of ingratitude and perfidy, neither the Nepaul government nor I can side with them.

Since the star of faith and integrity, sincerity in words, as well as in acts, and the wisdom and comprehension of the British, are shining as bright as the sun in every

quarter of the globe, be assured that my government will never disunite itself from the friendship of the exalted British government, or to be instigated to join with any monarch against it, be he as high as heaven; what grounds can we have for connecting ourselves with the Hindoos and Mohammedans of Hindostan?

Be it also known, that had I in any way been inclined to cultivate the friendship and intimacy of the Hindoo and Mohammedan tribes, should I have massacred five or six thousand of them in my way to Lucknow?

Now, as you have sent me a friendly letter, let me persuade you, that if any person, Hindoo or Mohammedan, who has not murdered a British lady or child, goes immediately to Mr. Montgomery, the chief commissioner of Lucknow, and surrender his arms, and make submission, he will be permitted to retain his honour, and his crime will be pardoned.

If you still be inclined to make war on the British, no rajah or king in the world will give you an asylum, and death will be the end of it.

I have written whatever has come into my plain mind, and it will be proper and better for you to act in accordance with what I have said.

When General Anson, the commander-in-chief of the forces in India, heard of the state of excitement in which the Bengal troops in the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej territories, more especially the former, had continued, and the alarming fires which had spread around the cantonments, he hastened to Umballah, and issued an order of the day, intended to appease the discontent of the soldiery, but its effect was to encourage them to feel their importance, and believe that the government of India was afraid of them. The decisive step on the part of the sepoy, that which set all the Bengal provinces in a flame of revolt, was the mutiny at Meerut.

## CHAPTER CXXVIII.

REVOLT OF THE SEPOYS AT MEERUT—MASSACRE OF OFFICERS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN—  
FLIGHT OF THE MUTINEERS TO DELHI—REVOLT OF THE GARRISON THERE, AND INSURRECTION OF THE PEOPLE—MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT PREPARATORY TO AN  
ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FORCES UPON DELHI.

DURING the latter weeks of April the sepoy at Meerut showed much excitement, and incendiary fires, such as have been noticed in the last chapter as occurring elsewhere, were frequent; no room was left for doubt that they were the work of the soldiery. It so happened that the European force at that station was very powerful in proportion to the native troops. This was the more remarkable as at most of the stations in the Bengal provinces there were scarcely any European soldiers. The English regiments were chiefly in the Punjaub upon the Affghan frontier, and in a few other places, where, as in Meerut, they were in comparatively considerable number. This arrangement was

singularly inappropriate to the normal condition of India, as well as to its especial requirements at that time. The Punjaub and Pegu were supposed, as newly annexed provinces, to require European garrisons; yet Oude, the most recently annexed, the annexation of which excited so much ill-will amongst the natives not only of Oude itself, but of all Bengal and of the Bengal sepoy, was guarded chiefly by troops discontented by the annexation. At Meerut the English force consisted of the 6th dragoon guards (carbineers), 600 strong. These troopers were only in part provided with horses, and these were of a very inferior description; a battalion of the 60th rifle regiment, 1000 strong; a troop of

horse artillery, and 500 artillery recruits; the whole numbering about 2200, exclusive of staff officers, and the officers and other Europeans connected with the sepoy regiments. The force of natives, which only outnumbered the Europeans by a few hundreds, consisted of the 3rd Bengal cavalry, and the 11th and 20th Bengal infantry.

Under such circumstances no apprehension of revolt was entertained, and it is nearly certain that none would have taken place had the sepoys been engaged in a dynastic or political conspiracy merely, or were they discontented about batta, severity of discipline, or any of the ordinary causes of complaint with Indian soldiers. The conviction had seized their minds, beyond all hope of eradication, that the cartridges were ceremonially unclean to both Hindoo and Mussulmans. Some of them undoubtedly were; the general suspicion rested upon a partial fact, sufficient to justify resistance. The prejudices of the sepoy and the good faith of the government had not been kept in view by the officials charged with the duty of preparing the ammunition; and when the sepoy discovered that in any instance he had been trifled with on the all-important subject of religion, his faith was gone for ever. Had not this been the reality of the case the native soldiers would not, as in many cases, have precipitated themselves upon certain death as the alternative of using the hated cartridge. It has been alleged that the plea of caste must have been only a pretence, as the same cartridges were used against the English, which they refused to use in their service. Those who use this argument overlook the casuistry which in false religions justifies to the consciences of their professors the most contradictory conduct. In using the cartridges against the English the end sanctified the deed in the opinion of those men; and many, believing that they had already lost caste, in sheer despair and vengeance resorted to them.

On the 23rd of April it was determined by the English officers at Meerut to put an end to all uncertainty by testing the spirit of the sepoys. Colonel Smyth, of the 3rd Bengal native cavalry, ordered out a portion of his regiment for parade on that day, to teach them the mode of loading adopted under general orders in deference to the prejudices of the troops against biting cartridges which might be glazed with forbidden substances. The previous evening he instructed the havildar-major and his orderly in the new system, and the latter having fired off a carbine, the colonel believed that the regiment would entertain no objection upon the following morning. That night, however, the

orderly's tent was set on fire, and also a veterinary hospital close to a magazine. These circumstances caused uneasiness as to the issue of the next day's experiment. When that day arrived, the appointed parade was held, and the havildar-major fired off a carbine without biting the cartridge. The men refused to receive the cartridges. It was pointed out to them that they were not new cartridges, but the old ones, to which they had been accustomed; still they refused. This was a new phase of the spirit of mutiny, more dangerous than had been displayed elsewhere, for if the troopers would neither use cartridges new nor old, upon a plan which did not require them to be pressed with the teeth, how was it possible for them to serve as soldiers? On the 25th an investigation took place before the deputy judge-advocate, and the men admitted that there was no evidence of any impure substance being in the cartridges, but they were told that they were unclean, and they believed their informants, and refused to accept the declarations of their officers. The judge assured them that the cartridges were such as had always been in use, and his assurances appeared to satisfy their scruples, for they expressed contrition, and promised to use the cartridges whenever called upon.

On the 6th of May the general in command of the station, Major-general Hewitt, deemed it necessary to prove the sincerity of the men. He ordered a parade for the 6th of May. On the 5th cartridges were distributed; eighty-five of the sowars, as the native cavalry of Bengal are called, refused to receive them. The general ordered their arrest. They were tried by court-martial, found guilty of mutiny, and sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for different periods varying from six to ten years. In presence of the whole of the troops in cantonment, they were stripped of their uniforms, ironed, and marched away to the common jail two miles distant, in the village of Meerut. The native troops looked on in silence upon these proceedings, but with scowling countenances.

Then began a series of blunders on the part of the chief military authorities, but for which the terrible results which followed could not have happened. The convicted "sowars" were handed over to the civil authorities, and guarded only by police. This would of course have been quite proper under ordinary circumstances, but the occasion demanded peculiar precautions. These events occurred on the 9th of May. When the native soldiers were dismissed from parade, they went to their lines in a state of

intense excitement and resentment. The punishment inflicted on them had deprived the sufferers of caste,—they were manacled as felons, and degraded. Measures were instantly taken by the whole native force to mutiny; their plans were well laid, and were executed with fatal facility. Notwithstanding the menacing behaviour of the men as they left the parade ground, the general took no precautions against outbreak, not even to have their conduct kept under observation. The regimental officers were as incautious as the staff. They retired to their bungalows in different directions near the lines. The native officers alone held intercourse with the men, and they also were disaffected. It is probable that the mutineers opened communications immediately with the native troops in Delhi, inciting them to revolt, and informing them of their own intention to march thither when they had executed the work of vengeance at Meerut.

On Sunday, the 10th of May, between five and six o'clock in the evening, when the European portion of the garrison were proceeding to church, or preparing to do so, open revolt began. In choosing the hour of religious service, the mutineers selected a time when the chance of resistance to themselves, or escape by their intended victims, was less than at any other time, even than at night, when sentinels might give alarm, and persons would in its silence be more likely to catch the first sounds of the movement. Throughout the day indications of great restlessness were shown by the sepoys; it was noticed by the Europeans, even by ladies and children, but no precautions were taken; the officers remained confident in their comparatively strong force of Europeans, and boldly careless of what the sepoys thought or did. It was strange that he upon whom the chief responsibility devolved should not have proved more vigilant than others.

Suddenly the native troops turned out and set fire to their cantonments, attacking first the bungalow of Mr. Greathead, the civil commissioner, who and whose lady, by concealing themselves upon the roof, found means to elude their pursuers, and ultimately escape. As soon as the disturbance burst forth, Colonel Finnis, of the 11th native infantry, rode to meet his men, and recall them to a sense of their duty. He was shot down. He was the first who fell in resisting the great sepoy revolt—the first murdered Englishman of the many who thus perished. Various officers were shot as they attempted to curb the violence of their men; officers, ladies, and even children were shot or bayoneted as they returned from worship. While the

infantry were engaged in firing the cantonments, the 3rd cavalry hastened to the jail, where they were joined by the police, and released the eighty-five sowars, and with them one thousand two hundred criminals, the vilest refuse of a truculent and dishonest population. Troopers, police, and convicts, all fraternised, and hastening to the lines, joined the revolted infantry in the work of destruction; the villagers of Meerut, and the populace generally, abetted the work. Then commenced the worst horrors of the occasion. Deeds of infamy were perpetrated too vile to describe; the victims of assassination were hacked with swords, perforated with bayonets, or riddled with balls; every indignity was offered to the dead, every cruelty to the dying. To particularise instances of suffering on the part of Europeans, and deeds of desperate atrocity on the part of the revolted, would be impossible within the limits of any work not exclusively devoted to a history of the mutiny. During two hours this havoc raged, and throughout that time no opposition was offered by the European portion of the troops. The general seems to have been paralysed by surprise; for until the work of destruction and massacre was accomplished, the European troops did not arrive in the cantonments of the sepoys. The rifles did arrive in time to open a fire upon the retreating enemy, who returned it; a few sepoys fell under the shots of the rifles. The carbincers were sent several miles on a wrong road; went astray; came back when it was too dark to see what was to be done, or how to do it. A civilian might well suppose that troops quartered a couple of miles from other troops of the same army would know the way to their lines. The sepoys marched to Delhi. The road was good, the moon soon rose; but no pursuit was instituted. The general pleaded, in excuse for this omission, that it was necessary to protect the European cantonments from the vagabonds who had escaped from prison. There were men enough for both objects; a few hundred infantry would have kept off the marauders, while the carbineers, rifles, and horse artillery might have pursued the fugitives. Some of the carbineers only had lances; these did follow a few miles on the Delhi road, and cut down some stragglers. The open mutiny of the Bengal army began with a great success. The mutineers burned down a camp, and murdered officers, ladies, and children, literally in the presence of a superior force of European soldiers. When tidings of the scandalous incompetency which marked the management of the whole transaction reached Calcutta and London, the council and the cabinet, the Europeans of the

Indian capital and the people of England were indignant and astonished. The governor-general of India seems to have thought that his first duty was conciliation. He put forth a proclamation, in which the reader will see that all was done in the way of reconciliation that could be done after the revolt at Meerut. Whatever were the errors there—whatever the want of vigour at Calcutta, the following proclamation shows that his excellency did not evince a vindictive spirit, but one of great forbearance and clemency.

*Caste Proclamation.*

Fort William, Home Department.  
May 16, 1857.

The governor-general of India in council has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the government of India are malicious falsehoods.

The governor-general in council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but among other classes of the people.

He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussulmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened, secretly as well as openly, by the acts of government, and that the government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own.

Some have been already deceived and led astray by these tales.

Once more, then, the governor-general in council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.

The government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The governor-general in council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been, or will be, done by the government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people.

The government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the governor-general in council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies.

This notice is addressed to those who hitherto, by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct, have shown their attachment to the government and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice.

The governor-general in council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors, who would lead them into danger and disgrace.

By order of the governor-general of India in council,

CECIL BEADON,

*Secretary to the government of India.*

After the terrible havoc at Meerut, the first idea of the general of the cantonments was to march at once and attack Delhi, but news arrived thence that the whole city was in arms, that the garrison had revolted, placed the king at the head of the insurrection, and that armed men in numbers had flocked at once to his standard from the surrounding country. Efforts to obtain advice or aid from the commander-in-chief had been unavailing. Notwithstanding the disorderly state of the Ben-

gal army for so long a time, his excellency had gone on a shooting party in the Himalayas, and could not be found: he was at last heard of at Umballah. No adequate means of obtaining information of what was passing in and around Delhi were put forth—time was lost, the commander-in-chief was dilatory, the counsels of Calcutta were confused. There were no proper means for moving an army, there was no commissariat, there were no camels, no elephants, no draught horses, not horses sufficient for the European cavalry; there were no depots of provisions for troops in the field, no medicine chests. The commander-in-chief was as helpless as if he had been suddenly set down in the middle of Africa. He had been appointed to his high office, not for his fitness, but on account of his connexions. He was old, took no thought of the state of India, was not a man capable, intellectually, of comprehending a large subject; physically, he was ill and enervated, utterly unfit for any command whatever. He lingered, unable to do anything, although his courage, which was well known, urged him to advance, and he desired to do so without guns or provisions; but so disorderly and distracted was the whole commissariat system, that he was unable to march at all. He remained at Kurnaul until the 27th of May, when he died of cholera.

During all that period the rebels and mutineers were strengthening themselves at Delhi, having first massacred every man, woman, and child upon whom they could lay their hands. News of these terrible excesses, and of the formidable preparations for resistance made in Delhi, continued to arrive at Meerut, Agra, and Calcutta during the period of inactivity. From day to day tidings more and more dark and sanguinary reached Meerut and Agra, borne by fugitives who had escaped the slaughter, and wandered wounded and exhausted, hiding in the jungle by day, and travelling through by-ways at night. Very little information could be gained from the natives, who were in league with the mutineers, and the whole police of the province went over to them. Delhi, and the province of which it was the capital, were in revolution, and the descendant of the Moguls, bearing the title of King of Delhi—a pensioner of the English government—had been proclaimed king, emperor, and padishaw. At Meerut, executions took place, by hanging or blowing away from guns, of the miscreants who had perpetrated outrages at that station. A few of the fugitive sepoys, who had dropped behind wounded on the night of the 10th of May, were found in the neighbourhood, convicted, and executed.

On the 11th of May, Mr. Colvin, the lieu-

tenant-governor of the upper provinces of Bengal, received at the capital of these provinces, Agra, correct intelligence of the events which had taken place at Meerut. He immediately telegraphed to Calcutta. On the 12th the lieutenant-governor sent a telegram announcing that emissaries from Delhi were passing to the other stations to excite revolt. On the 13th he used the telegraph to inform the government that all passengers between Meerut and Agra were molested and robbed by the inhabitants, and recommended that the troops employed in Persia should be sent up the country to Agra. Mr. Colvin was obliged to collect information without any assistance from the general at Meerut during the first three days after the mutiny. On the 14th Mr. Colvin sent a telegram to the governor-general that he had received a letter from the King of Delhi, informing him that the mutineers had taken possession of his person, court, and palace; that he had received news of a probability of revolt at Muttra, the sepoy having been persuaded that the government had mixed ground bones with their flour; and that Scindiah had offered the services of a battery and of his body-guard. The communication of the lieutenant-governor contained intelligence of the murder of the English commissioner, and of Miss Jennings and Mr. Cohen. In this telegram, Mr. Colvin, notwithstanding his former appeal for the help of the army of Persia, stated that he had no need of troops. The next day he sent a telegram to Lord Canning, announcing the slaughter of thirty persons at Delhi, the proclamation of the heir-apparent as king, the plunder of the Delhi treasury, containing half a million sterling, the loyalty of Bhurtpore and Gwalior, the satisfactory condition of affairs at Agra,—and the lieutenant-governor's conviction that proclamations and assurances from the governor-general and himself would prevent the extension of the mutiny! The conduct of Lord Canning and his council was supine, and the assurances of Mr. Colvin rendered it more so than it otherwise would have been. Lord Elphinstone informed his lordship, from Bombay, that he had means of at once communicating to London the state of affairs. It had been well if the governor of Bombay had done so on his own responsibility. Lord Canning saw no occasion for any unusual effort to send home any communication. On the 19th of May he wrote to the directors, at which date he had information from Lucknow of the threatening aspect of affairs there. The despatch to the company showed that the governor-general had no real appreciation of the state of India, or of what was requisite for the suppression of sedition. It seems utterly

incredible that any educated man in the position of Lord Canning should have sent home so ordinary a despatch in a crisis so terrible, after the destruction of the cantonments of Meerut, the massacres there and at Delhi, and while the capital of Hindostan, with its treasures and munitions of war, was in the hands of a rebel people and a revolted army.

"The necessity for an increase of the substantial strength of the army on the Bengal establishment, that is to say, of the European troops on this establishment, has been long apparent to us; but the necessity of refraining from any material increase to the charges of the military department, in the present state of our finances, has prevented us hitherto from moving your honourable court in this matter. The late untoward occurrences at Berhampore, Fort William, Barrackpore, and Lucknow, crowned by the shocking and alarming events of the past week at Meerut and Delhi, and taken in connection with the knowledge we have lately acquired of the dangerous state of feeling in the Bengal native army generally, strange, and, at present, unaccountable as it is, have convinced us of the urgent necessity of not merely a positive increase of our European strength, but of a material increase in the proportion which our European troops bear to the native regular troops on the establishment. We are of opinion that the latter is now the more pressing necessity of the two.

"We believe that all these objects, political, military, and financial, will be immediately attained in a very material degree by taking advantage of the present opportunity in the manner we have now the honour respectfully to propose; and we see no other way in which all the same objects can be attained in any degree, now or prospectively. We recommend that the six native regiments, which are in effect no longer in existence, should not be replaced, whereby the establishment of regular native infantry would be reduced to sixty-eight regiments; and that the European officers of these late regiments should be used to officer three regiments of Europeans to be added to your establishment at this presidency.

"We confidently affirm that the government will be much stronger, in respect of all important internal and external purposes, with three additional European regiments of the established strength, than it would be by embodying six native regiments of the established strength; and we anticipate no inconvenience in respect of minor objects, in time of peace and tranquillity, from the consequent numerical reduction of regular troops. Indeed, the financial result of the measure, if carried out as we propose, will leave a con-

siderable surplus available, if it should be thought fit so to employ it, for an augmentation of irregulars, who, for all such minor objects, are much better, as well as much cheaper, than regulars of any description."

The policy of the government at Calcutta was adopted in London. The "outbreak" was treated by the board of control as of no great consequence, in fact, as a means of effecting a pecuniary saving in the military department. The more experienced members of the India-house knew better, but their opinions were overruled by official personages, and Mr. Mangles "ran a race" with Mr. Vernon Smith in confidential assurances to parliament and the public that the thing was of no moment at all. Lord Palmerston seems to have taken up the views communicated to him by the president of the board of control and the chairman of the court of directors; but the more sage men in Leadenhall Street shook their heads and uttered words, few but ominous, which found their way into society, and caused uneasiness among the English public. The London press generally, especially the *Times* newspaper, treated the matter in the light Lord Canning placed it. The *Sunday Times*, the *Morning Advertiser*, and a few other journals sounded alarm, and so far influenced public opinion as to prevent the government from altogether ignoring the idea of danger.

At Calcutta Lord Canning concealed the information which he received from Agra and other quarters from the European public. Whatever was gleaned by it was from the native merchants, who were early informed of everything, and informed their European friends that the statements of the government press were efforts official and semi-official to conceal disaster and massacre. The Europeans at Calcutta and the independent press became hostile to Lord Canning and his policy of concealment, and of taking things easy, and from that moment his lordship became the enemy of a free press. When Lord Canning wrote the despatch last quoted, there was not a single European soldier, except the officers attached to the native regiments, at Cawnpore or Allahabad; and the same state of things existed at a great number of inferior stations. When the mutineers marched from Meerut to Delhi, there was not a European soldier there, although it contained the chief treasures and munitions of war for northern India. On the 18th of May, the day before Lord Canning wrote, the general at Meerut reported that the reinforcements for an advance upon Delhi were unable to move for want of carriage. Benares, the great native capital of Bengal, had no fortifications, and no cannon except "half a

bullock battery." Barrackpore had no artillerymen, and but six guns, to man which sailors had been sent from Calcutta. Matters continued to remain in this state for a long time, from the incompetency of those in high office, and the confusion which prevailed in the direction and arrangement of the army *matériel*. On the 16th of May, three days before Lord Canning's despatch, Sir Henry Lawrence telegraphed from Lucknow—"All is quiet here, but affairs are critical; get every European you can from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere; also, all the Goorkhas from the hills; time is everything." Lord Canning, to his credit, acted upon the advice of Mr. Colvin concerning the troops in the Persian Gulf, and that given by Sir Henry Lawrence was also followed. Lord Elphinstone offered aid from Bombay on the 17th, which was accepted. At the same date Sir John Lawrence suggested that he could raise five thousand from the police and guides in the Punjab, to be followed by one thousand more: this proposal was accepted. From every quarter offers of timely aid and wise counsel were given to the governor-general, all of which he accepted, on the grounds upon which they were offered—the imminence of the danger and seriousness of the crisis. Yet, *after all*, he wrote a despatch to the directors underrating the danger, suppressing the worst features of the revolt, and suggesting weak palliatives!

When his lordship recommended a few European regiments, on a plan of cheap substitution for the usual forces, there were at Calcutta, at Barrackpore, and Dum-Dum, in its neighbourhood, at Dinapore, and in all Bengal, from Fort William to Agra, not three thousand European soldiers! The following statement of forces, native and European, appeared in an official source of information:—"At the outbreak of the mutiny there were in Calcutta, and the adjoining stations of Dum-Dum and Barrackpore, two regiments of European infantry, the 53rd and 84th, mustering about 1,700 effective men. These, with the 10th at Dinapore and a company of artillery at Fort William, comprised the whole English force between the capital and Agra, nine hundred miles distant. The native corps consisted of the 2nd grenadiers, 43rd and 70th native infantry, the Calcutta militia, and the remnant of the 34th, in all 4,000 men, stationed within the limits of the presidency division. At Berhampore there was the 63rd native infantry; at Dinapore, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, together with a regiment of irregular cavalry. Benares was occupied by the 37th and the Loodianah regiment of Sikhs. The 6th were at Allahabad; the 65th at Ghazepore; the 2nd cavalry, 1st and 53rd

native infantry, at Cawnpore. The total available force of Europeans throughout this great extent of country was not more than 2,500, against 14,000 native troops. A thousand English volunteer infantry, 400 cavalry, and 1,500 sailors, were at the disposal of government a week after the revolt became known."

In reference to the volunteers, the editor of the *Friend of India* observed:—"It only needed the utterance of a few words of ordinary sympathy and encouragement to draw out the entire available European population: no great price to pay for such service as they were able and willing to perform; but small as was the estimated cost, Lord Canning grudged it. It was not until the 12th of June that he consented to the enrolment of a volunteer corps; and only then after much misgiving as to the propriety of showing special favour to any particular class of the population. The use that might have been made of such auxiliaries was pointed out at the time with sufficient clearness; but at this moment we can see that it would have been literally invaluable." As troops arrived from the sister presidencies, from the outlying provinces on the Bay of Bengal, &c., there was no proper provision made for them. They suffered hunger and thirst, inconvenience the most oppressive from unsuitable clothing, improper and even unhealthy quarters, and contemptuous neglect. Instead of assembling the troops, as Clive, Hastings, Wellesley, or Napier would have done, addressing to them words of encouragement, and showing them how their courage and constancy were the hope of England, they were sent up the country without notice, or any stimulus or hope, save what rested in their own brave hearts and noble sense of duty. Never were British soldiers treated more contumeliously, accustomed as they are to such treatment from men of rank, than the heroes who landed at Calcutta for the salvation of India were by Lord Canning and the members of his government. The author of *Young America Abroad*, who was in Calcutta when Lord Canning arrived there, was justified in the severe comments he made upon the cold, haughty, and insolently imperious bearing which he attributed to him. The sneer of Jung Bahadoor of Nepaul, when subsequent blunders provoked it, was well earned already, "How do the English hope to keep India with such rulers?"

#### DELHI MUTINY AND MASSACRE.

Having shown how the events of Meerut were regarded by the government of India, it is desirable to leave it in the midst of its preparations to avenge the disaster, and to

return to the mutineers. In fourteen hours the rebel force reached Delhi, the gates of which were opened to them by their comrades. On the road they met several Europeans travelling by "dâk," who were murdered. On entering, the work of slaughter began: the 3rd cavalry rode about through the city searching for British officers, into whose faces they discharged their pistols. The other mutineers, joined by the Delhi garrison, were less discriminate, revelling in promiscuous slaughter. The 3rd cavalry entertained a peculiar vengeance against the European officers, because of the court-martial at Meerut. It must not be supposed that the officer in command at Delhi, Brigadier Graves, had taken no precautions. He had received information of the events at Meerut before the arrival of the mutineers at the gates of Delhi. He paraded his men, and appealed to their loyalty; they responded with cheers, but all the while had resolved to betray and murder him. The regiments which composed the garrison were the 38th, 54th, and 74th infantry of the Bengal army, and a battery of Bengal artillery, manned by natives. There were besides many native artillerymen to serve the guns of position in the city, especially at the magazine and arsenal. The 54th and 74th had shown no disposition to revolt; the 38th was a notoriously insolent and stubborn corps since 1852, when it succeeded in resisting the authority of Lord Dalhousie when he ordered it to Pegu. The whole force occupied cantonments two miles north of the city. Critics have given the opinion that had these troops been marched out against the mutineers when tidings of the mutiny arrived, and had the Meerut European force pursued, that the former would have remained loyal, and the revolters have been killed, captured, or dispersed. Brigadier Graves resolved upon a defensive policy, and selected the Flagstaff tower as a refuge for the women and children. That building was circular in form, built of brick burnt in the sun, and strong; it was situated on the heights near the cantonments, about a mile and a half north of the Cashmere gate of the city, which was the nearest to it. The resources of Delhi, in ammunition and material of war, were enormous, and had five hundred men remained faithful, including a proportion of artillery, the city might have been defended against twice the number of the Meerut mutineers.

The events which transpired within the city on the arrival of the Meerut battalions have never appeared in a connected form, and never can be presented in consecutive order, so terrible was the massacre, and so little did those who escaped know of anything which

did not appear before their own eyes. Major Abbot was the senior officer among those who escaped to Meerut, and his account of what occurred was substantially as follows:—He described a few troopers of the 3rd as having first entered by the bridge of boats. Colonel Ripley of the 54th confronted them with a wing of his regiment, but the men refused to fire, alleging that their muskets were not loaded. The guard of the 38th also declared that they had no ammunition. Scarcely had the mutineers made good their entrance, when the troops of the Delhi garrison turned upon their officers; six officers of the 54th immediately fell under the bullets and bayonets of their own men—Colonel Ripley, Captains Smith and Burrows, Lieutenants Edwards, Waterhill, and Butler. Major Abbot addressed the men of the 74th, telling them that the time had arrived to prove their fidelity to him, and calling upon volunteers to follow him to the Cashmere gate, he marched forth attended by a considerable number. On arriving at the gate the men took possession, and seemed disposed to resist any attack. They remained in this state until three o'clock, when they were startled by a heavy firing of guns, followed by a terrific explosion. Lieutenant Willoughby had fired the magazine, to prevent its stores from falling into the hands of the rebels. There were two magazines at Delhi, one at the cantonments to supply the troops there quartered, and one in the city which was the depot of ammunition for northern India. It was situated between the Selingush Fort and the Cashmere gate, so that the explosion shook the earth under the feet of Major Abbot's party. The magazine contained 300 guns and mortars, 20,000 stand of small arms, 200,000 shot and shell, and large stores of *matériel* of war corresponding with such munitions. When the explosion of the vast mass of powder and shot and shell took place, the men at the Cashmere gate became intensely excited, and showed symptoms of sympathy with their co-religionists, whom they supposed engaged in a fierce and dangerous struggle, the nature of which they could not at the moment comprehend. The native officers stepped forward and advised the major to fly from the city. Shots were whizzing around him, and piercing cries broke upon his ear, the soldiers of the 38th were shooting their officers. Major Abbot begged his men to follow him to attempt their rescue, but they replied, "It is of no use, they are all killed now, we can save no one; we have saved you and are happy, you shall not perish." The men formed a circle around him, and hurried him away towards the cantonments. At that moment several

carriages drove up on the road to Kurnaul; the major inquired who they were. The men replied, "They are our officers flying for their lives; follow their example, we can protect you or them only for a little longer—fly!" Major Abbot asked them for the colours, which they gave him, and placing him and Captain Hawkey on one horse, they followed the carriages and escaped. The major's first impulse was, with the captain, to stay and endeavour to the last to check the mutiny, but his regiment declared, "You can do nothing, you can save no one; it is time to fly!" and they urged him forward with every demonstration of affectionate interest in his safety. Those portions of the 74th with which the major was not present, mutinied when the magazine blew up, and shot some of their officers. In this way Captain Gordon and Lieutenant Revley fell, Ensign Elton, Captain Tytler, Captain Nicoll, Captain Wallace, Lieutenant Aislabie, and Farrier-sergeant Law made their escape through extraordinary dangers, and arrived at Meerut after thirty-six hours of perilous wandering. Major Abbot attributed the insurrection to the King of Delhi and his family. His opinion is of importance from his knowledge of the proceedings of the court, and the judgment he displayed in his efforts to check the progress of the mutiny. He thus wrote upon the subject in his report to the government, as the senior surviving officer of the garrison:—"The insurrection was organised and matured in the palace of the King of Delhi with his full knowledge and sanction, in the mad attempt to establish himself in the sovereignty of this country. It is well known that he has called on the neighbouring states to co-operate with him in thus trying to subvert the existing government. The method he adopted appears to have been to gain the sympathy of the 38th light infantry, by spreading the lying reports now going through the country, of the government having it in contemplation to upset their religion and have them all forcibly inducted to Christianity. The 38th, by insidious and false arguments, quietly gained over the 54th and 74th native infantry, each being unacquainted with the other's real sentiments. I am perfectly persuaded that the 54th and 74th were forced to join the combination by threats that the 38th and 54th would annihilate the 74th if they refused; or, *vice versâ*, that the 38th and 74th would annihilate the 54th. I am almost convinced that had the 38th not been on guard at the Cashmere gate, the results would have been very different; the men of the 74th would have shot down every man who had the temerity to assail the post."

While Major Abbot was so gallantly preserving the loyalty of a portion of his regiment, and with them using his best efforts to check the progress of the insurgents, other events were taking place elsewhere, as at the magazine, to which reference has already been made. The palace of the king was, however, the great centre of action. A portion of the 3rd cavalry from Meerut proceeded thither, while the others were galloping about to shoot the officers of the garrison. When they arrived at the palace, they were received by the king and his court as friends and subjects. Had he ordered the gates to be shut, and made his palace the sanctuary of such English as were within it, or might have found their way thither, the insurrection would have been suppressed, or at all events the lives of the English seeking asylum within the walls of the building would have been safe. No mutineers would have dared to violate that sanctuary; every true Mussulman would have defended the person and palace of the king, and all within it at his orders. The excuses made by him of being under constraint were not only not accordant with facts, but were absurd. When Mr. Fraser, the British commissioner, perceived the approach of the mutineers, he, with his assistant, Captain Douglas, hastened to the palace that he might observe the conduct of the king at a moment that would test his loyalty. Mr. Fraser and the captain were attended by several other persons. The moment they entered the palatial precincts they were shot. Soon after, the Rev. Mr. Jennings, the chaplain, was murdered; his daughter and another lady shared his fate, after having been treated with every indignity which a Mohammedan would consider the worst and vilest his own wife or daughter could suffer. Several Europeans who hid in the palace gardens were

found tied to trees, and shot or sabred. All the robbers of the neighbourhood were encouraged by the mutineers, as at Meerut, to help themselves. The banks and rich shops were plundered; women were treated with indignity, and tortured to death or hacked to pieces; babies were lifted up and ripped open or hewn by the ferocious troopers in the presence of their parents. The cruelties to women and children were generally inflicted in the presence of husbands and fathers, who were then put to death. No mercy was shown; the troopers pointing to the marks of the irons on their wrists, which had been caused by their punishment at Meerut, thus justified their murder of women and babies. Numbers of European traders, civilians, clerks, half-caste natives, and any natives supposed to be Christians, were butchered. To possess European blood, or be suspected of being a Christian, was sufficient cause for a merciless death to be inflicted.

While these events transpired at the palace and in the streets, the magazine was the scene of an heroic defence, as recorded while noticing the conduct of the 74th at the Cashmere gate. Lieutenant Willoughby, in order to prevent the sepoys from possessing themselves of the military stores and ammunition, blew up a large portion of the magazine, and escaped to Meerut, where he died of his wounds. The success of the mutineers was complete. All the Europeans in Delhi at the beginning of the revolt were slain or fugitives. What happened within the city before the siege cannot be related upon European testimony. The king and the heir-apparent assumed regal power and dignity. The British treasury, of more than half a million sterling, was guarded by the king's relatives for his own use, the city acknowledged his government, and the Mussulmans everywhere proclaimed the Delhi Raj.

## CHAPTER CXXIX.

MUTINY AT BENARES—ITS SUPPRESSION BY COLONEL NEILL—MUTINY AT ALLAHABAD, ALSO SUPPRESSED BY COLONEL NEILL—MUTINY AT CAWNPORE—TREACHERY OF NANA SAHIB—GALLANT DEFENCE BY GENERAL WHEELER—CAPITULATION OF THE BRITISH, AND THEIR MASSACRE—MURDER OF FUGITIVES FROM FUTTYGHUR—MUTINY AT THAT PLACE—ASSUMPTION OF THE MAHRATTA SOVEREIGNTY BY NANA SAHIB.

It has been already shown that the outbreak at Meerut was preceded by many ominous symptoms of deep-rooted disaffection and contemplated revolt on the part of the sepoys of the Bengal army. Before narrating the siege of Delhi, it is desirable to trace the progress of revolt in other directions. These were un-

doubtedly encouraged and stimulated by the events at Meerut and Delhi. Towards the latter place the hopes and wishes of the whole native army of Bengal turned. It would require a volume to disclose all the separate incidents of disobedience, mutiny, and open revolt. In a work which comprises the

history of the British empire in India and the East such minute details would be out of keeping. It will suffice to direct the reader's attention to the grand theatres of mutiny: the outbreaks of discontent beyond these regions were like the effects produced by a storm which has burst in fury over a certain area, and scatters some of its force upon the outskirts of the territory over which it has passed. Before noticing any other of the scenes of action, it is desirable to relate the condition of things at Benares. That city, the grand capital of Indian heathenism, is so situated as to form a great central position, from which the forces of the government could radiate as it were to Oude, to Agra, and the north-west. Lord Canning, although deficient in his plans to push up reinforcements from Calcutta, had shown considerable activity and energy in bringing such reinforcements as were available from the shores of the Bay of Bengal, and his correspondence, by telegrams, with the Madras and Bombay governments was maintained constantly. Lord Harris in the one government, and Lord Elphinstone in the other, seconded the views of the governor-general, and exerted themselves to the utmost. By the end of May the 1st Madras fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Neill, landed at Calcutta. Upon their arrival, the railway train to Raneegunge was about to start: the distance was one hundred and twenty miles, and it was of the utmost importance that the men should be conveyed up the country as quickly as possible, as information arrived from every quarter that the native troops were mutinous—Delhi and the restoration of the Moguls filling every mind. The cartridge question, although still the ostensible occasion of dispute, was in reality lost in questions of nationality and race, and (in a larger sense than a debate about caste) of creed. Colonel Neill was pertly told by a railway official that unless he had his men in the train in a few minutes it would proceed without them. His reply was characteristic, he ordered a file of soldiers to arrest the agent; the other officials were secured in like manner. They of course protested, but the colonel wasted no words with them; he was a man of action. He seized the train, placed his men in it, ordered engineers and stokers to steam on, and arrived in due and rapid course at the destination to which the train conducted. Colonel Neill, and a portion of his fusiliers arrived at Benares just at the crisis of affairs there. The native regiments then stationed at that great city were the 37th Bengal infantry, the Loodianah foot, the 13th Bengal irregular cavalry. The Europeans were the artillery of Major Oliphant's battery, a detachment of the 1st

Madras fusiliers, one hundred and fifty men of "the brave Irish of the 10th" (as Colonel Herbert Edwardes described them). Information of a certain nature had been given to the authorities that the 37th native infantry was about to mutiny, that the cavalry would follow their example, and that the Sikhs were doubtful, the Mussulmans and the Hindoos among them being ready to join the mutineers, the pure Sikhs being overawed and afraid for their own safety. The night of the 4th of June was the expected period of the revolt. A parade, without arms, of the native regiments was ordered for that evening. Some companies of the 37th assembled as ordered, other companies piled their arms, and while in the act some of the men turned and fired upon their officers. This example was followed by the rest. The Sikhs, supposing that there was no safety on the side of the government, discharged a volley upon the Europeans. The three guns poured grape into the Sikhs, who charged them, but were repulsed from the very muzzles of the cannon by devouring discharges of grape. Thrice the gallant Sikhs came up with the bayonet, thrice were they swept away by the close fire of the guns. Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswood, of the 37th, took some port-fires and ignited the inflammable material in the sepoy lines; the flames spread, and threw up such a light as to expose to view the sepoys, who from cover were firing upon the Europeans. In a few minutes one hundred of the mutineers lay dead, and twice as many were wounded; they fled in confusion. Some of the irregular cavalry and Sikhs remained loyal, some neutral; the resolution of the Europeans decided them. Major Guire, of the cavalry, was murdered at the beginning of the mutiny; two ensigns were wounded, and eight men. The Sikhs submitted, and some of the cavalry returned craving pardon, and declaring that they acted under alarm created by the threats of the sepoys. Colonel Neill acted with terrible promptitude and decision, executing the ringleaders, pardoning the seduced, scouring the country and bringing in prisoners, who were at once dealt with as their cases really required. While the colonel was reducing the chaos to order, he was commanded by the governor-general to march to Allahabad. The curt reply of the colonel was—"Can't do it—wanted here."

The most guilty sowars and sepoys were confined in the fort, and when their guilt was made clear, were blown away from guns,—a punishment which they more dreaded than any other.

At Jaunpore the Sikh detachment murdered some of their officers and, joined by the 37th, plundered the treasury.

## MUTINY AT ALLAHABAD.

Allahabad, upon which Neill at first refused to march when directed, was in a state of great danger, and was a most important station. There was a large arsenal there, ammunition and arms for forty thousand men, a very large fort; and, situated on the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna, it held a most influential military relation to the lower provinces. The number of cannon at this place was great, of gunners there was not one! The population were all desperate fanatics, and amounted to seventy-five thousand. The condition of the arsenal was such as no discreet government would have allowed. The place was garrisoned by a battalion of Sikhs, and some companies of the 6th native infantry quartered in the fort, and a wing of the 6th in cantonments. Except those working at the magazine, there was not a single European soldier in the garrison. Thus everywhere in the Bengal provinces the strong places were left in the custody of mercenaries, while the Europeans were scattered in remote stations. The treasury was a temptation to the disaffected, as were also the great military stores. On the evening of the 6th of June a parade of the 6th native infantry was ordered. These men had volunteered to march against Delhi. They were assembled to hear Lord Canning's thanks for their loyalty and devotion. When the paper was read the men gave three cheers, after the fashion of British soldiers. In four hours afterwards they had murdered seventeen of their officers, all the women and children upon whom they could lay their hands, and marched off in a body to Delhi, the band playing "God save the Queen." Scenes of plunder and devastation now occurred at Allahabad, and throughout the whole neighbourhood, which beggar description. The loyal Sikhs were especially dexterous in their work, plundering alike friend and foe. Private as well as public property fell under the hands of the devastators. The houses of Europeans around Allahabad were given to the flames; the railway-stations shared a similar fate, the lines of rails were torn up for twenty miles, the telegraph lines were cut down, the sepoy considering that the "lightning dak" (or post) was magical, and opposed to true religion. The steam-engines were for some time left uninjured, the sepoy fearing to approach them lest they should go off like a gun and blow them away; they fired into them from a distance, riddling them with balls. Robbery, ruin, and violence continued until the 11th of June, when Colonel Neill and a detachment of his fusiliers arrived. The colonel's reputation for vigour had preceded him, and the

poor Europeans, bereft of everything, felt that while he was near life at least would be safe. The colonel's first care was the sanitary state of the fort—fifty died of cholera the day he arrived, and despair brooded over every living heart. He at once adopted measures so skilful, and inspired such confidence, activity, courage, and hope, that the disease abated as if by a miracle, and almost disappeared. He came as a saviour to the suffering Europeans at Allahabad. He at once adopted towards the mutineers and insurgents the course he took at Benares—rigour before clemency. No time-serving, useless talking, pompous promises, trick, or humbug of any kind marked his proceeding. To all these things the general government trusted, although constant evidence was afforded that the sepoy saw through them. Having, through the mercy of God, by the use of enlightened means, saved the garrison from pestilence, his next care was for the property of the town and the preservation of order. He put an end to the drunkenness and riot of the soldiery of all classes by simple and efficacious means. He published a proclamation, giving a few hours for the restoration of public property, and declaring that all persons found in possession of the like after the time had expired should be hung. Everybody knew that he said what he meant; property was restored with marvellous rapidity, and some who could not make up their mind to restitution paid the penalty. There was a portion of the town of Allahabad occupied by Brahmins, who were lazy, dishonest, and treasonable. These men, wrapped up in the pride of caste, paid no attention to the colonel's proclamation, and did their best to keep up the general disquietude. He did not send deputations to them, nor tell them he relied upon their loyalty, as the Calcutta officials would have done; he shelled their quarter of the town, and a few hours sufficed to make those whose lives were not sacrificed abject in their submission. He then formed a little movable column of fifty of his fusiliers, a few of the sowars who had remained obedient, the railway officials, volunteers, and three companies of Sikhs. Not far from the town, a fanatical moulvie, and two thousand rebels, had intrenched themselves. Seeing so small a body of opponents, they boldly left their trenches and advanced. Neill delivered a fire of Enfield rifles at five hundred yards, which brought down so many of them that their ranks became disordered, and but for the fanatical exertions of their leader, they would have turned: he, with desperate exertions, led them on, and on approaching to half the distance another volley of Enfield rifles spread

destruction and terror among them; they ran in confusion to their intrenchments, there, well covered, they relied on their guns, which were so numerous and well served that Neill, careful for his troops, held back. Their ammunition having been expended, they cut the electric wire into slugs, and used pieces of the railway and of the engines—these proved to be more formidable than the regulation “charges.” Neill burnt down all the houses of the disaffected, capturing or dispersing the inmates; he harassed the moulvie, picking off with his rifles the most forward of his adherents, until he at last fled with his followers from the neighbourhood. His nephew was captured, and, while a prisoner, attempted to murder an officer of the Sikhs; the soldiers trampled the wretch until life was extinct. Neill and his men scoured the country, slaying, dispersing, or capturing predatory bands. The sepoy captives he shot, the non-sepoy rebels he hung. The terror of his name spread through all the Bengal provinces, and fabulous accounts of his bravery formed the staple of the stories at the bivouacs of the rebels. Allahabad was saved, and its neighbourhood cleared of insurgents.

#### MUTINY AT CAWNPORE.

Throughout the month of May the regiments in the garrison of Cawnpore showed symptoms of disaffection. The officer who commanded was one of the most skilful and gallant in the company's service, Major-general Sir Hugh Wheeler. Many Europeans whose bungalows were burned, or who were insulted in the bazaar, left the station. The place was crowded with the families of officers and civilians serving in Lucknow and other stations in the upper provinces. General Wheeler did not fail to communicate to his government the precise state of things; he received advice which was worth nothing, but the supplies which competent management might have provided did not arrive. The general moved to intrenchments the public records, and such portions of his garrison and people as his wisdom deemed best. He was anxious for the safe keeping of the public treasury, which the sepoys guarded and refused to leave, making the usual protestations of loyalty. Wheeler knew well the value of such professions, but it was prudent to give an apparent acquiescence for the moment. He, however, immediately took measures which he felt certain would secure the safety of the treasure. He applied to the Rajah of Bithoor to send him a guard; the rajah being a warm friend of the English, as they universally thought, the expedient seemed discreet. His highness sent two hun-

dred Nujeebs, armed with matchlocks, and two pieces of cannon. The residence of the rajah was within a few miles of Cawnpore, and he was strong in influence, wealth, and armed retainers. This person was the infamous Nana Sahib, whose protestations of sympathy were lavishly bestowed, while he watched the opportunity for vengeance. He was naturally a brutal voluptuary, and bloodthirsty; his relations to the English were such as made him utterly vindictive to them. When the Mahratta empire was dissolved, and the Peishwa was dispossessed of his last remnant of power, he was allowed to live at Bithoor, and take the title of rajah from that place. Having no legitimate children, he adopted Nana Sahib, and left him property amounting to four millions sterling. A pension, allowed to the Peishwa by the English government, lapsed, according to English usage, from failure of heirs male. Nana Sahib pleaded oriental usage and law, and, as the adopted son of the Peishwa, claimed the pension, which the English refused to grant. From that hour he became their deadly enemy. He, however, concealed this enmity under the mask of an admiration for European civilization, and a taste for English manners. He accordingly entertained, *à l'Anglais*, English civil and military officers at his palace at Bithoor. It appeared to be his ambition to be regarded as an English gentleman: he spoke the English language, filled his palace with English furniture and pictures, used horses and carriages caparisoned and equipped in English fashion, but professed withal to be a profound Hindoo devotee. In the chapters on the social condition of India, the habits of life of this chief were described in illustration of the manners and customs of a high-bred native of the Anglo-Indian type.

Sir Hugh Wheeler's force for the defence of Cawnpore consisted of two companies of Europeans and eight guns. The supply of provisions was short. The sepoys in garrison were numerous. On the morning of the 5th of June the whole of the native troops mutinied. They first set fire to their lines, then marched on the treasury, where they were joined by the guards lent by the Nana. £170,000 was packed on elephants and carts, and the whole force marched out with the intention of proceeding to Delhi. The Nana, however, placed himself at the head of the mutincers, and brought up six hundred retainers, with four guns, from Bithoor, and the force halted. On the afternoon and night of the 5th he was irresolute what course to take, but early on the morning of the 6th he made hostile demonstrations against Cawn-

pore. He sent a body of sowars (irregular native cavalry) into the town to kill all the Europeans, Eurasians, and native converts, whom they could reach, without attacking Sir Hugh Wheeler's intrenchments. The work was done *con amore*. They had also been ordered to set fire to the town, which they performed most effectually. "The wind was blowing furiously at the time, and when the houses were fired, a few moments sufficed to set the whole in a blaze. The noise of the wind, the roaring of the fire, the wild cries of the mutineers, maddened with excitement and raging for blood, these, mingled with oaths, and prayers, and shrieks of anguish, formed an atmosphere of devilry which few of our countrymen would wish to breathe again. A few of the residents fought with the fury of despair; but they were a handful against many thousands of enemies, and silence gradually settled over the place which a few hours previously was fair and flourishing."\*

The Nana's next step was to declare himself, by beat of drum, sovereign of the Mahrattas; he planted two standards, one of which was proclaimed as the standard of Mohammed, the other of Huneyman, the monkey god. Around the former the Mohammedans, to the number of several thousands, crowded; around the latter only a few Budmashes and robbers gathered. Thus the two great sovereignties of India were set up again in the persons of the King of Delhi as the Great Mogul, and of Nana Sahib as the Peishwa of the Mahrattas. A position was taken up by the mutineers in front of the intrenchments, which Sir Hugh Wheeler and his little band defended with romantic gallantry, hourly expecting help whence no help came. Various assaults were repelled at great cost to the mutineers, who, at last, cannonaded the intrenchments almost with impunity, as Sir Hugh could only direct against their position, during a portion of the attack, a single gun. Meanwhile, Europeans—men, women, and children—were daily dragged from their hiding-places in the town and surrounding country, and put to death. Before slaying them, torture was resorted to, and every form of indignity. Barbarities at once puerile and disgusting afforded the Nana infinite delight. In some instances he caused the noses and ears of his victims to be cut off and hung round their necks as necklaces. "An English lady, with her children, had been captured by his bloodhounds, and was led into his presence. Her husband had been murdered on the road, and she implored the Nana for life; but the ruffian ordered them

all to be taken to the maidan and killed. On the way the children complained of the sun, and the lady requested they might be taken under the shade of some trees; but no attention was paid to her, and after a time she and her children were tied together and shot, with the exception of the youngest, who was crawling over the bodies, and feeling them, and asking them why they had fallen down in the sun. The poor infant was at last killed by a trooper."

One hundred and twenty-six persons escaping from Futtighur, arrived opposite Cawnpore during the investment of the intrenched position of the English. The Nana brought guns and musketry to bear upon these unfortunate and helpless persons, and gave them the alternative of landing under his protection, or of having the boats sunk. Some got away, refusing to trust him; others accepted his promises of security as their safest chance. He violated his solemn protestations. "When they were collected together, he ordered his men to commence the work of slaughter. The women and children were dispatched with swords and spears; the men were ranged in line, with a bamboo running along the whole extent and passing through each man's arms, which were tied behind his back. The troopers then rode round them and taunted their victims, reviling them with the grossest abuse, and gloating over the tortures they were about to inflict. When weary of vituperation, one of them would discharge a pistol in the face of a captive, whose shattered head would droop to the right or left, the body meanwhile being kept upright, and the blood and brains bespattering his living neighbours. The next person selected for slaughter would, perhaps, be four or five paces distant; and in this way the fiends contrived to prolong for several hours the horrible contact of the dead and the living. Not a soul escaped; and the Nana Sahib thanked the gods of the Hindoos for the sign of favour bestowed upon him by the opportunity vouchsafed thus to torment and slay the Christians." For twenty-two days the garrison held out, hoping against hope. They could not persuade themselves that neither from Lucknow, Allahabad, nor Calcutta would help arrive. What actually occurred at last can only be gathered from desultory sources of information. These crept out little by little, and the public mind of India, of England, and of all the world, not inhabited by heathen or Mussulmans, was filled with horror at the recital. Lord Canning published the following as the first authentic intelligence given to the natives of India of the event:—

\* *The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences.* By Henry Mead. London: G. Routledge & Co.

*Allahabad, July 5th.*

Colonel Neill reports that he had received a note, dated night of the 4th, from Major Renaud, of the Madras Fusiliers, commanding the advance column sent towards Cawnpore, that he had sent men into that place, who reported on their return that, in consequence of Sir Hugh Wheeler being shot through the leg, and afterwards mortally, the force had accepted the proffer of safety made by the Nana Sahib and the mutineers. The Nana allowed them to get into boats, with all they had, and three and a half lacs of rupees; that after getting them into boats fire was opened on them from the bank, and all were destroyed. One boat got away ten miles down the river, was pursued, brought back, and all in her taken back into barracks and shot. One old lady was alive on the 3rd, at Futtehpore.

The rumours which were spread in connection with the treatment of the victims of Cawnpore were innumerable, but rivalling one another in the pictures they gave of the atrocities of Nana Sahib and his followers. Reports that all the women murdered at Lucknow had been first violated, under circumstances of cruelty savage and appalling, influenced the Europeans in India with a desire for vengeance which it was difficult to slake. The floating tales of this nature which circulated so extensively greatly exaggerated the facts, but enough of the horrible remained true to justify the English community in India in demanding that English honour should be vindicated, and punishment inflicted upon the criminals with a stern hand. When the numbers destroyed by the rebels became more clearly ascertained, the distress of relations and friends, and of the whole English community in India, was beyond the power of pen to describe. The following were certainly known to be in the intrenchments on the 6th of June; of these many fell in dreadful battle, the rest by a more cruel destiny:—First company, 6th battalion, artillery, 61; her majesty's 32nd foot, 84; her majesty's 84th foot, 50; 1st European fusiliers, 15; English officers, mostly of mutinied regiments, 100; merchants, writers, clerks, &c., 100; English drummers of mutinied regiments, 40; wives and children of English officers, 50; wives and children of English soldiers, 160; wives and children of civilians, 120; sick, native officers and sepoy, 100; native servants, cooks, &c., 100.

A few of those who had served within these intrenchments escaped almost by miracle. Mr. Shepherd, a gentleman connected with the commissary department, left the trenches, disguised as a native cook, and was imprisoned by Nana Sahib, remaining in captivity while the murders were perpetrated, and finally escaping when the rebels retreated. The others who were saved were British officers. They were with the garrison, who, according to the stipulation made with the Nana, were permitted to go down

the river in boats. One of these gentlemen published an account of his escape. After describing the embarkation, and the progress of the treacherous attack, Lieutenant Delafosse continues:—"We had now one boat, crowded with wounded, and having on board more than she could carry. Two guns followed us the whole of that day, the infantry firing on us the whole of that night. On the second day, 28th June, a gun was seen on the Cawnpore side, which opened on us at Nujjubgurh, the infantry still following us on both sides. On the morning of the third day, the boat was no longer serviceable; we were aground on a sandbank, and had not strength sufficient to move her. Directly any of us got into the water, we were fired upon by thirty or forty men at a time. There was nothing left for us but to charge and drive the villains away; and fourteen of us were told off to do what we could. Directly we got on shore the insurgents retired, but having followed them up too far, we were cut off from the river, and had to retire ourselves, as we were being surrounded. We could not make for the river; we had to go down parallel, and came to the river again a mile lower down, where we saw a large force of men right in front waiting for us, and another lot on the opposite bank, should we attempt to cross the river. On the bank of the river, just by the force in front, was a temple. We fired a volley, and made for the temple, in which we took shelter, having one man killed and one wounded. From the door of the temple we fired on every insurgent that happened to show himself. Finding that they could do nothing against us whilst we remained inside, they heaped wood all round and set it on fire. When we could no longer remain inside on account of the smoke and heat, we threw off what clothes we had, and, each taking a musket, charged through the fire. Seven of us out of the twelve got into the water, but before we had gone far, two poor fellows were shot. There were only five of us left now, and we had to swim whilst the insurgents followed us along both banks, wading and firing as fast as they could. After we had gone three miles down the stream [probably swimming and wading by turns], one of our party, an artilleryman, to rest himself, began swimming on his back, and not knowing in what direction he was swimming, got on shore, and was killed. When we had got down about six miles, firing from both sides [of the river] ceased, and soon after we were hailed by some natives, on the Oude side, who asked us to come on shore, and said they would take us to their rajah, who was friendly to the English." The friendly

rajah sheltered Lieutenant Delafosse, Mowbray, and Thompson, with some others, who sought his protection, throughout the month of July, until they exchanged his hospitality for the ranks of their countrymen.

It is difficult to give any correct relation of the fate of the Englishwomen dragged from the boats, not only because the narratives of survivors is so different, but because the scenes in which the relaters substantially agree are too indelicate to place before our readers in their atrocious details.

The first demand of the Nana was that they should all enter his harem; they replied that they preferred death. Amongst these ladies the daughter of Sir Hugh Wheeler has been represented by all narrators as displaying extraordinary courage. Before her capture she is represented as having shot down five sepoy with a revolver. Mr. Shepherd relates that she was taken away by a sowar (trooper), as his particular prize, who conveyed her to his hut, that she then seized his sword, cut off his head, and threw herself into a well to escape outrage. An ayah (native nurse) of a European family says that it was in the hut, after cutting off the trooper's head, that she shot down four other sowars. Another account represents her as having been taken away by the trooper in the retreat of the mutineers. This story has two versions: one describes the conduct of the sowar as generous, the other represents him as carrying her about as his victim.

#### THE MUTINY AT FUTTYGHUR.

Futtyghur was a military cantonment higher up on the banks of the Ganges than Cawnpore, and not far from Ferokabad.

At the end of May the troops in those cantonments were the 10th regiment of native infantry (Bengal is always understood, unless especial mention is made of a corps as belonging to Bombay or Madras), and small detachments of other regiments. Unmistakable indications were made of an intended mutiny, so that it was deemed desirable to send the women, children, and non-combatants on to Cawnpore. The communications between these places had been so intercepted that the officers at either station were ignorant of the situation of their comrades at the other.

On the 4th of June boats were freighted with this precious charge, and they were sent down the Ganges.

After a short voyage, the demonstrations of hostility offered by the natives caused the

wanderers to separate into two parties. One of these, headed by Mr. Probyn, the collector, sought refuge with a zemindar, named Herden Buksh, living twelve miles from Futtyghur. The other party persisted in the voyage to Cawnpore. The first party numbered forty persons; the second, one hundred and twenty. It is impossible to judge when these parties separated, or how many of both were slain before the one reached Cawnpore and the other found refuge with the zemindar. Few survived to tell the tale, and their talents for narrative have not been very eminent. Some of them found their way back to Futtyghur, others were arrested and slain at Bithoor.

On the 18th of June the 10th infantry mutinied, and set fire to the cantonments at Futtyghur: the 41st, from the opposite shore of the Ganges, joined them, the treasure was seized, and the officers menaced. The river by that date had fallen so low that flight by boat was deemed unsafe, and the Europeans resolved to defend a post which they selected as the most tenable which they could make available. One hundred persons took up this position; thirty were European gentlemen, the rest women and children. They defended this place until the 4th of July, when, several military officers of rank having fallen, and most of the rest being wounded, longer defence became impossible. They took to their boats, under a terrible fire from their enemies. The boats were pursued, with a persistent thirst for blood. Some of the ladies jumped overboard, to avoid capture. Some were shot in their boats. One of the boats stranded; those on board leapt into the water, some were shot down, some drowned, others swam to land, and were captured and mutilated; a few found shelter from compassionate persons while wandering along the shore. One boat only reached Bithoor; Nana Sahib murdered all on board.

The fate of the first arrivals from Futtyghur has been already related.

The monster of Bithoor was not contented with the cruelties he had inflicted, but hearing that a British force was advancing, which he could hardly hope to resist, he resolved to cut off the noses and right hands of all the Bengalee clerks in the pay of commercial firms, or of the civil service, and of all persons who were known to be able to read or write or speak English. Such was the state of things at Cawnpore, when the tramp of British soldiery was heard, and the hour of retribution was nigh.

## CHAPTER CXXX.

THE MUTINY IN OUDE—DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW BY SIR HENRY LAWRENCE—HIS DEATH—MUTINY IN ROHILCUND AND THE DOAB—MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA—MUTINY IN THE PUNJAUB, AND ITS SUPPRESSION—UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AT MUTINY IN SCINDE.

THROUGHOUT the month of May the sepoy displayed a mutinous spirit all over Oude; but it was met with sufficient skill and address to keep it under, so far as open revolt and massacre were concerned. In time the spirit of disaffection increased, and Sir Henry Lawrence, who conducted the government of the province, suffered inconceivable anxiety, and displayed an ability and courage which render his name immortal. About the middle of June, Colonel Neill, then at Allahabad, as seen in the last chapter, received a letter from Sir Henry, announcing that Seetapore and Shahjehanpore, Baraiteh, and Fyzabad were taken by the mutineers, and that the revolted from these places, from Jeypore, and from Benares (where Neill had driven them), were advancing against Lucknow. On the 19th the government of Calcutta learned that cholera had broken out in Lucknow, and that Sir Henry had no hope of reinforcements unless by chance from Dinapore. In Benares it was learned a few days later that Sir Henry had got rid of all his sepoy by a dexterous piece of policy, and that he was himself ill, and had appointed a provisional council in case of his death, or incapacity by sickness. He held the residency, the cantonments, and commanded the city. He also occupied a fort called Muehee Bhonchan, which he garrisoned by 225 Europeans. This place was three quarters of a mile from the residency, and was strong. The residency and the fort were his chief reliance in case he should be pressed by the enemy. Before the end of June his communications were cut off, and Lucknow surrounded by an immense host, not merely of mutineers, but of rebels, well accustomed to the use of arms, and raging with hatred against the English government.

On the 27th of June he had supplies for two months, during which time he had no fear that the enemy could capture his positions. At the end of June the whole province of Oude was in arms, and the royal family active in the insurrection. There were now three royalties set up in hostility to the English, that of Delhi, Oude, and the Malharratta. On the 30th of June Sir Henry resolved to attack a force of eight thousand rebels, encamped on the Fyzabad road, near the Koobra canal. His force was as follows:—Artillery—Four guns, horse light field battery; six guns, Oude field

battery; and one 8-inch howitzer. Cavalry—one hundred and twenty troopers of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Oude irregular cavalry; and forty volunteer cavalry, under Captain Radcliffe. Infantry—three hundred of her majesty's 32nd foot; one hundred and fifty of 13th native infantry; sixty of the 48th native infantry; and twenty of the 71st. The enemy skilfully planned an ambush, their success in doing so was the more easily achieved as Lawrence bore himself far too confidently. He did not show as signal a military capacity on this occasion as he had always shown capacity for government. The rebels attacked him at Chihut. The Oude artillerymen in his service cut the traces of the horses, overturned the guns in a nullah, and deserted to the enemy during the first moment of surprise; they were probably aware of the ambush. To this misfortune was added the want of an adequate supply of ammunition, of which he should have assured himself before he set out. He was beaten. It was not a retreat, but a confused flight. The officers and men fell in great numbers, and so wretchedly arranged was the retreat, as well as the advance, that it is wonderful how a single man of the party reached Lucknow. This shameful defeat caused all the subsequent disasters. The enemy gained courage, their enthusiasm rose to the highest pitch, while the English became depressed. Lawrence resolved to abandon the cantonments, the fort, and another strong post, to fortify himself in the residency, and await succour. At midnight on the 1st of July he blew up the fort, containing two hundred and forty barrels of powder, and three millions of ball cartridges. This resolution on the part of Sir Henry has been much lauded, but the fact was obvious to the humblest soldier that it was the only thing that could be done to afford the defence the slightest prospect of success. By his marvellous faculty of administration he collected six months' provision in the residency. His courage equalled his industry. On the night of the 1st of July a shell was thrown by the enemy, which exploded in the room he occupied, but he declined taking up his quarters in a more secure place. On the 2nd of July a shell also burst in the same place, inflicting upon him a wound which eventually proved fatal. He immediately appointed Brigadier Inglis his military, and Major

Banks his civil successor; and on the 10th of July died. The defence of the residency now devolved upon the gallant Inglis.

It is necessary before returning to the defence of Lucknow, to glance at some of the other stations in Oude and elsewhere. Fyzabad was the scene of incipient mutiny on the 3rd of June. On the 8th it became open and decided. After the most solemn professions of loyalty and devotion on the part of the sepoy garrison, they suddenly rose and made prisoners of their officers. Next morning Dhuleep Singh, the chief of the insurgents, announced that the officers might go away, taking their private property.

The troops quartered at Fyzabad were—the 22nd regiment native infantry; the 6th regiment irregular Oude infantry; the 5th troop of the 15th regiment irregular cavalry; No. 5 company of the 7th battalion of artillery; and No. 13 horse battery. The chief officers were Colonels Lennox and O'Brien; Major Mill, Captain Morgan, Lieutenants Fowle, English, Bright, Lindesay, Thomas, Ouseley, Cautley, Gordon, Parsons, Percival, and Currie; and Ensigns Anderson and Ritchie. Colonel Goldney held a civil appointment as commissioner. The Europeans were placed in boats and directed to make their way to Dinapore. It was intended to murder them on the river. Some of the fugitives took to the land, leaving all their property behind, and made for Goruckpore. They were attacked by mutineers, and would have been killed, had not Meer Mohammed Hossein Khan rescued them, sheltered them in a zemindar fort, disguised and hid them, and by a succession of stratagems preserved them until the collector of Goruckpore, at the head of a party, came to conduct them away in safety; they thence reached Calcutta without losing an individual of their number. Of those who went by river, some reached Dinapore, others were slain or drowned. A portion left the boats and perished on land of privation or fatigue. The whole population was against them. One woman was delivered of a baby on the route. A lady, with two children, seven and three years of age, and a baby eight months old, after suffering considerable privations, and losing her infant by death, escaped. A sergeant-major was captured and dragged from village to village as an exhibition, subjected to unheard of cruelties and indignities. He at last escaped.

The mutinies at the other garrisons were similar—slaughter and rapine followed revolt everywhere. Neither Lawrence nor Inglis could obtain any assistance except from Nepaul. Jung Bahadoor was not only willing to render it, but he sent troops. Lord

Canning requested him to withdraw them, still labouring under the fatal hallucination that the army was in the main loyal, and that, at all events, the people were so. The Nepaulese chief marched back his troops at a season most trying, many of them perishing on the way by cholera. When his army had reached the capital, a message from Lord Canning arrived, requiring the assistance of ten thousand men. Jung Bahadoor afforded the aid required, but neither he nor his troops entered so heartily into the cause as at first. He expressed his astonishment how the English, with such rulers, could expect to hold India. The Goorkha chief also extended refuge and assistance to such fugitives as reached the confines of his country.

#### MUTINY IN ROHILCUND.

All the districts of this province were rebellious, and the Bengal troops stationed in it still more so. Bareilly was one of the most important places of Rohilcund, and it was like other such places, garrisoned wholly by native troops. Two regiments of infantry, the 68th and 18th, one of cavalry, the 8th, and a battery of native artillery were stationed there. The officers were the only English soldiers in the place. The usual staff of civilians was to be found there, and many women and children. The native population was one hundred thousand. The chief officers displayed the infatuation by which the military authorities were characterized elsewhere: the sepoys were implicitly trusted; the officers did not know them. Early in May symptoms of insurgency led to the adoption of some precautionary measures; the ladies and children were sent to the sanitary stations in the hills: Nynee Fal received many of them, where they were comparatively safe. On the 31st of May the sepoys revolted; the too confiding general of the station was one of the first men shot by the mutineers; others were murdered, some escaped, the cantonments were fired, and rapine ruled in Bareilly. Nineteen native troopers remained faithful, and escorted a number of their officers to Nynee Fal. The rebels, headed by a very old chief, Khan Bahadoor Khan, were completely successful. The khan, like others of the rebel chiefs, had been in receipt of a pension from the company, a mode of securing their loyalty which always failed, as the pension was regarded as a right, and a sense of injury experienced, whatever its amount, because it was not more. This man, like Nana Sahib, was the associate of the English, assuming their manners, and affecting their tastes. These men everywhere were the

bitterest enemies of the British. Intimate intercourse and close knowledge of us seemed to exasperate the educated natives against both our race and rule. This old chief of the Bareilly mutineers imitated our manners so closely, that he had the captive Europeans arraigned as rebels against the King of Delhi, tried by law, found guilty, and hanged.

Moorshedabad is half way between Bareilly and Meerut, and was, as to the insurrection, a place of importance from that circumstance. Here, as elsewhere, the treasury was captured in June, but the European population were enabled to make a timely escape to Meerut.

At Shahjehanpore the mutiny was marked by a peculiar activity. The troops rose on the 31st of May, a day on which so generally the sepoys revolted. It was the Sabbath. The mutineers, as elsewhere, selected the hours of worship. They surrounded the church, and put nearly the whole of the congregation, and the Rev. Mr. M'Collum, to death within the building. Those who escaped were hunted through the country, shot at, and sabred, until only one or two remained of all who had joined in Christian worship on that last Sabbath in May at Shahjehanpore. All Rohilcund, like Oude, fell to the rebels. One by one, and in small parties, fugitives reached Nynce Fal, where the neighbourhood of the Goorkhas deterred the enemy from pursuing, although the prize was much desired. The slaughter of such a large number of women and children as the most vindictive visitation to the whites was eagerly expected. Bands of mutineers watched in the neighbouring jungle for many a day in the hope of accomplishing this exploit. All around Rohilcund and Oude the insurrection grew and spread. In the Doab blood and fire marked the rebel track in every direction. From Allahabad, where Neill was victorious, to Ferokabad, and far beyond it to the upper country, all was desolation and vengeance. Futtyghur and Muttra obtained notoriety among the places in these districts where rebellion signalized itself. Allyghur was held by a few faithful native soldiers, under the command of a gallant young officer, named Cockburn; and by this means the road between Meerut and Agra was kept tolerably open. Agra itself, however, was doomed to experience the force of the wide-sweeping storm. The garrison there consisted of two regiments of native infantry and the 3rd Europeans, with a small detachment of artillery. On the 1st of June there was a disarmament of the natives. This was timely, for a conspiracy to murder all the officers was afterwards discovered. Most of the disarmed

sepoys escaped and made their way to Delhi, or into Oude; the remainder were a source of anxiety and alarm, although deprived of their weapons. The police and jail-guard deserted, and the population showed deadly hatred to the Europeans of every class. Mr. Colvin held Agra well, and threw out parties in every direction, who chastised rebel bands.

#### THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA.

Nagpore had a strong garrison of native troops. Mr. Plowden, the commissioner, by address and courage, succeeded in inducing them to surrender their arms, in which he was aided by the loyalty of the Madras native cavalry. By the end of June he had quieted every symptom of disturbance.

Further north, in Central India Proper, Major Erskine showed similar qualities to those employed by Mr. Plowden at Nagpore. The Saugor and Nerbuddah districts were intensely agitated, but skilful management, civil and military, averted many disasters.

The Bundelcund territory suffered much, and Jansi was the capital of revolt and outrage. The native troops mutinied on the 4th of June, seized the Star Fort, and massacred many of the officers in the cantonments, the rest escaping to the Town Fort, where they barricaded themselves, and offered resolute resistance. After a long and desperate fight, the garrison, no longer able to hold out, surrendered, on condition of having life spared, to which the mutineers, by the most sacred oaths known to their religions, pledged themselves. Those oaths were violated at Jansi, as everywhere else. The perjured horde bound the captive men in one row, and the women and children in another. The men were first slaughtered, and then the women and children; the children being first hewn in pieces before their mothers' eyes. In this case the women were neither tortured nor violated; a speedy death accomplished the bigoted vengeance of their persecutors. Nineteen ladies, twenty-three children, twenty-four civil servants and non-commissioned officers, and eight officers were the victims of the massacre. It was afterwards proved that the inciter to this deed of blood was the Ranee of Bundelcund, a chieftainess ambitious of ruling that province.

Lieutenant Osborne, at Rewah, hearing of these things, had the address to induce the maharajah to place his troops at the disposal of the company. With indomitable energy and ceaseless activity he provided for the security of a vast district, surrounded by others in which mutiny and rebellion waved their red hands triumphant.

In various places besides these noticed, the

same scenes occurred—successful insurrection, murder, and the flight of such as escaped, under all the circumstances of privation and suffering which might be supposed endurable by human beings.

At Nusserabad there were a few squadrons of Bombay lancers, who charged the Bengal artillery when in mutiny, and stood by their officers to the last, but the station was lost. At different periods of the mutiny symptoms of disaffection were shown in the Bombay army, but as a whole it remained staunch.

At Neemuch the insurgents were also successful, but most of the garrison escaped. The wife and three little children of a sergeant remained behind, and, although alone amidst soldiers, they were murdered.

The dominions of Holkar caught the infection. The maharajah himself remained the ally of the company. His troops revolted. The loss of life to Europeans was great at Mhow and Indore, as elsewhere. In July all the dominions of Holkar were filled with revolt. Mhow was held by a handful of Europeans until the arrival of troops from Bombay quelled the insurrection in Central India.

The conduct of Scindiah, the old rival of Holkar among the Mahratta chieftains, from generation to generation, was also faithful. In Holkar's dominions the revolt did not begin until July. In Scindiah's it commenced in the middle of June. The whole of the Gwalior contingent mutinied, comprising several thousand choice native soldiers. Finding that they could not induce their chief to lead them against the English, they marched forth to join the insurgents on other fields of enterprise.

#### MUTINY IN THE PUNJAUB.

During the revolt in other directions the preservation of order in the territory of the Punjaub was of the utmost importance. It was the government of Sir John Lawrence that found the means of reducing Delhi. Lord Stanley, in his place in the house of commons, when minister for Indian affairs, declared that had the mutiny been successful in the Punjaub, India would have been lost.

When the mutiny at Meerut was heard of at Lahore, the excitement among the sepoy regiments was intense, and every evidence that could be afforded of a determination to revolt was supplied. Sir John Lawrence was not at the seat of government, he was at a place called Rawul Pindee, partly for the purpose of recruiting his health. When tidings of the events at Meerut reached the other authorities, they took prompt methods to avert similar catastrophes in the Punjaub, and more especially in the neighbourhood of Lahore, Umritsir, and Umballah. The gentlemen in autho-

rity at and near Lahore were Mr. Montgomery, Mr. McLeod, Mr. Roberts, Colonel Macpherson, Colonel Lawrence (a member of Sir John's family), Major Ommaney, and Captain Hutchinson. These officials formed a council, and deliberated upon the plans best to be adopted to preserve the Punjaub from mutiny and massacre. Apprehensions were chiefly entertained concerning the station of Meean Meer. It was resolved by the council to disarm the sepoys, and introduce additional troops, Europeans, within the fort. On the 13th of May a parade was ordered, when, after some skilful manœuvres, the native corps were brought into a position by which the European infantry and artillery could, in case of a conflict, act with great advantage. The native regiments were the 16th, 26th, and 49th Bengal infantry, and the 8th Bengal cavalry. When the moment arrived for giving such a command, with the least prospect of enforcing its obedience, the order to pile arms was given to the infantry, and the order to unbuckle swords (the troopers were dismounted) given to the cavalry. The command was obeyed with the greatest reluctance, and not until the European artillery and infantry were about to open fire. Arrangements were then made as to the discipline and quarters of the disarmed sepoys, which were effectual in preserving order. The capital of the Punjaub was in this manner secured. Umritsir was the next important place in the territory administered by Sir John Lawrence. Immediately after the disarming at Lahore, a detachment of the 51st regiment was sent there. The fort of Govindgurh and certain cantonments contained the garrison by which the second city of the Punjaub was defended. The troops stationed there were the 59th native infantry of the Bengal army, a company of native artillery, a company of European artillery, and a light field battery. The native troops offered no opposition to any arrangements made concerning them, and the opposition on the part of the Sikh population to the Mohammedan population and sepoys was so strong that security was assured in Umritsir. Next to Umritsir, Ferozepore became the object of consideration. That place is situated in the Cis-Sutlej provinces of the empire of old Runjeet Singh. It was important only for its garrison, and its position near the west bank of the Sutlej. At the time of the mutiny the cantonments of Ferozepore contained the 45th and 47th Bengal native infantry, the 10th Bengal native cavalry, her majesty's 61st regiment, 150 European artillerymen, one light field battery of horse artillery, and six field guns besides. When the news of the mutiny at Meerut was received, the men of the native regiments mani-

festated uneasiness, but when tidings arrived that Delhi was in their hands, an enthusiastic sympathy for the cause of the king was manifested in every way short of open revolt in his name. Brigadier-general Innes, commanding the station, endeavoured to effect a different arrangement of the troops in quarters, but was resisted, and scenes arose similar to those recorded elsewhere. The two native infantry regiments and the chief part of the sowars escaped from the cantonments with their arms, after having fired the bungalows of their officers, the church, and other buildings: but for the heroism of a few Europeans their attempt to seize and ignite the magazine would have been successful. The 61st European regiment remained all the while in forced inaction, the position which they occupied in reference to the native regiments not affording, in the general's estimation, the prospect of a successful attack. Thus in consequence of mal-arrangements on the part of the superior officers, the native corps were allowed, almost with impunity, to plunder and burn an important station. The consequence of this mismanagement was that the stations of Jullundur, Jhelum, and Sealkote became at once disturbed. At Jullundur were stationed the 6th Bengal native cavalry, the 36th and 61st native infantry, a troop of horse artillery, and the 8th or Queen's own Irish. As soon as the first symptoms of disturbance were manifested, arrangements of an effective character were made, and the Rajah of Jullundur, who exercised the suzerainty of a small territory in the neighbourhood, remained loyal and gave the aid of his troops. The result was that the native regiments were overawed, and overt acts of riot and shouting ceased, although a brooding gloom hung upon the faces of the sepoys, and foreboded that if an opportunity for insurrection arose, it would not be lost.

In the eastern portion of the Punjaub the town of Phillour was regarded as important. It was intended by the sepoy garrison to rise on the 15th and secure its vast magazines, but succour arising from Jullundur, by a detachment of the Queen's Irish, the place was saved. It was afterwards discovered that all the sepoy garrisons in the Punjaub, especially in the Eastern Punjaub, had agreed to rise on the 15th, murder their officers, and the families of married officers, to kill all Europeans, civil and military, and to make Phillour their rendezvous and depot, calculating upon the possession of its large military stores. The premature outbreak at Meerut, on the 10th, baffled all the plans of the mutincers, put the English on the *qui vive*, and laid a train of consequences which prevented the success of the mutiny, not only in the Punjaub, but over

all the provinces of Bengal. At Jhelum, on the right bank of the river bearing the same name, about six companies of the 24th native infantry were stationed. They showed some symptoms of sedition, and it was deemed necessary to disarm them. For this purpose, three companies of her majesty's 24th were sent from the hill station of Rawul Pindec, accompanied by a detachment of horse artillery. The 14th native infantry received the Europeans, on parade, with a volley of musketry, to which the latter replied, but the sepoys maintained a well-directed fire, beneath which many Europeans fell. Had the 24th been ordered to charge with the bayonet, many British lives would have been spared, for the sepoys seldom awaited the charge of the English. The 14th were, however, allowed to get under the cover of their cantonments, where they had loopholed their huts and walls, firing from which they kept the 24th at bay. It was not until three pieces of cannon opened upon their position that they abandoned it and fled. The 24th were not in a condition to pursue, so the mutineers succeeded in effecting their escape to Delhi. At Sealkote the sepoys professed loyalty up to the very moment of revolt. The officers trusted to their professions—as they did generally. On the 9th of July, the 46th native infantry, and a wing of the 9th native cavalry, rose, set fire to the cantonments, and made open revolt; they were joined by the 14th, driven from Jhelum. After murdering many persons, and blowing up the magazine, they marched for Delhi. A flying column was organized at Jhelum to pursue them. Brigadier Nicholson, at the head of another column, made arrangements for intercepting them. The fugitives were hemmed in between both forces, and, fording the Ravee, took up a position on an island, where nearly all perished under the fire and steel of their pursuers.

There were various risings of the disarmed regiments in the Punjaub, some so desperate that they would be utterly unaccountable except that fanaticism drives men to madness. The most remarkable of these outbreaks was one which excited excessive attention in Europe, and engaged the press of England in fierce discussions. The British parliament was also made the scene of debate in connection with it, by a motion introduced to the house by Mr. Gilpin, in March, 1859, a year and seven months after the event. The revolt and destruction of the 26th native infantry caused these prolonged discussions. Mr. Cooper, a civil officer in the service of the Honourable East India Company, was the person chiefly concerned in suppressing the

revolt and punishing the revoltors. His own account of the transaction, although of some length, is given, because no abstract or abridgment of an event which caused such angry controversy in society and in the senate at home could do justice to all the parties concerned. Mr. F. Cooper, deputy commissioner of Umritsir, published a work entitled *The Crisis in the Punjab*, in which he set forth his own doings, and laid the ground for the attacks which were made upon himself personally, and upon the severe policy of the English civil and military officers to whom the government of the Punjab was committed. "The 26th native infantry, stationed under surveillance at Meean Meer, was disarmed on the 13th of May, 1857. Whether there had been any preconcerted scheme among the disarmed regiments to escape is not known, although it is generally understood that lots had been drawn, and that had the 26th succeeded, the 16th (grenadiers) had engaged to follow in their wake. Some say that the noonday gun was to be the signal of a general rise. Society was shocked, however, on the 30th of July, to hear of another foul murder of a commanding officer, Major Spenser, and the rise of the 26th regiment. Lieutenant Montagu White narrowly escaped. He was enticed into the lines by some sepoys, who affected sorrow at the murder, and was about to dismount, when a warning voice in his ear told him to beware. He galloped off; but not before some hand had aimed a felon stroke at him, and wounded his horse. The sergeant-major was also killed, and the regiment precipitately fled; a dust storm (as was the case at Jullundur when the mutiny arose) raging at the time, favouring their immediate escape, and concealing its exact direction. They were not, however, unmolested; and it is feared that the ardour of the Sikh levies, in firing when the first outbreak occurred, precipitated the murders and frightened all, good, bad, or indifferently disposed, to flight. From subsequent statements, since taken down, it is concurrently admitted that a fanatic of the name of Prakash Singh, *alias* Prakash Pandey, rushed out of his hut brandishing a sword, and bawling out to his comrades to rise and kill the Feringees, selected as his own victim the kind-hearted major. . . . .

"Another panic arose at Anarkullee, and the thundering of cannon at Meean Meer into the then empty lines of the fugitives spread the utmost alarm. It was taken for granted that the fugitives must flee southwards, and accordingly Captain Blagrove proceeded with a strong party from Lahore to the Hurriki ghat (near to which Sobraon was fought); and from Umritsir was detached in the same

direction a force (one hundred and fifty Punjab infantry and some Tawana horse) under Lieutenant Boswell, a rough and ready soldier, who was superior to all hardships. They had to march in a drenching rain, the country nearly flooded. Sanguine hopes warmed their hearts amid the wretched weather. But, alas for their hopes! intelligence reached the deputy commissioner that the mutineers had made almost due north; perhaps in hopes of getting to Cashmere, perhaps to try their luck and by preconcerted plan to run the gauntlet of those districts in which Hindostanee regiments, some with arms, some without arms, still existed. Suffice it to say, that it was reported at midday, on the 31st of July, that they were trying to skirt the left bank of the Ravee, but had met with unexpected and determined opposition from the telhseeldar, with a posse of police, aided by a swarm of sturdy villagers, at a ghat twenty-six miles from the station. A rapid pursuit was at once organized. At four o'clock, when the district officer arrived with some eighty or ninety horsemen, he found a great struggle had taken place; the gore, the marks of the trampling of hundreds of feet, and the broken banks of the river, which, augmented with the late rains, was sweeping a vast volume, all testified to it. Some hundred and fifty had been shot, mobbed back into the river and drowned inevitably, too weakened and famished as they must have been after their forty miles' flight to battle with the flood. The main body had fled upwards and swam over on pieces of wood, or floated on to an island about a mile from the shore, where they might be descried crouching like a brood of wild fowl. It remained to capture this body, and having done so, to execute condign punishment at once. . . . .

"There were but two boats, both rickety, and the boatmen unskilled. The presence of a good number of Hindostanees among the sowars might lead to embarrassment and accidental escapes. The point was first how to cross this large body to the main land, if they allowed themselves to be captured at all (after the model of the fox, the geese, and the peck of oats). This was not to be done under two or three trips, without leaving two-thirds of the mutineers on the island, under too scanty a protection, and able to escape, while the first batch was being conveyed to the main bank; nor also without launching the first batch when they did arrive, into the jaws of the Hindostanee party, who in the first trip were to be left ostensibly 'to take care of the horses' on the main land. From the desperate conflict which had already taken place, a considerable struggle was anticipated before these plans could be brought into operation. The trans-

lation of the above fable to the aged Sikh sirdar, who accompanied, and to the other heads of the pursuing party, caused intense mirth, and the plan of operations after this formula elicited general approval. So the boats put off with about thirty sowars (dis-mounted of course) in high spirits; most of the Hindostanee sowars being left on the bank. The boats straggled a little, but managed to reach the island in about twenty minutes. It was a long inhospitable patch, with tall grass; a most undesirable place to bivouac on for the night, with a rising tide; especially if wet, dispirited, hungry, without food, fire, or dry clothing. The sun was setting in golden splendour, and as the doomed men with joined palms crowded down to the shore on the approach of the boats, one side of which bristled with about sixty muskets, besides sundry revolvers and pistols, their long shadows were flung far athwart the gleaming waters. In utter despair forty or fifty dashed into the stream and disappeared, rose at a distance, and were borne away into the increasing gloom. Some thirty or forty sowars with matchlocks (subsequently discovered to be of very precarious value) jumped into the shallow water, and invested the lower side of the island, and being seen on the point of taking pot-shots at the heads of the swimmers, orders were given 'not to fire.' This accidental instruction produced an instantaneous effect on the mutineers. They evidently were possessed of a sudden and insane idea that they were going to be tried by court-martial, after some luxurious refreshment. In consequence of which sixty-six stalwart sepoys submitted to be bound by a single man deputed for the purpose from the boats, and stacked like slaves in a hold into one of the two boats emptied for the purpose. Leaving some forty armed sowars on the island, and feeling certain that after the peaceful submission of the first batch (or peck of oats) the rest would follow suit and suit, orders were given to push off. On reaching the shore, one by one, as they stepped out of the boats, all were tightly bound; their decorations and necklaces ignominiously cut off; and, under a guard of a posse of villagers, who had begun to assemble, and some Sikh horse, they were ordered to proceed slowly on their journey back, six miles to the police-station at Ujnalla. Meanwhile the Hindostanees (the geese) had been dispatched to the island back in the boats with an overawing number of Tawana sowars; and it was gratifying to see the next detachment put off safely, though at one time the escorting boat got at a great distance from the escorted, and fears were entertained that escape had been premeditated. However, by

dint of hallooing, with threats of a volley of musketry, the next invoice came safely to land, and were subjected to the same process of spoliation, disrobement, and pinioning. At any moment, had they made an attempt to escape, a bloody struggle must have ensued. But Providence ordered otherwise, and nothing on the side of the pursuing party seemed to go wrong. Some begged that their women and children might be spared, and were informed that the British government did not condescend to war with women and children. The last batch having arrived, the long, straggling party were safely, but slowly, escorted back to the police-station, almost all the road being knee-deep in water. Even this accident, by making the ground so heavy—not to mention the gracious moon, which came out through the clouds and reflected herself in myriad pools and streams, as if to light the prisoners to their fate—aided in preventing a single escape. It was near midnight before all were safely lodged in the police-station. A drizzling rain coming on prevented the commencement of the execution; so a rest until daybreak was announced. Before dawn another batch of sixty-six was brought in, and as the police-station was then nearly full, they were ushered into a large round tower or bastion. Previously to his departure with the pursuing party from Umritsir, the deputy commissioner had ordered out a large supply of rope, in case the numbers captured were few enough for hanging, (trees being scarce), and also a reserve of fifty Sikh levies for a firing party, in case of the numbers demanding wholesale execution, as also to be of use as a reserve in case of a fight on the island. So eager were the Sikhs that they marched straight on end, and he met them half way, twenty-three miles between the river and the police-station, on his journey back in charge of the prisoners, the total number of whom when the execution commenced amounted to two hundred and eighty-two of all ranks, besides numbers of camp followers, who were left to be taken care of by the villagers. As fortune would have it, again favouring audacity, a deep dry well was discovered within one hundred yards of the police-station, and its presence furnished a convenient solution as to the one remaining difficulty, which was of a sanitary consideration—the disposal of the corpses of the dishonoured soldiers. The climax of fortunate coincidences seemed to have arrived when it was remembered that the 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mohammedan sacrificial festival of the Buckra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindostanee Mussulman horsemen

to return to celebrate it at Umritsir, while the single Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature (and the nature of which they had not been made aware of) on the same morrow. When that morrow dawned sentries were placed round the town to prevent the egress of sight seers. The officials were called; and they were made aware of the character of the spectacle they were about to witness.

"Ten by ten the sepoy were called forth. Their names having been taken down in succession, they were pinioned, linked together, and marched to execution; a firing party being in readiness. Every phase of deportment was manifested by the doomed men, after the sullen firing of volleys of distant musketry forced the conviction of inevitable death; astonishment, rage, frantic despair, the most stoic calmness. One detachment, as they passed, yelled to the solitary Anglo-Saxon magistrate, as he sat under the shade of the police-station performing his solemn duty, with his native officials around him, that he, the Christian, would meet the same fate; then, as they passed the reserve of young Sikh soldiery who were to relieve the executioners after a certain period, they danced, though pinioned, insulted the Sikh religion, and called on Gungajee to aid them; but they only in one instance provoked a reply, which was instantaneously checked. Others again petitioned to be allowed to make one last 'salaam' to the sahib. About 150 having been thus executed, one of the executioners swooned away (he was the oldest of the firing-party), and a little respite was allowed. Then proceeding, the number had arrived at 237, when the district officer was informed that the remainder refused to come out of the bastion, where they had been imprisoned temporarily a few hours before. Expecting a rush and resistance, preparations were made against escape; but little expectation was entertained of the real and awful fate which had fallen on the remainder of the mutineers; they had anticipated, by a few short hours, their doom. The doors were opened, and, behold! they were nearly all dead! Unconsciously, the tragedy of Holwell's Black-hole had been re-enacted. No cries had been heard during the night, in consequence of the hubbub, tumult, and shooting of the crowds of horsemen, police, tehsel guards, and excited villagers. Forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light, and consigned, in common with all other bodies, into one common pit, by the hands of the village sweepers. One sepoy only was too much wounded in the

conflict to suffer the agony of being taken to the scene of execution. He was accordingly reprieved for queen's evidence, and forwarded to Lahore, with some forty-one subsequent captures from Umritsir. There, in full parade before the other mutinously-disposed regiments at Meean Meer, they all suffered death by being blown away from the cannon's mouth. The execution at Ujnalla commenced at daybreak, and the stern spectacle was over in a few hours. Thus, within forty-eight hours from the date of the crime, there fell by the law nearly five hundred men."

The reader of these terrible details will not be surprised that indignation was felt by many in England, and regret and grief by all who perused them. Letters were read in the house of commons by Mr. Gilpin, written by Mr. Montgomery and Sir John Lawrence, approving of the conduct of Mr. Cooper, in terms which were not qualified by any reference to the sanguinary vengeance put forth. General Thompson, in a fierce and withering denunciation of all the commissioners, branded the act of Mr. Cooper as one of the most cruel and vindictive recorded in history. The judgment of these events, and of the chief actors in them, pronounced by Lord Stanley, in the debate brought on by Mr. Gilpin in the house of commons, influenced public opinion in England, and brought the controversy to a termination. His lordship thus pronounced his own verdict, as the minister of the crown officially connected with India:—"It is impossible to deny that these transactions to which reference has been made are such as cannot be heard or read, even at this distance of time, without great pain or regret. And I will go further, and say that that pain is greatly increased by the tone and the spirit in which these transactions have been described, both in the despatch written at the time, and in the book subsequently published by the gentleman who gave instructions to the Sikhs engaged in these transactions. There is a tone of flippancy, and an appearance of exultation at that great sacrifice of human life—a sacrifice of life made not in the heat of action, nor after a judicial process—which is utterly at variance with good taste and good feeling. Making all allowances—and we were bound to make the very largest allowances for the circumstances of time and place—it was impossible not to condemn the language in which Mr. Cooper has written of these transactions. What the house has to consider is, not the tone in which Mr. Cooper has written, but the circumstances which took place at Meean Meer. Now, what were the circumstances? The regiment in question, the 26th native infantry, being strongly suspected of an inten-

tion to join in the mutiny, was placed under restraint. It remained under restraint for a period of about six weeks. I think it was on the 28th of July that the attempt to revolt was made. It has been said, in vindication of that attempt, that it was merely an effort on the part of these troops to escape, and that that effort was made because they were to be sent in small parties among a population that was hostile to them, which was tantamount to committing them to inevitable destruction. Now, I apprehend that this is simply a mistake in fact. It is quite true that at a later period regiments were disarmed and discharged in small parties, but no general disarmament of troops had taken place when this outbreak arose. Escape, then, is not the word to apply to such a transaction; and even if it had been a movement of escape on the part of the troops, though a single fugitive may possibly escape in this way, when a large body of men attempt to escape they must be prepared to resist force by force, and the attempt, therefore, on the part of a regiment under these circumstances to escape from the place where they were kept under surveillance would, in fact, on their part, lead to the inference that they were prepared to meet any force that might resist them. It is said that at the time of this outbreak these troops were not in arms. That is undoubtedly the case; but every one who knows India knows that arms are not difficult to be obtained there. They probably would not have succeeded in making their way any very great distance, but it is impossible to describe them as any other than insurgents. When did they make the attempt? the time that Delhi was taken. Every man of them, if they had escaped, would have gone to swell the ranks of the insurgents. At the time of the attempt there was already arrayed against the imperial forces an enormously disproportionate force of sepoys. I say, then, that whatever may have been their motive at the moment of this outbreak, it is impossible to treat it as anything but mutiny and insurrection. Then, it is said that the Sikhs fired upon these troops before the murders were committed. Now, we have not, and probably we never shall have, full and circumstantial evidence of what occurred at the time. But we know this,—we know that an outbreak was expected for some days before. We know that an outbreak actually took place upon that day,—the 30th of July,—and it is only reasonable to suppose that as English officers were present, or, at least, at no great distance, any attack made upon them by the Sikhs was owing to a previous outbreak on their part. But was this outbreak a mere panic, and was it merely by way of self-defence? If that was the case, how came

those two European officers to be murdered as they were? It may be said that those murders were the work of an individual only. We do not find that any attempt was made upon that individual by these sepoys, or that they endeavoured to disconnect themselves in any way from the crime which he had committed. But, admitting that the first murder was the work of an individual only, what was the case as regards the murder of the second officer? A plan was laid to entice him within the lines, and when they had brought him there an attempt was made on his life, with which he narrowly escaped. The object in this case could not be to get rid of an inconvenient witness, for the facts must have been public and notorious; nor was it any immediate danger to which the regiment was exposed. It appears to have been, as far as we can judge, a premeditated murder, and this must be borne in mind in coming to any decision on the facts. It is unfortunately true that out of seven hundred men nearly five hundred suffered death, some by execution. These facts were known, and are referred to in a despatch addressed by Lord Canning to Sir John Lawrence, in which the governor-general states that 'great credit is due to Mr. Cooper for his exertions.' We have evidence that every authority in India regarded this punishment as necessary. Two officers had been murdered by these men without any purpose; the result of the escape of the regiment would have been, that it would have joined the insurgent forces; and a severe example appears to have been necessary, to prevent similar risings elsewhere. Reference has been made to a note addressed to Mr. Cooper by Mr. Montgomery. This note is couched in hasty language; it could not have been deliberately employed. In that note it appears there was a large force in the neighbourhood; they were troops of the same garrison; they were similarly disarmed, but under the same temptation to rise, and not unlikely to yield to it. Probably Sir John Lawrence and those in command thought, if a severe punishment were inflicted on the first body, as an example, it might prevent a similar mutiny by other regiments, and, in the end, be the saving of many lives. I have now stated what I apprehend may fairly be stated in vindication or palliation of the course pursued, but in stating my sincere conviction on the subject, I cannot but wish that an indiscriminate execution of these men had not taken place, that some selection had been made, that there had been some previous investigation. But it is one thing to wish that an act of this kind had not been done, and another thing to pass a formal censure upon it. Only

by great exertions—by the employment of force, by making striking examples, and inspiring terror—could Sir J. Lawrence save the Punjaub; and if the Punjaub had gone the whole of India would have been lost with it. Sir John Lawrence has declared this act was necessary; and the governor-general has confirmed the opinion. Taking all this into consideration, and remembering that we, at this distance of time and place, are hardly fair judges of the feelings of men engaged in such a conflict, I hope the house will pass over the transaction with that silence which is sometimes the most judicious comment."

By great determination and decision Sir John Lawrence and his coadjutors, whose co-operation was most efficient, saved the Punjaub, especially by the plans adopted of raising troops and disposing of them. This was more particularly exemplified in the western provinces of Sir John Lawrence's government. Peshawur, bordering on Affghanistan, was at first supposed to be in the greatest danger; but events proved otherwise, by bringing out the administrative talents of the officials, civil and military, in that region. There were fourteen thousand men in the British pay in military occupation of the western frontier province. Three thousand were Europeans, infantry and artillery. Eleven thousand were Bengal troops, of which three thousand were cavalry and artillery. There was also a small force of Sikhs, and of those mountaineers who are half Affghans and half Punjaubees. The hill tribes which inhabited the neighbourhood of the great passes were partly in the pay of Colonel Edwardes, and were ready at that officer's call to serve the government in the field. On the 13th of May, Major-general Reid, commanding at Peshawur, received a telegraphic communication concerning the mutiny at Meerut. He instantly called a council of war, in which he was assisted by Brigadiers Chamberlain and Cotton, and Colonels Edwardes and Nicholson. It was resolved that Major-general Reid should assume the command of all the troops in the Punjaub, that Brigadier Cotton should be placed in command of the forces in the province of Peshawur, and that a flying column should be formed at Jhelum, from which point expeditions were to be undertaken against any part of the territory of the Punjaub menaced by mutiny or insurrection. The troops composing this column it was agreed should be composed of as few sepoys as possible. Europeans, Sikhs, Affghans, borderers, &c., were, as far as procurable, to constitute the force. The following troops were its constituents:—Her majesty's 27th foot, from Nowsherah; her majesty's

24th foot, from Rawul Pindee; one troop European horse artillery, from Peshawur; one light field-battery, from Jhelum; the guide corps, from Murdan; the 16th irregular cavalry, from Rawul Pindee; the 1st Punjaub infantry, from Bunnoo; the Kumaon battalion, from Rawul Pindee; a wing of the 2nd Punjaub cavalry, from Kohat; a half company of sappers, from Attock.

At Peshawur every military precaution was taken to secure treasury, ammunition, and stores from the hand of the incendiary and from sudden capture. Colonel Edwardes found enthusiastic support among the hill men, who flocked to his banners in great numbers, and supported the authorities, not only with zeal, but enthusiasm.

On the 21st of May startling news reached Peshawur; the 55th native infantry had mutinied. The 27th (Enniskilleners) had been removed from Nowsherah, to form a portion of the movable column; this encouraged the 55th, stationed at Murdan, to hope that it might revolt with impunity. They placed their officers under arrest. The colonel, Spottiswoode, committed suicide from grief and mortification that his corps, of which he thought so highly, had become rebellious. Immediately on receiving this news, the authorities at Peshawur resolved to disarm the Bengal regiments on the morning of the 22nd. This was effected with great skill, military and political. Three native infantry regiments, the 24th, 27th, and 51st, and one cavalry regiment, the 5th, were compelled to lay down their arms. A subahdar major of the 51st was hanged for treason and mutiny. The disarmed sepoys were placed under guard of European and Sikh troops. This accomplished, relief was sent to Murdan; the 55th was attacked there, two hundred of them killed or taken, and the rest dispersed in flight. The fugitives sought the hills, where they expected help; but the tribes there, under the influence of Colonel Edwardes, seized such of them as escaped the sword and shot of the pursuing English. The captives were brought back to Murdan, and in parties of five and ten were blown away from guns. Four other regiments of Bengal soldiers were disarmed in the fort garrisons, originally placed at the foot of the hills, to keep in check the hill marauders, who had grown so loyal under the clever management of Edwardes. Some of the disarmed regiments were disbanded, and sent away in small parties. Several natives of influence, Brahmin or Mohammedan fanatics, were arrested, and upon proof of their treason from their own letters, hung.

Sir John Lawrence urged upon Viscount

Canning the adoption, east of the Sutlej, of the means of pacification which had been so successful in his own hands; but the governor-general did not approve of recommendations which were as triumphantly successful as they were obviously sensible. Sir John's plan of meeting the difficulty of a free press at such a season was as different from that of Lord Canning as were all his other measures. Sir John arranged to supply the papers with authentic political intelligence, so as to prevent useless alarms and dangerous speculations. The press co-operated with his government, and the advantage was signal. Had Lord Canning adopted measures as rational and liberal, he would not have incurred the hostility of the whole of the English press in India, and of a large portion of it in England.

While Sir John and his gallant and able coadjutors met all difficulties which arose in the Punjaub, they were harassed with care in relation to the regions beyond the frontiers of their own government. Oude and the Agra regions kept them in continual alarm. Delhi being, at first, the grand centre of rebellion, it became necessary to unite all the available forces in the north-west against it. From causes over which Sir John Lawrence had no control, the reign of insurrection and disorder was permitted to prevail in the once gorgeous capital of Hindostan for a period which made vengeance slow, and reflected dishonour upon the military management of a people whose courage, perseverance, and enterprise had made them masters of India. While supineness, fickleness, time-serving, and incompetency characterized the proceedings of the English authorities, civil and military, the Delhi raj was active and energetic. The roads were kept open by armed patrols to favour the approach of fresh mutineers, and of armed natives from every quarter, while the communications of the English were cut off. Had Havelock had the men in the cantonments at Meerut, or at Umballah, he would have marched upon Delhi, and swept the city of those hordes of ill-governed men who were without a single leader of military talent. While the English did nothing, and appeared not to know what to attempt, the new government of Delhi adopted bold and efficient means for spreading revolt in the British army, and disaffection in all the populations of Upper Bengal. The following proclamation, which was issued extensively, and by numerous copies, shows the spirit of the ministers of the Delhi ruler, and the earnestness with which his aims and those of his adherents were prosecuted. A Mohammedan native paper in Calcutta daringly pub-

lished it; wandering dervishes, Brahmins, and fakeers spread copies of the document from Peshawur to Fort William with extraordinary rapidity, and, finally, circulated it all over India. Merchants, bankers, and men whose calling and position might well be supposed to attach them to the company's rule, were suspected of multiplying copies of the proclamation, and of wishing at heart for the success of the revolution. This document had great effect among the Punjaubees of the Brahminical and Mohammedan religions, but had not any influence over those of the Sikh faith:—

Be it known to all the Hindoos and Mohammedans, the subjects and servants on the part of the officers of the English forces stationed at Delhi and Meerut, that all the Europeans are united in this point—first, to deprive the army of their religion; and then, by the force of strong measures, to Christianize all the subjects. In fact, it is the absolute orders of the governor-general to serve out cartridges made up with swine and beef fat. If there be 10,000 who resist this, to blow them up; if 50,000, to disband them.

For this reason we have, merely for the sake of the faith, concerted with all the subjects, and have not left one infidel of this place alive; and have constituted the Emperor of Delhi upon this engagement, that whichever of the troops will slaughter all their European officers, and pledge allegiance to him, shall always receive double salary. Hundreds of cannon and immense treasure have come to hand; it is therefore requisite that all who find it difficult to become Christians, and all subjects, will unite cordially with the army, take courage, and not leave the seed of these devils in any place.

All the expenditure that may be incurred by the subjects in furnishing supplies to the army, they will take receipts for the same from the officers of the army, and retain them by themselves—they will receive double price from the emperor. Whoever will at this time give way to pusillanimity, and allow himself to be overreached by these deceivers, and depend upon their word, will experience the fruits of their submission, like the inhabitants of Lucknow. It is therefore necessary that all Hindoos and the Mohammedans should be of one mind in this struggle, and make arrangements for their preservation with the advice of some creditable persons. Wherever the arrangements shall be good, and with whomsoever the subjects shall be pleased, those individuals shall be placed in high offices in those places.

And to circulate copies of this proclamation in every place, as far as it may be possible, be not understood to be less than a stroke of the sword. That this proclamation be stuck up at a conspicuous place, in order that all Hindoos and Mohammedans may become apprised and be prepared.

If the infidels now become mild it is merely an expedient to save their lives. Whoever will be deluded with their frauds he will repent. Our reign continues. Thirty rupees to a mounted, and ten rupees to a foot soldier, will be the salary of the new servants of Delhi.

The intense bigotry of this production shows the grand motive-power of the rebellion. The allusion to the conduct of the British at Lucknow by the annexation of Oude, proved how thoroughly that event sank into the hearts, lived in the memories, and exasperated the fanaticism of the sepoys. This

missive produced much agitation in the Punjaub, and on the hill frontiers, but Edwardes kept his hill men loyal; and the Affghans had too recently tasted the danger of war with the English to try it so soon again. Sir John Lawrence, subduing every element of discontent in the Punjaub, devoted his energies to enable the army before Delhi to subdue that city. The army from Umballah, sent to besiege Delhi, had been augmented on its way by troops from the hill stations, British and Goorkhas, and by troops sent forward from the Punjaub. Among these reinforcements was the corps of guides. This was a local Punjaubee force, raised after the campaigns on the Sutlej, to act either as guides, or as regular troops, as occasion might require. They were recruited from all the tribes of Northern India and its frontiers, but more especially from all the tribes inhabiting the Punjaub, and from contiguous countries, British and independent. They were picked men in stature and appearance, and regard to their intellectual acquirements was also had in their selection. These were marched from the frontiers of Affghanistan to join the army of General Barnard. When Sir John Lawrence, and the other Punjaub commissioners, heard that the insurgents of Meerut marched upon Delhi, they rightly concluded that such a corps as the guides would be of great use, and Sir John so arranged as to send them with the utmost celerity. They marched to Umballah, sixty-eight miles in thirty-eight hours. After resting there until the staff of the army made arrangements for their further progress, they joined the army in the field, after another astonishing display of their marching capabilities by day and night, and under the burning sun of a climate and a season so trying to soldiers. And from that time forth until Delhi fell, Sir John never ceased to conduce to that catastrophe by all the supplies and reinforcements which care, foresight, enterprise, and activity could accomplish.

The Punjaub remained in peace during the further progress of the insurrection in other regions. Scinde, the neighbouring province to the Punjaub, also enjoyed undisturbed repose. The chief commissioner, Mr. Frere, displayed great ability, and General Jacobs preserved the loyalty of the army, more especially of the troopers of the Scinde horse, some sixteen hundred men, who were chiefly Mohammedans. One Bengal regiment in the province entered into a conspiracy to murder the few European officers of the Scinde horse. Captain Merewether, with the alacrity and courage for which he won reputation, seized the ringleaders, executed them, and quelled

at once all disposition to disturb the loyalty of the Scinde horse.

Such was the progress of the great Indian mutiny; it remains yet to show how it was extinguished. In the Punjaub and Scinde it will be seen that it was crushed as soon as it showed itself. In Allahabad and a few other places it met with a similar fate, as already related; but at Delhi, Cawnpore, and throughout Oude it was triumphant, and stern conflicts and protracted campaigns were necessary to trample it out. In other chapters the siege and capture of Delhi, the re-conquest of Cawnpore, the defence of Lucknow, and the campaigns in Oude and Central India will be related. Before approaching those subjects, it is desirable to present the reader with the most authentic returns made by the India-house and the board of control as to the number and quality of the troops, distinguishing European from native, in India at the time the revolt broke out.

Bengal Army, May 10, 1857.

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Presidency . . . . .	1,214	13,976	15,190
Dinapore . . . . .	1,597	15,063	16,660
Cawnpore . . . . .	277	5,725	6,002
Oude . . . . .	993	11,319	12,312
Saugor . . . . .	327	10,627	10,954
Meerut . . . . .	3,096	18,357	21,453
Sirhind . . . . .	4,790	11,049	15,839
Lahore . . . . .	4,018	15,939	19,957
Peshawur . . . . .	4,613	15,916	20,529
Pegu . . . . .	1,763	692	2,455
	22,698	118,663	141,361

The above shows the number of men in the military divisions or districts named.

Several of the garrison towns gave name to a military division of territory, but itself contained only a moderate garrison. For instance, the military division or district of Dinapore is represented in the above list as containing 16,660 men, whereas the garrison town or cantonment of that name had only 4000 men. The stations which contained the largest numbers of Bengal troops were the following :—

Peshawur . . . . .	9,500	Sealkote . . . . .	3,500
Lahore . . . . .	5,300	Benares . . . . .	3,200
Meerut . . . . .	5,000	Rawul Pindie . . . . .	3,200
Lucknow . . . . .	5,000	Bareilly . . . . .	3,000
Jullundur . . . . .	4,000	Mooltan . . . . .	3,000
Dinapore . . . . .	4,000	Saugor . . . . .	2,800
Umballah . . . . .	3,800	Agra . . . . .	2,700
Cawnpore . . . . .	3,700	Nowsherah . . . . .	2,600
Delhi . . . . .	3,600	Jhelum . . . . .	2,400
Barrackpore . . . . .	3,500	Allahabad . . . . .	2,300

The number of soldiers in the Punjaub was 40,000. As to the whole of the Bengal provinces, the troops were stationed at 160 cantonments, garrisons, or other places. The Europeans comprised 2271 commissioned

officers, 1602 non-commissioned officers, and 18,815 rank and file; the natives comprised 2325 commissioned officers, 5821 non-commissioned officers, and 110,517 rank and file.

*Madras Army, May 10, 1857.*

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Centre . . . . .	1,580	6,430	8,010
Mysore . . . . .	1,088	4,504	5,592
Malabar . . . . .	604	2,513	3,117
Northern . . . . .	215	6,169	6,384
Southern . . . . .	726	5,718	6,444
Ceded Districts . . . .	135	2,519	2,674
South Mahratta . . . .	16	375	391
Nagpoor . . . . .	369	3,505	3,874
Nizam's . . . . .	1,322	5,027	6,349
Penang and Malacca . . .	49	2,113	2,162
Pegu . . . . .	2,880	10,154	13,034
	10,194	49,737	59,931

These troops were dispersed in about forty stations. Pegu was a non-regulation province of Bengal, but it was, as the list shows, garrisoned by Madras troops. This arose from the convenience of sending them from Madras across the Bay of Bengal. Those sepoy remained loyal. There were 2000

Madras troops on service in Persia and China not enumerated in the above list.

*Bombay Army, May 10, 1857.*

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bombay Garrison . . . .	695	3,394	4,089
Southern . . . . .	283	5,108	5,391
Poonah . . . . .	1,838	6,817	8,655
Northern . . . . .	1,154	6,452	7,606
Asseerghur Fortress . . .	2	446	448
Scinde . . . . .	1,087	6,072	7,159
Rajpootana . . . . .	50	3,312	3,362
	5,109	31,601	36,710

About 5000 of the above numbers were Bengal or Madras sepoys. About 14,000 men belonging to the Bombay army were absent, garrisoning Aden or Bushire, in the Persian Gulf. In all India, on the 10th of May, when the sepoys rose in arms at Meerut, there were soldiers, 238,002 in the service of the company, of whom 38,001 were Europeans, and 200,001 natives; 19 Europeans to 100 natives. Such were the military elements amidst which the great struggle began.

## CHAPTER CXXXI.

ADVANCE OF A BRITISH ARMY AGAINST DELHI—SIEGE OF THE CITY—EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE BRITISH FROM DEFECTIVE MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND WANT OF INTELLIGENCE—THE SIEGE—BOMBARDMENT—STORM—CAPTURE OF THE KING OF DELHI, HIS BEGUM, AND HER SON, BY CAPTAIN HODSON—CAPTURE OF TWO OF THE KING'S SONS, AND GRANDSON—ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THEM—THEY ARE SHOT BY CAPTAIN HODSON—DEATH OF BRITISH OFFICERS OF TALENT AND DISTINCTION.

ON the death of General Anson, the command in chief of the army devolved upon General Sir H. Barnard, K.C.B., who had served as chief of the staff with the army in the Crimea. He arrived before Delhi on the 8th of June. One of the native regiments deserted in a body, entered the city, aided in its defence, and headed a fierce assault upon the British almost immediately upon their arrival. When Sir H. Barnard arrived before Delhi, he found that his army was unable to effect anything for want of guns. When the guns arrived there were no gunners, and no other men who knew how to fire the cannon; a fresh delay took place in order to obtain a supply of artillerymen. Sir Henry was not permitted to take up a position before Delhi unopposed. When the army was within four miles of the city, it came upon a village called Bardulla Serai. The guides and some other detachments remained at different distances in the rear, the force which formed the

encampment consisted of—Head-quarters and six companies of her majesty's 60th rifles; ditto, and nine companies of her majesty's 75th foot; 1st Bengal European fusiliers; 2nd ditto, head-quarters and six companies; Sirmoor battalion (Goorkhas), a wing; head-quarters detachment sappers and miners; her majesty's 9th lancers; ditto 6th dragoon guards (carabiniers), two squadrons; horse artillery, one troop of 1st brigade; ditto, two troops of 3rd brigade; foot artillery, two companies; and No. 14 horse battery; artillery recruits, detachment. The British arrived near the place already named before dawn, and descried thence the lines of watch-fires where the sepoy outposts bivouacked. While the advance guard was feeling its way in the darkness, guns and mortars opened upon them; the sepoys had information of the advance, and did not wait to be attacked within the city or the lines, which they had resolved to defend. As dawn began to break the English reconnoitred,

and found the enemy intrenched, the intrenchments armed with heavy guns well manned. It became necessary to attack in force. The assailants were divided into three columns, under Brigadiers Showers, Graves, and Grant. The first was ordered to advance on the main trunk road; the second to take the left of the same road; the third to cross the canal, and stealthily gain the rear of the enemy's position, and upon a given signal to attack. The guns were placed on each side of the main trunk road, but in very exposed situations. The English advanced, and were met by a fire the most steady and well directed; round shot and shell, succeeded by grape and canister, caused considerable loss, and it soon became evident that the fire of the English guns was not sufficient to silence that of the intrenchments. The 75th and 1st regiments (Europeans) were ordered to charge the guns, and in doing so, passed at double quick over open ground swept by the cannonade. The guns were reached; such of the gunners as fled not were bayoneted or sabred. The combinations of the British general were carried out by his brigadiers effectively, and the enemy, out-generaled, fled utterly discomfited, leaving all the guns behind them. Colonels Chester and Welchman behaved very gallantly, the former, acting adjutant-general, was killed by a cannon-ball.

The sun was now pouring his rays upon the field so lately contested, and the heat began to be excessive, but Sir Henry believed that the only safe course was to follow up the first blow, and prevent the sepoys from rallying or returning to the ground they had occupied. He advanced his whole force at six o'clock in the morning, ordering Brigadier Showers and Archdale Wilson to proceed by the main road with two columns of the army, while he, with a brigade under General Graves, turned off through the old cantonments, the scene of revolt and massacre the previous month. Both divisions of the army had to fight their way step by step, so determined was the resistance of the mutineers. As the British approached they perceived that a rocky ridge in front of the northern face of the city was occupied by the rebels in great force, especially of artillery. The commander-in-chief resolved by a flank movement to turn the right of this ridge, and relied for success upon the capacity of his troops to accomplish this movement with rapidity, and a strict preservation of the order of advance. Sir Henry led on the 60th rifles, commanded by Captain Jones, the 2nd Europeans, under Captain Boyd, and a troop of horse artillery, under Captain Money. He accomplished the manœuvre in the most skilful and gallant style, ascending the ridge, turning

the enemy's flank, and sweeping the mutineers from the whole line of their position, which was strewn with guns, arms, and accoutrements, as the coasts of Southern India covered with wrecks and surf under the blasts of the monsoon. The enemy lost twenty-six guns, a fine camp equipage, which the military stores of Delhi had supplied, and a large stock of ammunition. Brigadiers Wilson and Showers, advancing along the main road, ascended the ridge when the conquest had been effected. Besides Colonel Chester, already named, the slain in both actions were:—Captains Delamain and Russell, and Lieutenant Harrison. The wounded comprised Colonel Herbert; Captains Dawson and Greville; Lieutenants Light, Hunter, Davidson, Hare, Fitzgerald, Barter, Rivers, and Ellis; and Ensign Pym. In all, officers and privates, there were fifty-one killed and one hundred and thirty-three wounded. Nearly fifty horses were either killed or wounded. Among the captured articles was found a cart, supposed by the captors to contain ammunition, but which when examined was found to be filled with the mangled limbs and trunks of Christians slaughtered during the insurrection within the city and cantonments.

During the conflict several Europeans were seen heading the mutineers. Various speculations were set afloat by this circumstance. A few believed them to be French, more generally they were thought to be Russians; some officers averred that both French and Russians were there, judging from their appearance and bearing—this was the general impression, although the idea that they were British deserters was also entertained. Vengeance was vowed against these men, all resolving to give them no quarter.

The British soon found that Delhi was not to be taken by a *coup*. That might have been done had General Hewett the skill and spirit to have followed the mutineers from Meerut; the massacre had then never taken place, some of the troops would not have revolted, and Delhi would not have become the stronghold of insurrection. On the 8th of June the place was made too strong to be conquered by storm. If the reader will consult Captain Lawrence's military plan of Delhi and its cantonments (the unpublished plans of the late East India Company), the positions of the defences can be better understood than by letter-press description.

The position taken by Sir Henry Barnard's army was that of the former cantonments, not quite two miles from the northern wall of the city. A rocky ridge interposed between it and the city, and this was occupied by English outposts. On the extreme left of the line

of posts established on this range was the Flagstaff Tower; on the extreme right was a house with a square courtyard, and a baugh or garden. This was called Hindoo Rao's house; in the centre was an old mosque. The ridge of elevated ground did not maintain a parallel between the city and the cantonments, the right from the British lines being much nearer to the enemy. From the right extreme of the ridge the ground descended sharply, so that the post of Hindoo Rao's house and garden was regarded as very important, and three batteries were placed there, supported in successive positions by the rifles, guides, and Goorkhas. The house was very strong, the batteries were carefully placed, and the positions of the supporting infantry were well screened. As time wore on, the British were in a situation similar to that which they had occupied before Sebastopol—they were the besieged rather than the besiegers. The city was not invested, reinforcements of rebels constantly arrived, whilst those of the British came up slowly and in small detachments. Sorties were made on a grand scale; the English were obliged to stand on the defensive, and much time was consumed without anything being effected. The result of such a state of things all over India was disastrous. The universal belief of the natives was that the English could not take Delhi, and from all quarters accessions of force reached the Mogul capital, while insurrection was everywhere fomented in the name of the emperor.

Scarcely had the English taken up their new position when they were attacked. On the 9th a strong force advanced against the ridge and was repulsed promptly and with little loss. Captain Quintin Battye of the guides, an officer of great promise, was mortally wounded. The guides distinguished themselves in driving the mutineers from a position on the ridge which they attained by the celerity of their movements, and where alone they fought with any obstinacy. The 10th was spent in skirmishing.

On the 12th two columns moved out, one against each flank of the ridge. They were signally defeated, Major Jacobs especially distinguishing himself. Several hundreds of the enemy were put *hors de combat*. The mutineers were strengthened by two regiments, one of cavalry and one of infantry, from Rohilcund, who marched into the city with colours flying and bands playing, the European drummers and fifers having been compelled to play them in. This scene tended to discourage the native troops in the English lines. On the 13th, a place called Metcalfe House, near the British left, was occupied by the rebels, who immediately began to fortify it. They were

enabled to do so unmolested. On the 17th a fire was opened by the mutineer artillery against the English right, striking the house of Hindoo Rao, and killing and wounding some officers and men on duty. The enemy were also observed erecting a battery at a large building known as the Eedghal. The rifles and Goorkhas, supported by cavalry and horse artillery, drove out the enemy, but not until after a sharp combat. The 19th of June was a day of intense anxiety. The rear of the British lines was guarded by Brigadier Grant. Information fortunately reached him that two regiments of mutineers, lately arrived from Nusseerabad, had volunteered, supported by cavalry and artillery, to fall upon the rear of the English. Grant reconnoitred, and found the enemy still stronger than his information led him to believe, within half a mile of his position. He attacked them; they fought in the confidence of numbers, and seldom behaved so well when under British command. The contest ended in favour of the English, but not until many gallant men fell killed and wounded. Among the slain was Colonel Yule, of the 9th lancers; he had fallen wounded, and was found next morning with his throat cut, and stabs and gashes all over his person. Lieutenant Alexander was also killed. Captain Daly and six subalterns were wounded; nineteen privates were killed, and seventy-seven wounded. Several, both Europeans and natives, among the common soldiers behaved with signal valour. Sir Henry Barnard displayed remarkable care, caution, and vigilance. He brought in safely his convoys, reconnoitred every movement of the foe, and guarded his lines at every point.

The 23rd of June was a day of importance. It was the anniversary of the battle of Plassey, and the mutineers desired to mark the day, by some desperate effort, as one of humiliation to the English. It was also a Mohammedan and a Hindoo holiday; thus various motives combined to incite the enemy to a grand attack. The columns of the enemy maintained renewed assaults throughout the whole day, and the position of the English was at times critical. A plan had been laid to come upon the English rear, but the previous night the bridges over the canal had been broken down by the English sappers, which frustrated the attempt, and kept a considerable number of the enemy fruitlessly occupied. The heat was so great that many officers and men fell down exhausted, and some were the victims of *coup de soleil*. At one o'clock in the afternoon the mutineers made a fierce attack upon a position occupied by the guides, who were left without ammunition—a common occurrence in British armies. The delay which occurred in pro-

curing a supply for the gallant guides would probably have proved fatal, but a Sikh regiment opportunely arriving from the Punjaub, advanced to the position, and routed a far superior force of the enemy.

The 1st European regiment was engaged in a desperate contest in the suburbs, where, from house to house, a sanguinary conflict raged. The total loss of the British was thirty-nine killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded; among the former were Lieutenant Jackson, among the latter Colonel Welchman, Captain Jones, and Lieutenant Money. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, and they appeared for several days to be discouraged, but their reinforcements were so large that they again gained heart; while the English, scarcely able to maintain their position, sick, exhausted with fatigue, inadequately supplied with the necessaries of an army, were dispirited. There is a tone of despondency in the despatches of Sir Henry, which shows that he was apprehensive of the destruction of his army unless speedy succour arrived. By the end of June the mutineers had surrounded Delhi with batteries. The English had only fifteen siege guns and mortars, placed in batteries too distant to effect anything. The European troops were only three thousand; the Hindoo cavalry and infantry, few in number, were not trusted, and the guns were worked chiefly by men of that sort, who proved themselves inferior to the artillerymen among the mutineers. The guides, Sikhs, and Goorkhas, taken together, did not amount to five thousand men; but there was confidence in them, and they fought well.

When Sir John Lawrence had suppressed revolt in the Punjaub, he sent up the depots of the regiments before Delhi, and some flank companies, also fresh battalions of Punjaubees, guides, and Sikhs, and what Goorkha corps were in his province and available, also a wing of the 61st European regiment, which was followed by detachments of others; he kept the communications open, and thus provisions and medicines were obtainable. Food became plentiful, and the army was healthy when July began. Sir Henry and his troops felt that the Punjaub was a safe and sufficient base of support, and hope once more brightened the countenances of the besiegers. Notwithstanding that there were so many causes to cheer the English, there were still these two discouraging circumstances,—volunteers and mutineers flocked from all parts to augment the rebel garrison, and so great were the resources of the place, that the enemy had everything required for their defence. It became obvious that Lieutenant Willoughby had not destroyed so much ammunition as was sup-

posed; the explosion, however destructive to life among the marauders, left intact vast resources of guns and ammunition.

On the 1st of July an attack was made upon Hindoo Rao's house by about five thousand sepoys. The officer in command had but 150 men, guides; Major Reid, who commanded the pickets on the extreme right, sent him 150 of the rifles, and these three hundred men maintained for twenty-two hours a combat against nearly twenty times their number, and at last the enemy retired. Animadversions were made throughout the army upon the arrangements which left a post so important to be defended for so long a time by so few men, against a whole division of the enemy, especially as Brigadier Chamberlain and some reinforcements had arrived that morning.

The next morning Rohilcund regiments of mutineers, from Bareilly, Moorshedabad, and Shahjehanpore, amounting to five regiments, and a battery of artillery, marched into Delhi, with bands playing and flags flying. This reinforcement led the king and the mutineers to believe that they would be able to expel the English from the neighbourhood, and the Bareilly leader was named commander-in-chief. That night the Bareilly force undertook an expedition in the rear of the English, for the twofold object of cutting off their communications with the Punjaub, and capturing their depot at Alipore. Major Pope and a strong detachment attacked them, and drove them back to the city; the major's force with difficulty effected this end, for the rebels fought with confidence and obstinacy, and the English returned utterly exhausted, having suffered severely.

On the 4th of July Colonel Baird Smith arrived to take charge of the engineer staff. On the 5th General Barnard died, worn out with fatigue, and having proved himself a careful and a brave commander, and capable of handling a small force on the defensive against a more numerous enemy with judgment and patience. Major-general Reid assumed the command, to which, from ill-health, he was unequal.

In July the English were exposed to a new danger. There were two Hindoo regiments with the force, and in the Punjaub regiments there were many; suspicion fell upon them; a plot was detected, a Brahmin was hung for attempting to induce the soldiers to shoot their officers; a large portion of the Hindoos joined the enemy when skirmishing, the rest were *paid-up and dismissed the service, and thus allowed to go into Delhi, and swell the ranks of its garrison.*

The English established a picket in the

Sulzee Munde suburbs; on the 14th of July this was attacked, and the house of Hindoo Rao, in great force. The defenders had to maintain a long and unequal contest, and were left to do so without help for a great length of time; the help at last sent was inadequate, but by sheer dint of hard fighting, Brigadier Showers and his European and Punjaub infantry drove away the enemy. The killed and wounded of the English exceeded two hundred men.

The weather changed, and much rain fell, when sickness came upon the army, and it was found that the hot season was more healthy than the cooler but damp period by which it was followed. By the end of July the sick amounted to twelve hundred men, and the rest were kept perpetually on the alert, although Sir John Lawrence had sent nearly three thousand men during the last fortnight into the north, one third of whom were European fusiliers.

Major-general Reid despaired of the capture of Delhi, and his health no longer allowed of the exertion required from the commander of such an army. He resigned, and the chief command devolved upon Brigadier-general Wilson, who, as a good artillerist and a plodding, painstaking, persevering man, was considered capable for the operation, although not regarded as an officer adapted to the conduct of a diversified campaign. One officer said of him that "he was born to take Delhi, and for no other purpose." When General Wilson took the command, he and General Showers were the only generals in perfect health. One hundred and one officers had been killed and died of sun-stroke, cholera, wounds, or were then sick or wounded. Only 8000 men remained of the original army and reinforcements, half of whom were European. Of those called artillerymen, many were natives, of little use except for physical strength; and the Punjaub sappers and miners were merely unskilled labourers. The entire force, according to General Wilson's report to Mr. Colvin, was:—

<i>Infantry—</i>		<i>Officers and Men.</i>
H.M. 8th foot head-quarters	. . . . .	198
H.M. 61st foot	" . . . . .	296
H.M. 75th foot	" . . . . .	513
H.M. 60th Rifles	" . . . . .	299
1st European Bengal Fusiliers	. . . . .	520
2nd " "	" . . . . .	556
Guide Infantry	. . . . .	275
Sirmoor battalion, Goorkhas	. . . . .	296
1st Punjaub Infantry	. . . . .	725
4th Sikh Infantry	. . . . .	345
		—4023
<i>Cavalry—</i>		
H.M. Carabiniers	. . . . .	153
H.M. 9th Lancers	. . . . .	428
Guide Cavalry	. . . . .	338

1st Punjaub Cavalry	. . . . .	148
2nd " "	" . . . . .	110
5th " "	(at Alipore) . . . . .	116
		—1293

*Artillery and Engineers—*

Artillery, European and native	. . . . .	1129
Bengal Sappers and Miners	. . . . .	209
Punjaub " "	" . . . . .	264
		—1602
		6918

Besides these effectives there were as non-effectives 765 sick, 351 wounded—1116.

General Wilson at once adopted means of discovering the numbers and quality of the troops opposed to him, which he thus reported:—Bengal native infantry—3rd, 9th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 20th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 36th, 38th, 44th, 45th, 54th, 57th, 60th, 61st, 67th, 68th, 72nd, 74th, 78th. Other native infantry—5th and 7th Gwalior contingent, Kotah contingent, Hurrianah battalion, together with 2600 miscellaneous infantry. Native cavalry—portions of five or six regiments, besides others of the Gwalior and Malwah contingents. There arrived in the city mutinous regiments from Meerut, Hansi, Muttra, Lucknow, Nusserabad, Jullundur, Ferozepore, Bareilly, Jhansi, Gwalior, Neemuch, Allypurg, Agra, Rohtuk, Jhuggur, and Allahabad. The numbers were estimated by General Wilson at 15,000 infantry, of whom 12,000 were sepoys, the remainder volunteers; 4000 cavalry, well horsed, and well disciplined. The artillery were numerous in proportion, and had every description of supply. The perpetual combats reduced the number of General Wilson's effective troops, notwithstanding the reinforcements which gradually arrived from the Punjaub through the indefatigable industry and good management of Sir John Lawrence and his colleagues. On the 8th of August Brigadier-general Nicholson arrived with the advance guard of a brigade, organized under his command in the Punjaub, and which in that region had rendered most important services. On the 14th the main body of the brigade arrived. It consisted of her majesty's 52nd (light infantry), the wing of her majesty's 61st, which had remained in the Punjaub when the other wing had been sent on to Delhi, the 2nd Punjaub infantry, two hundred horse from Mooltan, and some guns. The brigade numbered eleven hundred Europeans, and fourteen hundred Punjaubees. This accession of force was a great relief to the overworked soldiers, wearied with combat and exposure to the sun, but it was too small to enable General Wilson to make any attempt upon Delhi. General Nicholson, however, brought the welcome tidings that Sir John

Lawrence had organized a new siege train at Ferozepore, which was on its way to enable General Wilson to subdue the fire of the city. The arrival of General Nicholson inspired new life in the English camp. He was an officer of extraordinary energy, and of the bravest courage.

On the night of the 14th of August an occasion arose for putting his military excellence to the test. A detachment of the mutineers was observed by General Wilson to move along the Rohtuk road, with the object, as the general supposed, of reaching Sorreeput, or of disturbing the Jheered rajah, who was faithful to the English, and procured them supplies. Hodson's horse, already a terror to the "pandies," went out after them, and turning aside, by a flank movement, got before their line of march, and after a desperate battle, dispersed them. The escape of a lady, the wife of a civil officer of the company, to the English lines on the 19th, caused great animation among the troops. She was probably the only European that had remained alive in the place up to that time.

#### BATTLE OF NUJUFFGHUR.

Soon after Nicholson's arrival, it was his fortune to have an opportunity of showing his ability to command. General Wilson received information that a strong force of mutineers was dispatched by night to Bahadoorghur, for the purpose of intercepting the siege train from the Punjaub. This force was commanded by Bukhtor Singh, who had distinguished himself in promoting the revolt at Bareilly (to be related elsewhere). General Wilson committed to his newly-arrived and intrepid young brigadier the task of meeting Bukhtor Singh, dispersing his force, and clearing the way for the siege-train. The troops placed at Nicholson's disposal were—

H.M. 9th Lancers	(Captain Sarrell)	One squadron.
Guide cavalry	(Captain Sandford)	120 men.
2nd Punjaub cavalry		80 "
Mooltan horse		
H.M. 61st foot	(Colonel Renny)	420 "
1st Bengal Europeans	(Major Jacob)	380 "
1st Punjaub infantry	(Coke's)	400 "
2nd Punjaub infantry	(Green's)	400 "
Sappers and Miners		30 "
Horse artillery	(Tomb's & Olphert's)	Sixteen guns.
Captain (now Major) Olphert being ill, the command of his troop was taken by Captain Remington.		

With these he sallied forth at dawn on the 25th of August, crossed two swamps, and effected a rapid march through other difficulties, until he reached a place half way between Delhi and the reported destination of the mutineers. Nicholson here learned that they had crossed the Nujuffghur Jheel, and would probably encamp at midday, during the heat,

near the town of Nujuffghur. He pursued, the way being covered three feet deep with water. After a harassing march of ten miles, he, at five o'clock in the evening, came in sight of the mutineers. They were astonished, but not daunted, at seeing a British force; for the division of Bukhtor Singh was composed of six regiments of mutineer infantry, three of irregular cavalry, and the pick of their field artillery, numbering thirteen guns; in all, seven thousand men. He immediately took up a good position, the key of which was an old serai on his left centre, where he put four guns in battery. The plan of Nicholson was partially to subdue the fire of the guns, and then storm the serai, and then sweep down their line of guns to the bridge. This he put into execution with extraordinary celerity, routing the mutineers, and capturing all their guns. The village of Nujuffghur was, however, desperately defended, when Lieutenant Saunders invested it, and left no possibility of escape. The gallant lieutenant fell in the successful execution of his duty, the mutineers were bayoneted, the village burned, and the bridge blown up. Lieutenant Gabbet was also killed, and twenty-five rank and file. Major Jacob, Lieutenant Elkington and seventy men were wounded. The mutineer horse were utterly inefficient, or the victory must have been longer contested and more hardly won.

While Nicholson was absent on this expedition, the fact was learned at Delhi, and an attack upon the mask battery was made in great force, in the hope that the weakened English lines would be unable materially to reinforce it. General Wilson repulsed the attack with little loss to himself, and great loss to the mutineers.

Early in September the long-expected and much-desired siege-train arrived, and with it the 4th Punjaub infantry, the Patan irregular horse, and reinforcements to her majesty's 8th, 24th, 52nd, and 60th regiments. The same day a Beloochee regiment came from Kurrachee. After all these supplies, the army did not number more than nine thousand men, effective for all purposes, including grass cutters, sycc bearers, labourers, native infantry, recruits yet undisciplined, &c. More reinforcements were wanted, and they were on their way. The sick and wounded reached the enormous proportion of three thousand and seventy, and there was every likelihood that the number of the wounded would increase, as became actually the case, so that Wilson was still importunate for help.

On the 7th of September the enemy first perceived the skilful and huge preparations made to cannonade the city. The works

proceeded until the 11th, each battery opening fire as it was formed. The enemy formed counter-works, and with skill and courage thwarted the English sappers and labourers, and killed and wounded a considerable number; they incessantly sent forth sorties, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, who showed skill and discipline. Still the work went on, and on the 11th the heavy siege-guns and mortars vomited forth their missiles of destruction. The English were deficient in foot artillerymen, but the gunners and men of the horse artillery volunteered to serve, as did also the officers and men of the infantry and cavalry. The Sikh battery was especially well served, and "won golden opinions from all sorts of men." During the 11th, 12th, 13th, and the morning of the 14th, the bombardment continued, and the mutineers behaved in the most gallant manner, skilfully meeting every emergency as it arose. On the evening of the 13th, breaches appeared to be made in the city wall near the Cashmere bastion and the Water bastion. Lieutenants Greathed, Home, Medley, and Lang were ordered to examine and report. This was a perilous undertaking, but was performed in the most intrepid manner; the reports were, that both breaches were practicable. The assault was ordered for the 14th. The assaulting army was thus organized:—

<i>First Column.</i>		
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NICHOLSON.		<i>Men.</i>
H.M. 75th foot	(Lieut.-colonel Herbert)	300
1st Bengal Europeans	(Major Jacob)	250
2nd Punjaub Infantry	(Captain Green)	450

<i>Second Column.</i>		
BRIGADIER JONES.		
H.M. 8th foot	(Lieut.-colonel Greathed)	250
2nd Bengal Europeans	(Captain Boyd)	250
4th Sikh Infantry	(Captain Rothney)	350

<i>Third Column.</i>		
COLONEL CAMPBELL.		
H.M. 52nd foot	(Major Vigors)	200
Kumaon Goorkhas	(Captain Ramsay)	250
1st Punjaub Infantry	(Lieut. Nicholson)	500

<i>Fourth Column.</i>		
MAJOR REID.		
Sirmoor Goorkhas	} Besides Cashmere Contingent, of which strength unknown . . . .	850
Guide Infantry		
European pickets		
Native pickets		

<i>Reserve.</i>		
BRIGADIER LONGFIELD.		
H.M. 61st foot	(Lieut.-colonel Deacon)	250
4th Punjaub Infantry	(Captain Wilde)	450
Belooch battalion	(Lieut.-colonel Farquhar)	300
Jheend auxiliaries	(Lieut.-colonel Dunsford)	300

The following engineer officers were attached to the several columns.

To the 1st column,	Lieuts. Medley, Lang, and Bingham.
" 2nd "	" Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton.
" 3rd "	" Home, Salkeld, and Tandy.
" 4th "	" Maunsell and Tennant.
" Reserve "	" Ward and Thackeray.

The order of attack was as follows:—The first column to assault the main breach, and escalade the face of the Cashmere bastion. This column was to be covered by a detachment of the 60th. The second column to enter the breach at the Water bastion, having a similar detachment of rifles to cover their approach. The third column to attack the Cashmere gate, preceded by a party of engineers, under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, to blow open the gate with petards and powder. This attempt was to be covered by a party of the ubiquitous rifles. The fourth column to force an entrance at the Cabul gate. A rifle party also covered this approach. The reserves were further strengthened, as a *dernier ressort*, by the remainder of the rifles. The cavalry, under Brigadier Grant, were disposed so as to guard the lines, the sick, and wounded, and prevent the enemy from making a sortie in any direction. At four o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the assault began. The rifles skirmished, and on dashed the columns at the double quick, Nicholson's first. The assailants suffered terribly from the well-directed and soldierly play of the mutineer artillery. The English officers and men, especially the former, covered themselves with glory; no danger daunted, no obstacle remained unsurmounted. The breaches were entered by the first and second columns almost simultaneously, Nicholson leading. The two columns wheeled to the right, and drove the desperate mutineers along the ramparts, captured successively the batteries, the tower between the Cashmere and Moree bastions, the Moree bastion, and the Cabul gate. The Bum bastion and Lahore gate defied every assault, the mutineers meeting the approaching victors with cool and resolute steadiness, and mowing down by volleys of musketry officers and men as they approached. Nicholson led his men along a narrow lane against the Lahore gate; the passage was swept by grape and musketry, and the noble young general fell desperately wounded. The grief and indignation of his soldiers were unbounded; their efforts were fierce, but the lane was swept by bullets, as a tunnel by a fierce wind or a penetrating torrent. The troops made good their conquests to the Cabul gate, threw up sand-bags for shelter, and turned the vanquished guns against the city. While the first two columns were thus alike successful and baffled, that directed against the Cashmere gate dashed on enthusiastically, under a fire near, precise, and deadly. The Cashmere gate was of prodigious strength, and a party of marksmen, stationed at a wicket, rendered all approach to it little short of certain death.

It was necessary that this gate should be forced by the engineers. Two parties of these were formed, led by Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, assisted by Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, attended by sappers carrying bags of powder, which they laid. Home was for a moment stunned, but speedily recovered; Carmichael was killed, and a native, named Madhoo, fell with him. How Lieutenant Home and his small party ever reached the gate is almost inconceivable; they had to clamber across a broken bridge in the light of a fine bright morning, under the eye and rifle-range of the mutineers. As soon as the bags were laid, the party slid down into the ditch to make way for the party by whom the powder was to be fired, which was headed by Lieutenant Salkeld. Colonel Baird Smith thus reported the exploit:—"Lieutenant Salkeld, while endeavouring to fire the charge, was shot through the arm and leg, and handed over the slow-match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded just as he had successfully accomplished the onerous duty. Havildar Tilluh Singh, of the Sikhs, was wounded, and Ramlool Sepoy, of the same corps, was killed during this part of the operation. The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily not wounded, caused the bugler (Hawthorne) to sound the regimental call of the 52nd, as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amidst the noise of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with complete success." Sergeant Smith, fearing that the match had not taken, rushed forward, but saw the train burning, and had barely time to cast himself into the ditch, when the ponderous mass of wood and stone blew into fragments. The third column rushed through the gate, when the bugle-call of Lieutenant Home broke upon their ear. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe guided this body through byways to the great thoroughfare, called the Chandnee Chowk, in hope of gaining the Jumna Musjid. The column was assailed with desperate bravery, and driven before the sepoys for an English mile, near to the gate by which it entered, where, with difficulty, it took up positions of some strength. But for the supports, it would have been beaten out of the city, so determined were the sepoys, and so great their numbers. The reserve pressed on to the support of the third column, and all their help was required. The reserve, as well as the third column, established itself within the gate. The attack under Major Reid on the western suburbs failed, arising from the inefficiency of the Cashmerian contingent, the bravery and num-

bers of the sepoys, and their contempt for the native force under Captain Dwyer's command. After a fearful conflict for possession of the Eedghah, the whole attack on the western side was abandoned. The English held the posts there, even within the gates; the enemy showed unflinching resolution, and even threatened the English flanks and rear. Night closed over the sanguinary scene, the English having lost eight officers killed, and fifty-two wounded; one hundred and sixty-two English, and one hundred and three native soldiers killed, five hundred and twelve English, and three hundred and ten natives wounded. The first and second columns held all the towers, bastions, and ramparts, from the vicinity of the Cashmere gate to the Cabul gate; the third column and the reserve held the Cashmere gate, the English church, Skinner's house, the Water bastion, Ahmed Ali Khan's house, the college-gardens, and many buildings and open spots in that part of Delhi; while the fourth column, defeated in the western suburbs, had retreated to the camp or the ridge.

On the morning of the 15th the British dragged fresh mortars into position between the gates of Cashmere and Cabul, so as to command the imperial palace. A battery was also raised in the college-gardens. When day dawned, the advanced posts skirmished, and the work of blood began again. The mutineers loopholed the houses and walls, and thence took patient and efficient aim. The 15th wore away, on the whole, in favour of the defenders. On the 16th the college-garden batteries breached the magazine—part of which Lieutenant Wilmoughby had blown up on the 11th of May. It was stormed and taken by the Punjaubees and Beloochees, supported by a wing of the 61st. The loss was slight, and the advantage decisive. The enemy abandoned the western suburb, which was taken possession of by a native battalion, sent down from the house of Hindoo Rao. The 16th ended on the whole in favour of the British.

The 17th dawned upon both parties eager for slaughter, and each resolute to assert its superiority. On this day a series of combats began for the possession of the ramparts, which were continued into the next day. The struggle issued in the interest of the English. Drawing a line from the magazine to the Cabul gate, all north of that line was now in the hands of the English. On the 18th the English threw forth columns of attack against the south part of the city, capturing the great buildings successively. The magazine, now in the hands of the English, supplied mortars, with which they shelled the palace, and the

strong houses occupied by the mutineers. The women and children began to flee, carrying with them the wounded. General Wilson allowed them to escape. Many sepoys took advantage of this indulgence to get away from the city.

Early on the 19th the Bum bastion, before which so many men and officers fell, was taken by surprise, by a party from the Cabul gate. Captain Hodson reconnoitred with his horse along the northern and western face of the city, and took possession of a cavalry camp which the enemy had formed there.

An attack was made upon the palace; the gates were strong, but were blown open by gunpowder. The place was found deserted, except by the wounded, &c., and a body of Mohammedan fanatics, who fought to the last. The city was now conquered, at an expense of four thousand men killed, missing, and wounded, out of about double that number engaged in the actual conflict. The havoc among the sepoys was terrific. No quarter was given on either side. The sepoys in despair shot themselves, or rushed upon the bayonets of the assailants, and perished. Many of the inhabitants cut the throats of their wives and children, believing that the English had hearts like themselves, and would murder the helpless. Their astonishment was as great as their gratitude was feeble when they found that the English spared women, children, and wounded, and regarded every non-combatant enemy as under their protection. The English soldiers slew all the male inhabitants they encountered.

The English lost many men from sickness and fatigue, and nearly six hundred horses fell dead from over work, or were killed by the bullets of the enemy.

The sights which met the gaze of the English when, the enemy being completely vanquished, they had time to look around them, were horrible. Christian women had been crucified naked against the houses, and native women and children, butchered by the sepoys, to avert the same fate at the hands of the English, lay scattered in streets and houses. Shattered ruins, mangled limbs, dead bodies, slain and wounded horses, lay in profusion in every direction. The English found large sums of money on the persons of the dead and wounded. The Sikhs and Beloochees, and most especially the guides, were expert in these discoveries. The English soldiers, breaking the spirit depots, drank to excess; and in this state bayoneted numbers of the inhabitants, who had found temporary security in hiding-places.

The king, and his family and retainers, fled from the city with the multitude. Captain

(afterwards Major) Hodson was at that juncture assistant quartermaster-general, and intelligence-officer on General Wilson's staff. On the 21st this officer learned that the king and his retinue had left by the Ajmeer gate, and had gone to the Kootub, a palace nine miles distant. Hodson, ever energetic and enterprising, wished to go in pursuit. Wilson, ever careful and cautious, hesitated. Zeenat Mahal, a begum and great favourite of the emperor, came to the camp, *offering terms to the English*, as if the royal person was too sacred for the victorious English to molest, and as if majesty still belonged to the imperial fugitive. Sepoys and armed retainers were rapidly gathering round the king, and Wilson believed that he could not spare troops to attack them. Hodson, chafing under this timid policy, at a moment when everything was to be gained by daring, and much might be lost by timidity or time-serving, requested permission to go after the king with his horse, and offer him his life on condition of surrender. He started forth, with fifty troopers, to Hoomayoon's tomb, distant from the palace about three miles. He sent a message to the king, who replied that he would give himself up to the captain, if with his own lips he repeated the assurance of his safety from personal violence. To this Hodson assented. The king came forth with his retainers. Hodson met him at the gate of the splendid tomb. The captain was the only white man amidst several thousand natives, but fear for the consequence he had none.

The king, Zeenat Mahal, and her son Jumma Bukt, were brought to Delhi by Hodson, and delivered to the civil authorities.

The next morning Hodson, with his troopers, started again, before any fresh interdict could be laid upon his daring. He went in pursuit of three of the princes, who had been the inciters of the atrocities which had taken place in Delhi, and who had themselves perpetrated disgraceful scenes. These princes were concealed in the tomb of Hoomayoon. Hodson succeeded, by dint of dexterous manœuvre, in getting possession of these royal personages. The tomb was occupied by armed scoundrels from the city. He sternly ordered them to lay down their arms and depart,—they obeyed. He sent a carriage on to the city with the prisoners, and a small escort; he, having dispersed the vagabonds from the neighbourhood of the tomb, followed with his troopers. Overtaking the cavalcade, he found the equipage surrounded by a mob, who were bent upon rescuing the prisoners. An officer of the troop thus relates what followed:—"This was no time for hesitation or delay. Hodson dashed at once into the

midst—in few but energetic words explained ‘that these were the men who had not only rebelled against the government, but had ordered and witnessed the massacre and shameful exposure of innocent women and children; and that thus therefore the government punished such traitors, taken in open resistance’—shooting them down at the word. The effect was instantaneous and wonderful. Not another hand was raised, not another weapon levelled, and the Mohammedans of the troop and some influential moulvies among the bystanders exclaimed, as if by simultaneous impulse, ‘Well and rightly done! Their crime has met with its just penalty. These were they who gave the signal for the death of helpless women and children, and outraged decency by the exposure of their persons, and now a righteous judgment has fallen on them. God is great!’ The remaining weapons were then laid down, and the crowd slowly and quietly dispersed. The bodies were carried into the city, and thrown out on the very spot where the blood of their innocent victims still stained the earth. They remained there till the 24th,

when, for sanitary reasons; they were removed from the Chibootra in front of the Kotwallee. The effect of this just retribution was as miraculous on the populace as it was deserved by the criminals.”

General Nicholson died of the wounds he received in the capture of Delhi. The Honourable East India Company granted his widowed and bereaved mother the sum of £500 a year pension. Lieutenant Philip Salkeld was one of the best and bravest officers who fell in that memorable conflict. He survived until the 10th of October, when his wounds proved fatal. He was a native of Dorsetshire, and son of a clergyman. He, and his companion, Lieutenant Home, who survived the assault, received the Victoria Cross; but the latter did not live long to wear it, for on the 1st of October he was mortally wounded, while in pursuit of the fugitive rebels.

Having brought the siege of Delhi to a close, our readers must now be conducted to other scenes, partly contemporaneous with, and partly consequent upon, the physical and moral triumph achieved over the capital of the insurrection.

## CHAPTER CXXXII.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELIEF OF CAWNPORE AND LUCKNOW—MARCH OF COLONEL NEILL'S COLUMN UPON CAWNPORE—ITS SUCCESS—MARCH OF OUTRAM AND HAVELOCK UPON LUCKNOW—RELIEF OF THE RESIDENCY—ADVANCE OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL TO LUCKNOW—REMOVAL OF THE GARRISON TO CAWNPORE.

ON the 1st of July Colonel Neill sent off a column of relief to rescue General Wheeler and his little garrison, who were then supposed to be living. The force dispatched by the gallant Neill consisted of two hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, two hundred of the 84th foot, three hundred Sikhs, and one hundred and twenty irregular cavalry. Major Renaud commanded the whole. It was intended to send another column forward as soon as possible. Before the second column could be prepared for its destination, and indeed only a few hours after the departure of the first, Brigadier-general Havelock arrived at Allahabad, and took the command of all the troops there, the government at Calcutta having given him the direction of the expeditionary forces designed to relieve both Cawnpore and Lucknow. In the chapter on the Persian war the arrival of General Havelock at Calcutta was noticed. Thence he pro-

ceeded, as quickly as possible, up country with such troops as he could take, after having dispatched others to strengthen Neill at Allahabad. Two days after Havelock's arrival, and before Neill's second column of relief was organized, Captain Spurgeon was sent forward towards Cawnpore, with one hundred Madras Europeans, armed with the Enfield rifles, twelve artillerymen, and two 6-pounder guns. Land conveyance being unattainable, this party went up the river by the steamer *Brahmapootra*. Its progress was opposed by a fire of musketry and a cannon from the Oude side of the river. The party landed, defeated the enemy, and captured the gun. Major Renaud had to skirmish with rebels day by day, for the whole population was hostile. On the 10th he learned what had occurred at Cawnpore, and the same day the sepoys and insurgents reached Futtehpore, to intercept the relieving troops. The force

of Major Renaud was eight hundred and twenty men and two guns; that of the rebels was three thousand five hundred men and twelve guns. Havelock was anxious to strengthen at once the major's party, but the forces at his disposal were extremely small, and reinforcements arrived only in dribbles. Havelock was of opinion that if he had "one thousand Europeans, one thousand Sikhs, and one thousand Goorkhas, he could thrash everything;" but, alas, he could only gather together about two thousand men of all arms.

It was on the 7th of July that Havelock mustered his little army at Allahabad; on the 12th he formed a junction with the advanced column, after a terrible march under the fierce sun of an Indian July. The main body of the enemy occupied strong posts at Futtehpore. The trunk road was alone available for the attacking party, the fields on each side being laid deep under water. The city of Futtehpore was only approachable through a fire directed under the cover of mango groves, enclosures, loopholed walls, and other defences. The British leader, having determined to give battle, sought to draw on the enemy to an imprudent onset against himself. He placed his eight guns across the road, protected by one hundred men of the 64th, armed with the Enfield rifles. The enemy paused; during the hesitation Havelock advanced, his infantry coming on at deploying distance, covered by rifle skirmishers, the few cavalry he possessed on the flanks. The 64th, his own regiment, formed his centre, the Highlanders his right, the 84th and the Sikhs his left. The enemy fled precipitately, awed by the range of the rifles, the rapidity of Captain Maude's guns, and the steady advance of the infantry. Their attempts to defend some hillocks, and high walls bounding garden enclosures, were defeated with the ease and skill characteristic of Havelock. He turned every defence with such celerity and prudence that he incurred hardly any loss in dispossessing the enemy of the strongest posts. Having driven them through the city, capturing their guns, Havelock hoped that the battle was won; but the enemy drew up beyond the city in a well-chosen position. The English were nearly exhausted, and the irregular native cavalry showed symptoms of going over to the foe. The moment was critical, but Havelock was the man for a crisis. He again advanced, using his men cautiously, and throwing forward the skirmishers and guns; the enemy was again routed. Havelock congratulated himself that seldom was a success so great achieved with a loss so small. He did not lose a single European; six native soldiers

were killed and three wounded. After alternate marching and repose, most skilfully and judiciously distributed, so as not to exhaust the men, and yet achieving celerity of advance, Havelock again came up with the foe on the 15th. They were posted at the village of Asang, some twenty miles from Cawnpore. The sepoys made little resistance, the fame of Havelock and his army of Persia had reached them, and the previous battle of Futtehpore dispirited them. They retreated precipitately before the advance guard, under Colonel Tytler, leaving guns and baggage as trophies of the easy triumph.

The captured position was within five miles of another intrenched position, at the head of a bridge crossing the Nuddee. This was carried by Havelock in the most gallant style. The action was fought on the same day as that at the village. In both battles Havelock had only twenty-six men wounded, chiefly of the Madras Fusiliers; among the wounded was Major Renaud. One man was killed. The enemy suffered severely. The moral effect of these triumphs was signal; the British became so confident, and regarded the enemy with such contempt, that they were willing to attack against any odds. The enemy was appalled by the celerity of the British, and the skill with which they were handled. The name of Havelock, although little known in England, was regarded with much respect by the sepoys who had fought in the various campaigns where the hero had distinguished himself. So bad had been the conduct of the sowars of the Oude and Bengal cavalry that it became necessary to dismount them.

The next task of General Havelock was to march upon Cawnpore itself. Nana Sahib resolved to confront him, but the sweeping victories of the British general alarmed him, and excited his vengeance to the uttermost. According to the generally received opinion, it was after the passage of the Nuddee by Havelock that the Sahib ordered the massacre of Cawnpore. Having perpetrated that sanguinary act, he advanced with his army to Akerwa, as at that place the road to the cantonments diverges from the road to the town. Five fortified villages, the approaches intrenched, and supporting one another, defended his position. The march from the Pandoo Nuddee to Akerwa was sixteen miles, which was accomplished during the night, but amidst clouds of dust; the night, too, was heavy and sultry, and the men were greatly tired by their exertions. On reconnoitring the position, Havelock saw that to attempt to storm it in front would be destruction; he therefore resolved to make a flank movement, coming upon the enemy's left. The baggage

remained three miles in the rear, at Maharajpore. On the 16th the troops were halted until the heat of the day had subsided, a friendly mango grove affording shade. Clumps of this wood extended along the left front of the enemy's position, and enabled Havelock to execute, unobserved, the flank movement which he had already resolved. When the enemy at last detected the attempt to turn their left, evident signs of astonishment and alarm were indicated; large bodies of cavalry and strong detachments of guns were thrown forward against the advancing British, in the hope even yet of frustrating the manœuvre. It was in vain; the resistless courage of the British, and of their wise and energetic chief, overbore all opposition. The villages were captured, seven guns fell to the victors, a force ten times their number was dispersed, the Nana was humbled on the field of battle in the presence of his retainers and the mutineers, who were discontented with his command. Havelock had only six men killed, but nearly one hundred wounded, among whom were several of his bravest officers. All fought well; if any surpassed, the general's own son, Lieutenant Henry Marsham Havelock, and Major Stirling, of the 64th, were the successful competitors for glory.

The little army of conquerors rested on the field of battle, and on the 17th entered Cawnpore. The battle of Akerwa had given the city to them as their prize: during the night the enemy blew up the arsenal and magazine, and abandoned the place. Havelock had marched one hundred and twenty-six miles, fought and gained four battles, and captured twenty-four guns in ten days. On entering the city, it was the bitter disappointment and grief of the conquerors to find that those whom they fought to rescue were beyond all help.

Havelock followed the enemy to Bhitoor. Four thousand men, chiefly sepoy, defended the post the Nana had chosen. Two streams lay between the assailants and assailed, which could not be forded; there were bridges, but they were fortified. This obliged Havelock to storm the position in front, which was accomplished with chivalrous valour, and the enemy chased for miles, but the English being without cavalry, could not maintain pursuit.

The palace of the murderer was given to the flames, his guns were captured, and his intrenchments levelled.

Havelock sent to Allahabad, where Neill remained in command, urging that officer to come to his assistance with what troops he could collect. Neill hastened forward with less than three hundred soldiers, and was nominated to the command of Cawnpore. This gallant soldier immediately proceeded to secure the

place, and to bring to account all persons guilty of any participation in the late atrocities. He caused the high caste Brahmins to wash off the blood from the ensanguined floor where much of the slaughter had been perpetrated. Many he hung, and many more he blew away from guns.

Neill's work at Cawnpore was as effectual as it was in itself revolting to his gallant heart. He avenged the fallen by many a sacrifice, and with his small garrison awed rebellion into stillness. Havelock's task was to advance upon Lucknow, where the brave garrison, under Brigadier-general Inglis, was maintaining a wondrous defence. Havelock surmounted all the difficulties which impeded his passage into Oude. He had scarcely marched six miles from the Ganges when he was met by a messenger from Lucknow, who had made his way through the enemy, and after encountering various perils, reached the general. He brought a plan of the city, prepared by Major Anderson, and various details of an important nature from the pen of General Inglis. A man of less purpose and resource than Havelock must have shrunk from the undertaking before him. He had but fifteen hundred men, after the losses incurred by battles, sickness, and sun-stroke. The number of his guns was ten, and these badly mounted. He could easily have brought with him twice that number, if cattle had been procurable; but he would not have had a sufficient number of artillerymen to work them. He had received information from Lucknow that the enemy was strong in numbers, ordnance, and position. The Nana had again collected his forces, and with three thousand men was preparing to place himself between Havelock and the Ganges, so as to cut off the general's retreat upon Cawnpore. Seldom, if ever, was a commander placed in circumstances more trying and difficult—seldom, if ever, did one snatch victory and honour from fortune with so much glory.

On the 29th of July, at Oonao, the enemy intercepted his march. They occupied a fortified village, protected on each flank, so as to render it impossible to turn either. The position was stormed. The beaten enemy, as if reinforced, drew up in line upon the open plain. Havelock followed, and gained another decided victory, capturing the enemy's guns, and with his invincible infantry putting a host of sowars, as well as sepoy, to flight. During these desperate encounters, Jupah Singh, a lieutenant of Nana Sahib, hung upon the British flank, watching for the least symptom of disorder to fall upon it. Disease now broke out in the British ranks, and carried off numbers. Havelock advanced to Busherunt-

gunge, a fortified place, defended by a numerous and vindictive foe. He captured it before the sun set, thus gaining another victory on that day of glory.

Cholera, dysentery, fever, all now smote the little band. To proceed without reinforcements would be annihilation. His few soldiers were in great destitution of all the requisites of an army. The general gave the reluctant but absolutely necessary order to retire upon Mungulwar. On the 31st they reached that place in their retrograde movement. From his halting-ground he sent back the sick and wounded to Cawnpore: Neill sent forward every disposable man that he had, and swelled Havelock's little band to the number of fourteen hundred Europeans; no natives remained, desertion, battle, sickness, and disbanding had annihilated them. Havelock's volunteer cavalry reconnoitred the surrounding country, and as this corps consisted of officers belonging to disbanded or revolted corps, they were very efficient, and were able to bring in valuable intelligence of the enemy's movements. It was discovered that the Nana's people had blocked up the line of march, and also the line of retreat, and the rebels were full of hope that they would cut off Havelock's entire force. The English chief having learned that his sick and wounded had reached that place in safety, and having received the small reinforcement sent forward by Neill, again advanced, and a second time found the enemy in force at Buseruntgunge. The disparity of force was such that victory could only be obtained by superior generalship. The English chief threw his little force of cavalry in front, disposing of them so as to make their numbers appear much greater than they were, while he sent his guns and infantry to turn the enemy's flanks. The clever manner in which these dispositions were made, and the great celerity of movement characteristic of Havelock, led to signal success. The shells of the English created such havoc in the town that the enemy fled, and in their flight "ran the gauntlet" under a terrible fire of grape and rifle balls. Two guns were captured, and many of the rebels slain. The intelligence now received by Havelock left him no hope that with the force at his command he could force the road to Lucknow, far less conquer his way to the relief of the residency. He again retired upon Mungulwar, and thence telegraphed to the commander-in-chief, Sir Patrick Grant, informing him of the precise condition of affairs.

On the morning of the 11th of August, General Havelock's men numbered one thousand; sickness, sun-stroke, and the late battle, had reduced the force with which his second

advance was made by nearly one-third. Neill had only two hundred and fifty men at Cawnpore able to do duty, and death had reduced the invalids to about an equal number. The enemy between Mungulwar and Lucknow numbered thirty thousand; and there were at least three strongly-fortified positions on the road. At Bhitoor they had again collected in considerable numbers. All the zemindars and villagers had joined the sepoys. Such was the position of affairs when the English commander learned that four thousand rebels had advanced to the position of Buseruntgunge, from which the sepoys had been already twice driven by signal battle. It was necessary to dislodge these. During his march the country people flocked armed to the enemy's lines, so as nearly to double the numbers in occupation of the strong defences which an abundant supply of labour had enabled them to throw up. Havelock found the obstacles greater on this occasion than on the two former instances of combat there. An advanced village, named Boursekee Chowkee, was defended by a strong redoubt. A party of the 78th Highlanders, without firing a shot or uttering a shout, charged and captured this battery. Lieutenant Crowe was the first man to enter the redoubt, where, for a few moments, he remained unsupported, displaying the most heroic intrepidity. Havelock recommended him for the Victoria Cross, which high honour he obtained. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, that of Havelock slight; but every man by which the number of the British was diminished told terribly upon the little force, and rendered a successful advance against Lucknow more hopeless. Havelock determined to retire on Cawnpore, whither he arrived on the night of the 13th of August. It was well that this movement was executed, for Nana Sahib, with the accession of the greater part of three revolted or disbanded regiments of sepoys, a large body of sowars, and a crowd of Mahrattas, was preparing to attack the diminutive garrison of Cawnpore. Havelock and Neill concocted a plan for dispersing these forces. Neill, with a few hundred men, attacked the extreme left of the Nana's army which menaced Cawnpore, gained a victory, and drove the enemy from the immediate vicinity of the city. Havelock, mustering all the men whom he and Neill had at their disposal, marched, on the 16th, to Bhitoor, and once more attacked that place. The Nana had about ten thousand men in a position before Bhitoor, which the experienced Havelock declared was one of the strongest he had ever seen. The brigadier had just thirteen hundred men. The plans laid for the attack were such as

only a man of genius could conceive; they were well calculated to effect great results with little cost of blood. The advance of the 78th Highlanders and Madras European Fusiliers upon the principal point of attack was at once so rapid and orderly, so cautious, and yet fearless, that the enemy were struck with astonishment, yielded to panic, and were utterly defeated. Some of the mutineers fought with greater courage than had been anywhere displayed by them, except at Delhi. Neill now demanded that a body of troops which had been marching and fighting for six weeks without intermission should have rest, or they must sink by sheer exhaustion. Havelock yielded to the opinion of his glorious colleague, and awaited reinforcements. In vain, however, did he telegraph; the incompetency at Calcutta marred everything. Help from Allahabad was impossible; there, and at Benares, the English were in daily alarm of attack or insurrection. The condition of Havelock now became one of the most imminent peril. So far from hoping to reach Lucknow, he telegraphed that he must abandon Cawnpore, as he had only seven hundred men fit for duty, while thirty-seven thousand mutineers and rebels menaced him on every side. He sent his sick and wounded to Allahabad. He could bring into the field eight efficiently mounted guns. The enemy, he knew, had thirty field-guns, well manned, and with all necessary *matériel*. He declared his willingness to "fight anything, and against all odds," but reminded the Calcutta authorities that "the loss of a single battle would be the ruin of everything in that part of India."

On the 23rd of August he heard from Lucknow that the garrison was suffering to extremity, that there were one hundred and twenty sick and wounded, two hundred and twenty women, and two hundred and thirty children. During the remainder of August, Havelock remained at Cawnpore, which place was almost invested by the rebels.

Major-general Sir James Outram was appointed to a local command, which placed him over Neill and Havelock. Sir James arrived at Dinapore August the 18th. Just then Sir Colin Campbell landed to take the command of the army in India. Outram was finally ordered to advance with such reinforcements as could be brought together from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and thence, with Havelock and Neill, to resume the march upon Lucknow. Outram found that seventeen hundred men had arrived at Allahabad; with about fourteen hundred of these he proceeded to Cawnpore. Outram, on his way, heard of a manœuvre of the enemy to interrupt the com-

munications between Cawnpore and Allahabad. Committing a small body of troops to Major Vincent Eyre, that officer mounted some on elephants, some on horses, and by various expedients accomplished a forced march and a surprise, cutting up nearly the whole.

On the 15th of September Outram reached Cawnpore. He was Havelock's senior officer, and the command of the relieving force devolved upon him. He immediately issued an order of the day, declining to deprive Havelock of the command; that the noble deeds of that officer pointed him out as the general upon whom the honour of relieving Lucknow ought to devolve; that Brigadier-general Havelock was promoted to the rank of Major-general, and that he, Sir James Outram, would accompany the force in his civil capacity as commissioner of Oude, and as a volunteer. He actually assumed the command of the volunteer horse. This noble act on the part of the gallant Outram was appreciated by his country, which was proud of the chivalry and magnanimity he displayed.

On the 19th of September the British crossed the Ganges. On the 21st they came up with the rebels at Mungulwar; a battle ensued, in which the English displayed perfect knowledge of the art of war, turned with ease the positions, and with little loss drove the enemy headlong, capturing four guns. The soldier whose personal valour on this occasion was most conspicuous was Sir James Outram, who, sword in hand, charged the guns, and set an example of dauntless bravery to the little army. This was the chief struggle on the march.

When the British arrived at Lucknow, they had to fight their way through lanes of streets, and by enclosures, every wall loop-holed, and every defensible spot fortified. Through every obstacle the heroic soldiers forced their way, and arrived wearied, but victorious, at the residency. The joy of the garrison at Lucknow on the arrival of Havelock was such as they alone can feel who have escaped such great and terrible perils. From the death of Sir Henry Lawrence, already recorded, until Havelock forced his way to the residency, the little garrison was exposed to incessant attacks from enemies as cowardly as they were cruel. The state of excitement in which the beleaguered British were upon the approach of the all-conquering Havelock, forms one of the most romantic and touching stories in a history so abounding in them. On the 22nd of September spies made their way into the residency, and announced that Havelock was at hand. On the next day they heard a furious cannonade, but distant; the 24th, the cannonade nearer, but still

distant, was renewed, and every ear listened with breathless suspense; the bridge of boats across the river was covered with fugitive sepoys. Still hope was chequered with fear, for the spies had informed General Inglis that the relieving force was small, not much above two thousand men, while it was known that more than fifty thousand rebels were prepared to dispute their entrance to Lucknow. At last the British were heard fighting their way through the streets. One\* of those who fought and suffered within the residency, a civilian, thus narrates the events of that exciting and all-important moment:—"The immense enthusiasm with which they were greeted defies description. As their hurrah and ours rang in my ears, I was nigh bursting with joy. The tears started involuntarily into my eyes, and I felt—no! it is impossible to describe in words that sudden sentiment of relief, that mingled feeling of hope and pleasure that came over me. The criminal condemned to death, and, just when he is about to be launched into eternity, is reprieved and pardoned,—or the shipwrecked sailor, whose hold on the wreck is relaxing, and is suddenly rescued, can alone form an adequate idea of our feelings. We felt not only happy, happy beyond imagination, and grateful to that God of mercy who by our noble deliverers, Generals Havelock and Outram, and their gallant troops, had thus snatched us from imminent death; but we also felt proud of the defence we had made, and the success with which, with such fearful odds to contend against, we had preserved, not only our own lives, but the honour and lives of the women and children entrusted to our keeping. As our deliverers poured in, they continued to greet us with loud hurrahs; and, as each garrison heard it, we sent up one fearful shout to heaven—"Hurrah!"—it was not 'God help us'—it was the first rallying cry of a despairing host. Thank God, we then gazed upon new faces of our countrymen. We ran up to them—officers and men, without distinction—and shook them by the hand, how cordially who can describe? The shrill tones of the Highlanders' bagpipes now pierced our ears. Not the most beautiful music ever was more welcome, more joy-bringing. And these brave men themselves, many of them bloody and exhausted, forgot the pain of their wounds, the fatigue of overcoming the fearful obstacles they had combated for our sakes, in the pleasure of having accomplished our relief."

Immediately on joining the garrison at the residency Sir James Outram assumed the

supreme authority. Generals Havelock and Inglis, who had so nobly distinguished themselves in the responsibility of independent commanders, acted in obedience to the orders of his excellency the commissioner for Oude and commander of the British forces in that and neighbouring provinces. From the death of Sir Henry Lawrence to the arrival of Outram and Havelock, General Inglis defended the residency with indomitable fortitude, and with a skill which raised him to a high place amongst British generals. The defence of the residency of Lucknow by Inglis would require a whole volume to do it justice. Its details, chiefly military, or records of sufferings and faith on the part of the garrison, are alone suitable to an especial narrative of that separate episode of Indian war.

The relieving army did not possess sufficient strength to drive away the rebels. The whole force was hemmed in until a fresh relief, under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, arrived in November. During that interval fierce attacks were made upon the garrison, and much heroism was required for its defence. Provisions ran short, cholera was among the soldiers and civilians, so that brief as was the space of time which elapsed until the arrival of Sir Colin, it was spent arduously and anxiously. As soon as Sir James Outram perceived that he could not withdraw the garrison, he determined to enlarge the space occupied by his troops, both from military and sanitary considerations. Part of the newly-arrived force had maintained a position outside of the enclosure during the night after their arrival; means were taken to secure and even extend that position. It was deemed desirable to include within it the clock-tower, the jail, a mosque, the Taree Kattree, the palace called Fureed Buksh, the Pyne Bagh (or garden), and other buildings, gardens, and houses. The 26th was a day of conflict and toil to secure these objects, to collect the wounded without the residency, and bear them to a place of safety. When the palaces and other buildings were thus brought within the garrison enclosure they were regarded no longer with respect, but their contents were made a spoil by the conquerors, according to the usages of war in such cases. Mr. Rees (already quoted) gives a graphic description of what then occurred:—"Everywhere might be seen people helping themselves to whatever they pleased. Jewels, shawls, dresses, pieces of satin, silk, broadcloths, coverings, rich embroidered velvet saddles for horses and elephants, the most magnificent divan carpets studded with pearls, dresses of cloth of gold, turbans of the most costly brocade, the finest muslins, the most valuable swords

\* Mr. L. E. Runtz Rees' *Personal Narrative*, p. 321.

and poniards, thousands of flint-guns, caps, muskets, ammunition, cash, books, pictures, European locks, English clothes, full-dress officers' uniforms, epaulettes, aiguillettes, manuscripts, charms; vehicles of the most grotesque forms, shaped like fish, dragons, and sea-horses; imauns, or representations of the prophet's hands; cups, saucers, cooking-utensils, china-ware sufficient to set up fifty merchants in Lombard Street, scientific instruments, ivory telescopes, pistols, and (what was better than all) tobacco, tea, rice, grain, spices, and vegetables."

Sir James organized a system by which some intelligence might be almost daily learned of the proceedings of friends and foes. His first information was that one of the royal princes, a child eight or nine years old, had been made King of Oude, or viceroy to the King of Delhi, and he was supported by a council of state. Sir James also learned that Sir Mountstuart Jackson, his sister, and other fugitives from Setapore, were prisoners in the city, and that the day of their execution was appointed.

Throughout the month of October there was much fighting; General Inglis commanded in the residency, General Havelock in the outer portion of the defence: his was undoubtedly the post of danger, labour, and anxiety, and the genius which characterized his advance from Cawnpore was displayed in his defence of the Lucknow residency. In order to facilitate the advance of Sir Colin Campbell, Havelock was incessantly engaged blowing up houses and clearing streets, so as to lessen the opposition which the commander-in-chief would receive. About four miles from the residency was a place called Alum Bagh, where Havelock had left a few hundred men on his advance, and with them his stores and baggage, sick, wounded, and camp followers. The enemy got between these two places, cut off the communication, and laid siege to both. The Alum Bagh garrison was enabled, however, to keep open a portion of the Cawnpore road, and the garrison there maintained communication, sending some reinforcements and considerable supplies to the Alum Bagh. Thus on the 3rd of October a convoy arrived of a valuable nature, which three hundred men were enabled to escort. On the 14th a second convoy was dispatched from Cawnpore, but was driven back by the enemy. A third convoy was successful. Colonel Wilson skilfully kept open the communication with such dribblets of troops as from time to time reached Cawnpore. The rebels left the Alum Bagh comparatively unmolested, nearly their whole energies being devoted to the subjugation of the residency.

#### ADVANCE OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL.

When Sir Colin arrived in India he found it necessary to remain some weeks at Calcutta to mature his plans, and organize reinforcements and supplies. Troops from various quarters were arriving at Calcutta. They were dispatched at the rate of about ninety a day. Detachments from China arrived, and two war steamers were placed at the service of the governor-general by Lord Elgin, the plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty for China. Captain Peel, R.N., was sent up the country with a body of five hundred seamen, and heavy cannon. The mercantile marines at Calcutta gallantly volunteered to serve with Captain Peel. That officer and his sailors, with Colonel Powel and a detachment of troops, were marching from Allahabad to Cawnpore, when they were attacked by two thousand sepoys and two thousand insurgents. A battle was fought, which was severe in its contest, and serious in its consequences. Colonel Powel was shot. Peel took the command, and fought with the skill of a general, defeating and utterly dispersing the enemy, but incurring heavy loss. He had to rest his men, regain fresh force, and then proceeded to Cawnpore. Various detachments made their way thither. The conquest of Delhi had set free a portion of the besieging army, which joined the other reinforcements.

At last Sir Colin reached Cawnpore, and on the 9th November began his march to Lucknow, with the following force: her majesty's 8th, 53rd, 75th, and 93rd foot; 2nd and 4th Punjaub infantry; her majesty's 9th lancers; detachments 1st, 2nd, and 5th Punjaub cavalry; detachment Hodson's Horse; detachments Bengal and Punjaub sappers and miners; naval brigade, 8 guns; Bengal horse artillery, 10 guns; Bengal horse field-battery, 6 guns; heavy field-battery. Total—about 700 cavalry, and 2,700 infantry, besides artillery. The general officers by whom he was assisted were General Mansfield, as chief of the staff; Brigadier-generals Hope Grant, Greathed, Russell, Adrian Hope, Little, and Crawford. Little commanded the cavalry, and Crawford the artillery. Captain Peel commanded the naval brigade; Lieutenant Lennox the engineers.

Sir Colin arrived with little opposition at Lucknow. He was much aided in his advance and in the plans he formed, by intelligence from the garrison brought by Mr. Cavanagh, a civil servant of the company, who won the Victoria Cross by the heroism he displayed in this adventure. On Sir Colin's side the portion of the combined operation was performed with heavy loss, so desperately was

he resisted by the sepoys in their fortified positions. That loss would have been more heavy but for the extraordinary courage, skill, and adventure of Captain Peel, who laid his great guns "alongside" (as a sailor would say) the Shah Nuzeef, a fortified mosque, and with his heavy shot, at so close a range, swept destruction against everything opposed to them. But for the fire of the Enfields borne by the Highlanders, Peel and his sailors must have perished before they could have dragged their big guns to so close a position. Campbell resolved not to force his way through the long narrow lanes where Havelock and Outram suffered so severely, but, profiting by their experience, and the information transmitted to him by them, he made his approach by the south-eastern suburb. In order to effect this, it was necessary that Havelock should co-operate in a bold and skilful manœuvre. Havelock's part in the transaction was performed with his usual skill and courage, and was the measure which insured Sir Colin's success. The operations of Sir Colin were a series of isolated sieges and bombardments of palaces, mosques, and huge public buildings. To spare his men he used his cannon deliberately and amply, and thus step by step, but still with heavy loss, conquered his way until he entered the residency. Ten officers were killed and thirty-three wounded; among the latter were Sir Colin himself and Captain Peel. Of the rank and file one hundred and twenty-two were killed, and three hundred and forty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was estimated at four thousand slain; the wounded and many of the dead were borne away. Once more the joy of the delivered resounded in the residency of Lucknow, and, as on the 25th of September, grateful hearts poured out their expressions of thanksgiving to their deliverers.

Sir Colin resolved to convey the garrison to Cawnpore, and abandon Lucknow, as untenable by so small a force, in the presence of an enemy which, notwithstanding all losses, was estimated at fifty thousand men, for after every defeat numbers still flocked to the standard of revolt. The orders given for departure were, that the wounded should first be removed to the Dil Koosha, four miles distant. The women and children were to proceed the next day to the same place, accompanied by the treasure and such stores as it was judicious to move. It was necessary that this work should be performed in silence and secrecy, to avoid the confusion and sacrifice of life which must ensue if the enemy should be on the alert. There were three places in which the helpless processions must come under the fire of the enemy, which was usually directed

upon the defences; some were wounded in passing, and some of the native attendants were killed. Lady Inglis distinguished herself by a fortitude and generosity worthy of her gallant husband. When the non-combatants were safely conducted beyond the perils of the residency, the military evacuation of the place was commenced. The conduct of it was under the guidance of Sir James Outram, and excited the admiration of Sir Colin Campbell and of the whole army. So effectually was the enemy deceived by the arrangements, that the whole force was brought quietly off before the movement was even suspected. One man only was left behind; Captain Waterman, from a mistake of orders, occupied a post when all besides had departed. When he discovered his real situation he sought safety, and reached the common rendezvous in a state of utter exhaustion. Not a soldier perished in this masterly manœuvre, and so well was it executed that, long after the whole army had left, the enemy continued to pour shot and shell into the intrenchments where the English were supposed to be. When the sepoys found that the English had brought off their women and wounded, the children, stores, and treasure, they were filled with fury, and blew away from guns the four Englishmen who had been prisoners in the city. One event threw a gloom over all the glory of this achievement: Havelock, by whom Outram was chiefly assisted in the great undertaking, died of over fatigue, exhaustion, and anxiety. The lamentations of the army were great, and those of his country not less so. He was buried in the Alum Bagh. England lost in him one of the greatest of her warriors and purest of her sons. She failed to recognise his greatness until life was waning, and rendered him posthumous honours.

Immediately after the sad event of Havelock's death, Sir Colin commenced his march for Cawnpore. He intended to rest his weary charge at the Alum Bagh, but on the 27th he heard heavy firing in the direction of Cawnpore, which, fearing some disaster, led him to hasten the march. On the 28th, leaving Outram in charge of a part of the force at the Alum Bagh, he hastened forward, messengers having arrived to assure him that General Windham, who had been left in Cawnpore, had been beaten by the Gwalior contingent, which, after it had mutinied, hung around that neighbourhood. The events at Cawnpore which led to these disastrous tidings, and which were subsequently connected with Sir Colin's advance, were described by Captain Monson as follows:—

"On the 26th November General Windham

left his camp near Dhuboulee with 1200 infantry, 100 sowars, and eight guns, and marched against the Gwalior mutineers approaching from Calpee. He met the advanced body of the enemy in a strong position, on the other side of the dry Pandoo Nuddee, carried it with a rush, and cleared the village (Bowsee), half a mile in rear. The appearance of the main body of the rebels, however, induced him to repair towards Cawnpore, and he encamped on the Jootee plain, in front of the town, with the copse and canal on his left flank.

"About noon on the 27th the enemy attacked his camp, and after a resistance of five hours, at length compelled him to retreat through the town. On the morning of the 28th, the enemy, having been reinforced from Sheorajpore and Shewlee, advanced, took possession of the town, and erected batteries. Colonel Walpole, on the south side of the canal, gained some advantage, and captured two 18-pounders; but our outposts, between the town and the Ganges, were driven back, the church and assembly rooms were occupied by the mutineers, and a battery erected between the two. A few of the enemy's guns were spiked in the course of the day; but this exploit entailed heavy loss.

"Sir Colin Campbell arrived at the intrenchment at dusk on the 28th, and his troops began to cross the Ganges at 10 A.M. on the 29th; the enemy's fire on the bridge being kept down by heavy guns placed on the left bank of the river, whilst the march of the troops was covered by a cross-fire from intrenchments. At 6 P.M., November 30th, the whole of the troops, baggage, families, and wounded, had crossed over, and the troops occupied a position encircling Sir H. Wheeler's intrenchment. An attack on our outposts, 1st December, was repulsed, and on the 3rd, Sir Colin Campbell, by judicious arrangements, had forced the enemy to slacken

their fire. An attempt, on the 4th, to destroy the bridge, by means of a fire-boat, failed; and another attack on our left picket was repulsed on the 5th.

"On the morning of the 6th General Windham received orders to open a heavy bombardment from intrenchments, so as to deceive the enemy with respect to our intended attack. As soon as the fire began to slacken, Sir Colin concentrated his forces, threw forward his left, and proceeded to attack the enemy's right, crossing the canal thus:—Brigadier Walpole on the right, Brigadiers Hope and Inglis in the centre, and the cavalry and horse artillery, two miles further to the left, threatening the enemy's rear. Driving the enemy before them, our troops reached and captured his camp; the 23rd and 38th were left to guard it. Sir Colin Campbell, preceded by the cavalry and horse artillery, pursued the enemy to the fourteenth milestone on the Calpee road; whilst General Mansfield, with the Rifles, 93rd, and fourteen guns, turned to the right, and drove another body of the rebels, encamped between the town and the river, from their position at the Subadar Tank. The enemy, still in great force, but hemmed in between our intrenchment and the Subadar Tank, retreated towards Bhitoor; not, however, without making several unsuccessful attacks against our positions at the Subadar Tank, the captured camp, and the intrenchment."

Cawnpore was now safe. The non-combatants of Sir Colin's convoy were sent under safe guard to Allahabad, and thence to Calcutta, where they arrived amidst the most extraordinary demonstrations of joy, and amidst many grateful utterances to the heroic men by whom their rescue had been effected.

The further exploits of Sir Colin and his army will be related in another chapter.

## CHAPTER CXXXIII.

### OPERATIONS FROM CAWNPORE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL— CONQUEST OF LUCKNOW, SHAHJEHANPORE, AND BAREILLY—SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY IN OUDE, ROHILCUND, AND NEIGHBOURING DISTRICTS.

THE first operation of Sir Colin Campbell after the defeat of the Gwalior contingent at Cawnpore, and the escape of the liberated garrison of Lucknow to Calcutta, was to order Brigadier Walpole to take a column of troops to clear the western Doab near the Jumna

of the rebels gathered there. This was an important preliminary to any advance upon Lucknow. On the 18th of December Walpole left Cawnpore, and as he marched restored order, dispersing armed parties which had been formed by the Gwalior mutineers.

He then marched towards Etawah, for the purpose of sweeping the country around Agra of the rebel bands which infested it. After partially effecting this object, he was ordered to co-operate with Brigadier Seaton and with Sir Colin himself in the capture of Furruckabad. It was important to achieve the capture of that place, from its position being the key of the Doab, Rohilcund, and Oude. In January, 1858, the junction of these officers was formed, and Furruckabad and all the surrounding country subdued. The rebels, however, escaped with very little punishment, owing to their greater swiftness of march, and their being unencumbered with the vast baggage which always attends European troops in India. Other brigadiers, such as Rowcroft, Franks, and Hope Grant, were also engaged in moving by a concerted scheme upon the grand scene of future action.

Sir Colin was better enabled to mature his plans, as they were not likely to be interrupted by any new revolts in the Bengal provinces. The Bengal army was gone, the seditious chiefs were already in arms, the districts which could be affected by their means were already insurgent; whereas Delhi was conquered, the Punjaub was tranquil and loyal, the country between Delhi and the Punjaub was kept in order by the ability and courage of Van Cortlandt; the Bombay and Madras presidencies were able on their own frontiers to menace the mutineers, and also send some help to Calcutta; and troops were arriving fast from England, although in detachments numerically small, and showing that the government in London had formed notions of aid inadequate to the emergency. By the middle of January, 1858, however, the number of troops landed in India from England was estimated at 23,000 men. Some of these were landed at Madras and Bombay, and were necessary to supply the places of other troops already sent to Bengal, or up the country; others which had landed at Calcutta were necessary for that city, Barrackpore, Benares, Allahabad, Eastern Bengal, &c., which had all been nearly denuded of troops, that had already become invalided or fallen in battle. Portions of the reinforcements were landed in ill-health, and others immediately succumbed to the climate, consisting as they did of mere raw lads. So that after all Sir Colin did not receive troops at all approaching the number requisite for the proper accomplishment of the great task before him.

During this period of the inactivity of the commander-in-chief, Jung Bahadoor and his Goorkhas were capturing rebel chiefs, and dispersing rebel hordes along the Oude frontier.

That leader, and Brigadiers Rowcroft and Franks, formed a *cordon* from Nepaul to the Ganges, such as they supposed would hem in the rebels of Oude.

Although Sir Colin remained in Futtighur, his brigadiers were engaged in active operations, for the rebels boldly approached headquarters, and made dispositions as if to shut up the general there. On the 27th Adrian Hope gained a splendid victory over a superior force. Soon after, he gained a second victory, which was more severely fought. In this Major Hodson, the gallant cavalier who organized "Hodson's Horse," was fatally wounded.

These different operations had the effect of drawing away or clearing away the rebels from extensive districts beyond, and Agra became again free, and a centre of active operations against the mutineers, many of whom were brought in prisoners and executed. At this time so great was the leniency displayed at Calcutta, that mutineers are alleged to have appeared in its streets selling their uniforms.

On the 11th of February Sir Colin at last began his march against Lucknow. It was a slow one, especially as the general brought with him 200 pieces of cannon. He was also checked by what might be called a rebel army of observation, which had assembled with remarkable celerity at Calpee.

Sir Colin was now approaching the Alum Bagh. Brigadier Franks had fought his way through the districts of Azinghur, Allahabad, and Juanpore, defeating the rebels at all points, and was approaching the grand army under Sir Colin. When this junction was effected the "Juanpore field force" formed a fourth infantry division under Franks.

While this bold brigadier awaited on the frontier the orders of Sir Colin, he snatched a glorious victory from the rebels. He crossed into Oude near Sengramow. A rebel army sent from Lucknow, commanded by Nazim Mahomed Hossein, advanced in two divisions, hoping to surprise Franks. The brigadier surprised them, caught the divisions, and beat them in detail, utterly routing the whole force. He captured six guns, and slew 800 men. A desperate race was now run between the nazim and the brigadier as to which should obtain possession of the fort of Badshaigunge, commanding the pass and jungle so notoriously bearing the same name. The generalship of Franks gained the object. The nazim, joined by Bunda Hossein, another distinguished leader of the Oudeans, resolved to attack Franks. More than 6000 of their forces were revolted sepoys and sowars, the rest insurgents, but well accustomed to the

use of arms. Each party endeavoured to out-manceuvre the other, and at last the collision came, not at the fort, but near Sultanpore. The position of the enemy was good, the generalship of Franks better; he, by skilful and intricate manœuvres, such as our generals are not usually expert in employing, totally confused and discomfited the enemy, capturing twenty guns, and all their ammunition and baggage. About 1800 rebels were left killed or wounded on the field, among whom were several rebel chiefs. The day of vengeance had indeed come. The baffled sepoys and insurgents fled to Lucknow, leaving the road open to Franks if he should choose to join the commander-in-chief in that way. In the three battles Franks lost two men killed, and sixteen wounded.

Jung Bahadoor approached the great centre of conflict more slowly than the commander-in-chief himself.

At the beginning of March Brigadier Seaton captured, levelled, and burned a number of villages round Futtyglhur, slaying and expelling bodies of rebels in every instance. One impediment to the advance of Sir Colin had been the neighbourhood of the Gwalior contingent, who were well equipped, well armed, and, it was believed, well commanded. Brigadier Maxwell encountered their force near Cawnpore, and routed it, having only a few men wounded. Brigadier Hope Grant had severe fighting in driving out the rebels from various small but strong forts and posts which they occupied between Cawnpore and Futtyglhur. He slew about fifteen hundred rebels, and did not himself lose twenty men. His skilful combinations and fire saved his men, when every European was so precious. Still the rebels perpetually appeared where least expected, and the presence of the Nana Sahib, or of the Gwalior contingent, now here, then there, as if by magic, kept the English officers much harassed, and continually on the *qui vive*.

The hour was gradually arriving when Lucknow must resist the might of England or perish. The plans of Sir Colin were every day telling. The brigadiers on the frontiers, and the Goorkha chief, were closing in and making narrower the circle within which, apparently, the rebellion must assert its vitality. Sir Colin advanced to Lucknow. Along the right bank of the Goomtee, for five miles, palaces and public buildings stretched away; farther from the river lay a dense mass of narrow streets and lanes. Beyond the building called the Muchee Bhawan there was a stone bridge over the river. Near the residency there was an iron bridge, and a bridge of boats near the building called the Motec

Mahal. The rebels, while in undisturbed possession, had fortified the place, and made it immensely strong. Ditches, earthworks, bastions, batteries, loopholed walls, fortified houses, gardens, enclosures, barricaded streets and lanes, guns mounted on domes and public buildings, piles of rubbish, and rude masonry of enormous thickness,—in fine, all resources which a great city could supply to mutinous soldiery were brought into requisition. The defenders were very numerous, comprising the whole population of three hundred thousand persons, Oude soldiery and retainers of various chiefs to the extent of fifty thousand, and sowars and sepoys, deserters from the army of Bengal, thirty thousand. A moulvie, a Mussulman fanatic, who perpetually incited the Mohammedans to acts of hostility, was supposed to aim at the throne himself.

On the 1st of March, Sir Colin, in his camp at Buntara, considered his plan of attack. He resolved to cannonade the city on each extremity, so as to enfilade the defences. His first preparation was for crossing the river. The enemy had removed the bridge of boats; the iron and stone bridges were commanded by batteries, and vigilantly watched. To invest the city was impossible, from its great extent. Attended by Generals Archdale Wilson, Little, Lugard, Adrian Hope, and Hope Grant, he advanced to the Dil Koosha palace and park on the eastern extremity of the city. This movement was for strategical purposes. The enemy's horse watched and menaced the approach. As the troopers retired, the guns of the defence opened with rapid and well-sustained fire. Sir Colin carried the Dil Koosha and the Mohenud Bagh; and occupied them as advanced pickets. Sir Colin perceived from the summits of the conquered parts that the defences could only be stormed at a terrible sacrifice of life, and success might be doubtful; that the conquest of the place must be effected by artillery. He sent for his siege-train and other heavy guns, and placed them in position. His army lay with its right on the Goomtee, and its left extending towards the Alum Bagh, covering the ground to the south-east of the city. The Dil Koosha was head-quarters. On the 4th the English lines were extended to Babiapore, a house and enclosure further down the right bank of the river. The inhabitants began to flee from the city, to the annoyance of the court and the mutincers, who calculated upon the townspeople making a desperate resistance. On the 5th, General Franks, after his splendid victories, joined the commander-in-chief. The army under Sir Colin was now about twenty-three thousand. He had cal-

culated upon having a force exceeding thirty thousand, as the least which afforded a prospect of complete success. The engineers had been preparing, since the 1st, the means of forming two bridges near the English advanced post of Babiapore, so as to operate upon the left as well as the right bank of the river. The bridges were completed in spite of the attempts of the enemy to obstruct them; and to Sir James Outram was entrusted the command of the forces destined to operate on the opposite bank of the river. A remarkable exemplification of the power of science and modern scientific discovery in war was shown in the use of the electric wire. Lieutenant Stewart followed Sir Colin Campbell, in the novel capacity of chief of his electric staff, with his wires, galvanic batteries, poles, &c. These were laid along from Allahabad, where the governor-general was, to Cawnpore, thence to the Alum Bagh, thence to Sir Colin's head-quarters, and thence over the river to the head-quarters of Sir James Outram, when that officer and his *corps d'armée* crossed the newly-made bridges.

On the 6th the first important combat commenced; previous conflicts were mere skirmishes. Sir James was then attacked in force, but with little loss repelled assaults which were continued all day. On the 7th these assaults were renewed with still more energy, and yet less success.

On the 9th Sir James opened his batteries upon the key of the enemy's position in that quarter, the Chukhur Walla Kathee. He drove the enemy from their positions by the resistless fire of his guns; they abandoned strong posts which might have been easily defended, and which Outram seized, advancing his infantry as that of the enemy receded. Crossing a bridge over a nullah, he advanced his right flank to the Fyzabad road. Some Mohammedan fanatics barricaded themselves in the Yellow House, and were with difficulty conquered; some fled, but most of them perished. Several villages were seized by the conqueror, and he advanced to the king's garden or Padishaw Bagh, opposite the Fureek Buksh palace. These conquests enabled him to open an enfilade fire on the defences of the Kaiser Bagh. When the Yellow House was captured by Outram, Campbell ordered a cannonade against the Martiniere. This was chiefly conducted by Sir William Peel and his sailors, and so skilfully did he cast ball, red-hot shot, shell, and rocket into the enclosures occupied by the sepoys, that great destruction of life was caused. Captain Peel received a musket-ball in the thigh, which was extracted immediately, and he insisted on returning to his

duty. Sir Edward Lugard, and a body of Highlanders and Sikhs, stormed the Martiniere without firing a shot; the loss was small. All these successes had been planned by Sir Colin himself, who issued his orders with minute particularisation.

On the 10th Outram's heavy guns raked the enemy's outer line of defence, while vertical shot fell among the groups of infantry whenever collected near that line. He conquered by his fire the head of the iron bridge completely, and nearly subdued the defence at the head of the stone bridge. General Lugard captured Banks House, and mounted guns there—an important object to the attack.

The first or outer line of defence was now conquered. Outram on the 11th took possession of the iron bridge leading from the cantonment to the city, and drove the rebels out from all their positions between that bridge and the Padishaw Bagh on the left bank of the river. On Sir Colin's side, Brigadier Napier, using the blocks of buildings for approaches, sapped through them, bringing up guns and mortars as he advanced his works, and bombarded the palaces of the Begum Kotee. When a breach was made, Lugard and Adrian Hope, with their Highlanders, Sikhs, and Goorkhas, stormed the place. The resistance was desperate, and the conflict sanguinary, but the British were victors. Napier continued to sap on through houses, garden walls, and enclosures, turning them all to account for cover, and again brought up the artillery to open its destructive charges upon the next interposing defence. While the attack on the Begum Kotee was going on, Jung Bahadoor arrived. His force was directed to cover the left wing of the British as its allotted task. The capture of the Begum Kotee was one of the most sanguinary scenes of war. The rooms of the palace were strewn with dead sepoys, while fragments of ladies' apparel, and other tokens of oriental grandeur, rent and blood-stained, lay around. Mr. (now Sir W. H.) Russell declared that the horrid scenes in the hospital of Sebastopol were less appalling than the rooms of that gaudy palace filled with the festering dead, and slippery with gore. From this building the sapping was continued to the Eman Barra, in the same way as before, through buildings and enclosures. So intricate were the passages, that it was the 13th before the guns and mortars for battering and breaching the Eman Barra could be brought forward. On that day Jung Bahadoor and his Nepaulese seized many out-buildings, and circumscribed the limits of the enemy. On the 14th the Eman Barra was breached and taken. The Sikhs,

pursuing the enemy from the captured post, turned the third or inmost line of defence, entered the Kaiser Bagh, and, followed by supports from Franks' brigade, a number of the most important public buildings, loopholed and defended by cannon, were taken without a shot. Sir James Outram, from his side, with cannon and rifle aided the work of the 14th.

On the 15th Sir Colin perceived that the defences were untenable, and that final victory must soon crown his efforts. The enemy also perceived this; crowds of the people were fleeing from the city, and the sepoys were with difficulty kept in the defences. The plunder of the palaces followed their capture: costly garments, Indian jewellery, precious stones, gold and silver, lace and specie, were the prizes of the conquerors. Luxuriant viands also gratified the hungry and refreshed the weary.

On the night of the 14th and the morning of the 15th many of the sepoys fled towards Upper Oude and Rohilcund. Sir Colin does not appear to have been prepared for this, and in consequence many desperate characters got safely away to rob and murder elsewhere. On the 16th Outram crossed the engineers' bridge, and marched right through the city to intercept fugitives if possible. He then received a proposition from the begum, offering to compromise matters. Outram refused any terms but those of unconditional surrender, and conquered his way to the residency, of which he took possession. Hard fighting began near the iron and stone bridges, and a great slaughter of rebels ensued. Their ingenuity and local knowledge enabled many to escape by means which the English could not frustrate. On the 17th the British were completely masters of the city. The enemy gathered in force outside its precincts and fought a battle, but Outram and Jung Bahadur routed them with slaughter, capturing their guns. So bold were the rebels that in their retreat they attempted the Alum Bagh. Here Jung Bahadur fought several severe combats, defeating the assailants. During the final day of combat in the city Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson were rescued from an obscure house, where they had been imprisoned. After the city was subdued it was discovered that the moulvie and a strong body of followers were concealed in one of the palaces: the place was stormed, the prime-minister was slain, but the moulvie escaped; shot and sabre left few of this strange garrison to become fugitives. Sir Colin lost nineteen officers killed, and forty-eight wounded, and more than eleven hundred men. The loss of the enemy was many thousands, but the great

majority escaped from indifferent pursuit. An earlier flight than could have been expected, according to the rules of war, baffled the general. Lucknow was taken, but the rebel army was in the field.

#### CAMPAIGN OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AFTER THE FALL OF LUCKNOW.

When the Europeans in Calcutta, and when the people of England, heard that the rebels had been allowed to escape from Lucknow with impunity, there was severe criticism upon the strategy of the British chief, and much discontent. This was increased when it was learned that Sir Colin lingered at Lucknow until the hot season, in all its fury, fell upon the plains of India. It was certain that no prompt energetic action, no bold and enterprising undertakings, followed the conquest of Lucknow. Mr. Montgomery, the colleague of Sir John Lawrence, was appointed civil commissioner in the room of Sir James Outram, for whom other work and other honours were reserved. He was appointed military member of the council at Calcutta.

In Rohilcund the chiefs of rebellion were now congregated; Khan Bahadur Khan assuming the sovereignty. Among the chiefs collected around him was Nana Sahib, who fled to Bareilly with four hundred troopers. He took part in the defence of Lucknow, but did not distinguish himself by his courage. It was rumoured that, failing in Rohilcund, the rebels would try their fortunes in Central India. Sir Colin, acting upon this supposition, so disposed his forces as to guard as many as possible of the ghauts on the Jumna and the Ganges, and so prevent the rebels accomplishing that object, and enclose the war within Rohilcund, leaving the actual disturbances in Central India to be dealt with by the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. Jung Bahadur and his Goorkhas returned home, feeling or affecting displeasure with the want of respect shown to them. Sir Edward Lugard was directed by the commander-in-chief to march to Arrah and attack Koer Singh, who, after many wandering depredations, was back again in his own district. Lord Mark Kerr, with a small force from Benares, had confronted this chief, and saved Azinghur, but his troops were too few to expel the rebels. Sir Edward Lugard made for Azinghur. A powerful force of the enemy got into his rear; Lugard returned and beat them. Lieutenant Charles Havelock, nephew of the hero of Lucknow, fell by an obscure enemy.

On the 15th of April Lugard reached Azinghur, fought and gained a battle, and captured the place. The enemy, as in most

other instances, escaped. Brigadier Douglas, with a portion of the troops, was sent in pursuit. After five days' chase Douglas overtook, defeated, and wounded Koer Singh. On the 21st Douglas again came up with him while crossing the Ganges; guns, treasure, and ammunition were captured, but Koer Singh succeeded in crossing the river. He retreated to his own dominion at Jugdespore. Captain Le Grande was then at Arrah, with one hundred and fifty men of H. M. 35th, fifty sailors, and one hundred and fifty Sikhs. He marched out to intercept Koer Singh, who, with two thousand dispirited men, without guns, took post on the skirt of a jungle. Le Grande attacked, but suddenly a bugle sounded retreat in the rear of the British. Le Grande hesitated, his men fell into confusion, and finally fled with dastardly precipitancy, followed by Koer Singh, who cut down and pursued them to Arrah. It was agreed on all hands that the cowardly and incompetent conduct of the men of the 35th caused this disaster. Le Grande and various other officers fell. Koer Singh's followers now became aggressors, and it required the skill of various British officers to maintain their positions. The insurgents fought better than the mutineers had fought. Douglas, after resting his troops, followed Koer Singh into his own region, and thoroughly swept it of rebellion, clearing the jungle, and suppressing the insurrection.

Sir Hope Grant had a column placed at his disposal to follow the rebels northward from Lucknow. He chased for some time the moulvie, and the begum and her paramour; but infamous as were this trio, the people everywhere sided with them, and they out-manceuvred Grant. He was as unsuccessful in this pursuit as he had been in preventing the escape of the rebels from Lucknow, and returned to head-quarters utterly baffled. Rohilcund continued in arms; the great cities and towns, such as Bareilly, Shahjehanpore, and Moorshedabad, were in the hands of the rebels. Khan Bahadoor Khan ruled at Bareilly, and his force was not to be despised. It became apparent to everybody how serious were the consequences of the bad generalship which allowed the rebels and mutineers to escape from Lucknow. The plan of the commander-in-chief now was to scour the borders of the province with two columns, which, setting out in opposite directions, should meet at Bareilly, the capital, where two of the Delhi princes had taken shelter with Bahadoor Khan. Brigadier Jones was ordered to advance from Roorkee with what was designated the Roorkee field-force, and to take a direction south-east. The other

column was to leave Lucknow, under Brigadier Walpole, and was called the Rohilcund field-force. This was to march north-westward. The Roorkee field-force at once began its operations, under the spirited management of Brigadier Jones. The formation of the Rohilcund force was delayed a little. Following the operations of these forces separately, the Roorkee field-force first requires notice, as first in action. It consisted of three thousand men, eight heavy, and six light guns. It was a perfect little brigade, comprising engineers, cavalry, &c., in due proportion. Having marched from Roorkee, they on the 15th of April prepared to cross the Ganges to the left bank. The enemy was intrenched on the opposite side at the most advantageous ghaut. Jones brought his light troops across elsewhere, surprised the enemy, took his intrenchments in flank, dispersed their defenders, and brought over the heavy guns and baggage at the ghaut. Jones marched on, sweeping all before him, until the 21st, when he was obstructed on the banks of a canal. He again took the enemy's position in flank, captured all his guns and elephants, and sent him away in mad flight, so that pursuit by regular troops was impossible. The loss of the brigadier's force in these transactions was one officer killed, and some men wounded. Moorshedabad was the next important place. The English had friends there among the natives, and the Rajah of Rampore was an ally. On the 21st of April, while Jones was beating the rebels, and capturing their elephants and cannon, the shah-zada (heir of the Delhi throne, or, at all events, one of the princes of that house), named Feroze Shah, marched to Moorshedabad to demand tribute and rations for his forces. He was refused, through the influence of the Rajah of Rampore, and a conflict was the consequence. The shah-zada pillaged the neighbourhood in order to obtain what he required. While his imperial highness was thus engaged, Jones, very much to his astonishment, arrived, attacked him, beat his forces, captured many of his chiefs, saved the town of Moorshedabad, and extended the authority of the Rampore rajah. Jones waited at that place further orders from Lucknow, in connection with the other column, with which he understood he was to co-operate against Bareilly. Walpole marched with six thousand men, and hearing that a body of rebels had sought the protection of one of the country forts situated at Roowah, he resolved to attack them. When he arrived, he, without any proper preparation, or even *reconnaissance*, and although possessing a powerful artillery, ordered his infantry at once to

attack it. The place was strong,—houses encircled by a wall, protected by bastions, every surface loopholed. The infantry were, of course, repulsed with slaughter, and the gallant Adrian Hope, one of the most talented officers in the service, perished. The impossible task had been committed to that officer, who saw the folly of the order assigned to him, but obeyed. The supports were so badly arranged as to be too late, the reserves were sent to a place remote from the attack, and all was confusion on the side of the British, and triumph on the side of the rebels, of whom there were only a few hundreds in the place. Walpole brought up his heavy guns to batter a breach, but the enemy stole away in the night, leaving the English general to batter his way in, or take some shorter method if he chose. The place was easy of investment, but was not invested; the enemy were permitted there, as everywhere else by Sir Colin Campbell and his officers, to make good their retreat with impunity, to unfurl the standard of resistance elsewhere. Walpole redeemed his honour at Sirsah, beating the enemy by the judicious use of his artillery and cavalry, driving them across the Ramgunga with heavy loss. The “Pandies” were too hotly pressed to destroy the bridge of boats, over which Walpole brought his army and equipage, and halted until joined by the commander-in-chief.

Sir Colin, at the head of the remainder of his army, marched towards Futtyghur, where he arrived on the 25th of April, and thence sent for Brigadier Penny, who had commanded in Delhi, and had made various flying expeditions round that territory. He was ordered to bring such troops as he could collect into the combined operations by which Rohilcund was to be conquered. He was to march towards Merumpore Muttra, between Shahjehanpore and Bareilly. The commander-in-chief marched direct into Rohilcund. On the 27th the junction with Walpole was effected at Zingree, near the Ramgunga. They at once marched to Jellalabad. The moulvie occupied Shahjehanpore with a strong force. Sir Colin’s dispositions were made to shut him up there, which he might have done, had he been as active or acute as the moulvie, who completely outgeneraled the general, and departed with his troops to Oude, doubling upon the commander-in-chief. This was most disheartening to his excellency, and to the whole British army. Nana Sahib had been with the moulvie; before retreating, he unroofed all the buildings. He thus deprived the English of shade in the midst of the hot season. Sir Colin found a deserted town of dilapidated houses,

where he had hoped to pen up powerful enemies, and bring them to decisive battle, or immediate surrender. His plans so far were costly, cumbrous, slow, and abortive. The death of Sir W. Peel, of small-pox, at Cawnpore, added to the disheartenment of the British army.

The month of April wore away: Bareilly was not captured, Rohilcund was not conquered, although it had been invaded from all quarters by four different armies, numerous, and perfectly equipped. The rebellion proved itself possessed of a vitality for which neither the governor-general nor the commander-in-chief was prepared. In Rohilcund, and all around it, people and chiefs were in arms, and no less than ten distinct columns of British were kept in harassing marches, beneath a burning sun, without being able to produce any decisive effect upon the insurrection. A successful exploit by Brigadier Seaton, at Kaubur, in which he cut up a large number of the enemy, and captured their baggage, and the papers of their leaders, threw light upon the plans of the insurgents generally, showing that they were acting in concert in Central India, Upper Bengal, Oude, and Rohilcund.

On the 2nd of May Sir Colin Campbell set out from Shahjehanpore to attack Bareilly. On the 3rd he was joined by the column of Brigadier Penny, which had moved thither from their sphere of operations to the west of Rohilcund. *En route*, Penny, by carelessness, allowed his troops to fall into an ambush, and with difficulty his army was saved from destruction; by the dint of hard fighting they beat the enemy and resumed their march. General Penny, who seems to have been the least vigilant officer in his host, was slain, and many officers were wounded through his inadvertence. He was killed by a rush made upon him by a body of fanatics. The beaten rebels marched to Bareilly, and strengthened that garrison. Colonel Jones, of the carabiniers (not to be confounded with the brigadier commanding the Roorkee field-force), brought on the brigade to Sir Colin. Brigadier John Jones marched from Moorshedabad towards Bareilly, operating at the same time with Sir Colin from an opposite direction. Jones was resisted on his march, but drove the rebels headlong before him. Arriving at Bareilly, he won the bridge, which the rebels defended stoutly; and, at the same time, the cannon of Sir Colin thundered tidings of his approach from the opposite side of the place. This was followed by a sudden charge of rebel cavalry upon the baggage in the rear of Sir Colin’s army, which created such confusion as to leave further hostile operations

that day impossible. Many had sunk on the march from fatigue, weakness, and sun-stroke. There were, however, plenty of troops fresh enough, and there was time enough to have entered the city and stormed it. Sir Colin, still preserving his dilatory tactics, halted on the plain, and so disposed his forces that, as usual where either he or his brigadiers commanded, the enemy escaped with impunity. Even on the 6th Sir Colin spent his time cannonading old houses. It was not until the 7th that he learned that General John Jones was at the opposite side of the city. Sir Colin *then* entered, ordering the brigadier to do the same. The rebels had fled, taking with them such portable things as were of most value.

Scarcely had Sir Colin Campbell left Shahjehanpore to march upon Bareilly than the rebels, numbering eight thousand men, returned. Colonel Hall and a few hundred men had been left behind as a garrison. These for eight days defended themselves, a defence which would have proved utterly unavailing had not Hall, with more foresight than his general, laid up provision and ammunition behind a strong and intrenched position. After suffering suspense, and continually fighting for nine days, the little band was saved. Sir Colin hearing at Bareilly of Colonel Hall's situation, sent back Brigadier Jones, with a well-appointed force, who beat the rebels in a pitched battle and relieved the place.

Brigadier Jones soon found that he had not defeated the grand force of the enemy, and that future struggle was in store for him. The Moulvie of Fyzabad, the Begum of Oude, the Shah-zada of Delhi, and Nana Sahib, uniting their forces, attacked Shahjehanpore on May 15th. The English general fought for

very life throughout the day, so numerous, powerful, and persistent were his enemies. Of the four chiefs named, all displayed great courage, even the lady termed the begum, except the Nana, who kept out of range, being a notorious coward. When Sir Colin heard this news he hastened back with a portion of his forces. On the morning of the 18th he arrived at Shahjehanpore. He was attacked the same day by a force, chiefly consisting of newly-raised Rohilla cavalry, splendidly mounted, good riders, expert swordsmen, and exceedingly gallant. Their cannon were numerous and well appointed. Sir Colin with difficulty repulsed the enemy, his own troops, wearied with marching, and suffering from heat, having been the portion of the army engaged. Campbell ordered Brigadier Coke to join him. On the 24th Sir Colin and Coke marched to the place (Mohumdee) which the chiefs had occupied as head-quarters, and whence they had issued to attack Shahjehanpore. They were gone. In the abandoned forts guns and treasure were found buried.

While the commander-in-chief was in Rohilcund, Sir H. Grant was engaged around Lucknow. Large bodies of rebels sprung up as if by magic. He gained battle after battle, but not until the hot season was over was any quiet ensured around the capital of Oude. Active operations by the brigadiers of the various movable columns in the north-western provinces also continued through the hot season. In the central region of the Ganges Sir Edward Lugard maintained a career of heroic exploits until the provinces there were controlled, and insurrection quelled. Sir Colin broke up the Rohilcund field-force, and considered the rebellion in that province and Oude subdued.

## CHAPTER CXXXIV.

VARIOUS MUTINIES AND INSURRECTIONS, AND THEIR SUPPRESSION—CAPTURE OF JHANSI AND CALPEE BY SIR HUGH ROSE—REVOLUTIONS IN GWALIOR—SURRENDER OF THE CITY TO TANTIA TOPEE—FLIGHT OF SCINDIAH—CAPTURE OF THE CITY AND FORTRESS BY SIR HUGH ROSE—RESTORATION OF SCINDIAH—DEATH OR CAPTURE OF THE CHIEF LEADERS OF THE REVOLT—DISPERSION OF THE REBEL BANDS—END OF THE MUTINY AND INSURRECTION.

DINAPORE was one of the most important stations in India. A vast district of country belonged to that military division. It is situated in the very populous province of Behar, between Oude and Bengal proper. The eastern portion of northern India would necessarily, at such a crisis, be much in-

fluenced by the loyalty or defection of the district of Dinapore. That district comprised the rich and populous city of Patna, which is within a short distance of the military station. The country around is fertile and cultivated, and remarkable for the number of rich indigo plantations. The chief civil au-

thority, Mr. Taylor, resided at Patna; the chief military authority was Major-general Lloyd, who resided at the cantonments. So feeble was he at the time of the mutiny, that he had to be lifted on his horse, and was incapable of using any exertion such as the superintendence of a large military station required. He had been a brave and efficient officer before his powers failed through age and exhaustion. The troops at the station were three regiments of Bengal native infantry—7th, 8th, and 40th. The European troops were a wing of her majesty's 10th foot, two companies of her majesty's 37th, and two troops of horse artillery. Evidence of the sedition of the native regiments was abundantly afforded through the months of May, June, and July. The officers declared that it would be easy for the European force to disarm the native regiments, but General Lloyd doubted their power to do so, and besides declared against the necessity of it, as *his* sepoys were loyal.

On the 24th of July General Lloyd was at last convinced that some precautions should be adopted. He ordered the percussion-caps to be taken out of the magazine which the sepoys guarded. This was done amidst turbulence on the part of the 8th regiment, but only a feeble attempt was made to interrupt the proceeding. The general, instead of at once disarming this regiment, gave the sepoys until four o'clock to consider whether they would give up the magazine quietly, which contained a large store of ball-cartridges. He then went on board a steamer on the river, without empowering any one else to act. While the general was absent, the sepoys revolted; they filled their pouches with ammunition, removed their families, and set things in order for the march to Delhi. The 10th and 37th Europeans stood to their arms, but it was not known that the general was asleep on board a steamer, and the second in command lost much time in looking for him. The sepoys began to shoot at their officers, but none were killed. The sick European soldiers and their guard mounted on the hospital, and opened fire into the masses of the sepoys, who broke and fled. The European troops, without orders, attacked the mutineers, who fled at the first discharge, leaving apparel, cooking utensils, and numbers of their families behind them. A squadron of cavalry would have succeeded in dispersing or cutting them up. The mutineers proceeded to Arrah, fourteen miles off. Pursuit was possible, as there were elephants at Dinapore by means of which it could have been instituted. The rebels went along at leisure, burning and plundering as they pro-

ceeded. Intelligence of their devastations, and the leisurely way in which they were committed, reached Dinapore hour by hour, but the general would give no orders. He was entreated to save Arrah, but still issued no commands. *On the evening of the 27th* one hundred and ninety men of the 37th were sent by steamer to relieve the few Europeans at Arrah, who were bravely defending themselves. The vessel soon grounded, and remained fast until the afternoon of the 29th, when another steamer was dispatched, which took them on board: it also bore seventy Sikhs, and one hundred and fifty men of the 10th. These troops disembarked twelve miles from Arrah, and marched towards it. Captain Dunbar, who commanded the party, believed native testimony as to the condition of things at Arrah: he was informed that the sepoys had abandoned the place; he therefore pushed on, although ignorant of the road, and in the darkness of rapidly-falling night, without throwing out an advanced guard, or making any dispositions to prevent surprise. When he arrived at a mango tope, through which the road passed, a fire of musketry was opened from both sides of the way. The sepoys were in ambush, having previously sent native emissaries for the purpose of deceiving the English captain. The British were thrown into confusion by the suddenness of the attack. Volley after volley swept down their numbers, and no orders were given to advance or retreat. Incredible as it may seem, this European force remained through the night exposed to this fire, from which darkness and the timidity of their enemies were the only protection. When morning dawned, half the force lay dead or wounded. Dunbar ordered a retreat; the wounded remaining behind were shot or bayoneted by the sepoys, who followed closely, throwing themselves with great rapidity upon the British flanks, and firing wherever there was cover. Captain Dunbar, Lieutenant Sale, Ensign Erskine, Lieutenants Ingleby and Anderson, volunteers, the mate of the steamer, and railway-engineer, also volunteers, and one hundred and fifty soldiers, were killed; scarcely a man of the remainder escaped being wounded.

General Lloyd was now more helpless than ever—he neither performed nor attempted anything. Tidings of this disgrace filled all the surrounding country, and men everywhere prepared for revolt. Meerut, Delhi, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Dinapore, were words of encouragement and hope to all the disaffected. Every disaster was made known far and near, while news of English successes travelled with comparative tardiness.

Major Vincent Eyre was at Buxar, and rightly judged that General Lloyd was incapable; that the *prestige* of the English name would be ruined all over Behar and Bengal; and that the fatal news would penetrate to Oude, and to the upper provinces, and everywhere strengthen disaffection, unless speedy relief was given to Arrah. He left Buxar with one hundred and fifty of her majesty's 5th Fusiliers, and three guns. As soon as he arrived within range, he opened fire upon the besieging sepoys, who fled without resistance, and the little garrison was at once and with ease relieved. When Eyre arrived, the loyal residents were in great straits. They numbered fifteen Europeans and fifty Sikhs. The Europeans were chiefly composed of railway clerks and indigo-planters. Fifty of the mutineers had fallen under the fire of the garrison, but not one of the little band had been hit. The rebels were mining the defences, and would have succeeded in blowing them up had not Eyre arrived with his Northumbrian Fusiliers. All the property, private and public, in the neighbourhood had been destroyed by the rebels.

The danger of Patna being looted was now apparent. The opium godowns contained property to the amount of two millions sterling. Its defenders were Rattray's Sikhs, without guns. The defence proved sufficient to deter the fugitive mutineers.

In August all Behar was disturbed, confusion and disorder reigned everywhere.

When Vincent Eyre relieved Arrah, two hundred Europeans of the 10th were sent to him from Dinapore upon his urgent demand, and that of Mr. Taylor, the civil commissioner at Patna. One hundred Sikhs arrived from Patna, so that the major had a force of five hundred men. With the greater portion of this body he set out for Jugdespore, where the Rajah Koer Singh, who had assisted the mutineers at Arrah, was in arms with his retainers, and a large body of sepoys. The fort at Jugdespore was strong, and the roads thither were cut up and flooded. Eyre arrived at the place through all difficulties. The 10th foot begged for leave to avenge the ambushade on the Arrah road. Permission was given; led by Captain Patterson they rushed upon the enemy with a shout, and fell upon them with the bayonet in the utmost fury, slaying all who resisted, and driving the sepoys in panic before them. Jugdespore surrendered, Eyre killing three hundred of its defenders; of his own force six men were wounded. Koer Singh fled to the jungle, where he had a house tolerably fortified. Captain L'Estrange was dispatched thither;

he destroyed some of the houses of the Koer Singh family, and swept the country of its adherents.

All through the month of August the Dinapore mutineers wandered about looting. Koer Singh collected various bands of marauders and marched into Bundelcund, spreading devastation as they went. Isolated corps and detachments of sepoys mutinied and murdered their officers all along the course of the Ganges. Amidst so much weakness and confusion Mr. Money, the magistrate at Gayah, showed great activity and intelligence, tracing rebel sepoys to their villages, and arresting them suddenly, the reluctant police being awed by his firmness, boldness, and air of authority, as well as by surprise at his extraordinary intelligence. Some of the military officers, as Major Horne, assumed local authority, and by dash and decision kept all quiet in their neighbourhood, proclaiming military law.

In September all Behar and Lower Bengal were afflicted by roving bands of robbers and mutineers; thirty millions of people were agitated by the results of the revolt at Dinapore. In Eastern Bengal the agitation was intense. Complications arose in Assam. Native pretenders were disposed to call the people to arms. There were no troops to send eastward from Calcutta, but a body of sailors, by some severe fighting and hard toil, kept the rebellious in awe.

#### INSURRECTION IN AND AROUND AGRA.

Agra, as the seat of government for the north-western or upper provinces of Bengal, and the residence of a lieutenant-governor, was a place of prime importance. To this place fugitives from Central India, from Bareilly, from Oude, and other regions made their way, until two thousand children, and nearly four thousand adults, chiefly noncombatants, occupied the fort. The sepoys gradually revolted or deserted; even those who had previously assisted in disarming mutineers, or attacking insurgents, caught the prevailing epidemic of disaffection, and mutinied. Various actions took place in the neighbourhood; the garrison sallying out against hordes of rebels twenty times their number. Brigadiers Polhiale and Cotton rendered good service, but the former officer, although efficient in the field, was not gifted with talents for organization, and was less enterprising than skilful in battle. The people of Agra, especially the Mohammedan rabble, aided by mutineers, destroyed the city, consuming the buildings and plundering all property, private and public. During the summer and autumn of 1857, the fort of Agra,

with its numerous refugees and children, held out unaided. The Kotah contingent, comprising seven hundred men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, upon which much reliance had been placed, mutinied, and added to the horrors that filled the once imperial city during three months of trial and suffering.

#### THE MUTINY BETWEEN DELHI AND FEROZEPUR DURING THE AUTUMN OF 1857.

In this vast district energy and ability were displayed by General Van Cortlandt, which entitled him to the gratitude of the British nation. The general was a native of India, and had been in the service of Runjeet Singh. He was received into the service of the company, and distinguished himself at Mooltan and elsewhere during the Sikh war. He assembled a small force of Sikh irregulars, and moved on Sirsah, where, as well as in the Hissar, Hansee, and Rohtuck districts, the rising had been universal. Within ten days these newly raised troops defeated vastly superior bodies of men in actions at Odhwala and Khyrakay, and retook Sirsah. Here he was reinforced by a large body of Bikaneer troops, and advanced on Hissar. The walled town of Hansee being attacked by the rebels in force, the general threw forward one thousand Rajpoots, who relieved the town, and held it till his arrival with the remainder of his forces. From Hansee he detached a large body of troops to Hissar to repel a threatened attack. Two thousand five hundred rebels advanced up to the very gates on the 19th of August, but were repulsed and completely routed, with a loss of upwards of three hundred men. At Mungalce, early in September, another action was fought with the rebels, in which they were completely routed. General Van Cortlandt then advanced with his whole force, and drove the enemy from Jumalpoore, where they had taken up a strong position, and cleared the whole country to Rohtuck, within a few miles of Delhi. The whole of the country from Sirsah to Delhi was utterly hostile; and massacres occurred at Sirsah, Hissar, and Hansee. Its importance, both politically and strategically, was immense, interposing between the Punjab and Delhi. Van Cortlandt, with a force entirely native, and composed of most heterogeneous materials, with but nine European officers, reconquered these districts, collected the revenue, retook the stations of Sirsah, Hissar, Hansee, and Rohtuck, re-established the customs line, diverted from Delhi a considerable force under Shah-zada Mohammed Azeem, whom he afterwards compelled to evacuate the country, and, with his lieutenants, totally routed the rebels in four hardly-fought actions.

#### MADRAS AND BOMBAY.

In Madras the troops remained loyal, although for the most part Mohammedans. This arose from the peculiar system of the Madras army, from the remoteness of the presidency from Delhi and Oude, the great traditional centres of native power, and from the large population of native Christians scattered through the presidency and connected with some of the native corps. There were agitations, arrests made by the sowars and sepoys themselves when emissaries from Bengal tampered with them, and some few disturbances, but the presidency remained loyal, its troops served in Central India against the rebels, and supplies of men and munitions were spared from Madras for Calcutta and other portions of Bengal.

In Bombay also the army was in the main loyal, although it excited much apprehension. The irregular troops in the north-west of the presidency were disposed to revolt, some deserted, and were captured and hung. At Kolapore, however, mutiny displayed itself. The 27th Bombay native infantry, without the slightest indication of dissatisfaction, suddenly rose on the 1st of August, the festival of Buckree Eed. Three of their officers were instantly murdered. They plundered the treasury, murdered a native woman, the mother of their own jemadar, performed sundry acts of religious devotion, and left the station in a body; the native officers of the corps remained loyal. Immediately, as in other cases, the surrounding country for a vast distance became agitated and disturbed. Vigilance, circumspection, and activity characterised the proceedings of the English authorities, and a Mohammedan conspiracy was discovered which had its ramifications throughout the presidency, its chief strength being in Poonah, Sattara, Belgaum, Dharwar, Rectnagherry, and Sawunt Warec. The Rajah of Sattara and his family were implicated. Mr. Rose, the commissioner, arrested him and placed him and the ranee under surveillance at Poonah. The religious leaders of the Mohammedans at that place had drawn up a plan for the massacre, not only of the Europeans, but of the native Christians at Poonah, Sattara, and Belgaum, which would have been put into execution but for the detection of the scheme. The first step of the proposed measures of revolt was the blowing up of the arsenal at Poonah. The native regiments were disarmed, the leading Mohammedan devotees arrested, and the disaffected awed by the display of vigour. Numbers of the captured 27th were blown away from guns at Kolapore and Rectnagherry. One of the chief conspirators at Belgaum was a moonshee, who

received one hundred and fifty rupees a month for teaching the officers Hindostanee.

The uneasiness at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta was very great as to how the Nizam of the Deccan would act at this juncture. He and his court happily remained faithful, as did also his troops. The populace of Hyderabad broke out into tumult; they were fanatical Mohammedans. Grape-shot from the guns of the horse artillery tamed their fanaticism, and there was no more insurrection. The irregular and some regular troops of the Bombay army in several instances refused to obey orders, and openly said that the King of Delhi was their rightful sovereign. Some deserted, but most were reduced to obedience.

#### ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS FROM ENGLAND AND NEPAUL—EXPEDITIONS OF THE CONQUERORS OF DELHI.

At last, in November and December, troops arrived at Calcutta from England in such numbers as to inspire hope. Had it not been for the aid derived from China, from the army returning from Persia, from Madras, Bombay, and the Cape of Good Hope, the troops arriving from England would have found all the Bengal provinces in the hands of the sepoys and insurgents. At the close of November four thousand five hundred newly-arrived troops were collected at Calcutta, and eleven men-of-war were anchored in the Hoogly. As the forces arrived, they were sent up the country, especially to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief.

Jung Bahadoor, with nine thousand Goorkhas, descended from the hills, and in the month of December appeared upon the theatre of conflict. He drove the Oude rebels from Goruckpore and Azimghur back into Oude. This movement enabled various officers in Northern India to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in his plans for the reconquest of Oude. Sir James Outram, with about four thousand men, held post at the Alum Bagh, between which and Cawnpore the communications were kept open with difficulty. Colonel Seaton, at the head of a portion of the force which conquered Delhi, marched south-eastward between the Jumna and the Ganges. His first object was the subjugation of the Rajah of Minporee. On his way Seaton had to fight several actions, in which Captain Hodson and his Horse performed prodigies of valour. He captured guns, cut up the enemy, dispersed rebel hordes, and slew in battle or executed many zemindars, leaders of revolt. Brigadier Showers commanded another column of the conquerors of Delhi, and with it swept a circle of extensive radius over the disturbed

districts from Delhi to Agra, slaying and dispersing rebels; he then returned with his column to Delhi.

#### SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA, RAJPOOTANA, AND BUNDELCUND—CONQUEST OF JHANSI AND OF CALPEE.

Sir Hugh Rose was placed in command of a body of Bombay troops, called the Central India field-force, and with this, as a flying column, he preceeded to restore order in those provinces where, in a former chapter, mutiny was described as having gained ascendancy. He was ordered to fight his way northward to Jhansi, and subdue the rebel garrison of that place. His force was divided into two brigades, which sometimes acted far apart. The actions fought were generally in the open field, or in the vicinity of jungles and passes; and everywhere Sir Hugh rolled away, or cut through the living ramparts that obstructed his progress. The Rajah of Shagur, an independent district, joined the rebels. Rose and Sir Robert Hamilton seized and confiscated his territory. Nana Sahib's brother, at the head of a vast mob of looters, was plundering various districts, and threatening the flanks of Sir Hugh's division. Brigadier Stuart, with one of Sir Hugh's brigades, operated to the south of Jhansi, and swept through Malwa, beating the rebels everywhere.

A body of troops, called the Rajpootana field-force, was collected in the Bombay presidency. It was strong in European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, as well as in good native troops. General Roberts commanded it, and Brigadier General Lawrence attended it as political agent. On the 10th of March this force marched from Nusserabad against Kotah. The rajah was faithful; the contingent had mutinied. The rajah held a portion of the city, and co-operated with General Roberts, who, by skilful generalship, captured the place without the loss of an officer, and losing only a few men; fifty guns were captured. The rebels, as usual, got away with no loss after that which they suffered in the bombardment and advance.

General Whitlock, in a direction east of Jhansi, pursued wandering bands of rebels with such celerity as to leave them no rest, cutting up and dispersing them in every direction.

Sir Hugh Rose, having laid siege to Jhansi, maintained it with vigour. On the 1st of April an attempt was made to raise the siege by a rebel army, under a Mahratta chief, named Tantia Topee, a relative of Nana Sahib. This chief proved to be a braver man and better general than his kinsman, the Nana. He fought with courage,

manœuvred with skill, and was very expert in choosing his field of battle. In his efforts to raise the siege of Jhansi, or make his way into the fortress, Tantia fought a pitched battle with Sir Hugh Rose. Victory rested, as usual, with the arms of the British general. He pursued Tantia two miles beyond the river Betwa, taking eighteen guns, and slaying fifteen hundred of his followers. Two of the mutineer regiments of the Gwalior contingent were in the ranks of Tantia; these fought with fury and obstinacy, and suffered severely.

The result of this battle was of great importance. The Ranée of Jhansi saw from the walls the defeat of her confederates. She effected her escape that night with a chosen band of her followers. The city was taken by storm. The garrison endeavoured to escape when they saw that the English had made secure their entrance, but Rose had taken measures to prevent this, and the slaughter of the enemy was signal. As the town people had aided the garrison they were made partakers of the vengeance.

Possessed of Jhansi Sir Hugh found his difficulties great. The Kotah rebel contingent infested the roads, the country people were in arms, and Tantia Topee was recruiting his forces at Calpee. The number of sick and wounded was great. While he remained at Jhansi settling affairs in that city, and reorganizing, he threw out parties in every direction, which scoured the country, dispersing bands, chastising rebel rajahs, razing forts, and defeating mutineers. Major Gall in one of these excursions captured a fort belonging to the Rajah of Sumpter.

While Sir Hugh Rose and Whitlock were leading their troops to victory, more than a thousand faithful sepoy of the Bengal army, with an equal number of Madras thrown into it by Whitlock, maintained the safety of Saugor, and kept at bay a country swarming with rebels.

Scindiah cut up the Kotah mutineers who sought shelter in his territory from the sword of General Roberts, and captured or destroyed ten guns. This band was accompanied by a large number of fugitive women and children, who now in their turn suffered the hardships and perils of flight, which had been in so many cases imposed upon the families of the English.

The Rajpootana field-force performed numerous desultory exploits, and dispersed many bands of Rajpoot and Mahratta rebels. The Gujerat field-force disarmed the country, and hung or blew away from guns rajahs and native officers of the Bombay army detected in treasonable correspondence with Tantia Topee, Nana Sahib, and other rebel leaders.

While these events were occurring under General Rose, General Whitlock with his Madras troops was engaged successfully in the troubled district of Bundelcund. On the 19th of April he defeated seven thousand rebels under the command of the Nawab of Banda. He captured the Nawab and his guns, slew five hundred of his retainers, and dispersed his whole force.

The rebels now became exceedingly anxious for Calpee. Ram Rao Gohind, a Mahratta, had collected three thousand men of his race, and three guns. Tantia Topee had made up his force to ten thousand men, composed of mutinous sepoy and sowars, about one thousand Mahratta horse, and not much less than seven thousand Ghazees, or fanatics. Calpee is on the right bank of the Jumna, and derived importance from being a place of support for the insurrection, and from being on the main road from Jhansi to Cawnpore.

On the 9th of May Sir Hugh Rose, on his way to Calpee, had arrived at Kooneh, where Tantia Topee and the Ranee of Jhansi intercepted his march. The enemy were intrenched; Rose beat them out of their intrenchments, captured the town and several guns, and made much havoc, especially in the pursuit. The British, and the general himself, principally suffered from exposure to the sun. His advance to Calpee was resisted perpetually, but in vain: as the torrent bears away the branch which falls across its course, so the forces of the rebels were swept away in his progress. Maxwell from Cawnpore, Whitlock from the south, Riddell from Etawah, were all acting in a combined system of operation with Sir Hugh Rose. As he approached Calpee, skirmishes were frequent, occurring daily, almost hourly. A nephew of Nana Sahib was the most active chief in obstructing Sir Hugh's approach. On the 18th Rose shelled the earthworks which had been constructed by Nana Sahib some time before. On the opposite bank of the Jumna Maxwell opened fire next day, which was a surprise to the rebel chiefs, who believed him to be at Cawnpore. On the 20th a sortie was made in force and with skill; the enemy after fighting with energy were beaten in. On the 22nd the rebels, galled by the fire of Maxwell's heavy guns, attacked Sir Hugh Rose's position. Rose drove back a force of fifteen thousand men. The enemy evacuated Calpee in the night with silence, caution, and celerity. It was difficult, perhaps impossible, to prevent this, as long nullahs and scattered topes favoured a concealed flight. They left all their guns behind. Rose found a well-stocked arsenal, foundries, and material of all kinds, vast in quantity, and of great value.

The enemy had retreated chiefly by the road to Gwalior, which Rose had least guarded. Sir Hugh sent a flying column in pursuit, but the fugitives were too nimble, and far outstripped their pursuers.

#### REVOLUTION IN GWALIOR.

Sir Hugh Rose having captured Calpee, like Sir Colin Campbell when he had captured Bareilly, believed that the rebellion in that part of India was subdued. He did not even yet know the people among whom he was, nor the troops he had so often conquered. Like Sir Colin Campbell he issued a glowing address to his troops, congratulating them on the end of their labours, and, again like Sir Colin, he had scarcely done so when new and great alarms called him to the field. On the day Sir Hugh addressed his soldiers the fugitives from Calpee entered Gwalior, drove Scindiah from his throne, and convulsed all Central India by their success. This was on the 1st of June.

When Tantia Topee encamped near Gwalior, Scindiah sent to Agra for succour, but none could be given; he himself fled thither, after having in vain appealed to his troops to meet the enemy. Three thousand cavalry, six thousand infantry, and artillery, with eight guns, went over to Rao Sahib, nephew to Nana Sahib. The body-guard fought until nearly cut to pieces; their remnant, with persistent bravery, escorted their sovereign off the field.

Nana Sahib was proclaimed as Peishwa of the Mahrattas, a title which he had proclaimed for himself at Cawnpore. Rao Sahib was made chief or sovereign of Gwalior. Scindiah had immense treasures which were seized, all the royal property was confiscated, and the rich citizens plundered. The escape from Calpee was the ruin of Gwalior. The surrounding rajahs flocked to the capital, bringing their retainers. A large army was thus organized, and with ample resources in money and stores to supply it.

Sir Hugh Rose was ill when he conquered Calpee. Probably to that circumstance it was owing that the rebels escaped thence. When the tidings reached him of the fall of Gwalior, he hastened to repair the disaster. Collecting all the forces he could bring together from every quarter, he marched upon the place. On the 16th of June he arrived near the old cantonments. Rose reconnoitred the place, and immediately resolved to attack the cantonments. The attempt was successful the slaughter of the fugitives frightful,—some of the trenches formed beyond the cantonments were nearly choked with the dead. Sir Hugh encamped within the vanquished lines.

The Ranee of Jhansi organized forces to intercept Rose's reinforcements, and in doing so fought a battle with Brigadier Smith, in which she fell. Tantia Topee assumed the direction of those operations which she had guided, and fought with skill and energy. Smith, however, was victorious. His contingent was joined by the general-in-chief, who effected a flank movement to that side of the city. The next day he stormed the chief of the fortified heights held by the enemy, who, finding that no obstacles impeded the English, became panic-struck, and fled out of the place. The British cavalry pursued the broken fugitives, cutting them down in vast numbers, until the plains were strewn with their dead.

All was conquered except the great rock fort, into which some of the rebels had retired. Two young officers, who were appointed with a small party to watch a police-station near the fort, resolved to surprise it in the night. Aided by a blacksmith, they, with their few soldiers, forced their way in, and, after desperate fighting, won the place. The attempt was planned by Lieutenant Rose, who perished in executing it. His companion, Lieutenant Waller, secured the prize. Soon after, Scindiah was reinstated upon his throne.

#### SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY.

The main body of the rebels had retreated to Kurawlee. Thither Rose sent light troops in pursuit. Brigadier Napier took the command. On arriving at Jowla Alipore, he observed the enemy in great force, with twenty-five guns. After all their signal defeats and losses, they had an ample command of *matériel* of war. Napier had not a thousand men; the enemy counted ten times that number. The gallant brigadier, worthy of his name, achieved a swift, glorious, and complete victory, capturing all their guns. After a vain pursuit of the nimble fugitives, the conqueror returned to Gwalior.

Tantia Topee, with another body of about eight thousand in number, directed his way to Geypore, the chief of the Rajpoot states. He carried with him the crown jewels and the treasure of Scindiah. This daring and active chief now kept Central India in agitation.

Sir Hugh Rose, worn out with toil, retired from his command, and the Central India field-force was broken up. Sir Edward Lugard soon after also retired, worn out with fatigue and anxiety. In this way almost all the eminent men whom the mutiny had called forth as able commanders dropped away gradually, and gave place to others who followed

up with success the work of pacification. The neck of the Indian rebellion was now broken. Proclamations of amnesty and pardon were issued by the government to all who would seek mercy—exceptions in cases of actual murder, and of the great ringleaders of insurrection, being of course made. These proclamations told upon vast numbers, but many remained contumacious to the last.

After the hot season of 1858, the rebellion became a guerrilla war, and a pursuit of bandits. The great leaders were discomfited, the minor rajahs and chiefs were captured, hung, blown away from guns, or, submitting, were pardoned. The moulvie was killed in an encounter with one of the Rohilcund rajahs, who deemed it his interest to side with the English. The moulvie was a sincere zealot, and was probably the man who devised the scheme of the revolt, and created the

rebellion. Nana Sahib's cowardice kept him from the path of danger, and he escaped capture. He ultimately fled into the Nepaul dominions, with a band of followers. The Nana's nephew fell in one of the combats in Central India, after the flight of the rebels from Gwalior. Tantia Topee for some time eluded pursuit, and wandered about, a wretched but gallant fugitive, until at last he became a prisoner, and paid with his life the penalty of his misdeeds. With the removal of that remarkable man from the scene of so many horrors, so great struggles, and so much bloodshed, the last spark of rebellion expired.

In the summer of 1859 thanksgiving was offered for the entire suppression of the insurrection, but it was in fact subdued at the close of the campaign of 1858, with the exception of roving bands of marauders, for the suppression of which the police were adequate.

## CHAPTER CXXXV.

### PRINCIPAL HOME EVENTS CONNECTED WITH INDIA AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW OF 1854, TO THE ABOLITION OF THE COMPANY'S POLITICAL CONTROL, 1858.

THERE were few events occurring immediately after the new constitution of the company in any way calling for notice in a general history of our empire in the East. The new act of 1854 came into operation on the day nominated, but some time elapsed before it worked with facility in the India-house. In 1855 the policy of Lord Dalhousie was much discussed by the English public, and from that time to the close of his career, the directors were constantly engaged with difficult subjects which he brought before them, or in discussions arising from his measures; and when the mutiny began, his annexation of Oude proved to be the grand difficulty of India.

Without any formal reversal of the policy of Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning was nominated as his successor. On other pages of this history his arrival in Calcutta, the spirit in which he assumed the government, and the policy which he pursued have been brought before the reader. That policy was viewed in England from the standing-point of party politics.

When the news of the revolt arrived in England, with the opinion of Lord Canning as to its partial and temporary nature, the board of control and the court of directors discussed, in the usual tedious way, the propriety of sending out reinforcements. The fatal words of Lord Canning, making light of the mutiny,

checked the zeal of the English authorities upon whom the duty devolved of sending aid. The long sea route was preferred to the overland route; and heavy sailing-vessels, some of them the worst sailers in Europe, and hardly seaworthy, were preferred to swift steamers. Lord Palmerston implicitly trusted to the opinions of Lord Canning, who was his nominee and friend.

A great conflict of parliamentary opinions, concerning the administration of Lord Canning, arose in connection with a proclamation intended to encourage the submission of such insurgents as were disposed to lay down their arms, and to deter the continuance of revolt on the part of the obstinate, by threatening consequences the most formidable which, in the opinion of the governor-general, he could hold out.

The government of Lord Palmerston having been displaced, and Lord Derby at the head of the tory party having assumed office, Lord Ellenborough was nominated to the presidency of the board of control, instead of Mr. Vernon Smith. Lord Ellenborough disapproved of the proclamation, or thought it a good occasion for a party move. He wrote a despatch which was almost vituperative, and caused it to be circulated amongst the adherents of government in parliament, some of whom published it. The document was so indiscreet, and the party motive of

the writer so obvious, that irrespective of the merits of the proclamation, a strong feeling arose in the country against the administration of Indian affairs by Lord Ellenborough. The house of commons were prepared to give an adverse vote, which would have compelled Lord Derby's government to retire, but the resignation of Lord Ellenborough at once relieved India of the danger of his further connection with it, and the cabinet from being displaced. The general opinion in England was that Lord Canning's proclamation was too severe to be politic, but those who raised the outcry against it were the very men who had heaped upon him continued censure for his lenity. Lord Canning prudently gave discretion to those by whom the proclamation would have to be carried out. The opinions of Mr. Montgomery and Sir James Outram harmonised with those of the English public, and Lord Canning was influenced by such experienced councillors. Mr. Vernon Smith, the ex-president of the board of control, placed his party and Lord Canning in much disadvantage by concealing letters written by the governor-general to the board of control, which Mr. Smith ought, as a matter of public duty, to have handed to Lord Ellenborough. This circumstance much irritated the liberal party in parliament.

At last, public opinion seemed to demand that the government of the East India Company should cease. Bills to effect this were brought in by the great opposing parties. The views entertained by Lord Stanley and Lord Palmerston were more nearly allied than those of other members on opposite sides of the legislature. After long discussions, needlessly protracted, intolerably tedious, developing but little wisdom on the part of our legislators, a bill passed the legislature for the future government of India, depriving the East India Company of all political connection with the country, and governing it by a minister of the crown responsible to parliament, aided by a council. The Act, which passed the legislature August 2nd, 1858, was entitled, "An Act for the better Government of India."

With the abolition of the East India Company's political existence, this work appropriately closes. Perhaps the time had arrived when that political anomaly, brilliant as it was, should cease to exist; but the unpreju-

diced historian cannot fail to admit that, as a governing power, it was the most unique and remarkable in the world. Granted that faults have been committed, and much left undone that ought to have been done, still what has been accomplished fairly deserves the admiration of posterity. That an association of merchants, almost unaided by the home government, should have established the basis of an Eastern empire fifteen thousand miles from home, is a remarkable phenomenon. Aided by a long roll of eminent servants, of their own rearing, they extended their dominions to their present dimensions, and gradually introduced the institutions of civilized communities.

Under the company's later auspices, private property was protected; barbarous customs restrained; justice equitably administered; native chiefs and princes compelled to observe the law; an efficient police established; toleration of religious opinions ensured; and industry protected.

Under the salutary influence of the gentle sovereignty of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, the country has entered on a new era of peace and prosperity. European colonization—much neglected by the company—should be zealously promoted. Wherever the experiment has been made, it has been successful; and a marked improvement has been observed in the neighbourhood.

The fallacies concerning the climate have vanished before practical experience. In the higher regions a European temperature can be found; while in the plains the inconveniences of the climate have been much exaggerated. The staple products of the country are valuable, and capable of increased development, offering an extensive field for agricultural enterprise.

To the ardent political economist India opens up a fruitful scene of action; while the no less hopeful Christian missionary sees a wide sphere for Gospel labours. The one hopes for the social regeneration of the country by introducing the advantages of civilization; the other believes in the possibility of advancing the cause of Christianity by the permanent residence of practical Christians. Should either, or both, of these aspirations be realized, the natives of India will have no cause to regret the transference of their allegiance to a foreign sovereign.

THE END.

# CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

	PAGE.		PAGE.
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	i	CHAP. XIV.	
CHAP. I.		The Government of the British Indian Empire	
India:—Geographical position—Geology—Climate		(Continued) . . . . .	307
—Productions . . . . .	1	CHAP. XV.	
CHAP. II.		The Government of the British Indian Empire	
Population—Religion—Languages—Literature . .	26	(Continued) . . . . .	317
CHAP. III.		CHAP. XVI.	
Provinces—Chief Cities . . . . .	70	The Government of the British Indian Empire	
CHAP. IV.		(Continued) . . . . .	325
Cities and Districts (Continued)—North-western		CHAP. XVII.	
Provinces . . . . .	86	The Government of the British Indian Empire	
CHAP. V.		(Continued) . . . . .	338
Districts and Cities (Continued)—Non-regulation		CHAP. XVIII.	
Provinces of the Bengal and North-western Go-		The importance of a Knowledge of the Languages of	
vernments . . . . .	100	India by Government Officers—Communications	
CHAP. VI.		between England and India . . . . .	355
General Description of the Deccan—Presidency of		CHAP. XIX.	
Madras—Collectorates and Cities . . . . .	124	The Commerce of India:—Ancient Intercourse be-	
CHAP. VII.		tween India and the West . . . . .	366
Districts and Cities—The Bombay Presidency . .	138	CHAP. XX.	
CHAP. VIII.		Commerce (Continued)—Commercial Intercourse	
Ceylon:—Geology—Productions—Population—Re-		between India and the Western Nations from the	
ligion—Literature—Chief Towns . . . . .	158	Invasion of Alexander to the Settlement of the	
CHAP. IX.		British . . . . .	371
Independent States . . . . .	188	CHAP. XXI.	
CHAP. X.		Commerce (Continued)—Mode of transacting Busi-	
Maritime Settlements:—The Eastern Straits—Bor-		ness in India—The Currency—Weights and Mea-	
neo—Aden . . . . .	199	sures—Import of Silver—Import and Export of	
CHAP. XI.		General Merchandize . . . . .	377
Independent Countries which have been Theatres of		CHAP. XXII.	
War during the Progress of our Eastern Dominion	205	Commerce (Continued)—Chief Articles of Indian	
CHAP. XII.		Commerce . . . . .	390
Independent Countries which have been Theatres of		CHAP. XXIII.	
War during the Progress of our Eastern Dominion		Commerce (Continued)—Commerce of outlying Set-	
(Continued) . . . . .	257	tlements . . . . .	416
CHAP. XIII.		CHAP. XXIV.	
The Government of the British Indian Empire . .	282	Science and Art of the Hindoos . . . . .	434
		CHAP. XXV.	
		The Social Condition of India . . . . .	463
		CHAP. XXVI.	
		The Social Condition of India (Continued) . . .	483

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. XXVII.		CHAP. XXXIX.	
The Social Condition of India ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	502	The Reign of Akbar . . . . .	638
CHAP. XXVIII.		CHAP. XL.	
Ancient India—Chronology—Historical Record— Brahma—Menu—The Great War . . . . .	523	The Reign of Jehanghire . . . . .	648
CHAP. XXIX.		CHAP. XLI.	
Ancient History :—The Kingdoms of Magada and Cashmere . . . . .	532	The Reigns of Shah Jehan and Aurungzebe . . . . .	660
CHAP. XXX.		CHAP. XLII.	
Invasion of the Greeks—Alexander the Great—Se- leucus Nicator—The Bactrian Greeks . . . . .	537	From the Death of Aurungzebe to the Dissolution of the Empire . . . . .	683
CHAP. XXXI.		CHAP. XLIII.	
Alexander crossing the Indus, and subsequent Opera- tions . . . . .	548	Review of the Mohammedan Period . . . . .	704
CHAP. XXXII.		CHAP. XLIV.	
The Return of Alexander . . . . .	556	The Parsces :—Their relation to Indian History . . . . .	719
CHAP. XXXIII.		CHAP. XLV.	
Christianity in India, from its Introduction to the time of the arrival of the English . . . . .	569	Russian Intercourse, Commercial and Political, with Eastern Asia . . . . .	735
CHAP. XXXIV.		CHAP. XLVI.	
The Mohammedans in India . . . . .	587	The Portuguese in India and Eastern Asia . . . . .	741
CHAP. XXXV.		CHAP. XLVII.	
The History of the Kings of the Houses of Ghizni ( <i>Concluded</i> ) . . . . .	601	Advent of the British in India—British Eastern Ex- peditions in the Sixteenth Century . . . . .	751
CHAP. XXXVI.		CHAP. XLVIII.	
The Dynasties of Ghoor and Khilji . . . . .	604	Proceedings of the London East India Company from the beginning of the Seventeenth Century to the Settlement of Factories under Treaties of Com- merce in India and the Eastern Seas . . . . .	767
CHAP. XXXVII.		CHAP. XLIX.	
The Dynasty of Toghluks—Invasion of Tamerlane— The Dynasties of Syud and Lodi . . . . .	613	The Dutch in India and the Eastern Seas . . . . .	785
CHAP. XXXVIII.			
The Affghans and Mogals . . . . .	623		

## CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. L.		CHAP. LXVI.	
Progress of the East India Company, from the Establishment of Factories in Continental India to the First Settlement on the Hoogly . . . . .	1	Establishment of a regular Navy at Bombay, and of regular Military forces in Bombay, Madras, and Bengal . . . . .	176
CHAP. LI.		CHAP. LXVII.	
Home History of the Company, from the Civil War in England to the end of the Seventeenth Century . . . . .	14	Jealousies and Quarrels with the French previous to the first breaking out of War between them and the British in India . . . . .	186
CHAP. LII.		CHAP. LXVIII.	
The English in India and the Eastern Archipelago, from the Settlement at Hoogly to the end of the Seventeenth Century . . . . .	30	War between England and France in the East . . . . .	195
CHAP. LIII.		CHAP. LXIX.	
Review of the History of British Connection with India to the close of the Seventeenth Century . . . . .	48	English Conquest of the Carnatic . . . . .	203
CHAP. LIV.		CHAP. LXX.	
Review of the History of British Connection with India to the close of the Seventeenth Century ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	62	British Conquest of the Carnatic ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	216
CHAP. LV.		CHAP. LXXI.	
The Home Affairs of the Company during the first half of the Eighteenth Century . . . . .	72	Conflicts between the English and French in Western India after the breaking out of War between the two Nations in 1744 . . . . .	237
CHAP. LVI.		CHAP. LXXII.	
The Ostend Company . . . . .	80	Events in Bengal after the breaking out of the War with France in 1744—Massacre of Englishmen in the Black Hole of Calcutta—Expulsion of the French . . . . .	243
CHAP. LVII.		CHAP. LXXIII.	
The Danes in India and Eastern Asia . . . . .	88	Dethronement of Suraj-ad-Dowlah—Battle of Plassey . . . . .	252
CHAP. LVIII.		CHAP. LXXIV.	
The Minor East India Companies:—Swedish, Prussian, Trieste, and Spanish . . . . .	95	Opposition to the Soubahdarship of Meer Jaffier—Intrigues of the Nabob of Oude, and other Native Princes, instigated by the French—Invasion of Bengal by the Dutch, and their Defeat and Destruction by Colonel Ford—Invasion of Bengal by Shah-zada—His Repulse and Flight . . . . .	264
CHAP. LIX.		CHAP. LXXV.	
French Enterprise in India and the East, to the time of the formation of "The Perpetual Company of the Indies" . . . . .	105	Warren Hastings prominent in the Affairs of Bengal—Governor Vansittart opposed by the Council—War with the Emperor—Defeat of the imperial army, and of the French, with the capture of M. Law, the French chief—Establishment of Meer Cossim in the Soubahdarship by the English . . . . .	275
CHAP. LX.		CHAP. LXXVI.	
French Enterprise in India and the East from the formation of "The Perpetual Company of the Indies" to the War with England . . . . .	117	Affairs in Bengal—Violent and fraudulent conduct of the English—Disputes between the Governor and Council of Calcutta—Revenue Contests between the Officers of the Council and those of the Soubahdar—Commencement of War by the British—Series of Victories—Massacre of the English at Patna—Expulsion of Meer Cossim from Bengal . . . . .	283
CHAP. LXI.		CHAP. LXXVII.	
British Affairs in China during the Eighteenth Century . . . . .	123	War with the Nabob of Oude—Ruin of Meer Cossim—Death of Meer Jaffier—The English place Nujum-ad-Dowlah upon the Musnid of Bengal—Humiliation of Nundcoomar, the minister of Jaffier—Disorganization of English Affairs in Bengal—Corrupt practices of the Council—Appointment of Clive as Governor . . . . .	292
CHAP. LXII.			
The British in Western India during the first quarter of the Eighteenth Century . . . . .	132		
CHAP. LXIII.			
The British in Western India during the second quarter of the Eighteenth Century . . . . .	148		
CHAP. LXIV.			
Madras from the beginning of the Eighteenth Century to the breaking out of Hostilities with the French in 1744 . . . . .	163		
CHAP. LXV.			
Events in Bengal from the beginning of the Eighteenth Century to the breaking out of Hostilities with France in 1744 . . . . .	169		

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. LXXVIII.		CHAP. XCVI.	
Affairs in Bengal during the Government of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier—Arrival of Warren Hastings as Governor . . . . .	303	Third Campaign against Tippoo Sultan ( <i>Continued</i> )	445
CHAP. LXXIX.		CHAP. XCVII.	
Bombay and Madras—Events connected with those Presidencies to 1775 . . . . .	308	War with Tippoo Sultan ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	454
CHAP. LXXX.		CHAP. XCVIII.	
War with Hyder Ali of Mysore . . . . .	315	Departure of Lord Cornwallis from India—Sir John Shore becomes Governor-general—He resigns—The Earl of Mornington is appointed Governor-general—General Conspiracy against the English—Efforts of the French—Tippoo Sultan forms a French Alliance to expel the English from India	464
CHAP. LXXXI.		CHAP. XCIX.	
Home Affairs of the East India Company from 1750 to 1775 . . . . .	324	Final War with Tippoo Sultan—Storming of Seringapatam—Death of Tippoo . . . . .	470
CHAP. LXXXII.		CHAP. C.	
Affairs in Bengal during the Government of Warren Hastings . . . . .	335	The Hon. Colonel Wellesley, as Governor of Mysore, makes War on Dhoondia Waugh—Results upon the Interests of the English in India—General Difficulties of Lord Wellesley's Government—Affairs of Oude—Disagreements with Birmah—Missionary Efforts in the Eighteenth Century . . . . .	480
CHAP. LXXXIII.		CHAP. CI.	
The Government of Bengal under Warren Hastings as Governor-general of India . . . . .	345	Relations of the French to India in the opening of the Nineteenth Century—Policy of the Marquis Wellesley in reference to French influence in India, and the Mahrattas—War with the Mahrattas—Operations of General Wellesley—Battles of Assaye and Argaum . . . . .	490
CHAP. LXXXIV.		CHAP. CII.	
Government of Warren Hastings as Governor-general ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	355	Mahratta War ( <i>Continued</i> )—Operations of General Lake—Battles and Sieges—Final Subjugation of the Mahrattas, and Treaties of Peace . . . . .	500
CHAP. LXXXV.		CHAP. CIII.	
Government of Hastings ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	361	Resignation of the Marquis Wellesley—Marquis Cornwallis succeeds him—Policy and Death of his Lordship—Appointment and revocation of Sir G. Barlow—Nomination of Lord Minto—Affairs of Madras—Mutiny and Massacre at Vellore—Arrival of Lord Minto—His Policy . . . . .	507
CHAP. LXXXVI.		CHAP. CIV.	
Government of Hastings ( <i>Concluded</i> ) . . . . .	370	Government of the Earl of Moira . . . . .	514
CHAP. LXXXVII.		CHAP. CV.	
War with Hyder Ali of Mysore—His Invasion of the Carnatic—His Devastations, Victories, Cruelty, and Death . . . . .	377	Progress of British Interests in China and the Archipelago, from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the end of the Government of the Marquis Hastings . . . . .	525
CHAP. LXXXVIII.		CHAP. CVI.	
The War with Tippoo Sahib—Withdrawal from the Carnatic—Conquests in Western India—Sieges of Mangalore and Onore—Victories of Colonel Fullarton and General Stuart—Defeat of Bussy and the French—Peace with France—Peace with Tippoo . . . . .	387	Home Events connected with the East India Company from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Renewal of the Charter in 1833-4	537
CHAP. LXXXIX.		CHAP. CVII.	
Naval Operations in the Indian Seas during the War with Mysore, France, Spain, and Holland—Capture of Negapatam, Trincomalee, &c., from the Dutch—Loss of Trincomalee to the French . . . . .	399	Government of Lord Amherst . . . . .	543
CHAP. XC.		CHAP. CVIII.	
Home Affairs . . . . .	404	Government of Lord Amherst ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	556
CHAP. XCI.		CHAP. CIX.	
Home Affairs ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	414	Provisional Government of Sir Charles Metcalfe—Government of Lord Auckland—Russian Intervention in the Affairs of Afghanistan—Persian Invasion of Herat—British Expedition to the Persian Gulf—Treaty of Lahore . . . . .	562
CHAP. XCII.		CHAP. CX.	
Mr. Macpherson succeeds Hastings as Governor-general—His Financial Measures—Tippoo defeats the Mahrattas—Lord Macartney surrenders the Government of Madras and refuses that of Bengal—Ambition of Scindiah—The Sikhs become important—Earl Cornwallis assumes the Government of India—His General Measures—Tippoo invades Travancore . . . . .	419	The Affghan War . . . . .	572
CHAP. XCIII.			
War with Tippoo Sultan . . . . .	426		
CHAP. XCIV.			
Second Campaign against Tippoo Sultan . . . . .	430		
CHAP. XCV.			
War with Tippoo: Third Campaign . . . . .	438		

# CONTENTS.

v

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. CXI.		CHAP. CXXV.	
Affghan War ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	581	Annexation of Oude—Laws affecting the Tenure of Land in Bengal . . . . .	686
CHAP. CXII.		CHAP. CXXVI.	
Transactions and Battles of the British Army at Cabul, from the departure of Sir Robert Sale to the retreat of the Hon. General Elphinstoue . .	588	Persian War—Its Causes—Invasion of Herat—Expedition to the Persian Gulf—Capture of Bushire, Mohammerah, and Akwaz—Peace negotiated at Paris . . . . .	693
CHAP. CXIII.		CHAP. CXXVII.	
Retreat of the British from Cabul—Destruction of the Army . . . . .	597	Departure of Lord Dalhousie—Arrival of Lord Canning as Governor-general—Breaking out of a Sepoy Mutiny—Want of foresight and decision on the part of Government—Disbanding of Regiments and Punishment of individual Officers and Soldiers—Proofs of a Mohammedan Conspiracy .	706
CHAP. CXIV.		CHAP. CXXVIII.	
Second Invasion of Afghanistan by the British . .	603	Revolt of the Sepoys at Meerut—Measures of Government preparatory to an Advance of the British Forces upon Delhi . . . . .	715
CHAP. CXV.		CHAP. CXXIX.	
Events in Upper Afghanistan—General Nott Marches to Scinde—Capture of Ghizni—Generals Nott and Pollock advance to Cabul—Rescue of the English Prisoners—Destruction and Evacuation of Cabul . . . . .	611	Mutiny at Benares—Its suppression by Colonel Neill—Mutiny at Allahabad, also suppressed by Colonel Neill—Mutiny at Cawnpore—Treachery of Nana Sahib—Gallant Defence by General Wheeler—Capitulation of the British, and their Massacre—Murder of Fugitives from Futtyghur—Mutiny at that Place—Assumption of the Mahratta Sovereignty by Nana Sahib . . . .	723
CHAP. CXVI.		CHAP. CXXX.	
The War in Scinde—Advance towards Hyderabad—The Ameers coerced into a Treaty with the English—Attack upon the English Residency at Hyderabad—Expedition of Sir Charles Napier in the Desert—Battle of Meannee—Battle of Dubba—Victories of Colonel Roberts and Captain Jacobs—Sir Charles Napier's Government of Scinde . . . . .	620	The Mutiny in Oude—Defence of Lucknow by Sir Henry Lawrence—His Death—Mutiny in Rohilcund and the Doab—Mutiny in Central India—Mutiny in the Punjab, and its Suppression—Unsuccessful attempt at Mutiny in Scinde . .	730
CHAP. CXVII.		CHAP. CXXXI.	
War with China—Naval and Military Operations—Treaty of Peace—Opening of Five Ports to European Commerce . . . . .	626	Advance of a British Army against Delhi—Siege of the City . . . . .	742
CHAP. CXVIII.		CHAP. CXXXII.	
War with the Mahrattas of Gwalior—Battles of Maharajpore and Punniar—Dangers on the Sikh Frontier—Lord Ellenborough recalled—Mr. Bird Governor-general, <i>pro. tem.</i> —Sir Henry Hardinge arrives as Governor-general . . . . .	640	Arrangements for the relief of Cawnpore and Lucknow—March of Colonel Neill's Column upon Cawnpore—Its Success—March of Outram and Havelock upon Lucknow—Relief of the Residency—Advance of Sir Colin Campbell to Lucknow—Removal of the Garrison to Cawnpore . . . .	751
CHAP. CXIX.		CHAP. CXXXIII.	
The Sikh War—Battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon—Advance upon Lahore—Peace . . . . .	644	Operations from Cawnpore under the direction of Sir Colin Campbell—Conquest of Lucknow, Shah-jehanpore, and Bareilly—Suppression of the Mutiny in Oude, Rohilcund, and neighbouring Districts . . . . .	759
CHAP. CXX.		CHAP. CXXXIV.	
The Second Sikh War—Revolt of Chuttur Singh—Murder of English Envoys at Mooltan—Gallant Conduct of Lieutenant Edwardes—General Whish bombards and captures Mooltan—Sentence on Moolraj—Advance of Lord Gough—Battle of Ramnuggur . . . . .	652	Various Mutinies and Insurrections, and their Suppression—Capture of Jhansi and Calpee by Sir Hugh Rose—Revolutions in Gwalior—Surrender of the City to Tantia Topce—Flight of Scindiah—Capture of the City and Fortress by Sir Hugh Rose—Restoration of Scindiah—Death or Capture of the Chief Leaders of the Revolt—Dispersion of the Rebel Bands—End of the Mutiny and Insurrection . . . . .	766
CHAP. CXXI.		CHAP. CXXXV.	
Shere Singh retreats from Ramnuggur to Russool—Battle of Chillianwallah—Operations against Ram Singh in the Raree Doab—Storming of the Dullah Heights—Battle of Goojerat—Defeat and surrender of the Sikh Army—Annexation of the Punjab . . . . .	659	Principal Home Events connected with India after the Enactment of the Law of 1854, to the Abolition of the Company's Political Control, 1858 . . .	773
CHAP. CXXII.			
General Affairs of India under the Government of Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge—His departure—Arrival of Lord Dalhousie—His General Policy .	667		
CHAP. CXXIII.			
Government of the Marquis of Dalhousie from 1851 ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	674		
CHAP. CXXIV.			
Home Events . . . . .	680		



# THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OF THE

## BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA

### AND THE EAST.

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#### CHAPTER CXXXVI.

#### LORD CANNING'S VICEROYALTY.

ON the first day of November, 1858, amidst the booming of guns and the cheers of assembled multitudes, illuminations, and other demonstrations of rejoicing, it was announced throughout India that the hundred years' reign of the Honourable East India Company had ceased, and that her Majesty Queen Victoria had taken upon herself the government of the British territories in Hindustan. The Governor-General, by proclamation from Allahabad, summoned all men, of every race and class, who, under the administration of the Company, had joined to uphold the honour and power of England, to assist, with their whole heart and strength, in fulfilling the gracious will and pleasure of the Queen as set forth in her Royal Proclamation, calling, in words full of benevolence and mercy, upon all her subjects for their faithfulness and true allegiance. The Proclamation was a message of grace and peace, granting pardon to all but the worst offenders, promising to the princes of India a scrupulous maintenance of treaties and engagements, and repudiating any desire for the extension of territory, enjoining the fullest toleration and protection in matters of religious faith and observance, granting the admission of qualified natives to offices in the public service, declaring to the natives at large respect to and protection in their ancient rights and usages, especially those connected with their ancestral holdings, and binding the Crown to a faithful and conscientious discharge of the duties of government.

The following is the text of the Queen's Proclamation :—

“PROCLAMATION BY THE QUEEN IN COUNCIL  
TO THE PRINCES, CHIEFS, AND PEOPLE  
OF INDIA.

“*VICTORIA*, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

“Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company,

“Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful, and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter, from time to time, see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

“And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and counsellor, Charles John, Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-General in and over

our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our Principal Secretaries of State.

“And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

“We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part.

“We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and, while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

“We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

“Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.

“And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

“We know, and respect, the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India

regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

“We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field: we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

“Already, in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:—

“Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been, or shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

“To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in apportioning the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

“To all others in arms against the government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

“It is our royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next.

“When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our

earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

Though, as stated at the conclusion of vol. ii. p. 773, the last spark of rebellion expired with the removal of the notorious Tantia Topi, the services of the troops were still required in the field. Towards the close of 1859 the Begum of Oude and the Nana Sahib, after spending a wretched existence in the gorges of Nepaul, were completely defeated by the Nepaulese under Sir Jung Bahadur, the Regent of Nepaul, acting in concert with a column under Brigadier Holditch. Beni Madho Singh fell in the battle, and the other leaders surrendered at discretion. At this point we may note the fate of the principal rebel leaders. The Begum and her son were allowed to reside at Khatmandu, but her alleged paramour, Mummu Khan of Lucknow, was imprisoned for life. The infamous Khan Bahadoor Khan of Bareilly expiated his crimes in March, 1860, in front of the Kotwalli at Bareilly, the spot where he had given the signal for murder. The Nana escaped. His death was announced in 1860, but two years later new movements were discovered, which were attributed to him, and it is not known with certainty whether he is dead or alive. Several persons have been arrested on suspicion of being the Nana, but in each case it has been found that a mistake had been made. The Rajah Jye Lall Singh was hanged for his complicity in the murder of numerous Europeans, but a greater criminal, the Nawab of Furruckabad, escaped the deserts of his guilt through his having surrendered under an indiscreet promise of pardon made to him by Special Commissioner Major Barrow, and the capital sentence recorded against him was commuted to one of perpetual banishment. The ex-Nawab elected to retire to Mecca. The ex-King of Oude was released from surveillance in 1859, and granted a pension of £120,000 per annum. The ex-King of Delhi was sent to Rangoon, where he died in November, 1862, and with him passed away the last vestige of the Mogul sovereignty in India. His grandson, the celebrated Feroze Shah, died at Bokhara in 1866. The Rao Sahib Peshwa, the old companion of Tantia Topi, was captured in

1863, and suffered the penalty of his crimes. "Many other rebels of less mark, who escaped death in the field or in the lonely forest, were caught, tried, pardoned, or punished according to their several degrees of guilt. Towards all but murderers of the deepest dye British resentment became placable enough. A few hundred wretches had to linger out their forfeit lives in the Andaman Islands; a few thousand worked out shorter terms of forced labour in the local gaols. Twice as many more, perhaps, were allowed to go free. But of the once powerful native army of Bengal, with its group of outside contingents, only a few weak regiments survived the mutiny, from which they had kept aloof. The waste of life among the disloyal remainder through wounds, hardships, judicial deaths, must have exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand in two years. Of rebels non-military the number slain in that period must have been yet greater, not to speak of those who perished wrongfully through the mistakes or the savage recklessness of their destroyers. Nor had the conquering party come out of the long struggle without cruel loss. Besides the dark list of men, women, and children slain directly or indirectly by the mutineers, a whole army of fighting Englishmen had succumbed to the wasting influences of a struggle in which numbers, climate, position, everything seemed against them save their own unconquerable pluck."\*

But while justice and mercy were thus dealt out to offenders, honours and rewards were freely distributed among all who had done good service during the mutiny. The Governor-General was created Earl Canning; Sir John Lawrence, General Wilson, and Sir James Outram were made baronets; Sir Colin Campbell was raised to the peerage as Lord Clyde; and numerous officers, both civil and military, received the Order of the Bath. All the soldiers who served in the siege of Delhi or in the defence of Lucknow were allowed to reckon an extra year's service towards their pension. Grants of land, offices, or pensions were bestowed on many persons, both English and native, who had deserved well of the Government, and every native known to have saved English life or property received his reward. The services of the native chiefs and princes who remained loyal were amply acknowledged. The Nizam, who had rendered the Government the most important assistance, had his debt to the State of sixty-five lakhs wholly remitted, and a territory yielding an annual revenue of fourteen lakhs ceded to him in return for cer-

\* *Trotter's History of the British Empire in India.* London: W. H. Allen & Co.

tain lands on the Godavery worth twenty thousand rupees a year. His worthy minister, Salar Jung, was also handsomely rewarded. Sindiah, the Maharajah of Gwalior, received an addition of territory of the value of three lakhs, with various exemptions; and his "faithful, fearless, and able minister," Dewan Dinkur Rao, was presented with a confiscated estate, free of revenue, in perpetuity, yielding a yearly rental of five thousand rupees. The Gaikwar obtained a remission of the tribute or subsidy of three lakhs annually, which he was bound to pay for the support of a force of irregular cavalry. To the Maharajah of Jaipur, who refused to surrender to the rebels the British officers in his capital, was granted the pergunnah of Kote Kasim, formerly an appanage of the King of Delhi; to the Rajah of Patiala a cession of territory worth two lakhs of rupees; and to the Maharajah of Nepaul the restoration of a strip of territory adjoining his frontier which had been ceded to the British Government in 1816. Numerous other chiefs received special rewards. But a reward still more gratifying to the native princes was the assurance given to many of them that, in the event of failure of direct heirs, the British Government would recognise, as chiefs of their several houses, the heirs adopted by them in accordance with the law and with the usages of their respective families. This assurance was publicly conveyed by the Governor-General to the Maharajahs Sindiah and Holkar, the Maharajah of Rewah, the Maharajah of Cashmere, to the great chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States, and to others of less note. But Lord Canning considered that this concession should be extended, and that the time had come when some rule might be announced, in regard to succession to native states, "more distinct than could be found either in our own previous practice or in that of former paramount powers of India."

"A time," he wrote, "so opportune for the step can never occur again. The last vestiges of the royal house of Delhi, from which, for our own convenience, we had long been content to accept a vicarious authority, have been swept away. The last pretender to the representation of the Peshwa has disappeared. The crown of England stands forth the unquestioned ruler and paramount power in all India, and is, for the first time, brought face to face with its feudatories. There is a reality in the suzerainty of the sovereignty of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt, but eagerly acknowledged, by the chiefs. A great convulsion has been followed by such a manifestation of our strength as India had never

seen; and if this, in its turn, be followed by an act of general substantial grace to the native chiefs, over and above the rewards which have already been given to those whose services deserve them, the measure will be reasonable and appreciated.

"Such an act of grace—and, in my humble opinion, of sound policy—will be an assurance to every chief above the rank of jaghirdar who now governs his own territory, no matter how small it may be, or where it may be situated, or whence his authority over it may, in the first instance, have been derived, that the paramount power desires to see his government perpetuated, and that, on failure of natural heirs, his adoption of a successor according to Hindu law (if he be a Hindu), and to the customs of his race, will be recognised, and that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to him, so long as his house is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of the treaties or grants which record its obligation to the British Government.

"The proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to right such serious abuses in a native government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming temporary charge of a native state when there shall be sufficient reason to do so. This has long been our practice."

In accordance with this recommendation, the right of adoption was recognised in all chiefs above the rank of mere jaghirdars, and even these were, in certain cases, to be permitted to exercise the much-coveted privilege. "The safety of our rule," says Lord Canning, "is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of native chiefs well affected to us."

The famous proclamation issued by Lord Canning on the re-conquest of Oude has been referred to in vol. ii. p. 773. By it he rewarded a few faithful talukdars with a perpetual confirmation of their estates, and declared that, with those and similar exceptions, "the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as it might seem fitting." "Within little more than a month after the capture of Lucknow almost all the large talukdars of Oude had tendered their allegiance—by letter, by 'vakeel,' or in person. . . . In proportion as the masterly arrangements of Sir Colin Campbell restored our military possession of the province, no difficulty was found in convincing the people that our 'confiscation of the proprietary right in the soil' was perfectly consistent with a resettlement on liberal conditions, according as

their conduct might deserve. The principle on which this re-settlement proceeded was that indicated by Sir James Outram. The events of the rebellion were assumed as proving that the village communities were too feeble, and too broken by the oppressions to which they had been so long exposed, to enable them to hold that position in Oude which had been given to similar communities in the Punjab and in our own north-western provinces. The alternative was to lean more on the talukdars as the responsible landholders, and to give a more general and more extended recognition to their authority.\*

In pursuance of this policy, Lord Canning, towards the close of 1859, revived the Talukdari system, with such restrictions as might protect the rights of the occupiers and cultivators of the soil. The following extract from the *sunnud*, or charter, conferring the estate, shows the conditions of the grant:—"This sunnud is given you in order that it may be known to all whom it may concern that the above estate has been conferred upon you and your heirs for ever, subject to the payment of such annual revenue as may from time to time be imposed, and to the conditions of surrendering all arms, destroying all forts, preventing and reporting crime, rendering any service you may be called upon to perform, and of showing constant good faith, loyalty, zeal, and attachment to the British Government, according to the provisions of the engagement which you have executed; the breach of any one of which at any time shall be held to annul the right and title now conferred on you and your heirs. It is also a condition of this grant that you will, so far as is in your power, promote the agricultural prosperity of your estate, and that all holding under you shall be secured in the possession of all the subordinate rights they formerly enjoyed. As long as the above obligations are observed by you and your heirs in good faith, so long will the British Government maintain you and your heirs as proprietors of the above-mentioned estate."

In a magnificent durbar held at Lucknow on October 25th, Lord Canning addressed the talukdars in a speech which conveyed in lucid and forcible language the future policy of the British Government with regard to India:—

"Talukdars of Oude! I am glad to find myself in your country, and amongst you, and to have this opportunity of speaking to you in the name of the Queen your sovereign."

"A year has not passed away since this

\* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, by the Duke of Argyll.

province was the seat of anarchy and war. The conduct of its people had been such that the Government was compelled to lay a heavy hand upon it. But peace and order are now restored to every corner of Oude, and I am come to speak to you, not of the past, but of the future.

"You have all of you who are here present received yesterday the grants of those estates which the Government has restored to you."

"You will have seen by the terms of those grants that the ancient Talukdari system of Oude is revived and perpetuated."

"Be assured that so long as each one of you is a loyal and faithful subject and a just master his right and dignity will be upheld by me and by every representative of your Queen, and that no man shall disturb them."

"You will also have seen by those grants that the same rights are secured on the same conditions to your heirs for ever."

"Let this security be an encouragement to you to spend your care, and time, and money upon the improvement of your possessions."

"As the Government has been generous to you, so do you be generous to those who hold under you, down to the humblest tribes of the soil. Aid them, by advances of money and other indulgences, to increase the productiveness of the land, and set them an example of order and obedience to your rulers."

"Let this same security in your possessions encourage you to bring up your sons in a manner befitting the position which they will afterwards occupy as chiefs of Oude. Learn yourselves, and teach them, to look to the Government as a father."

By this measure Lord Canning conciliated Oude, and raised up a native landed aristocracy, whose interests are identical with those of the Government which in times of trouble they may be expected to defend. Lord Canning afterwards showed his further confidence in the talukdars by granting to some of them a limited revenue jurisdiction over their estates, and investing them with magisterial powers. The manner in which these duties were performed exceeded his lordship's highest expectations.

The transfer to the Crown of the government of India involved also the transfer of the Indian army. The native regiments that had behaved well during the mutiny, such as the Sikhs and those of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, were retained, but the treachery of the native regiments of Bengal prevented their restoration. In 1858 a commission was appointed to inquire into the whole circumstances relating to the reorganization of the army. Its report was pre-

sented in 1859, but little was done either in that or the following year in the way of reconstruction.

Meanwhile alarm was created by rumours of a mutiny among the late Company's European troops, the men who had but lately distinguished themselves by the invaluable service they had rendered in the repression and punishment of mutiny and rebellion. A feeling prevailed, especially among the younger soldiers, that they had not been dealt with justly in the transfer of their services from the Company to the Crown. They objected to their being handed over from one service to another like "a lot of horses." As they were enlisted by the East India Company, they maintained that they were entitled either to their discharge or to a fresh enlistment and a bounty. Lord Canning referred the matter to the law officers of the Government, who at once pronounced the claim of the dissatisfied soldiers to be legally inadmissible. The men declined to accept this decision, and loudly declared their intention not to submit to such treatment while the Pandies were pampered and petted. Mutinous meetings were held, and at Meerut, on the 2nd of May, many of the Bengal Artillery and 2nd Light Cavalry refused to appear on parade. Similar proceedings took place at Lahor, Gwalior, Barhampur, and Allahabad, and her Majesty's regiments manifested sympathy with their insubordinate comrades of the local army. Courts of inquiry were held during May to investigate the grievances of the men. After the proceedings of these courts had been laid before the Government, a general order was issued on June 20th, in which the Government declared itself satisfied that the objections of many of the men were founded on an honest conviction that their rights had been overlooked, and determined that, as it was desirable that there should not be "even an appearance of injustice done to any soldier," every non-commissioned officer and soldier in the three presidencies, who enlisted for the East India Company's forces, should, if he desired it, be allowed to take his discharge, and for that purpose be conveyed to England at the expense of the Government; but no one accepting his discharge under this order would be permitted to enlist into any regiment in India, whether of the line or of her Majesty's Indian forces. No fewer than ten thousand men at once accepted their discharge. The 5th Bengal Europeans, stationed at Barhampur, on account of their extreme disorderly conduct, were excluded from the operation of the order of discharge. The regiment continued to exhibit a mutinous

spirit, which culminated in open rebellion at Dinapur in the following year, after which it was disbanded. These proceedings directed fresh attention to the reorganization of the army, and the question became hotly contested between a large proportion of Indian statesmen and the Government at home, whether the British force in India should be reinforced by increasing the number of regiments of the line stationed in India, or by a large increase in the small local European force, whose service was confined to India. The latter course was strongly urged by the Governor-General, the Indian Council, and the Indian services generally. At length, in 1861, the Secretary of State for India carried his scheme of "amalgamation," by which the British portion of the Indian army became part of the Queen's army generally, and was required to take its turn at home and in the colonies like the rest. Three regiments of cavalry and nine of infantry were formed out of the old European forces, and officered by volunteers from the officers of the army in India, and the great mass of the old Indian officers were absorbed in a General Staff Corps and by service with the native regiments. The staff employment embraces all civil and political employments whatever, all military appointments on the general and personal staff, and the appointments of commandant, second in command, adjutant, interpreter, and quartermaster. The Artillery and Engineer corps were left to die out and become gradually blended with the corresponding services in the royal army. The native army was to be composed of 155 regiments, each consisting of about 600 privates and 90 non-commissioned officers, together with about 20 British commissioned officers to each regiment.

During 1859 and 1860 frequent employment was given to the troops of the Bombay Government by outbreaks of the turbulent Waghirs of Okamundel, a wild predatory tribe, who, having rebelled against the Gaikwar of Baroda, robbed and greatly oppressed the Hindus in the extreme point of the peninsula of Kattiawar, Gujarat. After they had plundered Dwarka, Verwada, and the neighbouring island, and several coasting craft, including vessels bearing the English flag, an expedition under Colonel Donovan was sent against them in the beginning of October, 1859. The first operations were directed against the fortress on the island of Beit, which was bombarded on the 5th, and next day a storming party was landed, but the breach was found impracticable, and the men were exposed to a galling fire of musketry from the walls, which had been extensively

loopholed for the purpose. The men were then withdrawn, and it was resolved to recommence the bombardment, when a white flag was hung out from the fort, but, the conditions of surrender not being accepted by the chief, the firing was renewed. Soon after dark, however, the enemy evacuated the place. The unsuccessful assault occasioned to our troops the serious loss of two officers and twenty-two men killed, and two officers and forty-five men wounded. The troops next proceeded to Dwarka, which, after several days' cannonade and some ineffectual sorties on the part of the enemy, was evacuated on the 1st of November. After plundering on their way the village of Ravana, the Waghirs assembled in large numbers on the hills behind Porbandar, whence they made raids upon the surrounding country. On December 18th Major Honner found them posted from one thousand to two thousand strong in a fort on what was previously deemed an inaccessible peak of the hill Abhpurah. Here they had gathered themselves together, with their wives and children, as if determined to make a glorious ending of the campaign. They were, however, resolutely attacked both in front and rear, and after a gallant resistance the fort was taken, with a loss to the British of sixteen killed and forty wounded. When the rebels found they could no longer avoid a hand-to-hand fight, they tried to flee with their wives and children to another place of refuge, but their retreat was cut off by Captain Walker, who made prisoners of upwards of six hundred of them. The remnant of the insurgents ultimately retired into the Geer, a dense forest in the south-west corner of Kattiawar, from whence they harassed the districts of the Gaikwar. The most serious of their outbreaks after their defeat at Abhpurah was in October, 1860, when they suddenly dashed out from the Geer and surprised the town of Korinar, where, in addition to the plunder of the shops, they possessed themselves of some hundreds of Enfield rifles, several pieces of artillery, and a large sum of money, after which they dispersed themselves among the surrounding jungles, where they were hunted down by detachments of infantry mounted on camels.

Much about the same time it was found necessary to dispatch a force against the Wuziris of the hills bordering on the Punjab frontier, to exact satisfaction for the murder of a British officer.

Captain R. Mecham, of the Bengal Artillery, commandant of the battery at Banu, having been appointed private secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, left the station by dawk for Kohat on the

evening of November 5th, 1859. He was armed with a Colt's revolver, and was escorted by two police sowars, armed with carbines and swords. When near Luttamur, a post in the Kohat district, about sixteen miles from Banu, the doolie was attacked by a party of five Wuziris, who had been skulking behind some bushes close to the road, and Mecham, left alone to struggle with his murderers, was almost immediately cut to pieces. Immediate measures were taken to avenge this barbarous outrage. Captain Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, proceeded to one of the frontier posts, and summoned the Wuziri chiefs, of whom he demanded the surrender of the murderers. On their professing their inability to comply with this demand, Captain Henderson declared the Cabul Kheyl, the section of the tribe to which the leader of the murderers belonged, to be the enemies of the British Government, and that they would be proceeded against accordingly. Brigadier-General Chamberlain then marched against the Cabul Kheyl, and on December 22nd destroyed four of their largest encampments, seized all their stores of grain, and carried off five thousand sheep, three hundred head of cattle, and some camels. Upwards of twenty of the tribe were killed, and a much larger number wounded. The tribe then sued for mercy, and promised to use their best endeavours to capture the actual murderers, whose deed had brought ruin on them all.

In April, 1860, the general was again compelled to take the field against another division of the Wuziris, the Mahsuds, the most powerful section of them all, to avenge an attack made by them on the town of Tak, about fifty miles north-west of Dera Ismail Khan. Taking advantage of the absence of the Nawab of Tak, who had gone with the Commissioner to meet the Viceroy at Sialkot, the Mahsuds, several thousands in number, swooped down from their hills opposite Tak, and, according to immemorial custom, began to murder and plunder. On hearing of their arrival, the Resaldar Saadut Khan, of the 5th Punjab cavalry, hastily called in the detachments from the neighbouring posts, and on March 13th, with some two hundred sabres, he fell upon these mountain caterans, and drove them in rapid flight to their hills, leaving their principal mullick and two hundred and fifty bodies dead on the plain. Ever since the Daman had become the boundary of the Punjab these Mahsud Wuziris had not ceased to harass the border and commit injuries upon British subjects, merchants, and travellers. It was determined now to teach them a severe lesson. With a force of six

thousand men General Chamberlain entered the hills on April 17th, and advanced to Kot Shingi, which was burned, and some cattle captured. On the 20th Colonel Lumsden was left at Pullosin with one thousand six hundred infantry, one hundred sabres, and four field guns in position; while General Chamberlain made a flank movement in a westerly direction through the difficult Shahur defile, with the double object of surveying that country and punishing the Shingi, Navakhail, and Mullikhehye tribes for their raids along the border. Kot Shunhur was destroyed on the 21st, and on the 23rd the fort of Jungi Khan, situated at the head of the Burwund valley on a high scarp hill, and consisting of a centre keep, with four towers and good stone walls, was razed to the ground. Jungi Khan was the mullick who headed the movement on Tak and fell in the skirmish with Resaldar Saadut Khan. After destroying the property of the above-mentioned tribes, the general rejoined Colonel Lumsden on the 26th. During his advance the camp of the latter was suddenly attacked on the morning of the 23rd by three thousand of the enemy, who overpowered the pickets. About five hundred of them made their way to the camp, and did considerable damage among the cattle and camp followers, while the main body kept up a matchlock fire from the ridge. They were, however, speedily cleared out with great loss, and pursued for three miles over the hill. Ninety-two of the enemy were left on the ground, and forty fell in the pursuit, while the British had fifty killed and one hundred and fifteen wounded. On May 4th General Chamberlain attacked the Barrah Pass, which was held by from six thousand to seven thousand Wuziris, who fought bravely, but suffered severely. The united force then marched, and after taking and destroying Kanigoum and Mukim, the largest town of the Mahsuds, returned to the plains, bringing with them through the heart of the country enormous lines of camels carrying sixteen days' provisions. "In a military point of view the whole affair was not less brilliant, and has been not less successful, than the series of border raids by which in the last seven years we have tamed turbulent tribes, and converted marauding mountaineers into our faithful soldiers and feudatories. We penetrated into an unknown territory, farther than we have ever done before, terrified the only great tribe which had never been chastised, and added to our prestige in the eyes of other clans which had long witnessed the successful defiance by their neighbours of our power. The damage we inflicted on the Mahsuds is estimated at Rs. 1,40,000, a loss which it will take a savage tribe years to

recover. We have completely lifted the veil, for Major Walker succeeded in mapping the whole country most accurately and fully. Kanigoum, the settlement which we last captured, is more than seven thousand feet high. It belongs to the Patans known as 'Hurmur,' who are not Wuziris. In a raid into the hills the warfare is almost entirely of a guerrilla character, and there are opportunities for individual officers and soldiers distinguishing themselves by engagements almost as romantic and quite as valorous as in the Homeric battles. Several of these occurred, and for distinguished bravery six native soldiers have already been decorated with the Order of Merit. The gallantry of Captain Keyes deserves special notice. When in command of the infantry reserves in the action at the Barrah Pass he met a body of Mahsuds, who, flushed with a slight success, were rapidly descending the hill towards our position. Advancing several paces in front of his men, he met them alone, and cut down their leader with his own hand. The rest turned and fled, the reserves pursued them over the crest of the hill, and the key of the enemy's position was gained. The political results of the campaign are not so evident yet. . . . The Mahsuds, unaccustomed to the yoke, are a stiff-necked race of robbers. Meanwhile they are under strict blockade. They have a thriving trade in iron with our territories, and will feel the loss they sustain. . . . With their flocks and crops destroyed and their strongholds burnt, with opportunities for neither trade nor plunder, it is not likely that they will wait for us to pay them a second visit in the cold weather."\* By the middle of 1861 the *Friend of India*, just quoted, had the satisfaction of reporting that the Mahsud Wuziris, who ever since General Chamberlain's expedition had been "under blockade," had made their submission, and been readmitted to all the advantages of free intercourse with the British territory. "Instead of watching the British posts, matchlock in hand, from the neighbouring heights, the proud Wuziris are at this moment thronging our frontier marts, and exchanging the simple commodities of their hills—such as iron, wood, and matting—for the produce of European civilisation."

The hill tribes of Sikhim next demanded attention. In 1835 the Government, wanting a sanitarium for Bengal, offered to purchase Darjiling from the Rajah of Sikhim, who at first declined to take payment, but subsequently accepted three thousand rupees a year, which was afterwards doubled. All went on well till he appointed a dewan, who has been

\* *Friend of India*.

described as a bad specimen of the notorious Chinese Commissioner Yeh. At his instigation regular raids were made into British territory, and British subjects murdered or carried off without redress. At last even the Superintendent of Darjiling and Dr. Hooker were kidnapped, and were rescued only by troops sent to their assistance. In consequence of this the Rajah's allowance was stopped, and in 1850 a portion of his territory was annexed. In 1853 the Rajah abdicated in favour of his son, and since then the relations with Sikhim were on the whole peaceable, if not friendly, till the old dewan asserted his influence over the new Rajah, and the usual custom of massacre and plunder was again resorted to. Warnings, remonstrances, and threats were alike unavailing to procure satisfaction and reparation. At length aggression was brought to a climax, when, during the rainy season, in July, 1860, a native family was attacked, the father and mother cruelly maltreated, and their two young children carried off into captivity. Some of our ryots were also forcibly carried away by parties of these marauders. The restitution of the children and the ryots and the surrender of the criminals were promptly demanded of the Rajah by Dr. Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjiling. The children were recovered, but the Rajah refused to restore the ryots, or to deliver up the guilty parties. On this the Government authorised the occupation of a further portion of the Sikhim territory, and, on November 1st, Dr. Campbell, with one hundred sappers and one gun, marched into Sikhim, and took possession of about five hundred and fifty square miles of country lying to the north of the Rummam River and to the west of the Great Runjit River, and containing within its limits one of the loftiest peaks of the Himalayas, and valleys well wooded and watered. Dr. Campbell advanced as far as Richinkong, when his farther progress was arrested by an attack from a large number of Bhotias, who assailed his little force with great intrepidity. Three outlying pickets were also overpowered, and thirty native soldiers either slain or taken prisoners. Unable to make head against his assailants, who were rapidly increasing in number, Dr. Campbell entrenched himself, and sent to Darjiling for reinforcements. Major Maitland accordingly set out with a party of forty Europeans and twenty-five natives; but when he reached Goke, on the frontier, the coolies threw down the baggage and took to their heels. This somewhat delayed his march, and Dr. Campbell was obliged to fall back to Goke, which he reached on the morning of December 1st. Prepara-

tions were now made for a second expedition to Sikhim, under the command of Colonel Gawler, of her Majesty's 73rd regiment, accompanied by the Hon. Mr. Ashley Eden as political envoy. On January 30th, 1861, Colonel Gawler, at the head of one thousand men, advanced into the disputed territory, and on February 3rd a bridge of rafts was thrown over the Runjit, and the stockades abandoned by the enemy destroyed. The Rajah himself had fled into Tibet. On the march to Namchi the troops were fired at from a stockade, and one private and one officer wounded, arrows and bullets falling thickly; but before the party could double up the enemy had disappeared. Namchi was found deserted. The troops left on the 14th, and after fatiguing and harassing marches over the steep and rugged mountains, making dours on all sides without the enemy ever making a stand, crossed the Tista on March 3rd, and on the 10th arrived at Kabi, close to their capital, Tamlong. On the 12th Mr. Eden had an interview with the Rajah's son, whom his father desired to be considered the reigning authority, and who was attended by all the chief lamas, kajis, and other principal persons of the country. Arrangements were then made for a contribution of Rs. 7,000 towards the expenses of the war; for the delivery of the criminals and prisoners, some of whom had already been given up; for increased facilities for commerce between the British territories in Bengal and Tibet; and for the construction of a road by the Sikhim Government between the Tista and the Tibet frontier, the British Government to make another between the Tista and the Runjit.

In the beginning of February, 1860, the Kukis, a barbarous aboriginal race inhabiting the Tipperah Hills in the east of Bengal, suddenly descended from their heights, and attacked villages belonging to the British and the Rajah of Tipperah, destroying all before them. Thirteen villages were burnt, and fifteen more plundered, men, women, and children being killed without discrimination, and a large number of cattle destroyed. One hundred and eighty-five dead bodies were found, and many more were left lying in the jungle. Upwards of five hundred villagers were carried off into captivity, the robbers taking with them as many cattle as they could drive. The magistrate of Tipperah, having obtained troops from Dacca, succeeded in restoring confidence, and the people that had fled returned to their villages. The Kukis, however, were not allowed to remain unpunished. Towards the end of the year an expedition was organized against them, and in January, 1861, Captain Raban,

with a force of military police and armed peasantry, left Chittagong for the purpose of penetrating as far as possible into their country, and avenging the injuries they had inflicted. After placing a chain of posts at different important points to protect the inhabitants of the plains, the rest of the force, numbering about six hundred, followed the course of the river Kurnafuli as far as Burkal, where Captain Magrath, Superintendent of Hill Tribes, had for some time been engaged in endeavouring to bring together a body of coolies for the conveyance of stores. The number that he had been enabled to collect was, however, so small that it was found necessary to restrict the number of men who were to proceed into the enemy's country to two hundred and forty, with supplies for ten days. After marching four or five miles they crossed the river, and encamped in the jungle on the opposite bank. The path they followed led up the bed of a nullah, now and then diverging across some steep hills covered with dense bamboo jungle, through which they had to cut a way for themselves and their elephants. The latter they soon had to leave behind, for the road got worse and worse at every step, and it was only by scrambling and clinging to bamboos that the men were enabled to get on at all. After a few days the force surprised a party of the enemy, who, with all their goods and chattels, were on their way to join a chief called Ruttun Puea. At sight of the troops they all scampered into the jungle, leaving their property behind them. On the summit of a mountain called Ohepum a large village was found built on piles, which was looted and burnt. The advance was now greatly impeded by numbers of bayonet-shaped stakes, which had been stuck into the road by the enemy. The troops, nevertheless, succeeded in reaching the large and substantial village of Ruttun Puea, which they destroyed, with its stores of grain and provisions. The main object of the expedition being now considered accomplished, and supplies failing, the troops fell back on Chittagong. On March 15th the Kukis attacked a position commanding a ford over the river Copalong, where forty of the military police had been left under a jemadar. Ten of these had gone with Captain Magrath to inspect some villages that had been plundered, and of the thirty left ten were sick. After six hours' firing kept up by the Kukis, they retired, and were caught by Captain Magrath returning, who, though their number was fifteen to his one, immediately charged them, drove them across the river, and pursued them for ten miles, the chase ending only when night came on. The enemy suffered severely in killed and wounded, and nearly all the captives they

had taken were recovered. Next day another party went out, and captured a considerable quantity of loot and several stands of arms. One important result of the Kuki expedition was the survey by Mr. Moran of the unexplored country through which flow the Kurrafuli and Kasalong rivers. Five ranges of hills, from four hundred and fifty to two thousand feet high, run from south-west to north-east. About twelve miles east of Ruttun Puea's tribe is the great Howlong range, estimated at about four thousand feet high. The rivers can be used by boats of small burden all the year round. There are no roads among the hills. Amongst the trees of the forests is found a variety of the bamboo which contains between the joints pure drinkable water. The soil is poor, but cotton is grown on the hill-tops and on the banks of the rivers.

These frontier raids, to use the words of Lord Dalhousie, are, and must be, viewed as events inseparable from the society which for centuries past has existed among the mountain tribes. They are no more to be regarded as interruptions of the general peace in India than the street brawls which appear among the every-day proceedings of a police court in London are regarded as indications of the existence of civil war in England.

In the early portion of 1860 an agrarian insurrection broke out among the ryots, or peasants, of Lower Bengal, who had previously been looked upon as too spiritless even to murmur against oppression. The indigo planters had been in the habit of advancing sums of money to the ryots for the purchase of seed and the maintenance of their families, to be repaid by indigo plant at certain fixed prices. The cultivation of indigo being less profitable than that of rice and other seeds, the ryots not unfrequently failed to implement their part of the bargain, while the planters sometimes took the law into their own hands. A feeling of antagonism between employers and employed was thus produced, which was fanned into a blaze by a widely circulated letter from Mr. Eden, the magistrate of Baraset, and approved of by the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Grant, which stated "that the ryots are to keep possession of their own lands, sowing thereon such crops as they may desire; that the police should take care that neither indigo planters nor other persons should interfere with the ryots; that indigo planters shall not be able, under pretence of the ryots having agreed to sow indigo, to cause indigo to be sown by the use of violence on the lands of those ryots; and that, if the ryots have indeed agreed to do so, the indigo planters are at liberty to sue them for the same in the civil court, the Fujdari

Court having no concern at all in that matter, for the ryots can bring forward numerous objections to their cultivating the indigo, and in respect of their denial of the above agreement." As was to be expected, this was interpreted by the inferior officials as an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's desire to check indigo-planting, and by the ryots as an authority to them to resist the fulfilment of their contracts with the planters. Believing themselves thus supported by the authorities, the ryots not only refused to grow any more indigo, but proceeded to acts of violence, destroying factories, plundering the rich, and coercing those of the well disposed of their own number who refused to participate in their proceedings. On this the Lieutenant-Governor, with a view to the removal of the false impression which had been produced, issued a notification declaring that it was always optional with ryots to take advances and to enter into contracts for indigo, or not to do so, as they might think best for their own interests—and in this matter they required no assistance beyond that of the law, which was equally fair to all parties. Still, if they did enter into such contracts lawfully, and of their own will, they must expect to be required to fulfil them; and, further, that if they should dishonestly refuse to act up to their engagements they would be liable to the lawful consequences of such misconduct. Notwithstanding this proclamation, outrages continued to increase, and it was found necessary to occupy the disturbed districts by bodies of military police; and, it being evident that a continuance of the strike would cause the utter ruin of the indigo trade, a Coercion Bill was passed, which provided that a ryot who should refuse to sow after having accepted advances might be fined five times the sum, and imprisoned, and that any person guilty of instigating such breach of contract, or of damaging growing crops, might also be imprisoned. At the same time a commission of inquiry was appointed to investigate the whole question. The presence of the military prevented any serious outbreak on the part of the ryots, who, however, could not be compelled to fulfil their contracts with the planters, and in consequence many of the largest concerns suspended operations, and indigo-planting in Lower Bengal almost ceased to exist. The undoubted cause of the indigo disagreement was the unprofitableness of the cultivation to the ryot, but in the beginning of 1861 the schism became complicated by the refusal of the ryots to pay their rents. Both ryots and planters clamoured against the Government, and the quarrel became embittered by the indiscreet publication and the free cir-

culatation by the Bengal secretariat of a satire on the planters called *Nil Durpan; or, the Indigo-planting Mirror*. This was a Bengali drama, intended to depict the indigo-planting system as viewed by the natives, and translated into English by a native to gratify a wish expressed by various Europeans. The translator was employed by the Rev. James Long, a missionary violently opposed to the planters. But it was not the planters alone who were reviled in this wretched production. The proprietors of the *Englishman* and *Hurkaru* journals were likened in the preface to "the detestable Judas," who "gave the great preacher of the Christian religion, Jesus, into the hands of odious Pilate for the sake of thirty rupees." The only Englishmen well spoken of were the missionaries, whose "bounty, mildness, and forgiving temper" filled the ryots with wonder, so that, comparing them with the indigo planters, they began to say to one another, "All bamboos are of one tuft, but of one is made the frame of the goddess Durga, and of another the sweeper's basket." The planters themselves were described as "the low people of Belata" (England), and as "the dregs of the Sahebs." The two planters introduced into the work are represented as committing the most horrible cruelties in order to compel the ryots to cultivate indigo. Mr. Long was tried for libel, and sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand rupees, and to undergo one month's imprisonment. The fine was immediately paid by a native gentleman, and, to the discredit of all parties concerned, the rest of the sentence was carried into effect. Mr. Seton-Karr, secretary to the Bengal Government, who had officially franked the ill-judged publication, made the *amende honorable* by an ample apology, in which he denied any intention of libelling the planters, towards whom he was personally well disposed. He looked upon the drama as nothing more than a popular exponent of native feeling, and as such worthy of the notice of the authorities, and of all desirous to become acquainted with the under-currents of native society. Since, however, the effect of the publication had been to create a strong feeling of irritation between Europeans and natives, he deeply regretted having in any way contributed to its circulation. Nevertheless he paid for his "unwarrantable assumption and indiscreet exercise of an authority which did not belong to him" with the loss of his office. These proceedings somewhat allayed the wrath of the planters, who ultimately gave higher prices for the indigo plant, and the strife and turmoil gradually died away.

During the latter months of 1860 and the

first six months of 1861 the north-western provinces were wasted by a famine such as India had not witnessed since the terrible visitation of 1837-38, when many thousands of natives perished miserably from starvation. The injury to the crops and the waste and wanton destruction of much that was in store during the rebellion, followed by a prolonged drought, caused a widespread dearth of food in the Northern Doab, especially around Meerut, Delhi, Agra, and Allyghur, where the soil had become baked to the hardness of iron, and agricultural efforts were completely paralyzed. Suffering, misery, and death from starvation followed. Crowds of women and children, presenting the most miserable and emaciated appearance, spread themselves over the jungles, sifting the earth for Gokhru thorns, or picking a few berries left on the bushes. Grain of the most unwholesome kind, which had been buried for years, was exposed for sale in the bazaars. Families wandered hither and thither in search of food, or laid themselves down by the wayside to die in want and despair. Herds and flocks disappeared from the land, destroyed from their owners' inability to feed them, or starved to death for want of herbage. Whole villages and districts rapidly became depopulated. Delhi lost its population as if by pestilence, and thousands died of starvation in the surrounding neighbourhood. In Travancor, also wasted by the famine, mothers offered their children for sale to save themselves and the rest of their offspring. Altogether upwards of one hundred thousand persons perished, and vast numbers were reduced to penury, while the loss of cattle and agricultural produce amounted to £3,250,000. Immediate measures were taken by the Government and by private individuals to mitigate this fearful calamity and relieve the suffering people. Remissions of land-tax were made to the amount of £370,000, and a large sum was expended in relief works. Upwards of £120,000 was remitted to India by the people of England, and the English in India, forgetting the horrors and cruelties of the mutiny, gave freely money, food, and clothing to all who stood in need. Relief-houses were established in the famine districts, and on an average eighty thousand persons were daily relieved. Those who could work were required to give their labour in return for aid in money, and one hundred and forty thousand were daily employed on relief works. Emigration was also encouraged, and about half a million of persons removed either to foreign states, or to other parts of British territory. At length, in June, the rain came in a heavy and continuous downfall, which changed the face

of the country. Population seemed called into existence as by a wizard's wand, and every acre of ground was brought under the influence of the plough. A bounteous harvest followed, and the dread of further famine gradually died away.

Unfortunately the famine was followed by cholera, to which the enfeebled natives of the Doab fell an easy prey. At Lahor upwards of five hundred Europeans succumbed to its attacks. Thence it spread to Cabul, where within a few days several thousands perished. Peshawar, Kobat, and various other places suffered severely during the summer; and towards the end of 1861 the pestilence broke out at Bombay, and afterwards appeared in many parts of that presidency, especially in the malarious province of Gujarat, while several places in the Deccan, intermediate between Bombay and Madras, also suffered.

Among those whose efforts were employed in the mitigation and relief of the misery caused by the famine none was more prominent and energetic than Colonel Baird Smith of the Engineers. When signs appeared of coming famine, his intimate knowledge of the districts likely to be affected led him to predict its probable extent, and to suggest remedial measures. His communication to the *Friend of India* on the famine and its palliatives was adopted by the Calcutta Committee as their appeal, and roused England to efforts for relief. His exhaustive reports on the famine districts, and the measures he suggested for the prevention of similar calamities, proved of invaluable service to the Government. But his exertions during his tour of the afflicted districts, amidst the heats and rains of so severe a season, brought on a disease of which he died at sea a few days after leaving Calcutta on his way home. Previously to the famine, Colonel Smith, who was the son of a country doctor at Lasswade, in Scotland, and son-in-law of the exquisite writer De Quincey, had greatly distinguished himself in the completion and administration of the canal and irrigation system of the north-west provinces, in the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns, at Rurki on the outbreak of the mutiny, and still more at the siege of Delhi. (See vol. ii. chap. cxxxi.)

By the summer of 1859 the financial embarrassments of the Government of India were such as to call for the most anxious consideration. Before the mutiny the debt of India amounted, on April 30th, 1857, to £59,462,000, and the interest to £2,525,000. The military expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, came to £12,561,000. In 1857-58 the general expenditure was £40,226,000, and the revenue £31,706,000, leaving a de-

ficiency of £8,520,000. In 1858-59 the expenditure was £48,500,000, and the revenue £33,800,000, leaving a deficiency of £14,700,000, and making a total deficiency for the two years of £23,220,000, or two-thirds of the entire revenue for one year. To fill up this terrible gap recourse was had to loans, and the sums borrowed during these two years amounted to £22,118,000, of which £11,562,000 were raised in England and £10,556,000 in India. By April 30th, 1859, the debt of India had increased to £81,580,000, the interest being £3,564,000, and the military expenditure had risen to £25,849,000, or more than double that of 1857. For 1859-60 the total deficiency was calculated at twelve millions and a half, and by the close of 1860 the debt would amount to £95,836,000, with a burden upon the revenue for interest amounting to £3,900,000. Towards the close of 1859 the Right Hon. James Wilson, editor of the *Economist* and Secretary to the Treasury, a gentleman versed both theoretically and practically in all matters relating to finance, was sent by her Majesty's Government to Calcutta, to take the revenue and financial department under his charge. On February 18th, 1860, Mr. Wilson made an exposition of his budget before the Legislative Council of Calcutta. He showed that the mutiny had cost the sum of forty millions, involving an increased annual charge of two millions in interest. He eulogized the principles on which the war had been carried on, every service having been paid for and every claim met, and believed that the future historian would give credit to Lord Canning for the calmness and consistency with which he had pursued his course and policy. The present position of India was worse than that of any British possession ever had been, and it was not to be endured that the practice should be continued of meeting annual deficits by open loans. The deficiency for the current fiscal year he calculated at upwards of nine millions, and to make good this deficit his principal proposals were the imposition of an income-tax, a duty on tobacco, and another on trade and professional licenses. The income-tax scheme was received with great opposition, and was violently attacked by Sir Charles Trevelyan, the new Governor of Madras, who indiscreetly published a confidential minute on the subject in the local papers, and was recalled by the Home Government. Notwithstanding all objections, however, the income-tax was passed, to continue in force from the 31st of July until the 1st of August, 1865. The two other duties and other measures recommended by Mr. Wilson

were either delayed or set aside by his untimely death, which took place on the 11th of August. The work begun by Mr. Wilson was ably carried on by his successor, the Hon. Samuel Laing, M.P. for the Wick Burghs. The deficit at the close of 1860-61 amounted to £6,000,000, which Mr. Laing proposed to meet, first of all, by a reduction of the military estimates by three millions and a half. During the year the cost of the Indian army had been five millions and a quarter more than in 1856, previous to the mutiny. The native army was now reduced to 150,000 fewer than in the previous year, and was to remain at 140,000, the European force being left unchanged at 70,000. The permanent annual expense under the head of military charges would amount to a little more than twelve millions. A saving of £319,000 was effected in charges for the Indian navy, regarding which Mr. Laing observed that the whole fleet could scarcely stand against one broadside of a modern ship of the line, and it would be absurd for an embarrassed Government to keep up a navy "merely for the name of the thing." The navy was finally abolished in 1862. In the civil administration a saving was also effected, but this was comparatively small, owing to the increased cost of opium, salt, and income-tax, and the necessity of affording temporary relief to the extent of £150,000 to the starving population of the north-western provinces. The total reduction under all heads amounted to almost £3,600,000, the total expenditure for 1861-62 being estimated at £41,554,699, as against £45,154,449 in the previous year. At the same time there was an increase in the receipts of two millions (£2,008,864), the total revenue being estimated at £41,294,595, as compared with £39,285,731 in 1860-61. The deficit was thus reduced to £260,104, but as a sum of £500,000 was assigned to civil works in excess of the previous year's expenditure, there was a surplus of £239,896, because that half million was to be defrayed, not from the public treasury, but from local taxation. It was quite reasonable, said Mr. Laing, to expect in future years still better results, and with continued perseverance in further reductions, it would not be necessary hereafter to bring out English Chancellors of the Exchequer, or, if English chancellors came, they would not need to cudgel their brains and expend their energies in inventing new taxes or finding out new sources of revenue.

A scheme for a new Paper Currency which had been advocated by Mr. Wilson as a measure calculated to greatly further the development of the resources of India and the promotion of its commercial interests,

after being moulded into practical shape by Mr. Laing and Sir Charles Wood, came into operation on March 1st, 1862, when the privilege of issuing notes so long enjoyed by the three presidency banks ceased, and new notes bearing the imprimatur of the Government of India, and as low in value as ten rupees, were for the first time issued as a legal tender.

Mr. Laing's budget for 1862-63 was brought forward in April, 1862, and its results are thus summed up by himself. "The year 1860-61 closed a long series of deficits with one still estimated at £6,000,000, and which in reality was upwards of £4,000,000. 1861-62 sees this deficit extinguished by a reduction of £5,000,000 of expenditure effected within twelve months in a total expenditure of £29,000,000, open to revision. Further reductions and continued buoyancy of revenue find us in 1862-63, notwithstanding the remission of the license-tax and a large increase of outlay on opium and public works, with a surplus of £1,428,623. We apply this surplus, first, in further augmenting by £524,813 the grants for public works and education; secondly, in reducing to the normal rate the exceptional import duties imposed on manufactures; thirdly, in relieving two-thirds of the payers of income-tax from all further assessments. We close the year 1861-62 with a cash balance of £17,690,000. We have every reason to believe that our estimates are on the safe side, and that we shall close the year 1862-63 with at least an equal balance. This is the simple state of facts laid before you without exaggeration or embellishment." Regarding this and the preceding budget disputes arose between Mr. Laing and Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, which led to the resignation by the former of his office as Financial Councillor of the Governor-General. Sir Charles complained of the extreme inaccuracy of the accounts transmitted from India, the errors in which were briefly these. The probable deficit for 1861-62 was stated at £122,189, but there was an omission of £473,324 for "loss by exchange" arising out of the rate at which the rupee is taken in the accounts with the railway companies, viz. 2*d.* in the rupee—an omission which made the real deficit of the year not £122,189, but £595,513. The same item was omitted in the budget for 1862-63, and might be taken at £458,333. Besides this, Mr Laing included as part of the year's income £529,446, repaid by the imperial treasury for charges connected with the China expedition and advances in India on account of the imperial government. By these corrections Mr. Laing's estimated surplus of

£1,428,693 for 1862-63 became reduced to £440,914, while his surrender of customs revenue to the amount of £475,000, and of income-tax amounting to £250,000, with an increased outlay of £526,453 on public works and education, turned this surplus into a deficit of £810,539. Sir Charles showed that the finances of India during the last three years had really been as under:—

Year.	Revenue.	Charge.
1860-61	£42,903,000	£46,924,000
1861-62	42,911,000	43,506,000
1862-63	42,971,000	43,255,000

There was thus a deficit of revenue in each year, which Sir Charles expected would disappear at the end of the last-named year, as a sound system of Indian finance was being approached.

The Legislative Council, first established in 1833, as distinct from the Executive Council, and enlarged in 1853 by the addition of representatives from the minor presidencies, had proved its incapacity to perform the functions of a representative body for the whole of India. It had been characterized by Lord Grey in the House of Lords as "a miserable farce," and Lord Ellenborough had declared that it was inconsistent with the honour, the dignity, and the strength of the Government of India. It was, therefore, remodelled in 1861. The number of members was increased, of whom a certain proportion were Europeans or natives, not members of the Government, with power to pass laws and regulations for the whole of India; but the initiative in all legislative proceedings was reserved to the Government. Smaller councils similarly constituted were established in Madras and Bombay, but their power was restricted to the making of laws and regulations on local subjects only. The Governor-General was by the new act empowered to constitute similar councils in the north-west provinces and in other parts of India, and power was also given him to act on his own authority in cases of emergency. Among the first non-official members of the viceregal council were the Maharajah of Patiala, Rajah Dinkar Rao, Sindia's late minister, and Deo Narain Singh, Rajah of Benares.

Another important measure of reform was the amalgamation of the Supreme and Sadr or County Courts, instead of which justice was to be administered by a High Court at the capital of each presidency, presided over by a chief justice appointed by the Crown, with a certain number of assistant judges, of whom one-third were to be barristers of five years' standing, and one-third covenanted

civil servants of ten years' standing and three years' service as district judges. Natives were eligible for these courts, and the judges were to go on circuit to hear appeals and try cases, civil or criminal, reserved from the lower courts. This latter provision satisfactorily removed the chief objection made to the amalgamation by Europeans, who feared that they would be deprived of English law and be subjected to Mofussil judges, as a rule, completely ignorant of even the rudimentary principles of law. About the same time a new Penal Code was established, accompanied by a new Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Civil Service of India was thrown open to any one who could pass the requisite examinations after seven years' residence in India.

In June, 1861, the Queen, in order to afford to the princes, chiefs, and people of her Indian empire a public and signal testimony of her regard, to commemorate her assumption of the government of India, and to enable her to reward conspicuous merit and loyalty, instituted a new order of knighthood, called "The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India." The order consists of the Sovereign, a Grand Master, who is to be the Viceroy and Governor-General of India for the time being, and twenty-five knights, together with such extra and honorary knights as her Majesty, her heirs and successors, shall from time to time appoint. The dignity of a Knight of the Order is to be conferred upon such native princes and chiefs of India as shall have entitled themselves to her Majesty's favour, and upon such of her British subjects as have, by important and loyal services rendered by them to the Indian Empire, merited her Majesty's favour. The insignia consist of a collar, badge, and star. The collar of the order is composed of the heraldic rose of England, two palm branches in saltire tied with a ribbon, and a lotus flower, alternating with each other, all of gold enamelled, and connected by a double golden chain. From an imperial crown, intervening between two lotus leaves, depends the badge, consisting of a brilliant star of five points, and hanging from it an oval medallion, with an onyx cameo profile bust of Queen Victoria, encircled by the motto, "Heaven's light our guide," in gold letters on an enriched border of light blue enamel. The investment badge is similar to the collar badge, but with the star, the setting of the cameo, and the motto all of diamonds. It is worn pendent from a ribbon of pale blue with white borders. The star of the order is a five-pointed star or mullet of diamonds on an irradiated field of gold. Around it, on an azure fillet bordered with gold, is the same motto in diamonds, the

whole encircled by wavy rays of gold. The first investiture of the order was held by the Queen in Windsor Castle on November 1st, 1861, the anniversary of the day on which her Majesty's proclamation was promulgated, whereby her resolution to take upon herself the government of India was notified to her Indian subjects. The Queen, as sovereign of the order, wore the mantle, which is of light blue satin, lined with white satin, and fastened with a cordon of white silk, with blue and silver tassels. On the left side was the star of the order. The Prince Consort and the Prince of Wales, having been nominated as extra knights, were first invested with the insignia of the order; after which General Viscount Gough, formerly Commander-in-chief of her Majesty's forces in the East Indies; Lord Harris, formerly Governor of the Presidency of Madras; the Maharajah Dulip Singh; General Lord Clyde, formerly Commander of her Majesty's forces in the East Indies; the Right Hon. Sir John Lawrence, Bart., lately Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; and General Sir George Pollock, received investiture. Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, Bart., lately member of the Council of the Governor-General of India, and Field Marshal Viscount Combermere, who had been nominated knights, were unable to be present. On the same day, at Allahabad, the Viceroy and Governor-General invested with the insignia of the order the Maharajah Sindia, the Maharajah of Patiala, the Secunder Begum of Bhopal, and the Nawab of Rampur. The attire of the Maharajah of Patiala attracted everybody's attention. It consisted chiefly of gold cloth on a green and scarlet ground. Round his neck was a double string of pearls hanging down almost to his waist, each pearl being quite round and as large as a sparrow's egg. His head-dress was a helmet made of gold studded with numerous precious stones, and ornamented in front with huge diamonds. The Begum of Bhopal wore a green kinkhob tunic, tight kinkhob pants, and a heavy cloth of gold round her shoulders and head, with a large gold brooch pinning it at the neck, and another at the waist, leaving the countenance quite open. She had no other ornaments about her person, save a pair of massive gold anklets on her feet, and was the only one of the knights-elect who wore gloves. After the ceremony the Governor-General explained the objects of the institution of the order, and addressed the newly invested knights as follows:—"It was the gracious wish of the Queen that, in the execution of her commands, nothing should be omitted which might serve to testify her Majesty's consideration for your Highnesses, who have, by your loyalty, con-

stancy, and good service, merited this mark of her royal favour, or which might tend to show respect to her Majesty's Most Exalted Order. I am satisfied that on your parts nothing will be wanting to uphold the high dignity of that Order, and that, enjoying the peculiar honour of being among the first selected members of it, you will continue to set before your fellow-countrymen a prominent example of cordial attachment and sympathy between the feudatory princes of India and the Crown of England." On the same day the Gaikwar of Baroda, and Holkar, Maharajah of Indor, were invested in their respective dominions, and during the month the Nizam of Haidarabad and the Maharajah of Cashmere received similar honour. Sir Hugh Rose had been invested by Lord Canning in the month of August.

Soon after the grand durbar held at Allahabad, Lord Canning's further progress in Upper India was cut short by the death of Lady Canning, which took place at Calcutta on November 18th. She had for some time been in indifferent health, and in the hope of amendment had tried the effects of a change to Darjiling, but her case was too desperate for so mild a remedy. In March of the following year the Viceroy himself bade farewell to India, after receiving addresses from all sections of society, and returned home to die three months later, June 17th, 1862.

Charles John Canning, third son of the celebrated George Canning, was born at Brompton in 1812. He was educated at Christchurch, Oxford, where, at the same time, were Mr. W. E. Gladstone and Lords Dalhousie and Elgin. He commenced his public life in 1836, when he entered the House of Commons as member for Warwickshire. On the death of his mother in the following year, he went to the Upper House. When Sir Robert Peel came into power in 1841, he was appointed Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which office he held till 1846, when he resigned with his party. As Postmaster-General under the government of Lord Aberdeen, he distinguished himself by his administrative capacity, and set on foot the practice of submitting annually to Parliament a report of the work, and especially the progress achieved by the Post-Office. During 1855 he was selected as successor to Lord Dalhousie. "The peculiar fitness of this selection lay in the fact that the Governor-Generalship was the destined prize of which George Canning had been balked. He had received the appointment, he was on the eve of starting for India, when Lord Castlereagh committed suicide, and the Foreign Office was left without a head. Canning, a compara-

tively poor man, gave up the chances of acquiring a fortune in the splendid post of Viceroy, in order to win a name for himself at home, and, perhaps, to reach the Premier-ship. He did win a name, and he did become first minister, but he died in the effort. These were events which Lord Palmerston, as a Canningite, could not forget, and Lord Canning, otherwise well qualified for the post, was appointed to succeed Lord Dalhousie. . . . In the year after he assumed office, the mutiny broke out, and he had to stem it as he could. Never has any Governor-General had to go through so fierce a trial. He had a fearful load of responsibility; for a moment the Indian Empire seemed almost lost. In Calcutta the European inhabitants were in the greatest consternation; and Lord Canning was accused of weakness and softness in dealing with the crisis. The Indian Empire was saved as by a miracle. It was saved by the firmness and the resolution of a very small band of men, chief among whom ranks Lord Canning. For a time even the friends of the Governor-General were in doubt as to the wisdom of his policy; but it is now confessed that in that terrible emergency he displayed extraordinary courage, great administrative and very great moral qualities. There are few finer things in modern history than the fact of his quietly remaining at his post after receiving Lord Ellenborough's outrageous despatch on the government of Oude. As he had before been accused of too much leniency to the natives, he was now accused—and that, too, by the Home Government, and in the most extravagant terms—of too much severity. After such a public rebuke, especially in the knowledge that it was undeserved, he could easily have escaped from the labour of a most arduous task—the pacification of India. He might have resigned, and let some new man undertake the work. He held on, however; he knew that, under the circumstances, resignation would be most embarrassing to the public service, and that no one could do the work of pacification so effectually as himself. He remained where he was, and he has had the satisfaction of seeing India once more happy and content, once more able to make the revenue meet the expenditure, once more promise to rise from its decay and to flourish in a new life. Having faced such unexampled dangers, having grappled with such enormous difficulties, and having accomplished such wonderful triumphs, Lord Canning came home, two months ago, for a little repose. The repose which he sought he has found in death." \*


\* *Times.*







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